Overall Score:

73 - Moderate

Legal Framework Score:

80 - Moderate

Actual Implementation Score:

65 - Weak

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

67

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

Comments:
Although there are at least 500,000 CSOs (possibly as many as 750,000) in Brazil, a very small number focus on governance and anti-corruption.

References:
Federal Constitution, Art. 5, items 17-18 guarantee freedom of association, barring only association for illicit purposes.

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.
1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

YES | NO

References:
There are no defined funding conditions.

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

NO: A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

References:
There’s no such requirement defined anywhere.

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

100

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.
References:
Art. 5, item 18 of the Constitution expressly prohibits getting authorization for creating an association.

100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

75:

50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
NGOs are systematically invited to give their opinions. Many of them belong to government-sponsored councils and similar organizations aimed at monitoring public policies, examining issues and/or proposing new legislation. They are frequent sources in the press.

References:
Constant appearances of NGO representatives discussing all sorts of issues in the media.

100: Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

75:

50: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

25:

0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:
Media (or lack thereof).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned related to work covering corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the p

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

References:
Media (or lack thereof).
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist’s work.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

References:
Media (or lack thereof).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed related to a corruption case in the specific study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual’s history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

88

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

Comments:
In order to become accredited (and thus actually representing workers before both employers and the Labour Justice), trade unions must fulfill a number of requirements. Just one Union can exist in a municipality representing a given trade. Thus, competing Unions cannot co-exist in the same municipality.

References:
Federal Constitution, Art. 5, item 17 guarantees freedom of association, barring only association for illicit purposes.

Decree-Law 5452/1943.

YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.
4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Trade Unions became quite irrelevant both politically and regarding labor matters due to economic stagnation. As for forming new trade unions, the bigger obstacles are pre-existing unions. This is a relevant issue because accredited trade unions are mainly financed by compulsory discounts took from workers’ salaries.

References:
Media.

100: Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

I-2. Media

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.
References:
Constitution, art. 5. numerous items. Art. 222 specifies that media concerns must be owned (controlled) by Brazilian citizens or by firms established in Brazil.

All legislation pertaining to public concessions (radio and TV) can be found here – [http://www.mc.gov.br/rtv/lei/default.htm](http://www.mc.gov.br/rtv/lei/default.htm)

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government is legally banned, or if any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, art. 5, items 4 and 9.

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form media entities?

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
However, local conditions might (and usually have) a strong influence on whether or not a newspaper or TV station will not find itself running against interference. Also, since in most states the local economy does not create enough advertising to support economically-independent media, most regional newspaper and radio/TV groups are dominated by the same oligarchies that dominate everything else. This is especially true in the Northeast, North, and Central Northern regions.

References:
Media (no reporting of barriers have been artificially created).
100: Media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system.

75:

50: Formation of media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

6b. In law, where a media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:
A radio/TV concession might be revoked for a number of administrative reasons (non-compliance with regulations), all of them subjected to administrative appeal. Appeal to Congress, as a last resort, is always possible.

References:
Power invested in Congress to deal with all radio-diffusion matters (Constitution, Art. 48, item 12) entails that appeals for revokement are dealt there.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied media license. A YES score is also earned if no license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
As a radio-diffusion license is subjected to Congressional approval, times tend to be lengthy.

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:
Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a media license at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Bureaucratic costs are reasonable, but lobbying Congress might be expensive.

References:
www.anatel.gov.br

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are the media able to report on corruption?

67

7a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | NO

References:
It is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure according to Article 220 (paragraphs 1 and 2) of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.
NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

7b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
This is almost impossible to answer. Since Brazil is an immense country, all sorts of people control the media. Most Brazilian regional media is controlled by oligarchies that exercise all sorts of pressures on their employees. More often than not, they steer the news they produce into this or that direction. However, if one considers so-called national media*, this is free from the federal government’s pressures and on the whole not subjected to undue internal pressures. Exceptions might occur.

References:
See, eg., Transparencia Brasil Deu no Jornal” (It Made the News) project (www.deunojornal.org.br), which collects and analyzes news on corruption published in 59 daily newspapers and 4 weekly newsmagazines. An average of 4.3 new cases of corruption are reported every day.

100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75:

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

25:

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

7c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint on publishing corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In many states and especially in municipalities, exercising political and economic pressures is commonplace. The concentration of the media at the hands of politico-economic oligarchies precludes independent reporting in most local media.

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:
The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. In countries where illiteracy is higher, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material.

8. Are the media credible sources of information?

8a. In law, media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

Comments: This is true for any enterprise. Of course, layers of subsidiaries might mask the true ownership of any firm, including those controlling the media.


YES: A YES score is earned if media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

8b. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments: The matter of journalists behaving according to a regulated code of conduct has been subject to heated debate. An attempt to promulgate a law regulating journalism as a professional activity failed in 2005. Media controllers are unanimously against it. Opinions are sharply divided among journalists.

In practice, even in the major media, individual journalists enjoy ample discretion and scant monitoring. This is a mixed blessing.

References: There’s no overall code of conduct for journalists.
Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

Editors and journalists are widely known to sell favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

There is an academic research group named Doxa that measures the press coverage and assesses its neutrality.

All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.
References:
There are no significant complaints regarding this issue. The subject was extensively covered in the media between August 8, 2004 and late September 2004. See Folha de S. Paulo, O Globo and O Estado de S. Paulo.

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content.

75:

50: The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

9. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

33

9a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:
Lack of reporting.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

9b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

Comments:
It is always healthy to keep in mind the immense size of Brazil. Cases (especially relatively mild ones) might happen locally and never be known outside a small town.
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

9c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

Comments:
Reporters Without Borders reports that, Known as ‘Jota Cândido’ to his listeners, José Cândido Amorim Pinto was gunned down on the morning of 1 July 2005 in Carpina...[Pinto was] a Carpina municipal council and presenter of an investigative programme for his radio station [and] often reported and commented about corruption cases on the air.”

References:
http://www.rsf.org/killed_2005.php3?id_article=14343

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual’s work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

I-3. Public Access to Information

10. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

10a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.
Comments:
However, access to information is not regulated. The availability of information varies immensely, notably in the executive branch.

The formulation of this group of questions does not adapt very well to the Brazilian situation. From experience, the Brazilian state provides incomparably more information than most other countries, especially in the federal sphere. It is not difficult to get information on judicial processes, for instance. All data is public. Most problems regarding access to information in the executive branch stem not from unwillingness to provide it, but from the fact that information is not properly gathered. Thus, indicators for government programs and actions are not available because they usually are not kept.

Government decisions are always public (barring secret codicils in treaties, for example), but some decision processes are not.

Overall, the scores given in this section will probably put Brazil in a bad light, when in fact it compares favorably with most countries. This stems from the way the questions are posed.

References:
Constitution, Art. 5, item 33.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access any government documents. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request. There should be a formal process for requesting this information.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

10b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

10c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.
Comments:
However, there are certain laws (such as e.g. law 8666/93 regulating public procurement) that specifically establish mechanisms.

References:
Access to information is not regulated.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

11. Is the right of access to information effective?

30

11a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
It depends on the institution. Generally, federal organizations either respond immediately or respond that the information does not exist. In states and municipalities, most simply do not respond.

References:
Access to information is not regulated.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

11b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.
Comments:
If a citizen encounters resistance when trying to access information, getting hold of it might entail protracted legal proceedings, which are always very expensive.

References:
Access to information is not regulated.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75: 

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25: 

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

11c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
If a citizen encounters resistance when trying to access information, getting hold of it might entail protracted legal proceedings, which are always very expensive.

References:
Access to information is not regulated.

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75: 

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25: 

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.
11d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

References:
Access to information is not regulated.

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

11e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

References:
Access to information is not regulated.

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.
Category II. Elections

II-1. Voting & Citizen Participation

12. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

12a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of that country. A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

12b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, several items. Law 9504/97.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

13. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?
13a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100

References:
No reporting of noncompliance.

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

13b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100

Comments:
Although there are critics, fraudulent tampering with electoral results have not been reported. However, those same critics (e.g. www.votoseguro.org) say that the Brazilian electronic voting procedures make it very difficult to detect fraud, because the systems are not properly audited. Lately, the argument that electronic voting should be paired with a printed ballot that would be deposited in a ballot box has strengthened. This would allow for comparison in case of a challenge. However, such a proposal does not answer to the following simple question: in the event of a disparity, how do you decide which type of voting was tampered with, the electronic or the paper?

References:
Voting is electronic.

100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

75:

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.
0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

13c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Always.

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

14. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

100

14a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
It is too easy to form political parties. A rule that will come into effect in 2006 will limit the representation of parties in Congress to those that get at least 5 percent of the overall congressional voting, distributed among at least nine states (one-third of the 26 states plus the Federal District), with a minimum of 2 percent in each. Parties might survive locally, if not nationally. All this will bring unfathomable consequences to the Brazilian party structure.

References:
Constitution Art. 17., Political Parties law, 9096/95.

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.
NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

14b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

14c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Same as before.

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

75:

50: Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

25:

0: Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

14d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.
### References:

Same as before.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0</th>
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</table>

### 100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

### 75:

### 50: Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

### 25:

### 0: Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

14e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0</th>
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</thead>
</table>

### References:

More than one.

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<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
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<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

### 75:

### 50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

### 25:

### 0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

---

II-2. Election Integrity
15. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

YES | NO

References:
A branch of the Judiciary is dedicated to the electoral process. Each state has its regional electoral tribunal and the whole system is headed by a federal supreme electoral court, which formulates each election's regulations and examines appeals. A Justiça Eleitoral e a Consolidação da Democracia no Brasil, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1996. See also www.transparencia.org.br/Source

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency or set of agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or set of agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police.

16. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

90

16a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
Sadek 1996 Justiça eleitoral; See also www.transparencia.org.br/Source

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies being contested in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no election monitoring agency.
16b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Since appointments to the higher courts are made by the President and approved by Congress, politicking is always present.

References:
Sadek 1996 Justiça eleitoral; See also www.transparencia.org.br/Source

100: Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

16c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Federal electoral justices are usually experienced in electoral matters, but in states judges are often not specialized.

References:
Sadek 1996 Justiça eleitoral; See also www.transparencia.org.br/Source

100: The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.
16d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

**Comments:**
Reporting comprises on-line accessible data on candidates (such as asset disclosure, donations and campaign expenditures, contest to candidacies, appeals and so on) and, of course, elections results. Since voting is electronic, results are made public within 24 hours, and in some states within a few hours of poll closing.

**References:**
www.tse.gov.br

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

**Comments:**
Punishing violations such as vote-buying or abuse of economic power has been been less difficult since the 2004 election.

**References:**
Sadek 1996 Justiça eleitoral; See also www.transparencia.org.br/Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

17. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

100

17a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
www.tse.gov.br

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost\(^*\) voting by non-existent voters is common.

17b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

| YES | NO |

References:
Law 9504/97.

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.
17c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

**Comments:**
It the 2004 municipal elections, it happened in the city of Campos, in the state of Rio de Janeiro.

**References:**
Media reports, Supreme Electoral Court's reports, regional courts reports.

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

17d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

**References:**
No reporting of incidents.

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

75:

50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:

0: The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overtly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or
17e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
Yes” and “No” answers to this question are not complementary. Not having an explicit reference doesn’t equate a prohibition.

**References:**
There’s no regulation explicitly allowing or disallowing it.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

17f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

**100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0**

**Comments:**
The OAS usually conducts observations in countries in the region and issues reports but only upon request (such as in Haiti, Ecuador, Nicaragua etc.). No one ever asked for an election report for Brazil. Delegations from the U.S. House Representatives and French Parliament also come to observe,* and also to comment, but they do not issue reports.

**References:**
Observers come to Brazil as a matter of course.

**100:** Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers’ activities.

**75:**

**50:** Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

**25:**

**0:** Election observers’ movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.
18. Are there regulations governing political financing?

YES | NO

Comments:
It's important to note that party finances are kept separate from election finances.

References:
Law 9096/95 regulates parties. Law 9504/97 regulates elections.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

18b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
An individual can donate up to 10 percent of his declared income to candidates. Donations to parties are not limited.

References:
Law 9096/95 regulates parties. Law 9504/97 regulates elections.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.
18c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
Firms can donate up to 2 percent of their annual revenue to candidates. Donations to parties are not limited.

References:
Law 9096/95 regulates parties. Law 9504/97 regulates elections.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on corporate contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to candidates or political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

18d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

Comments:
No such limits exist. Candidates must declare how much they will spend in an election, but this amount might be adjusted. Penalties are limited to very small fines.

References:
Law 9096/95 regulates parties. Law 9504/97 regulates elections.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

18e. In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
All contributions are made public after the elections. Beginning in 2006, candidates are required to report twice on the donations
they received, without identifying the donors, during the election campaign. Parties are not subject to such requirements. This allows for the obvious mechanism of parties getting financing and redistributing among candidates. This makes it more difficult to associate a donor with a candidate.

References:
Law 9096/95 regulates parties. Law 9504/97 regulates elections.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor’s name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

18f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:
Parties audit” each other. This leads to compromises: “If you look the other way, I will do likewise.”

References:
Law 9096/95 regulates parties. Law 9504/97 regulates elections.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

19. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

50

19a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual’s ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Individual (reported) donations are always kept within the legal limits. However, since the limits are expressed in terms of a percentage (10 percent) of the donor’s income, wealth individuals might exercise a decisive influence in an election, especially at the local level.
References:
Transparencia Brasil maintains project Às Claras (www.asclaras.org.br), where political financing is systematically analysed.

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

19b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company’s ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

Comments:
Corporate (reported) donations are always kept within the legal limits. However, since the limits are expressed in terms of a percentage (2 percent) of the firm’s revenues, firms might exercise a decisive influence in an election, especially at the local level. Some candidates own firms that donate huge amounts of money (albeit within the legal limits) to their owners’ campaigns.

References:
Às Claras (www.asclaras.org.br).
19c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party’s ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

Comments:
This is not really a matter of lack of specific regulation. Rather, it’s a matter of the ease of illegal monies flowing into political coffers. There are some who maintain that prohibiting private electoral financing and establishing a purely state-sponsored election financing structure would make illegal financing disappear (the reasoning is faulty, but nevertheless it got a lot of support). Since under-the-table financing is already illegal, how would prohibiting all private financing make the problem disappear? Illegal monies flow into elections because of the inefficiency of the tax-collecting apparatus to detect under-the-table monies amassed by firms and private individuals. Thus, the main problem of illegal electoral financing in Brazil is not electoral at all, but fiscal.

References:
Scandals involving political financing have dominated the Brazilian political arena in the last two years.

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

19d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.

References:
The entity regulating elections belongs to the judiciary, thus does not act ex officio. However, the Public Ministry has an electoral branch, which does initiate investigations. This justifies the score, since the Public Ministry is part of the judicial system.

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:
The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.

The Supreme Electoral Court is trying to establish a systematic relationship with the Internal Revenue Service to allow for closer monitoring of incompatibilities. This is a novelty, and the results will only be known after the October 2006 elections. Observe that this is limited to comparisons between declared donations and individual assets and firms’ declared revenues. It does not include auditing expenditures.

Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.
Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

20. Can citizens access records related to political financing?

50

20a. In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Candidates’ finances are available in the Internet. Party finances are not, they are only published in the Official Gazette.

References:
www.tse.gov.br

100: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

20b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Only electoral finances.
100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

Comments:
Electoral finances are readily available. Parties' finances are not.

References:
www.tse.gov.br, www.asclaras.org.br

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category III. Government Accountability

III-1. Executive Accountability

21. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?
21. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | NO

References:
Article 5, item 34b of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

22. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

75

22a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

Comments:
Policies must be reflected in the budget, which is submitted to congress and debated. As for day-to-day decisions, explanations are given, most often by ministers. The president rarely holds press conferences. Ministers are often required to make statements to congress and submit to questioning.

References:

Art. 48 of the Constitution establishes the right of Congress to summon ministers to submit explanations about their sphere of authority.

100: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

75:

50: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.
0: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely sensor such sessions.

22b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

Comments:
Any executive action is subject to judicial contest.

References:
Constitution, several items

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

22c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
It often happens.

References:
The Supreme Court website (www.stf.gov.br) reports every process.

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:
The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

22d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

Comments:
Provisional measures have been issued in increasing amounts by successive presidents. A provisional measure must be approved by Congress within 60 days of issuance, on pain of being nullified. In the meantime, whatever it states holds. Since many provisional measures define non-reversible regulations, Congress has no actual power to reverse them.

References:
Constitution, art. 62, allows the president to issue provisional measures.

100: The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

75:

50: The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25:

0: The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

23. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

100

23a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

Comments:
It never happened to a president. (A former president was impeached by Congress, but such procedure is political, not judicial.) Mayors are often prosecuted, governors, too, but less frequently.

References:
Constitution.
**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>23b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**
There is no exemption/immunity for ministers under the Constitution.

---

| **YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. |
| **NO:** A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials. |

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24. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
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</table>

**Comments:**
Disclosure forms are published in the Official Gazette. Asset disclosure is also required by the electoral law. See http://noticias.uol.com.br/fernandorodrigues/politicosdobrasil/, a comprehensive electoral asset-disclosure database.

**References:**
Law 8.730/93.

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| **YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. |
| **NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets. |

---
24b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
Asset disclosures are published in the Official Gazette (www.in.gov.br), which is published on the Internet, however the search engine is not user friendly. If the minister was elected, his or her asset disclosure is more easily available at the Electoral Court's website (www.tse.gov.br). See http://noticias.uol.com.br/fernandorodrigues/politicosdobrasil/, a comprehensive electoral asset disclosure database.

**References:**
Law 8.730/93.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

24c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
It excludes the president, but comprises 800+ high-level officials.

**References:**
Federal decree 1171/94.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

24d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).
YES | NO

References:
Federal decree 1171/94 does no provide for it.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

24e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

Comments:
It excludes the president.

References:
Federal decree 1171/94 establishes such restrictions to about 800 officials up to the ministerial level.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

24f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The Public Ethics Committee enforces quarantine. See http://www.presidencia.gov.br/estrutura_presidencia/cepub.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.
The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

References:
The Public Ethics Committee enforces limits for gifts and entertainment. See [http://www.presidencia.gov.br/estrutura_presidencia/cepub](http://www.presidencia.gov.br/estrutura_presidencia/cepub)

There's no provision for such auditing.
25. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

YES | NO

Comments:
Those that sustain that Art. 5, Item 33 (dealing with access to information) is to be taken without exception consider that all information held by the State is in principle accessible. Those that consider that privacy principles apply would say that assets constitute private information and may not be disclosed. However, the matter is in fact moot because the electoral law requires asset disclosure, and since the heads of state/government are elected, they must disclose the information to the Electoral Court, which in turn makes it public.

References:
Constitution, Art. 5, Item 33.

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

25b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

YES: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.
Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

In practice, is the ruling party distinct from the state?

The Executive freely appoints about 23,000 people to fill management posts in the administration and in state companies. Such power of political appointment is used to fill the spots with party cadre and is used to negotiate parliamentary support from other parties. The situation is the same in states. The score given to this question significantly differs from the score given in 2004, not because there were regulatory changes, but because the problem has become especially acute since 2003.
References:
Abundant reports in the media. See www.deunojornal.org.br.

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

50: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:

0: The government is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

III-2. Legislative Accountability

27. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

100

27a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution, several items.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

27b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.
References:
See www.stf.gov.br, the Supreme Court website, for numerous examples.

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

27c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

**YES** | **NO**

References:
Constitution, art. 5. But art. 102, item I, b, establishes that members of congress must be prosecuted in the Supreme Court.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.

28. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

**14**

28a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

**YES** | **NO**
Comments:
However, since these disclosures are not audited, there is widespread suspicion that they are often fictional. Also, asset disclosure does not include spouses and other close relatives.

References:
The electoral law requires that candidates fill an assets disclosure form.

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

28b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
No such provision exists.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

28c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:
No such provision exists.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.
28d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:
No such provision exists.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

28e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Not applicable.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

28f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.
### References:
Not applicable.

| 100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 75: |
| 50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed. |
| 25: |
| 0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions. |

| 28g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 |

### References:
Not applicable.

| 100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 75: |
| 50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets. |
| 25: |
| 0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices. |

### 29. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

100

| 29a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature. |
### YEs NO

**References:**
Constitution, art. 5, item 33.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

29b. In practice, citizens can access these records within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

29c. In practice, citizens can access these records at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The data is available online, but most Brazilians do not have access to the Internet.
References:

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

30. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

100

30a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, art. 5, item 33, and art. 37.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

30b. In practice, citizens can access these records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Lower House maintains a push system that emits an e-mail for subscribers every time something happens with a piece of legislation being deliberated.
100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

30c. In practice, citizens can access these records at a reasonable cost.

References:

Ditto.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

References:
Ditto.

III-3. Judicial Accountability

31. Are judges appointed fairly?
31a. In practice, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
High court justices (ministers) are appointed by the president and subject to approval by the senate. This process has been subject to increasing criticism.

**References:**
Constitution, Chapter III.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages.

**NO:** A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight.

31b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

**100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0**

**Comments:**
To be appointed to high court, the only requirements are the following: One must be a professional lawyer, aged 35-65 and have an unblemished reputation." These cannot be taken as “professional criteria.”

**References:**
Constitution, Chapter III

**100:** National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

**75:**

**50:** Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

31c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

32. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

75

32a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | NO

Comments:
In following with the Roman law tradition, Brazilian law is heavily procedural. For everything there’s a reason, however recondite.

References:
Penal and Civil Codes, penal and Civil processual Codes.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

32b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
All superior courts maintain Web sites where all decisions are published.
Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

32c. In law, there is an ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:
Although dubbed by some as external control, it cannot possibly be considered an ombudsman, since it is exclusively formed by members of the judicial profession (lawyers, judges and public prosecutors) and is presided over by the president of the Supreme Court. Although not autonomous from the judiciary and even less independent, the National Justice Council has performed well in disciplining some aspects of the judiciary, such as nepotism (which in itself is just a by-product of the prerogative of judges to hire individuals to serve in tribunals).

References:
Constitutional amendment # 45 (2004) established a National Justice Council with oversight duties toward the judiciary.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a ombudsman or equivalent mechanism for the judicial system. A judicial ombudsman is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a judicial ombudsman.

32d. In law, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
As an offshoot of the Judiciary, it is automatically protected from executive interference.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial ombudsman is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative or judicial branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial ombudsman. A NO score is given if the judicial ombudsman function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry or legislative committee.

32e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) initiates investigations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The CNJ rules over the entire judiciary, but it has no investigative powers such as those that characterize law-enforcement agencies.

References:
Not applicable.

100: The ombudsman aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The ombudsman is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The ombudsman will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The ombudsman, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The ombudsman rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the ombudsman is partisan in its application of this power.

32f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Although not autonomous from the judiciary and even less independent, the National Justice Council has performed well in disciplining some aspects of the judiciary, such as nepotism (which in itself is just a by-product of the perogative of judges to hire individuals to serve in tribunals).

References:
Constitutional ammendment # 45 (2004) established a National Justice Council with oversight duties toward the judiciary.
When rules violations are discovered, the ombudsman is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

The ombudsman enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The ombudsman may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The ombudsman does not effectively penalize offenders. The ombudsman may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The ombudsman may be partisan in its application of power.

III-4. Budget Processes

33. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

92

33a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, art. 48 item 3.

YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can approve, but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

33b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Pluri-annual plans, yearly budget guidelines and the budget itself are discussed and approved by Congress. However, although
the executive cannot perform unauthorized expenditures, a big political problem stems from the fact that the budget is not compulsory. This allows the executive to not fulfill the budget in its entirety. This is used politically to co-opt parliamentary support: “Vote with me, and in return I will authorize such-and-such budget expenditure.”

References:
All budgetary process is reported both in the Lower House Web site and the Senate’s.

100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive’s personal budget, or other expenses.

25:

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

33c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

100: Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

75:

50: Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

34. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

50

34a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).
Comments:
Although formally open to debate, including public sessions, public hearings and so on; in practice, political and corporate interests have much more weight in influencing the budget.

References:

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

34b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

Comments:
CSOs participate in budgetary discussions and often are able to introduce changes. However, the vast majority of interests represented in CSOs do not act in Congress. Also, there's no organized procedure to collect, analyze and aggregate budget suggestions coming from CSOs. Thus the score given.

References:

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75:

50: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

25:

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.
34. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:

| 100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date. |
| 75: |
| 50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date. |
| 25: |
| 0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency. |

35. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

| 100 |

References:
The Finances and Control committee of the Lower House.

| YES: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds. |
| NO: A NO score is earned if no such body exists. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not under the direction of the legislature. |

36. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

| 31 |
36a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
See e.g. the Lower House home page dedicated to Committees, www2.camara.gov.br/comissoes.

100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:

50: Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

25:

0: There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

36b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Committees are populated according to overall partisan balance.

References:
Media.

100: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee’s work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

75:

50: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members’ ability to shape the committee’s activities.

25:

0: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.
36c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

References:
Ditto.

100: This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.

25:

0: This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee’s behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

36d. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

Comments:
Congress does not perform its constitutional duty of overseeing the executive branch well. Due to the exaggerated political influence the executive has over congress, the latter is ill-equipped to systematically follow up what is going on administratively within the executive branch.

Sometimes big scandals (such as those recently reported in the international media) prompt the creation of special investigative committees. But there’s no efficient day-to-day oversight.

References:
It rarely happens.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

75:

50: The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.
The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. Civil Service Regulations

37. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

37a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

Comments:
However, all positions of responsibility are filled by political appointees. In the federal sphere alone there are more than 23,000 such positions. The appointment of those is used by the executive to co-opt political parties and is a major source of corruption. Often those filling the positions work with their parties' interest in mind, rather than the public's. Eliminating such power of appointment is one of the major challenges of the anti-corruption struggle.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

37b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO
Comments:
However, the law does not apply to those filling positions of trust (political appointees). Nepotism does not seem to be a problem in the federal executive, but cronyism is widespread. See the comment to the previous question.

References:
Law 8112/90.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

37c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

Comments:
Such mechanisms are not independent from the functional structure itself. (How would an absolutely "independent" body function, and what is the meaning of it?) As a last resort, there is always recourse to the judiciary.

References:
Law 8112/90 establishes rights and procedures to punish public servants, together with appeal mechanisms and so on.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism’s decisions to the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

37d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

Comments:
The General Comptroller’s Office publishes charges brought against public officials (http://www.cgu.gov.br/cgu/relatorio_gestao_cgu_2005.pdf). The actual process, however, is protracted and few people are actually found guilty of corruption. It must be noted that actually proving corruption is very difficult in any country, and in any country punishment for corruption is relatively rare.

References:
Law 8112/90.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

38. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

72

38a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
According to law 8112/90, civil servants cannot be fired at will. However, their posting is subject to arbitrary decision. Thus, political interference is the rule.

References:
Abundant reports in the media.

100: Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

75:

50: Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:

0: Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

38b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In some areas (finance, control), civil servants must be hired according to professional criteria. However, in all so-called social areas (such as eg education, health etc.), the career is not regulated.
100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

38c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100  75  50  25  0

References:
See answer to 37a.

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

75:

50: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

25:

0: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

38d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100  75  50  25  0

References:
Some careers (financial, control) do, most don't.
Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position's authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

References:
Not applicable. There are no bonuses.

Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

References:
Since the year 2000, aggregated numbers are published monthly (see the Planning Ministry's reports in [http://www.servidor.gov.br/publicacao/boletim_estatistico/bol_estatistico.htm](http://www.servidor.gov.br/publicacao/boletim_estatistico/bol_estatistico.htm)). However, the last such bulletin published corresponds to December 2005.
100: The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

75:

50: The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

25:

0: The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

38g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100

75

50

25

0

Comments:
It would be illegal to fire anybody without motive, and the Judiciary would promptly revert any such attempt.

References:
There's no report of non-motivated firings in the public sector.

100: The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

75:

50: The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

38h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100

75

50

25

0

References:
No reporting of delays.
**100**: In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

**38**: In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

**References:**
See answer to 37d.

**39. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?**

**YES** | **NO**

39a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

**Comments:**
The Committee for Public Transparency and Combatting Corruption, established in the general Comptroller’s Office (CGU) prepared a new law tightening the management of conflicts of interest. The proposed law has been subject to public hearings and is expected to be presented to congress shortly.
References:
Law 8112/90 vaguely establishes such barriers. Some specific laws (such as the public procurement regulation 8666/93) specifies prohibitions.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

39b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
See the previous question.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

39c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES | NO

References:
Upper-echelon officials are subject to a policy that is enforced by the Public Ethics Committee (http://www.presidencia.gov.br/etica/). Lower-echelon servants are not covered.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

39d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.
The conflict of interest bill referred to in question 39a addresses the matter for all public officials, not only those covered by the Public Ethics Committee.

References:
Only applicable to higher-level servants (http://www.presidencia.gov.br/etica/).

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

39e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

References:
Only for higher level servants. See previous questions.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.
39f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100  75  50  25  0

References:
Applicable when specifically prohibited (such as in public procurement), but not generally.

100: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

75:

50: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

25:

0: Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

40. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

40a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES  NO

Comments:
Senior officials (ministers, etc.) must file a declaration of assets in the Public Ethics Committee. These records are kept in sealed envelopes and are not accessible to citizens.

References:
Not provided for in the regulations.

YES: A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

40b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.
IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures
41. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

0

41a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

Comments:
Although the constitutional text clearly limits the prohibition to the expression of thought (opinions), the Supreme Court has ruled that it encompasses denounciations (whistleblowing). Thus, most organizations refuse to accept anonymous charges. A few (such as the Supreme Audit Institution) do accept them, and charge culprits ex-officio (so that the charge is attributed to the organization's servant who moves on it, not to the person who originally brought attention to the matter).

The online form used by the general comptroller’s office to present a denounciation (http://www.cgu.gov.br/cgu/form_main.htm) requires full identification.

References:
Constitution, art. 5, item IV disposes that expressing one’s opinion is guaranteed, anonymity being prohibited.* This is taken as meaning that the state cannot receive anonymous denounciations.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

41b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In view of the Constitutional lack of protection for whistleblowers, some offices are adopting the procedure of receiving anonymous charges and then assuming themselves the role of accuser ex-officio.

References:
Constitution, art. 5, item IV disposes that expressing one’s opinion is guaranteed, anonymity being prohibited.* This is taken as meaning that the state cannot receive anonymous denounciations.

100: Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and
Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

The same problem exists in the private sector as it does for the public sector: anonymous whistleblowing is not permitted.

In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

In view of the Constitutional lack of protection for whistleblowers, some offices are adopting the procedure of receiving anonymous charges and then assuming themselves the role of accuser ex-officio.

Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.
Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

42. Is there an effective internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) where civil servants can report corruption?

42a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
Almost all Ministries have some whistleblowing mechanism, although all of them are subject to the restrictions identified in question 41a.

The General Comptroller’s office maintains a centralized system.

42b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

Comments:
The General Comptroller’s office is under-funded (see the federal budget), so this specific task is affected accordingly.
References:
Budget.

100: The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

42c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
The task is bigger than the available resources. Investigating all charges is impossible and discretion is exercised.

References:
See the General Comptroller’s office reports.

100: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

42d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

Comments:
When necessary” is subject to discretion.
References:
See the General Controller’s Office reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies’ investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV-3. Procurement

43. Is the public procurement process effective?

80

43a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

**YES** | **NO**

Comments:
An official who has any interest (or a spouse or dependent) in a field addressed in a tender cannot participate in the process.

References:
Law 8666/93.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private gain for public procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

43b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.
Comments:
However, in the federal government, most officials dealing with public procurement are trained or have extensive experience in the field.

References:
There's no such explicit provision or requirement in law.

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, or voluntary.

43c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Very few reported violations.

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

43d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

Comments:
The proposed conflict of interest bill drafted by the executive (referred to in question 39a) covers these officials.
References:
There’s no such legal provision.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

43e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

Comments:
Not only major ones, but all purchases are subject to competitive bidding, excepting those involving fairly small amounts (less than about US$4,000).

References:
Law 8666/93.

YES: A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

NO: A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% of GDP).

43f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

References:
Law 8666/93.

YES: A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

43g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**References:**
Law 8666/93. The right to contest administrative decisions is codified in Chapter 5, Arts 109 of the Constitution.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

43h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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</table>

**References:**
Constitution, Article 5, item 34b.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

43i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**References:**
Law 8666/93.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.
43. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Their number is relatively small due to the difficulties of actually proving corruption.

References:
Companies guilty of corruption are publicly blacklisted. Several government Web sites.

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

44. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

100

44a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

References:
All documents pertaining to a tender and subsequent contract are public. Law 8666/93.

YES: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public.

NO: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

44b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.
**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
Law 8666/93.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

44c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
Summaries are published in the Internet. In most cases, the full documents are also made available in the Internet. If not, full documents are readily available upon request.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
By law (8666/93), the only admissible charge corresponds to reproduction.
100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

44e. In practice, major public procurements are widely advertised.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
All (small or large) are published

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government Web site, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

44f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
All results (large or small) are published.

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75:
IV-4. Privatization

45. Is the privatization process effective?

100

45a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES  |  NO

Comments:
There is much controversy on the privatizations carried out during the previous president’s tenure (1994-2002). Critics maintain that many of them were harmful to the public interest, either because the prices paid were too low, or because the Brazilian Development Bank financed most of them under unfavourable circumstances. Those who defend these privatizations hold that they freed the state of a heavy burden and allowed the affected sectors to develop. The new PPP regulation was criticized for containing rules that allow for preferential selection of contenders. The matter is still open, as the method is new.

References:
Privatizations are subsumed to the public procurement law (8666/93). Concessions, a type of privatization, are regulated by law 8987/95. In 2004, Congress passed a Public-Private Partnership law (11079/04).

YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

45b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES  |  NO

Comments:
However, the expression conflict of interest” itself does not appear in the law. In fact, there’s no comprehensive regulation for conflicts of interest, although in late 2006 a project establishing such regulation was sent by the President to Congress.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

45c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

References:
They are spelled out in the public procurement regulation, Law 8666/93, Art. 9.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

YES | NO

46. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

100

46a. In law, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids.

References:
Lack of reports to the contrary.

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

References:
The situation is exactly the same as in common public procurement.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of publishing the details of privatization bids that makes information available to all citizens.
NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal publication process, or if any citizens are excluded by law from accessing this information.

46b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

References:
Ditto.

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

46c. In practice, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Ditto.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

46d. In practice, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids at a reasonable cost.
100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. National Ombudsman

47. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

0

Comments:
Although the General Comptroller’s Office is charged with coordinating a system of ouvidores, its role in doing so is just beginning.

References:
Law 10683/03 established the Ouvidoria-Geral da União under the General Comptroller’s Office (CGU). In Brazil there’s no
ombudsman in the Nordic sense, that is, a person or office that is independent from the body it covers. The role is taken over by “ouvidores,” that is, “hearers,” appointed by the executive. They are not independent, although in some cases practice makes it next to impossible to dismiss such a person. “Ouvidorias” are more active in states than in the federal government.


48. Is the national ombudsman effective?

| 48a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference. |  
|---|---|
| **YES** | **NO** |

Comments:

References:
Each ministerial ouvidor is appointed by the corresponding minister and is not protected from interference. The same holds for the general ouvidor.

48b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

| 48b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference. |  
|---|---|
| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Each ministerial ouvidor is appointed by the corresponding minister and is not protected from interference. The same holds for the general ouvidor. Since the role of federal ouvidores is mostly timid, the answer is irrelevant.
100: This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

75:

50: This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

48c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

References:
Each ministerial ouvidor is appointed by the corresponding minister and is not protected from interference. The same holds for the general ouvidor.

100: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

48d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
Information not available, hence the 50 score (intending to be neutral).

100: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.
The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

48e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

References:
No appointment of individuals to occupy positions of trust, as the general ouvidor is, are free of political interference.

Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

48f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

References:
Regular but small. See the CGU budget.

The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.
Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

48g. In practice, the agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

Comments:
Such reports are essentially useless, due to the wrongly conceived role the ouvidor is given. A ouvidor should collect complaints, direct them to the appropriate organization and follow up. The aggregation of similar problems affecting an organization would then point to opportunities for improvement. Ouvidores in Brazil never do that. The annual report lists events office holders attended and lists complaints received and forwarded, but no information is given about the effects of how the complaints changed the affected organizations. The same happens with state ouvidores. See www.transparencia.org.br/docs/ouvidorias-sp.pdf for a report on 59 ouvidorias of the sate of São Paulo. In this case, not even reports are made public and when they are, they are uninformative.

References:

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

48h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

Comments:
This office has no power of investigation. It forwards serious complaints to other bodies within the CGU.

References:
There's no such provision.

100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:
50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

48i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

48j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
See above.

100: Ombudsman’s reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, ombudsman’s reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.
48k. In practice, the agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

References:
See above. It does not act.

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

49. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

100

49a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | NO

Comments:
But those reports are next to useless.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

49b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.
**Comments:**
They are published on the Internet.

**References:**

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100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

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100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution
50. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

| YES | NO |

Comments:
The Supreme Audit Institution is an auxiliary organ of congress.

References:
Constitution, Art. 71.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

51. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

91

51a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

| YES | NO |

Comments:
Once appointed, ministers can only be removed by impeachment. Since appointments involve negotiations between the executive branch and the senate, political considerations are always present.

References:
Constitution Art. 52. stipulates that SAI ministers (as they are called) appointed by the president must be approved by the senate. There are nine ministers, seven of them appointed by the president, two rise from the technical staff.

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.
NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

51b. In practice, the head of the agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

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References:
No SAI minister has ever been impeached.

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

51c. In practice, the agency has a professional, full-time staff.

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Comments:
Staff is hired by public contest and promotions obey de jure fair criteria.

References:
Constitution, Art. 73.

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders it ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.
51d. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The Constitution, Art. 73, paragraph 1 defines vague criteria that SAI Ministers must fulfill.

100: Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

51e. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Budget has been around 1 billion real (about US$ 500 million).

References:
Federal budget.

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

51f. In practice, the agency makes regular public reports.
The SAI reports on its activities abundantly.

Managerial recommendations stemming from the SAI are not compulsory. However, in recent years, the SAI has been increasingly active in pushing forward its recommendations, and the government is becoming more willing to comply.

Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.
51h. In practice, the supreme audit institution is able to initiate its own investigations.

Comments:
It does so continuously. All proceedings, minutes, questionings etc. are published on the Supreme Audit Institution's website. Proceedings about any person can be found at https://contas.tcu.gov.br/portaltextual/Pesquisalivre (of course, the name of the person must be redacted).

References:
Media coverage, supreme audit institution's website.

100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

52. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

100

52a. In law, citizens can access reports of the agency.

YES | NO

Comments:
All proceedings are public and published in the Internet.

References:
See www.tcu.gov.br

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.
52b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Ditto.

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

52c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Ditto.

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
53. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

100

YES | NO

References:
http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/SRF.asp

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

54. Is the tax collection agency effective?

100

54a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
http://www.unafisco.org.br/juridico/legislacao.htm

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.
54b. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

References:
Federal budget.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

55. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

25

References:

55. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Overall tax evasion (including federal, state and municipal taxes) is estimated at 20-30 percent. For individuals who earn salaries, it is impossible to avoid paying federal taxes, because federal taxes are deducted from paychecks. As for taxes on asset transfers, various mechanisms are used to avoid paying the taxes in full. Most tax evasion come from firms. Tax laws are very lax, and conditional amnesties are frequent. The conditions defined for an amnesty are seldom met and new amnesties are then defined ad infinitum.

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:
50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

25:

0: Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

56. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

56. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

Comments:
Customs is a department of the Federal Tax Authority.

References:
http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/Grupo1/Aduana.asp

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

57. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

100

57a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
http://www.unafisco.org.br/juridico/legislacao.htm

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:
50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

57b. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
As part of the tax authority budget.

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

58. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

25

58. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Customs is held to be profoundly corrupt.

References:
Media reports on scandals. See also www.transparencia.org.br/docs/private-sector-2003.pdf.

100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.
Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. Financial Sector Regulation

59. In law, is there a financial regulatory agency overseeing publicly listed companies?

100

YES | NO

References:
Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (Securities Commission), law 6385/76. http://www.cvm.gov.br/

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency tasked with overseeing publicly listed companies in the public interest and ensuring that disclosure rules are met.

NO: A NO score is earned if this function is spread over several agencies or does not exist.

60. Is the financial regulatory agency effective?

100

60a. In law, the financial regulatory agency is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Commission is autonomous, but reports to the Monetary Commission, which in turn reports to the finance minister.
YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

60b. In practice, the agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Hiring is by public contest.

References:

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

60c. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Federal budget, Law 6385/76.

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:
50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

60d. In practice, when necessary, the financial regulatory agency independently initiates investigations.

Comments:
It has such a reputation. All decisions are published on the Internet (reference given).

References:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/formdecis.asp

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

75:

50: The agency starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

60e. In practice, when necessary, the financial regulatory agency imposes penalties on offenders.

References:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/formdecis.asp

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:
The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partis

61. Can citizens access the financial records of publicly listed companies?

100

YES | NO

References:
Law 6404/76

YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all publicly traded companies is required by law to be public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any category of publicly owned or publicly-traded company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

61b. In practice, the financial records of publicly listed companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Records are published in the media and the Web.

100: Publicly traded companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

75:

50: Publicly traded companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

25:

0: Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value to investors.
61c. In practice, the financial records of publicly listed companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Law 6404/1976

100: Financial records of all public companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

75:

50: Financial records of public companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

25:

0: Publicly traded companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

61d. In practice, citizens can access the records of disciplinary decisions imposed by the government on publicly-listed companies.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
All decisions are published.

References:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/formdecis.asp

100: These records are freely available to all citizens through a formal official process.

75:

50: These records are available to all citizens, with some exceptions.

25:

0: These records are generally not available through official processes.
61e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of publicly listed companies within a reasonable time period.

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References:
Media and the Internet.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

61f. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of publicly listed companies at a reasonable cost.

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</table>

References:
Media and the Internet.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation
62. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

62a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

| YES | NO |

References:
The Constitution, the Civil Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required.

62b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

| YES | NO |

References:
Civil Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

62c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Brazil ranked in 115 in the World Bank’s 2005 Doing Business report. Average time to open a business in São Paulo is 152 days.
References:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=28

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months.

25:

0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

62d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Average cost of opening a business is evaluated by the WB at about US$340.

References:

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

63. Do businesses receive equitable regulatory treatment from the government?

50

63a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting health, safety, and environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.
Comments:
All regulations are publicly available, but they are so complex that only specialists can (barely) maneuver them. Since regulations are byzantine, this creates frequent opportunities for extortion by corrupt public officials. As for the more important ones, the problem is that there are too many of them. There are federal, state and municipal regulations all over the place.

References:
There are an enormous amount of regulations pertaining to those fields.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting health, safety, and environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

63b. In practice, business inspections by the government are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
See eg www.transparencia.org.br/docs/PMSP.pdf, section III, for an assessment by business representatives about corruption in municipal inspections.

**100:** Business inspections by the government (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are routinely carried out by the government in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law
64. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

100

64a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

| YES | NO |

Comments: As in all anti-bribery regulations, the law requires that corruption is actually proven. This is usually exceedingly difficult because of the need to prove that money actually changed hands and that payment was made in exchange for some advantage.

References:
Law 8429/92 and others.

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64b. In law, extortion is illegal.

| YES | NO |

References: Laws 8429/92, 1079/50.

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

| YES | NO |
64d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

| YES | NO |

64e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

| YES | NO |

64f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

| YES | NO |
64g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

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64h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

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64i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

| YES | NO |
VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

65. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

0

65. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

Comments:
The General Comptroller’s Office is slowly taking this role, but it is far from being an actual anti-corruption agency. In fact, if prosecutorial duties must be included in the definition of such an agency, Brazil will never have it, because such duties are the privilege of the public ministry.

All questions in this section are formulated in such a way as to render very imprecise whatever answers are given.

References:
Lack thereof.

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

66. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

61

66a. In law, the agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.
YES | NO

**References:**
The General Comptroller’s Office is a ministry.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

66b. In practice, the agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
Media. See also reports on www.cgu.gov.br

**100:** This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

66c. In practice, the head of the agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |
**References:**
The General Comptroller’s Office head is a minister, and thus can be replaced at will.

100: The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

66d. In practice, appointments to the agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

**Comments:**
The head of the General Comptroller’s Office is a minister. All directors are freely appointed by the minister. General staff are hired by public contest.

**References:**
Constitution, civil service regulations.

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

66e. In practice, the agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.
100: The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

66f. In practice, the agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
But this doesn't mean that the budget is sufficient. The General Comptroller's Office is receiving increasing funding, although it is still insufficient.

References:
See www.cgu.gov.br

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

66g. In practice, the agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
See www.cgu.gov.br
100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

66h. In practice, the agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The general Comptroller’s Office has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate, but its mandate does not include all requirements defined in these questions to make it an anti-corruption agency.

References:
See www.cgu.gov.br

100: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

66i. In practice, when necessary, the agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Media.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.
The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

67. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

63

67a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
There is no information to respond.

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

67b. In practice, citizens can complain to the agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
See the online form at http://www.cgu.gov.br/cgu/form_main.htm.
Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

VI-3. Rule of Law

68. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

50

68a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution's Art. 5, item 34b guarantees that right to appeal all decisions, including judicial ones. The whole judicial system is built around the appeals process.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

68b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.
Comments:
The Brazilian judiciary is swift when perpetrators are poor, yet extremely slow when they are rich.

References:
Common knowledge.

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:

0: Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

68c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Although there is a system of public defenders for poor defendants, good defense costs a fortune.

References:
Common knowledge.

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

69. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100
Comments:
Appeals on formalities (including interpretations of the law) are the rule in the Brazilian Judiciary.

References:
Penal code. Very, very few cases of misjudgement have been reported, and these refer to new evidence or false testimonies being given in the original trial. There have been no reported cases where an individual was convicted by a wrongful reading of the law.

100: Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

75:

50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

70. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100

References:
No reports to the contrary.

100: Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

25:
Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

71. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

94

71a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, Chapter III

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

71b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Constitutional court justices may decide according to the government's political conveniences. Justices and judges cannot be removed.

References:
Abundant media reports.

100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:
National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

71c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

References:
See www.stf.gov.br for the system.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

71d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, Chapter III.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

72. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

72a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

72b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge’s involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

73. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

42

73a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

Comments:
Blacks are overwhelmingly more prone to be convicted than whites. This might be because blacks are overwhelmingly poorer than whites.
Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups may occasionally be discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system.

Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes.

Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence.

As for the lawyers' mean competence, there's no evaluation extant.

There are public defenders' offices in every state and at the federal level.
100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well trained and effective in representing the rights of indigent defendants.

75:

50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some indigent defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

25:

0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most indigent defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

73d. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Access to justice is all but impossible for anybody earning anything less than twenty or thirty times the minimum wage (median income” would be inadequate as a standard, due to Brazil’s appalling income imbalance).

References:
Common knowledge.

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.

73e. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Common knowledge.

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance.
In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

Comments:
Citizens living in states located in poorer regions have access to far fewer tribunals per 10,000 inhabitants than states in richer parts of the country.

References:

Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

Courtrooms are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

VI-4. Law Enforcement

Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.
Comments:
This does not mean that the personnel hired are actually qualified. Federal police agents are far more qualified than state police agents.

References:
All law enforcement personnel are hired by public contest.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.</td>
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<td>50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.</td>
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<td>25:</td>
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<td>0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.</td>
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74b. In practice, the agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

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<tr>
<td>100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
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<td>75:</td>
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<tr>
<td>50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
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<td>0: The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.</td>
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74c. In practice, the agency is protected from political interference.
Comments:
In recent years, the federal police has developed a reputation for acting independently. The same cannot be said of the average Brazilian state police.

References:
Media reports.

100: The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

75. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

67

75a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

Comments:
Every law enforcement organization has its internal affairs’ division. Ouvidorias might also receive complaints.

References:
State and federal police regulations

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism.
75b. In practice, the independent reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Impossible to ascertain as reports are faulty.

100: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

75c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

References:
See above.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity is separate from the regular police department.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

75d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
Punishment of law enforcement officials vary by state.

References:
Reports

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

75e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

75f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

Comments:
Law enforcement officials are often accused of various crimes. Bringing them to justice is improbable in poorer states, but relatively frequent in richer ones.

References:
Amnesty International reports.
Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.