Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

100

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution of Ghana, 1972
Chapter Five, On Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
(Article 21(1)(e) guarantees freedom of association which shall include freedom to form or join trade unions or other associations, national or international, for the protection of their interest*)

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.
Comments:
Political parties are not allowed to accept contributions or donations from non-citizens (Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574). This has not been observed totally in practice.

References:
Constitution of Ghana, 1992
Art. 21 General Fundamental Freedoms – guarantees freedom of association, including the formation and operation of anti-corruption good governance CSOs.
The Constitution stipulates no restrictions on the sources of funds that these CSOs can legally access.

According to Professor Kofi Kumado, Professor of Law at the University of Ghana and Director of the Legon Centre for International Affairs, there is no law in Ghana that stipulates any such restrictions.

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

NO: A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

References:
Under the Companies Code, CSOs and NGOs, to gain tax exempt status, register with the Registrar General’s Office as Companies limited by guarantee. They have to file annual returns. These returns are expected to include their incomes, and so the sources of those incomes will have to be revealed.

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

83

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.
Comments:
In practice, the government does not create barriers against the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

References:
Ben Ephson, Editor of Despatch, has concurrent observations on this matter with leading journalists in Ghana.

100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

75:

50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

References:
Researcher’s observations, confirmed by key participants in the Ghanaian political and administrative processes, such as Mr. Freddie Blay, a lawyer, Member of Parliament and First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, and Professor S.N. Woode, ex-Director of the School of Administration, University of Ghana, now Chairman of the Public Service Commission.

100: Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

75:

50: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

25:

0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.
2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Ghanaian political scene is now so vibrant, with independent radio stations, print media and watchful opposition parties, that a government that definitely does not want to be seen as acting unconstitutionally will not dare shut down an anti-corruption CSO.

References:
I have not read of any such action by the government over the period in question and my journalist friend, Ben Ephson, has assured me there has been no such incident over the past year.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Ghanaian political scene is now so vibrant, with independent radio stations, print media and watchful opposition parties, that a government that definitely does not want to be seen as acting unconstitutionally will not dare shut down an anti-corruption CSO.

References:
I have not read of any such action by the government over the period in question and my journalist friend, Ben Ephson, has assured me there has been no such incident over the past year.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned related to work covering corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the p
3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

| YES | NO |

References:
Mr. Ben Ephson, Editor of The Despatch newspaper, and one of the most knowledgeable and reliable Ghanaian journalists.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist’s work.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

| YES | NO |

Comments:
There would have been such a media outrage that everybody with an interest in Ghana would have heard about it.

References:
Mr. Ben Ephson, Editor of The Despatch newspaper, and one of the most knowledgeable and reliable Ghanaian journalists.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed related to a corruption case in the specific study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual’s history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

88

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.
References:
It is a constitutional right, Article 21 (1) (e), and the Labour Act 2003, (Act 651) confirms it.

YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
My own observations, confirmed by other keen observers of, and participants in, the Ghanaian political processes, such as Mr. Freddie Blay, a lawyer, Member of Parliament and First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, and Professor S.N. Woode, ex- Director of the School of Administration, University of Ghana, now Chairman of the Public Service Commission.

100: Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

I-2. Media

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100
5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

References:
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Article 21 (1) (a) on freedom of speech and expression which shall include freedom of the press and other media.
Chapter 12, Freedom and Independence of the Media

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

References:
Article 21 (1) (a) says All persons shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media.

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form media entities?

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a media entity.
References:
Mr. Ben Ephson, Editor of The Despatch; Mr. Egbert Faibille, Jnr., Editor of The Ghanaian Observer

100: Media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system.

75:

50: Formation of media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

6b. In law, where a media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES   NO

Comments:
Only owners and operators of electronic media, television and fm stations have to obtain licenses to operate.

References:
National Communications Act, 1996 (Act 524) and L.I. 1719, 2003 which regulates procedures for acquiring electronic media licenses, has appeals provisions.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied media license. A YES score is also earned if no license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a media license within a reasonable time period.
References:
Interview with Joshua K. Peprah, Director, Regulations and Licensing, National Communications Authority. According to him, major applications (into which category he places applications for tv and fm radio licenses) take three to six months from start to finish, if they are not complete with all necessary information; otherwise the process could take less than three months.

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<td>Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.</td>
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<td>Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.</td>
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<td>Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.</td>
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6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a media license at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
There is a listing of the fees for various categories of applicants on the the Authority’s website, www.nca.org.gh. The fees do not appear onerous.

References:
Interview with Joshua K. Peprah, Director, Regulations and Licensing, National Communications Authority. According to him, major applications (into which category he places applications for tv and fm radio licenses) take three to six months from start to finish, if they are not complete with all necessary information; otherwise the process could take less than three months.

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<td>Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.</td>
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<td>Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.</td>
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<td>Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.</td>
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7. Are the media able to report on corruption?

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7a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.
**References:**
Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) Chapter 7, on Libel, more specifically Article 117 which says: when publication is defamatory truth is absolutely privileged", and 117(1)(h):”If the matter is true, and if it is found that it was for the public benefit that the matter should be published” then the reputation of the public figure is no bar.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

7b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
Editors, proprietors, professors at the Institute of Communication Studies at the University of Ghana, and in general everyone involved with the idea, agree there is no self-censorship on corruption-related stories.

100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

7c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint on publishing corruption-related stories.
Editors, proprietors, professors at the Institute of Communication Studies at the University of Ghana, and in general everyone involved with the media, agree there is no self-censorship on corruption-related stories.

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. In countries where illiteracy is higher, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material.

8. Are the media credible sources of information?

81

8a. In law, media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

8b. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.
References:
Bold front page headlines in the Daily Graphic of September 4, 2006, entitled No Blackmail, carried a report of a 70th Ghana Broadcasting Anniversary Lectures, in which the speaker, Nana Dr. S.K.B. Asante, a renowned Ghanaian international lawyer, a paramount chief of an Asante state and the current President of the Ghana Academy of Arts and Science, warned of the dangers that the unprofessional conduct of some journalists are posing to democracy and the rule of law in the country, comparing them with the dreaded knock on the door by security agencies in the bad old days of dictatorial regimes in the country.

100: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

25:

0: Editors and journalists are widely known to sell favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

8c. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

References:
The academic study of the 2004 national and presidential elections, edited by Professor Kwame Boafo-Arthur, concluded that fair media coverage had characterised the election campaigns. All media persons and observers of the media scene agree with that conclusion.

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75:

50: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25:

0: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

8d. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.
Comments:
The government would exploit to the full the advantages of incumbency, if it were allowed to do so. But the diversity of the media in Ghana now, the multiparty environment and, above all, the constitutional provisions to make the media, even the state-owned ones, truly accessible to all parties and candidates, ensure the equitable access.

References:
The published academic researches on recent Ghanaian elections.

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content.

75:

50: The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

9. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

100

9a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:
Many journalists and professional media critics, such as Kweku Baako, Ben Ephson, Professor Bonnah-Koomson, etc, concur.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist’s work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

9b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.
9c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

References:
Many journalists and professional media critics, such as Kweku Baako, Ben Ephson, Professor Bonnah-Koomson, Freddie Blay, Gina Blay, etc. concur.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual’s work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.
A 2006 Freedom of Information Act was passed by Parliament, and now awaits presidential assent.

References:
The 1992 Constitution, Art. 21(1)(f): All persons shall have the right to information, subject to such qualification and laws as are necessary in a democratic society.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access any government documents. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request. There should be a formal process for requesting this information.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

10b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | NO

Comments:
This right has not been tested in court, but it is expected that The Freedom of Information Act will have provisions relating to a right of appeal.

References:
The 1992 Constitution, Art. 21(1)(f) does not grant this facility; the article does not go into details of that sort.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

10c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

References:
The Freedom of Information Act has not yet received presidential assent, so it has yet to be enforced.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

11. Is the right of access to information effective?

50

11a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Everything depends on the type of information that one wants to access. Parliamentary records, for instance, are available promptly and without cost. The Electoral Commission also makes available information promptly and without cost, and also does The Ombudsman: the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). But if one wants to access documents in the Ministries that becomes a bit more difficult and tiresome, although not expensive. As for information about asset disclosures by public officials, access is not allowed.

References:
Various sources who hold high political or administrative positions or are seasoned observers of the Ghanaian political scene: the Deputy Clerk of Parliament, Mr. Robert Apodolla, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Freddie Blay, Kweku Baako, Ben Ephson, Professor Bonnah-Koomson, Freddie Blay, Gina Blay, etc.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

11b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Cost is generally not a factor in the access/non access issue because, if granted, access is free or at the cost of photocopying.
### References:
Various sources who hold high political or administrative positions or are seasoned observers of the Ghanaian political scene: the Deputy Clerk of Parliament, Mr. Robert Apodolla, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Freddie Blay, Kweku Baako, Ben Ephson, Professor Bonnah-Koomson, Freddie Blay, Gina Blay, etc.

### 100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

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### 50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

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### 0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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### Comments:
As there is no Freedom of Information Act yet, there is really no system or predictability about anything. But, generally, it would be true to say that appeals are not likely to work if there is initial denial of access.

### References:
Various sources who hold high political or administrative positions or are seasoned observers of the Ghanaian political scene: the Deputy Clerk of Parliament, Mr. Robert Apodolla, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Freddie Blay, Kweku Baako, Ben Ephson, Professor Bonnah-Koomson, Freddie Blay, Gina Blay, etc.

### 100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

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### 50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

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### 0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

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### 11d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.
Comments:
There is no appeals mechanism at all, so cost is irrelevant.

References:
Various sources who hold high political or administrative positions or are seasoned observers of the Ghanaian political scene: the Deputy Clerk of Parliament, Mr. Robert Apodolla, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Freddie Blay, Kweku Baako, Ben Ephson, Professor Bonnah-Koomson, Freddie Blay, Gina Blay, etc.

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

11e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

References:
Various sources who hold high political or administrative positions or are seasoned observers of the Ghanaian political scene: the Deputy Clerk of Parliament, Mr. Robert Apodolla, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Freddie Blay, Kweku Baako, Ben Ephson, Professor Bonnah-Koomson, Freddie Blay, Gina Blay, etc.

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.
II-1. Voting & Citizen Participation

12. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

12a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 7, Representation of the People – more specifically Art. 42.

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of that country. A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

12b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Arts. 43-48
The Electoral Commission Act, 1993 (Act. 451);
and the mode of election of the president and members of parliament under the respective provisions of the constitution on the executive and the legislature.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.
13. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

13a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100

75

50

25

0

References:
The academic studies of Ghanaian national elections since the 1992 Constitution, such as those edited by Professor JRA Ayee on the 2000 Elections and by Professor Kwame Boafo-Arthur.

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

50: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

13b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100

75

50

25

0

References:
Researcher’s observations
Published studies of elections: the academic studies of Ghanaian national elections since the 1992 Constitution, such as those edited by Professor JRA Ayee on the 2000 Elections and by Professor Kwame Boafo-Arthur.

100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

75: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

25:
0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

13c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
Since 1992, national parliamentary and presidential elections have been held in November/December every four years, while District Assembly elections are also held every four years, in the mid-term of the presidential and Parliamentary elections.

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

14. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

YES  |  NO

14a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

References:
The general fundamental freedoms granted by the 1992 Constitution
Political Parties Act, 2000, (Act 574)

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.
14b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

References:
The general fundamental freedoms granted by the 1992 Constitution
Political Parties Act, 2000, (Act 574)

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

14c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Every observer of the Ghanaian political scene now would agree with this.

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

75:

50: Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

25:

0: Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

14d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
Comments:
The high cost of running a successful campaign is the only real deterrent.

References:
Researcher’s observations, confirmed by other sources.

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

75:

50: Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

25:

0: Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

14e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

References:
There are three opposition parties in Parliament, accounting for some 100 out of the 230 MPs.

100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

75:

50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition’s ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature’s proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

II-2. Election Integrity
15. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

References:
The Electoral Commission Act, 1993 (Act 451)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency or set of agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or set of agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police.

16. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

95

16a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
The 1992 Constitution, Articles 43-46,
The Electoral Commission Act, 1993 (Act 451)

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies being contested in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no election monitoring agency.

16b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.
References:
The researcher knows all the members of the Commission, including the Chairman.

100: Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

16c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
Researcher’s knowledge; there is a full-time staff in downtown Accra at the Election Commission’s headquarters building.

100: The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

16d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.
Comments:
There is a current Court challenge by members of the leading opposition party that seeks to suggest that there might have been some lapse in this area with regard to the 2004 elections.

References:
The Electoral Commission’s Reports to Parliament are evidence of this.

100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

75:

50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

16e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

Comments:
With individual rule violation, such as impersonation or attempting to vote more than once, the Commission has not shirked its duty to penalize or seek penalty. With parties, however, the Commission has often taken the pragmatic view that it is more important for the parties to grow and perform than to insist on their observing every regulation about disclosures, for instance.

References:
Researcher’s conclusions after observing the commission since 2001, supported at public fora he conducted at the Institute of Economic Affairs, where he was Head of Governance.

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.
17. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

96

17a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The vibrant multi-party environment, more than anything else, ensures this.

References:
Researcher’s observation and academic commentaries on elections in Ghana.

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost voting by non-existent voters is common.

17b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Art. 125 (5) gives the judiciary jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, including matters relating to this Constitution, and such other jurisdiction as parliament may, by law, confer on it.”

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.
17c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

References:
Newspaper reports of ongoing cases

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

17d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

References:
Academic studies of elections referred to and observations of professional political commentators.

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

75:

50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:

0: The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.
17e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

**YES | NO**

**References:**
The closest we get to a specific law allowing domestic observers to monitor elections is Article 49 (2), which insists there shall be counting and recording of the votes immediately after the close of poll in the presence of the candidates or their representatives and agents. The general fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution also constitute a sufficient legal basis for at least domestic election observers and monitors.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

17f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

**100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0**

**References:**
Academic studies, newspaper reports at election times, reports of domestic observer and monitoring groups, as well as those of international observers such as The Commonwealth and EU Monitors.

**100:** Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers’ activities.

**75:**

**50:** Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

**25:**

**0:** Election observers’ movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

---

II-3. Political Financing
18. Are there regulations governing political financing?

18a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

References:
The Political Parties Act

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

18b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

References:
The Political Parties Act

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

18c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
The firm or company must be at least 75 percent Ghanaian owned, otherwise it cannot donate anything at all.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on corporate contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to candidates or political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

18d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES  |  NO

References:
The Political Parties Act

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

18e. In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

YES  |  NO

References:
The Political Parties Act

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor’s name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

18f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.
References:
Political Parties Act, Article 21(i)(b) requires political parties to submit audited accounts annually. The Commission can also at any time order the accounts of a political party to be audited and an auditor appointed by the Commission whose fees shall be paid by the Commission.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

19. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

25

19a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual’s ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

Comments:
No limits apply.

References:
Political Parties Act

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.
19b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company’s ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

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References:
Political Parties Act

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making to donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

19c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party’s ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

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Comments:
There are no limits.

References:
Political Parties Act

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or...
accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

19d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.

100  75  50  25  0

Comments:
It is not out of partisanship that the Commission rarely initiates investigations. It is largely the result of a belief that what is important is to let the parties take roots. It is also perhaps a realistic appraisal of what you do with the results of an investigation, if it means having to proscribe the ruling party or the main opposition party. The Commission cannot impose many sanctions.

References:
Researcher’s observations

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

19e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

100  75  50  25  0

Comments:
The Commission’s policy has been to mentor, persuade and convince in the first instance, rather than sanction, by calling in errant parties and making them comply through warnings.

References:
Phone interview with Deputy Chairman of the Electoral Commission, Mr. David Kangah.

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.
The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.

Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

Can citizens access records related to political financing?

In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

Comments: This happens once a year.
### Political Parties Act

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**References:**
Mr. David Kangah, The Deputy Chairman of the Commission

**Comments:**
It is very easy to access such records at the Commission.

### Records Availability

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**References:**
Mr. David Kangah, The Deputy Chairman of the Commission

**Comments:**
Citizens can access these records for free.
Refereces:
Researcher’s observations
Mr. David Kangah, The Deputy Chairman of the Commission

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category III. Government Accountability

III-1. Executive Accountability

21. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

21. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 5, Fundamental Human rights and Freedoms,
Article 12 (1), Protection of Fundamental Human Rights,
Article 125 (3) on the judicial power of Ghana

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.
22. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

100

22a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

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<td>100</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.</td>
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Comments:
The Constitution requires the President to address Parliament, which he does. His cabinet ministers are hauled before Parliament to explain decisions. Outside Parliament, Ministers have schedules to meet the press to explain decisions. The government has instituted annual people’s assemblies where the President and his ministers meet the public to answer questions.

References:
Television and press coverage of the president and his ministers at public fora, outside parliamentary sessions, addressing press conferences and taking questions.

22b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

References:
The 1992 Constitution, Article 125 (3), on the judicial power of Ghana and Article 130 (1), on original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which shall include all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution and “all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution”.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.
NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

22c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
This has been done many times since 1993 when the current Constitution came into force.

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

22d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The separation of powers under the 1992 Constitution is real in this regard; Parliament rather than the President accounts for passing new laws and regulations, even if the executive initiates them.

References:
Researcher’s observation.

100: The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

75:

50: The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal
requirements for legislative action or approval.

25:

0: The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

23. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

50

23a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

Comments:
Within three years of leaving office, civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against the President in respect of anything done or committed to be done by him in his personal capacity during his term of office.

References:
Article 57 (5) says: The President shall not, while in office as President, be personally liable to any civil or criminal proceedings in court*.

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

23b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution does not exempt ministers from prosecution whereas it does exempt the President.

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.
24. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

24a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 24, Code of Conduct for Public Officers, specifically Article 286, on the declaration of assets by public officers, including the President.

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

24b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

NO: A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

24c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO
The Assets Declaration Law does not really regulate this, certainly not in the way the law does so in the US and in the UK.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

24d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
Indeed, the Auditor General who is the Custodian of the completed Asset Declaration Forms receives them in sealed envelopes and has no authority to open those envelopes. Only a court of law can order them to be opened.

**References:**
1992 Constitution, Chapter 24, Act 550

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

24e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

| YES | NO |

**References:**
The Constitution does not say so, and there is no other law that says so.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.
24f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

References:
The Constitution does not say so, and there is no other law that says so.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

24g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

References:
There is no such regulation in either the Code of Conduct for Public Officers (1992 Constitution, Chapter 24) or in Act 550, The Declaration of Assets Law, or in any other law.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from
outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

24h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 24, Act 550

100: Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

25. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

0

25a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | NO

Comments:
Only a court of law can order the disclosure of the assets declared. Otherwise nobody, not even the Auditor General who is the authorized custodian of these forms, knows what assets have been declared.

References:
Act 550

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.
25b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

References:
The law does not allow citizens access.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

25c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

References:
The law does not allow citizens access.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

26. In practice, is the ruling party distinct from the state?
26. In practice, is the ruling party distinct from the state?

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The vibrant multi-party and pluralistic media environment enforces the distinction.

References:
Researcher’s observations.

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

50: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:

0: The government is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

III-2. Legislative Accountability

27. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

100

27a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

References:
1992 Constitution, Art. 125
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

27b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
The history of judicial reviews in Ghana since 1993

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

27c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | NO

Comments:
It is only on their way to Parliament or in Parliament or returning from proceedings in Parliament that civil or criminal process from a court cannot be served to a parliamentarian.

References:
The privileges and immunities for parliamentarians listed in Articles 115-120 do not include immunity from criminal proceedings.

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.
28. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

14

28a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 24, Act 550

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

28b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
There is no such law.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

28c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO
**References:**
Mr. Freddie Blay, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, and a lawyer

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

28d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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**References:**
1992 Constitution, Chapter 24, Act 550 does not require it.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

28e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
There is no law, and no practice or convention has arisen without a relevant law.

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.
28f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

| 100 | 75  | 50  | 25  | 0   |

References:
There are no such regulations.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

28g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

| 100 | 75  | 50  | 25  | 0   |

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 24, Act 550 makes it impossible for national legislative branch asset disclosures to be audited.

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.
29. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

0

29a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is no Freedom of Information Act already in operation.

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 24, Act 550

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

29b. In practice, citizens can access these records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
There is no law; there is no practice or convention.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

29c. In practice, citizens can access these records at a reasonable cost.
30. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

30a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

**YES** | **NO**

References:
Mr. Freddie Blay, MP and Deputy Speaker of Parliament;
Researcher’s observation

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there are exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

30b. In practice, citizens can access these records within a reasonable time period.
### III-3. Judicial Accountability

<table>
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<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
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</table>

**References:**
Mr. Freddie Blay; Robert Apodolla, Deputy Clerk of Parliament;
Researcher’s observation

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

---

30c. In practice, citizens can access these records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**
Researcher’s observation

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
31. Are judges appointed fairly?

100

31a. In practice, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES  |  NO

References:
Professor Kumado, Professor of Law at the University of Ghana;
Mr Freddie Blay, Deputy Speaker of Parliament and a lawyer. He is also the Chairman of the Appointments Committee in Parliament.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages.

NO: A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight.

31b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
Professor Kumado, Professor of Law at the University of Ghana;
Mr Freddie Blay, Deputy Speaker of Parliament and a lawyer. He is also the Chairman of the Appointments Committee in Parliament.

100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

31c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).
32. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

92

32a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

References:
The Rules of Court Committee, set up under Article 157 of the Constitution to make rules and regulations for the procedure and practice of courts in Ghana, demands it;
Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

32b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

References:
The privately-owned newspapers in particular find the publication of superior court judgments a productive way of filling up space
and selling their paper. As an example, The Crusading Guide newspaper of September 5, 2006, carried a six-page judgment by
an Appeals Court judge over a high profile land litigation case.

100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply
with these requirements.

75:

50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include
special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

25:

0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

32c. In law, there is an ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) can investigate breaches of administrative procedures
and abuses of power of the judiciary brought to its attention by any aggrieved citizen, but this mandate does not extend to
investigating the correctness or otherwise of court decisions and judgments, which remains within the exclusive province of the
judiciary itself, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter.

References:
1992 Constitution, Art.153 sets up a Judicial Council. Although its stated mandate is not exactly the same as what is detailed
here, Article 154 (b) says it is a forum for consideration and discussion of matters relating to the discharge of the functions of the
judiciary and thereby assist the Chief Justice in the performance of his duties with a view to ensuring efficiency and effective
realization of justice³. There is also a general Ombudsman, not a specifically mandated judicial ombudsman, known in Ghana as

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a ombudsman or equivalent mechanism for the judicial system. A judicial
ombudsman is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure,
abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a judicial ombudsman.

32d. In law, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:
The General Ombudsman, whose remit covers the judiciary as well because it can investigate complaints of violations of
fundamental human rights and freedoms, injustice, corruption, abuse of power and unfair treatment of any person by a public
officer in the exercise of his official duties, is operationally independent of any authority or person.
References:
1992 Constitution:
Art 225, on the Independence of the Commission and Commissioners,
Article 223, on the Terms and Conditions of service of the Commissioners,
Article 228 on the Removal of Commissioners,
Article 227, charging the expenses of the Commission on the Consolidated Fund,
all attest to the protection of the commission and commissioners from political interference.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial ombudsman is operationally independent
from political interference by the executive, legislative or judicial branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial ombudsman. A NO score
is given if the judicial ombudsman function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive
ministry or legislative committee.

32e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) initiates investigations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), whose remit extends to the judiciary, can initiate
investigations, and will cooperate with other institutions with oversight responsibilities. However, there is no record of active
investigation of the judiciary.

References:
Interviews with the Public Affairs Manager, CHRAJ;
Interviews with other highly placed Public Officers and Academics, such as Professor SN Woode, former Director of the School of
Administration, Legon and currently Chairman of the Public Services Commission, and Professor Kofi Kumado

100: The ombudsman aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations —
into judicial misconduct. The ombudsman is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The ombudsman will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has
limited effectiveness when investigating. The ombudsman, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of
power.

25:

0: The ombudsman rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the ombudsman is
partisan in its application of this power.

32f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) imposes penalties on
offenders.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |
Comments:
The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the general ombudsman, whose remit covers human rights abuse and administrative injustice, wherever it may occur in Ghana, can and does impose penalties, although in many cases it has to go to court to get court orders or request the Attorney General to prosecute.

References:
Interviews with the Public Affairs Manager, CHRAJ;
Interviews with other highly placed Public Officers and Academics, such as Professor SN Woode, former Director of the School of Administration, Legon and currently Chairman of the Public Services Commission, and Professor Kofi Kumado

100: When rules violations are discovered, the ombudsman is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The ombudsman enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The ombudsman may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The ombudsman does not effectively penalize offenders. The ombudsman may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The ombudsman may be partisan in its application of power.

III-4. Budget Processes

33. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

83

33a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 13, Finance, specifically Arts. 175-179

YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can approve, but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.
33b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

**References:**
Mr. Freddie Blay

**100:** All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

**75:**

**50:** Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

**25:**

**0:** The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

33c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

**References:**
Mr. Peter Ala Adjetey, Speaker of Parliament, 2001-2004, gave a paper that was widely reported in the newspapers, including the Daily Graphic, on September 5, 2006, detailing the lack of capacity of Parliament to deal with public finance matters; Researcher’s own work, at the time when he was at the Institute of Economic Affairs, involved a review of Parliament’s performance in 2002. The conclusions were the same as those of the former speaker.

**100:** Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

**75:**

**50:** Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

**25:**

**0:** Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

34. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?
34a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

**References:**
Parliamentary proceedings are open to the public, and records of proceedings are easily accessible.

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

50: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

34b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

**References:**
Conversations with former MP Nana Asante Frempong

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

50: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

0: Citizens can access itemized budget allocations.
References:
Researcher’s experience

100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

75:

50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

25:

0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

35. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

35. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

References:
The Public Accounts Committee. The Finance Committee also has a role here.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such body exists. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not under the direction of the legislature.

36. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

75

36a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.
The Auditor General performs below par because it is not sufficiently funded.

References:
The Auditor General is the channel through which the financial affairs of the agency come to the attention of the Public Accounts Committee.

100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:

50: Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

25:

0: There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

36b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

Comments:
The Chairman of this Committee is, by convention, a member of an/the opposition party.

References:
Researcher’s own work on Parliament in 2003;
Mr Freddie Blay.

100: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee’s work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

75:

50: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members’ ability to shape the committee’s activities.

25:
0: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

36c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Researcher's observation

100: This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.

25:

0: This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee's behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

36d. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
This is true, because the Chairman is, by convention, a member of the opposition, rather than the government.

References:
Researcher's observation

100: When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

75:

50: The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:
0: The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. Civil Service Regulations

37. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

37a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

References:
Civil Service Law, 1993 (PNDCL 327)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

37b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 24, Code of Conduct for Public Officers;
The Public Service Law, 1993
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

37c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

References:
Act 456, Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, 1993

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism’s decisions to the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

37d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

References:
Civil Service Law, 1993 (PNDC Law 327) Art. 58

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

38. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

81

38a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.
Comments:
At the very top, the civil servant is the minister's adviser. Appointments take that into account.

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

100: Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

75:

50: Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:

0: Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

38b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

Comments:
For say 95% of the service, professional criteria would operate. At the very top of the administrative hierarchy, other criteria, most often party affiliation, may influence appointments.

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:
Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

38c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

75:

50: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

25:

0: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

100: Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position's authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

75:

50: Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some
Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position’s responsibilities, authority, or pay.

In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small faction of total pay.

If bonuses are perhaps a synonym for allowances, e.g. allowance for living in your own house instead of being housed by the government, then these can be quite a large proportion of a top civil servant's emolument.

Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

This used to be so. But, apparently because of the rapid, massive changes that seem to be going on all the time with restructuring of the service, the practice of gazetting authorized civil service positions along with the number has virtually disappeared.

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission
The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission
In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

38i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

39. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

39a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

1992 Constitution, Code of Conduct for Public Officers;
Public Service Law, 1993
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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**References:**
It is not in the Public Service Law, nor in the Constitution.

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<tr>
<td>39c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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**References:**
Constitution, Code of Conduct for Public Officers.

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<td>39d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.</td>
<td>100</td>
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**Comments:**
There are no such regulations.
100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

39e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

39f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission
References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public Service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission;
Interviews with two senior civil servants.

100: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

75:

50: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

25:

0: Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

40. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

40a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | NO

Comments:
No Freedom of Information Act exists yet.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

40b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.
IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

41. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?
41a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

**YES | NO**

**References:**
There is no whistle-blower law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

41b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

**References:**
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

**100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0**

**100:** Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

41c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
YES | NO

Comments:
According to Professor Woode, a Code of Conduct in many private sector corporations evidently encourages whistle blowing with protection.

References:
Jesse Clottey, Director, Technical Services, The Private Enterprise Foundation;
Mr. Yaw Frempong, Program Officer, also at The Private Enterprise Foundation

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

41d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public Service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

100: Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

42. Is there an effective internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) where civil servants can report corruption?

0

42a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.
References:
No such office exists, according to Professor Woode.

100: The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.
75:
50: The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.
25:
0: The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

42b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

References:
No such office exists, according to Professor Woode.

100: The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.
75:
50: The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.
25:
0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

42c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.
References:
No such office exists, according to Professor Woode.

100: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

42d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

References:
No such office exists, according to Professor Woode.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies’ investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.
43. Is the public procurement process effective?

90

43a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

| YES | NO |

References:
Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private gain for public procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

43b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

| YES | NO |

Comments:
The scheme of service provides for the teaching of a procurement class.

References:
Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), Art.3 (j) and (k)

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, or voluntary.

43c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

50: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

43d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

43e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

There is no section of the Procurement Law or the Public Service Law or the Internal Revenue Service law that suggests this.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663)

YES: A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

NO: A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).
43f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

**References:**
Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

43g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

**References:**
Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

43h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

**References:**
Newspaper reports of court battles, for instance between Ghanaian textbook suppliers and the Ministry of Education over a procurement award to Macmillan publishers of Great Britain.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.
43i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
The system of blacklisting exists.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

43j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public Service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

44. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

100

44a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.
YES | NO

**References:**
Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663)

**YES**: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

44b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

**References:**
Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663)

**YES**: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

44c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;

**100**: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75**: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.
0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public Service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

44e. In practice, major public procurements are widely advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Frequent newspaper reports

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government Web site, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.
44f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman, Public service Commission;
Mr. Mike Gabah, Secretary, Public Service Commission

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75: 

50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

25: 

0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.

IV-4. Privatization

45. Is the privatization process effective?

92

45a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO

References:
Divestiture of State Interests (Implementation) Law, 1993 (PNDC Law 326)

YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.
NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

45b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 26;
PNDC Law 326

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

45c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
From the website of the Committee, www.dic.com.gh and from the researcher’s visit to the office in Accra, the researcher’s impression is that there a more professional staff is in charge than in 2003.

References:
Newspaper reports of divestiture scandals during and before 2001.

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

46. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?
46a. In law, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids.

| YES | NO |

References:
PNDC Law 326

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of publishing the details of privatization bids that makes information available to all citizens.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no formal publication process, or if any citizens are excluded by law from accessing this information.

46b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

| YES | NO |

References:
PNDC Law 326

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

46c. In practice, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Researcher’s experience of dealing with that office.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.
75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

46d. In practice, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids at a reasonable cost.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Their publications are available for free.

References:
Researcher’s experience

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. National Ombudsman

47. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100
47. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Chapter 18; Act 456 of 1993

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

48. Is the national ombudsman effective?

48a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Arts. 223, 225, 226, 227 and 228 respectively on the Terms and Conditions of Service of the Commissioners, on the Independence of Commission and Commissioners, on the Appointment of Staff, on the Expenses of the Commission Charged on the Consolidated Fund, and on the difficult procedure for the Removal of Commissioners;
Act 456, the statutory Act that puts flesh on the Constitutional bare bones of the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), confirms the legal protection of CHRAJ from political interference.

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

48b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
### Comments:
The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) is independent from political interference.

### References:
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ.

| 100 | This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. |
| 75 | |
| 50 | This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations. |
| 25 | |
| 0 | This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information. |

48c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

| 100 | |
| 75 | |
| 50 | |
| 25 | |
| 0 | |

### Comments:
There has been only one other 'Ombudsman' since the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) was established in 1993. He resigned to take up a similar post in another African country.

### References:
1992 Constitution, Art. 228;
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ

| 100 | The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power. |
| 75 | |
| 50 | The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure. |
| 25 | |
The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

48d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
I have visited the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) premises at least ten times over the past five years, in connection with various consultancy work, and the full time professional staff there are very much in evidence.

References:
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ

100: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

48e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In making appointments, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) has to act in consultation with the Public Service Commission, according to both the Constitution (Article 226) and CHRAJ Act, and it does.

References:
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman of the Public Service Commission.

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.
25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

48f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Under the current administration, political considerations are not as important in funding as they appeared to be in the past. However, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) Annual Reports indicate that funding continues to be inadequate for its mandate.

References:
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ
Annual Budgets of Ghana;
Annual Reports to Parliament

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

48g. In practice, the agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Commission also issues, from time to time, publications on various aspects of its work. Its Reports and publications are in the public domain and are distributed, or can be picked up, freely.

References:
The Commission's Annual Report to Parliament is mandatory.

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.
The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

48h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

References:
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ;
Reports of the Commission

100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

48i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

References:
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ;
Annual Reports to Parliament.

Comments:
In criminal cases, the agency cannot prosecute or impose penalties. Its reports go to the Attorney General who decides whether to prosecute or not.
100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

48j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
On the whole, in cases of administrative injustices, the government acts on the findings of the agency.

References:
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ;
Newspaper reports of lack of government action on Reports of CHRAJ;
Investigations into allegations of corruption, or against Ministers during the NDC period.

100: Ombudsman’s reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, ombudsman’s reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.

48k. In practice, the agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The process takes between two to three months for resolution of uncomplicated citizen complaints. A high turnover of lawyers, who command better pay outside the public service, is beginning to present a problem, slowing down processes.
**References:**
Mr. Bosompem, Public Affairs Manager of CHRAJ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### 49. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td>49a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**YES** | **NO**

**Comments:**
From researcher’s own experience, as a user of the Commission’s publications, the Commission’s Reports are easy to access, once they have been tabled in Parliament (in the case of the Annual Reports).

**References:**
Article 21, (1) (f) guarantees the right to information, subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic state”.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td>49b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**
Citizens can obtain the documents instantly, once they have spoken to the public affairs manager. If the agency runs out of copies, they will make additional ones and distribute them.
References: 
Researcher’s experience

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Their publications are free.

References: 
Researcher’s experience

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

50. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?
50. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Arts. 187, 188;
Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

51. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

91

51a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Arts. 187, 188;
Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584)

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

51b. In practice, the head of the agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.
References:
Mr. Lamptey, Deputy Auditor-General;
Professor S.N.Woode, Chairman of Public Services Commission

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

51c. In practice, the agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The agency has full-time staff, but this is not to say that it has the establishment it would like to have in order to carry out its mandate, or even that it is able to fill all its establishment positions. Salaries and conditions of service are uncompetitive compared especially with the private sector.

References:
Mr. Lamptey, Deputy Auditor-General

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders it ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

51d. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the agency.
Comments:
Procedures for recruiting into the Service involve the participation of the Public Service Commission, the acknowledged guarantor of the application of appropriate criteria to ensure professionalism and independence in recruitment.

References:
Mr. Lamptey, Deputy Auditor-General;  
Professor S.N.Woode, Chairman of Public Services Commission

100: Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

51e. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
It is generally agreed by officers of the Service and by impartial observers that funding tends to fall far short of what is required for creditable performance. But as far as one can ascertain, the shortfall is not the result of political considerations, just inadequate government revenue.

References:
Mr. Lamptey, Deputy Auditor-General;  
Professor S.N.Woode, Chairman of Public Services Commission

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.
51f. In practice, the agency makes regular public reports.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The agency fulfills the constitutional requirement and sends annual reports to Parliament.

References:
Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee Documents

100: The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

51g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the agency.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The fact that the same problems come up year after year suggests that remedial actions are either non-existent or ineffective.

References:
Parliamentary reports suggest that the Reports of the Auditor-General are taken seriously and that they provoke concerned debates.

100: Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.
51h. In practice, the supreme audit institution is able to initiate its own investigations.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
There are newspaper reports of investigations into incidents of malfeasance, embezzlement, conflicts of interests, etc. on the part of public servants.

References:
Mr. Lamptey, Deputy Auditor-General

100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

52. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

100

52a. In law, citizens can access reports of the agency.

YES  |  NO

References:
Mr. Lamptey, Deputy Auditor-General;
Professor S.N.Woode, Chairman of Public Services Commission
Researcher’s observation

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.
52b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Once reports are in the public domain, they are easily accessible to the public.

References:
Mr. Lamptey, Deputy Auditor-General

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

52c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
As in all state institutions in Ghana, documents available to the public cost hardly anything.

References:
Researcher's experience

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
53. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

100

53. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

References:
Internal Revenue Act, 2000 (Act 592)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

54. Is the tax collection agency effective?

100

54a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The researcher knows several of their offices, including one near the University.

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.
0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

54b. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

References:
Professor S.N. Woode, Chairman of Public Services Commission

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

55. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

50

References:
Persistent national debates in newspapers and over the airwaves suggest that persons operating at the lower end of the vast informal sector of the economy hardly pay any tax.

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:

50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.
Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

56. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

YES | NO

References:
Customs and Excise and Preventive Service (Mgt) Law, 1993 (PNDC Law 330)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

57. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

100

57a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Paakow Ekumah, Public Relations Officer, CEPS

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.
57b. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Paakow Ekumah, Public Relations Officer, CEPS

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

58. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Differences in the degree of enforcement would not be systemic or systematic, but the result of individual corruption.

References:
Paakow Ekumah, Public Relations Officer, CEPS

100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

75:

50: Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.
0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. Financial Sector Regulation

59. In law, is there a financial regulatory agency overseeing publicly listed companies?

YES

NO

References:
Securities Exchange Commission Act 590

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency tasked with overseeing publicly listed companies in the public interest and ensuring that disclosure rules are met.

NO: A NO score is earned if this function is spread over several agencies or does not exist.

60. Is the financial regulatory agency effective?

YES

NO

References:
Securities Exchange Commission Act 590
YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

60b. In practice, the agency has a professional, full-time staff.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Emmanuel T Ashong-Katai, Head, Research and Market Development, Securities and Exchange Commission

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

60c. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Government funding accounts for about 80 percent of its income.

References:
Emmanuel T Ashong-Katai, Head, Research and Market Development, Securities and Exchange Commission

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:
0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

60d. In practice, when necessary, the financial regulatory agency independently initiates investigations.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
Emmanuel T Ashong-Katai, Head, Research and Market Development, Securities and Exchange Commission

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

75:

50: The agency starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

60e. In practice, when necessary, the financial regulatory agency imposes penalties on offenders.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
Emmanuel T Ashong-Katai, Head, Research and Market Development, Securities and Exchange Commission

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan
61. Can citizens access the financial records of publicly listed companies?

92

61a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of publicly listed companies.

YES | NO

References:
Act 590;
The Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179)

YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all publicly traded companies is required by law to be public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any category of publicly-owned or publicly-traded company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

61b. In practice, the financial records of publicly listed companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The records are updated four times a year.

References:
Emmanuel T Ashong-Katai, Head, Research and Market Development, Securities and Exchange Commission

100: Publicly traded companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

75:

50: Publicly traded companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

25:

0: Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value to investors.

61c. In practice, the financial records of publicly listed companies are audited according to international accounting standards.
References:
Emmanuel T Ashong-Katai, Head, Research and Market Development, Securities and Exchange Commission

100: Financial records of all public companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

75: Financial records of public companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

50: Publicly traded companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

61d. In practice, citizens can access the records of disciplinary decisions imposed by the government on publicly-listed companies.

Comments:
Normally these records are confidential, but if policy violations are involved the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) wants the media to get hold of it.

References:
Emmanuel T Ashong-Katai, Head, Research and Market Development, Securities and Exchange Commission

100: These records are freely available to all citizens through a formal official process.

75: These records are available to all citizens, with some exceptions.

50: These records are generally not available through official processes.

61e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of publicly listed companies within a reasonable time period.
### Financial Records of Publicly Listed Companies

#### 100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

#### 75:

#### 50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

#### 25:

#### 0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

In practice, citizens can access the financial records of publicly listed companies at a reasonable cost.

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#### Comments:
Shareholders have to be given the financial reports free of charge.

### Business Licensing and Regulation

#### 100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

#### 75:

#### 50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

#### 25:

#### 0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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### References:
Emmanuel T Ashong-Katai, Head, Research and Market Development, Securities and Exchange Commission; Researcher’s experience
62. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

88

62a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES  |  NO

References:
Article 8 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179)

YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required.

62b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES  |  NO

References:
The Companies Code

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

62c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0
Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months.

Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

Do businesses receive equitable regulatory treatment from the government?

In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting health, safety, and environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES  |  NO
YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting health, safety, and environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

63b. In practice, business inspections by the government are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Yaw Frempong, Programme Officer, Private Enterprise Foundation, Accra

100: Business inspections by the government (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are routinely carried out by the government in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law

64. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

89

64a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.
YES | NO

References:
The Criminal Code, 1960, Act 29

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
The Criminal Code, 1960

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
The Criminal Code, 1960

YES: A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.
**Comments:**
Both bribe giver and taker are liable.

**References:**
The Criminal Code, 1960

**YES:** A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.
**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

**64e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.**

**Comments:**
Territoriality is what counts, i.e. that the bribery takes place in Ghana, and not the nationality of the giver or taker.

**References:**
The Criminal Code, 1960

**YES:** A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.
**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

**64f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.**

**References:**
Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1993, Act 458, Article 179C criminalises corruption, which is defined as using public office for profit*.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.
**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.
64g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

**YES**  |  **NO**

**Comments:**
Insider trading is illegal.

**References:**
Criminal Code

YES: A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

**YES**  |  **NO**

**References:**
According to Mr. Kyei, Research Officer in the Research Department of the Bank of Ghana, there is no specific law yet criminalizing money laundering in Ghana.

YES: A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

**YES**  |  **NO**

**References:**
The Criminal Code
VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

65. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

YES | NO

References:
Act 416 of 1993 establishes the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

66. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

69

YES | NO

66a. In law, the agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

Comments:
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is an agency of the Ministry of Attorney General and Justice.
YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

66b. In practice, the agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Although the SFO is under the Attorney General, in practice it is widely known to be independent.

References:
The Director in charge of Operations at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)

100: This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

75:

50: This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

66c. In practice, the head of the agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
The Director in charge of Operations at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)
The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

In practice, appointments to the agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

In practice, the agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.
The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

0: The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

In practice, the agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

In practice, the agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.
66h. In practice, the agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The director of the Operations at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) considers that the agency is efficient in terms of legal mandate and inefficient in terms of practical approach.

References:
The Director in charge of Operations at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)

100: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

66i. In practice, when necessary, the agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
The Director in charge of Operations at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.
67. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

75

67a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The Director in charge of Operations at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

67b. In practice, citizens can complain to the agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The Director in charge of Operations at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)

100: Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:
Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

81
VI-3. Rule of Law

68. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

58

68a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

References:
The 1992 Constitution, Art. 137(2)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

68b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer, and a practising lawyer

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:
Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.
50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

70. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

70. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Freddie Blay, a lawyer, considers that judicial decisions are completely enforced by the state; Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer and a practising lawyer, considers that the judicial decisions are about 60 percent enforced by the state.

100: Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

71. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

71a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

71b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Freddie Blay, a lawyer, considers that national-level judges are entirely protected from political interference; Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer and a practising lawyer, considers that national-level judges are only 80 percent protected from political interference.

100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:

0: National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

71c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Executive branch does not control the process. The judges themselves do not have influence over which cases they adjudicate. But Mr. Faibille is adamant that lawyers who know which judges they would rather have, influence the Registrar who is supposed to distribute the cases blindly and impartially.

References:
Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer, and a practising lawyer
Freddie Blay, a lawyer
YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

71d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

References:
1992 Constitution, Art. 146

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

72. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

72a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

Comments:
Judges usually have police escort.

References:
Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer, and a practising lawyer
Freddie Blay, a lawyer
Professon Kumado

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.
72b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

Comments:
This would have made such news that it would have been impossible to miss it.

References:
Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer, and a practising lawyer;
Freddie Blay, a lawyer

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

73. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

75

73a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer, and a practising lawyer
Freddie Blay, a lawyer
Professor Kumado

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.
73b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer, and a practising lawyer
Freddie Blay, a lawyer
Professon Kumado

100: Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system.

75:

50: Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes.

25:

0: Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence.

73c. In practice, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Professor Kumado

100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well trained and effective in representing the rights of indigent defendants.

75:

50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some indigent defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

25:

0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most indigent defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

73d. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.
In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In some cases, the cost is prohibitive. The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.

In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In some cases, the cost is prohibitive. The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.
References:
Egbert Faibille, Jnr, Editor of The Ghanaian Observer, and a practising lawyer
Freddie Blay, a lawyer
Professon Kumado

100: Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

75:

50: Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

25:

0: Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

VI-4. Law Enforcement

74. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

75

74a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

References:
Egbert Faibille, Editor of the Ghanaian Observer;
Ben Ephson, Editor of Despatch

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.
Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

74b. In practice, the agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Police funding woes are never far from crises point and are constantly in the national press.

References:
Egbert Faibille, Editor of the Ghanaian Observer;
Ben Ephson, Editor of Despatch

100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

74c. In practice, the agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is a Police Council to help insulate the Police Service from political interference, despite the fact that the Inspector General of Police is appointed by the President.

References:
Egbert Faibille, Editor of the Ghanaian Observer;
Ben Ephson, Editor of Despatch

100: The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.
The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

75. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

88

75a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Public Complaints Unit of the Police is not independent, in the sense of being outside the Police. But it is an independent mechanism in the sense that it is not a part of any of the operational units the public are likely to complain about.

References:
There is nothing in the Police Service Act, or in any other legislation, that sets up any such independent complaints unit. But the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action, although it is not specifically or exclusively for complaints about the police. In addition, the Police have an internal mechanism for dealing with public complaints about the police.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions.
NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism.

75b. In practice, the independent reporting mechanism responds to citizen’s complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Police are not generally known in Ghana for speed in their investigations.

References:
Conversation with an ex-Inspector General of Police.
100: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

75c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES    |    NO

Comments:
Such an agency exists, but it is not specific for law enforcement officials; it is for all cases of administrative injustice and allegations of corruption against public officers. However, while the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) is authorised to investigate and prosecute in cases of human rights abuse and administrative injustice, in the case of allegations of corruption it is required to hand over the report of its investigation to the Attorney General for prosecution, if he/she decides to do so.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity is separate from the regular police department.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

75d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100    |    75    |    50    |    25    |    0

References:
The Director in charge of Operations at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:
50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

References:
1992 Constitution, Art.293, Claims against government;
The Criminal Code does not exempt law enforcement officials from criminal proceedings

YES | NO

75e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

References:
There are constant newspaper reports on policemen being arraigned before courts for criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

100: Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

75:

50: Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

25:

0: Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.