Overall Score:

59 - Very Weak

Legal Framework Score:

79 - Moderate

Actual Implementation Score:

39 - Very Weak

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

100

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

Comments:
Tanzanian CSOs were involved in extended consultations with the government over proposed legislation to regulate the registration, funding and activities of NGOs, but they were not happy with the bill that was eventually passed by the National Assembly in 2002. To date, the new Act has not been enforced because high levels of non-compliance with its requirements by NGOs.

NGOs have to disclose their source of funding to satisfy both the legal requirements and their donors. While some politicians accept that NGOs/CSOs have a role to play, many others consider them to be foreign mouthpieces with no real constituencies.

References:
Interview with NGO staff;

Mercer, Claire
Performing Partnership: Civil Society and the Illusion of Good Governance in Tanzania,
Political Geography, 27(7), pp. 741-63
2003

Cooksey, Brian
Corruption and Governance in Tanzania: What Does the Literature Say?
The Societies Act, Cap 337 (R.E.2002);
The Non-Government Organizations Act, 2002;
Companies Ordinance, Cap 212 (for companies limited by guarantee)

NOTE: Most of the legislation cited is sourced from the Laws of Tanzania (Revised Edition of 2002), which also contains legislation for 2003 and 2004.

### YES:
A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

### NO:
A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
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**Comments:**
Most NGOs are heavily dependent on external aid.

**References:**
The Societies Act, Chapter 337 (R.E.2002)

### YES:
A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

### NO:
A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
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</table>

**Comments:**
NGOs are required to file their audited accounts with the Registrar annually. Audited accounts indicate the source of funding. Donor agencies may require their contributions to be acknowledged in this way too.

**References:**
Non-Government Organizations Act, 2002
YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

75

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
A plethora of good governance/anti-corruption NGOs/CSOs have been registered in recent years.

References:
Mercer, Claire
Performing Partnership: Civil Society and the Illusion of Good Governance in Tanzania,
Political Geography, 27(7), pp. 741-63
2003

100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

75:

50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is much greater involvement in policy-making than in politics. A number of international and local NGOs are formally involved in governance-related policy and budgetary processes such as the Public Expenditure Review, but are not considered legitimate political actors by many in the state apparatus since they are unelected (and foreign-funded).
Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

HakiElimu (right to education) was hounded by the minister of Education, Joseph Mungai, for allegedly portraying an unfair picture of the basic education sector.

A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned related to work covering corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the activist's work was related to the charges, then a NO score is earned.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

References:
Legal and Human Rights Centre
Tanzania Human Rights Report 2005
LHCR/Haki Elimu,
Dar es Salaam, 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist's work.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

References:
Legal and Human Rights Centre
Tanzania Human Rights Report 2005
LHCR/Haki Elimu,
Dar es Salaam, 2006
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed related to a corruption case in the specific study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

75

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

Comments:
Since the advent of political pluralism, the trade union movement is no longer a formal affiliate of the (still) ruling party.

References:
The Employment and Labour Relations Act, 2004, No. 7;
Trade Union Act, Chapter 244 (R.E.2002)

YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Trade Unions are politically irrelevant and industrial action is very rare. However, foreign investors consider industrial relations ‘inflexible’.
100: Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

I-2. Media

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

References:
YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form media entities?

69

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with former media owner

100: Media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system.

75:

50: Formation of media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

6b. In law, where a media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.
**References:**
Interview with former media owner

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied media license. A YES score is also earned if no license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a media license within a reasonable time period.

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**Comments:**
Licensing is required and usually takes more than two months.

**References:**
Interview with former media owner

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a media license at a reasonable cost.

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**References:**
Interview with former media owner
100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained online or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are the media able to report on corruption?

75

7a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES  |  NO

Comments: There are numerous ‘untouchables’ (and untouchable areas such as the misuse of foreign loans) within the political system whose activities are strictly off-limits for investigative journalists. According to the IPI (2005): Tanzania is among the 50 countries in the world with partial press freedom."

References:
International Press Institute
Status of World Press Freedom,
May 2005

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

7b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments: Media self-censorship is widely practiced. Senior political figures have taken media houses to court for libel, claiming hefty damages (but this is rare).
According to USADI/ARD 2003, the media practice self-censorship over the activities of the police and security forces, particularly outside Dar es Salaam.

References:
USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State
ARD Inc.
Burlington, Vermont, November, 2003;

Interviews

100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75:

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

25:

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

7c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint on publishing corruption-related stories.

Comments:
The government does not prevent the publication of corruption-related materials, but self-censorship performs this function.

References:
Interview with former media owner

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. In countries where illiteracy is higher, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material.
8. Are the media credible sources of information?

63

8a. In law, media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

| YES | NO |

References:
The Broadcasting Services Act, Chapter 306;
The Newspaper Act, Chapter 229

YES: A YES score is earned if media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

8b. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0  

Comments:
Regardless of ownership … the media in Tanzania is not yet free of the political patronage system. The media have been captured by the rich and powerful in politics and business [who are] shaping the coverage of the media through payments to media executives or individual journalists.”(ESRF/FACEIT 2002:127-8). Technical capacity is often lacking. Journalists rarely stick with a story. Names of key figures in corruption-related stories are sometimes withheld.

References:
Economic and Social Research Foundation/Front Against Corrupt Elements in Tanzania

USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State
ARD Inc., Burlington, Vermont, November, 2003

100: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.
Editors and journalists are widely known to sell favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

8c. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

Comments:
According to the TAMWA/MISA/UNA report (page 5), the weight of coverage by state-owned and private-owned (sic) media was overwhelmingly in favour of CCM [Chama Cha Madinduzi, the ruling party]. Like state-owned radio and television stations, the private media “were tilted towards the ruling party whether by design or default.” There was one exception: “The state-owned newspapers, the Daily News in particular, tried to give equitable, fair and regular coverage to all contending political parties” (page 6).

References:

100
75
50
25
0

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75:

50: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25:

0: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

8d. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

Comments:
There are massive and systematic biases towards the ruling party/government in the official media.

References:
ESRF/FACEIT
Annual Report of the State of Corruption in Tanzania, pp.127-8
2002
The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content.

The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

9. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

100

9a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

Comments:
Tanzania does not have a strong tradition of investigative journalism on corruption issues.

References:
Legal and Human Rights Centre
Tanzania Human Rights Report 2004
LHCR/Haki Elimu,
Dar es Salaam, 2005

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

9b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

9c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual’s work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

I-3. Public Access to Information

10. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

33

10a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | NO
Comments:
This article guarantees the right of citizens to access government information, though as yet there are no formal mechanisms in place for this to happen. A draft Freedom of Information Bill due to be presented to the next parliamentary session has been heavily criticized by academics, media owners, and civil society activists because of its restrictive clauses and limitations of press freedoms.

References:
Dar es Salaam, June 2005

Article 18 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access any government documents. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request. There should be a formal process for requesting this information.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

10b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES    |    NO

References:
USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State
ARD Inc.,
Burlington, Vermont, November, 2003

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

10c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES    |    NO

References:
USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State
ARD Inc.,
Burlington, Vermont, November, 2003
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

11. Is the right of access to information effective?

5

11a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is no legislation that specifically addresses access to information.

References:
USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State
ARD Inc., Burlington, Vermont, November, 2003

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

11b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is no legislation that specifically addresses access to information.
100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

11c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
There is no legislation that specifically addresses access to information.

References:
USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State
ARD Inc.,
Burlington, Vermont, November, 2003

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

11d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.
Comments:
There is no legislation that specifically addresses access to information.

References:
USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State
ARD Inc.,
Burlington, Vermont, November, 2003

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

11e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

Comments:
There is no legislation that specifically addresses access to information.

References:
USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State
ARD Inc.,
Burlington, Vermont, November, 2003

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.
II-1. Voting & Citizen Participation

12. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

12a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Art. 5

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of that country. A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

12b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Art. 65

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.
13. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

75

13a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

Comments:
Voting is open to all citizens. However, there have been complaints concerning serious voting irregularities, particularly in Zanzibar.

References:
Legal and Human Rights Centre
Tanzania Human Rights Report 2005
LHCR, Haki Elimu,
Dar es Salaam, 2006

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

13b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

Comments:
Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting. Cases of double voting are also reported.

References:
Research and Education for Democracy
Democratic Transition in East Africa, E&D Limited, Dar es Salaam, 2005;
Cooksey, Brian
‘Corruption and Governance in Tanzania: What Does the Literature Say?’
Report for the Royal Norwegian Embassy and the Governance Working Group, Section V
Dar es Salaam, June 2005
Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

100: Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

65

14a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.
YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

14b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

References:
Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

14c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
One opposition party in particular (the Civic United Front – CUF) has complained about harassment and intimidation. The problem is acute in Zanzibar, where political affiliations are polarised between the ruling party and an equally popular opposition party, and between Zanzibar’s two main islands (Unguja and Pemba).

References:
Interview with political scientist

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

75:

50: Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.
Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

Comments:
Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot, including bribery during the selection process (this applies to the ruling party in particular, where the short-listing process is tantamount to being elected in the majority of cases). The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

References:
Interview with political scientist

While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing do may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

Comments:
Since even the ruling party has little effective control of the executive, the role of opposition parties is even weaker.

References:
Cooksey, Brian
‘Corruption and Governance in Tanzania: What Does the Literature Say?’
Report for the Royal Norwegian Embassy and the Governance Working Group, pp. 27, 32-35
Dar es Salaam, June 2005

Interviews
The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition’s ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature’s proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

II-2. Election Integrity

15. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

Comments:
The agency is called the National Electoral Commission (NEC).

References:
The National Election Act, Chapter 343

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency or set of agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or set of agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police.

16. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

YES  |  NO

16a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.
YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies being contested in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no election monitoring agency.

16b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100  75  50  25  0

Comments:
Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, key individuals appointed may have clear or implicit party loyalties.

References:
Interview with member of the National Electoral Commission (NEC)

100: Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

16c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.
Comments:
The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

References:
Researcher’s experience;
Interviews

100: The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

16d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The official report for the December 2005 elections is still not publicly available (31 August 2006).

References:
Visit to National Electoral Commission (NEC)

100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

75:

50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

16e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.
Comments:
Under the National Election Act (Cap 343) the National Electoral Commission (NEC) has no powers to impose penalties and refers all election offences in Section 104-128 to the police for investigations and prosecution.

References:
National Election Act, Chapter 343

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

75: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

17. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

71

17a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

Comments:
There are opposition complaints concerning serious voter registration abuses, particularly in Zanzibar.

References:
TEMCO
The 2000 General Elections in Tanzania
Dar es Salaam, 2001

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters
may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

| 25: |

| 0: | The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost* voting by non-existent voters is common. |

17b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

| YES | NO |

References:
National Election Act, Section 142-144

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

17c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Candidates, including ruling party candidates, rather than voters sometimes appeal against results, and appeals may be upheld.

References:
Interviews

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.
17d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

Comments:
The opposition Civic United Front (CUF) party complained about the heavy presence of security personnel at polling stations during the 2000 and 2005 elections.

References:
Newspaper reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

References:
National Election Act, Section 142-144

YES: A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

17f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.
Comments:
Election observers generally have access to polling and counting stations. Most irregularies take place at the voter registration stage, which election monitors do not monitor.

References:
Interview with political scientist

| 100: | Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers’ activities. |
| 75: | Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement. |
| 50: | Election observers’ movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective. |

II-3. Political Financing

18. Are there regulations governing political financing?

50

18a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

Comments:
The regulations only concern contribution from foreign organisations or non-citizens from outside Tanzania.

NOTE: Political parties receive official financing in proportion to their representation in parliament. Thus, the ruling party, with a large majority of seats, receives the lion’s share of official funding.
### 18b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Comments:**
In law there is no limit on individual donations.

### 18c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Comments:**
In law there is no limit on corporate donations.

### 18d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
The law is silent on the issue.

References:
National Election Act

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

YES: In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

NO: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

Comments:
The regulations only concern contribution from outside Tanzania, from foreign organization or non-citizens. Internally, all political parties are required to submit annual audited accounts to the Registrar of Political Parties.

References:
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

19. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

0

19a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual’s ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There are no limits on donations to parties or candidates.

References:
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

19b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company’s ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There are no limits to corporate contributions.
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

19c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party’s ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no effective limits.

References:
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

19d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.
100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**
This is not applicable.

**References:**
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.</td>
<td>75:</td>
<td>50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.</td>
<td>25:</td>
<td>0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.</td>
<td>75:</td>
<td>50: The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
<td>25:</td>
<td>0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19f. In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.
Comments:
Audits performed have no value in tracking contributions.

References:
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

100: Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

75:

50: Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

20. Can citizens access records related to political financing?

0

20a. In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures.

References:
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

100: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.
Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regularly withheld from public disclosure.

20b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There are no such legal access provisions.

References:
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

20c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures.

References:
The Political Parties Act, Chapter 258 (R.E. 2002)

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.
Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

## Category III. Government Accountability

### III-1. Executive Accountability

21. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**YES**

A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

**NO**

A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

References:
The Government Proceedings Act, Chapter 5, Sections 3-5

22. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

22a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.
**Comments:**
Major decisions, for example on large development or construction projects, are made in the absence of adequate discussion or subsequent explanation by the executive. Agreement conditions ('conditionalities') with international financial institutions are generally not made public.

**References:**
Andrew Lawson and Lise Rakner
Understanding Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania
Final Synthesis Report
Oxford Policy Management, Chr. Michelson Institute, REPOA, August 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
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22b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

**References:**
Law Reform Act (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions), Chapter 310, Sections 17-19

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<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.
Comments:
Ad hoc commissions of inquiry may be set up to investigate issues, including major accidents/disasters. Officials are rarely held accountable; findings are sometimes not made public. There are long delays in making rulings.

References:
Sections 17-19 of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Cap 310

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?
23a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
Only the President has immunity from criminal proceedings, unless he is impeached by the National Assembly.

**References:**
Presidential Affairs Act Cap 9;
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

23b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
Higher officials can be prosecuted under the criminal law.

**References:**
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

24. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

24a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.
YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

24b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

Comments:
The forms are filed annually.

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Chapter 398

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

NO: A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

24c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Section 6(1)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.
NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

24d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

Comments:
The law is silent on this.

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

24e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Section 6(3)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

24f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.
References:
Researcher’s experience

The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

24g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.
24h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

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</table>

**Comments:**
There is no legal requirement for this.

**References:**
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
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</table>

100: Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

25. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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</table>

25a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

**References:**
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Section 6(1), Section 20(3)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.
25b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
It is virtually impossible for the public or journalists to access the asset disclosure forms of individual politicians or civil servants.

References:
Brian Cooksey
Wealth Declarations in East Africa – A Means of Combatting Corruption?
Thematic paper III, Centra, Washington DC, 2004

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

25c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Files are not accessible.

References:
Brian Cooksey
Wealth Declarations in East Africa – A Means of Combatting Corruption?
Thematic paper III, Centra, Washington DC, 2004

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:
26. In practice, is the ruling party distinct from the state?

50

Comments:
The separation of party and state is a very recent phenomenon: the first multi-party elections were held in 1985. Not surprisingly, there are still gray areas. For example, regional and district commissioners are appointed by the President, not elected, but they assume executive functions. The President can veto legislation passed by the National Assembly. The most disturbing new trend is for the incumbents of state power to use political corruption to keep the ruling party in power.

References:
Brian Cooksey
Wealth Declarations in East Africa – A Means of Combating Corruption?, pp.27
Thematic paper III, Centra, Washington DC, 2004

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

50: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:

0: The government is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

III-2. Legislative Accountability

27. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

75

27a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.
Comments:
The judiciary can only review laws passed by legislature presented to them by individuals, and not on its own motion.

References:
Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Chapter 310

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

27b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The judiciary can only review laws passed by legislature presented to them by individuals, and not on its own motion.

References:
Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Chapter 310

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

27c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?
YES | NO

References:
Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Chapter 310

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.

28. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

43

28a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

Comments:
Over 1,000 officials are considered ‘leaders’ for the purposes of the legislation.

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Chapter 398

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

28b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Chapter 398
YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

28c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Chapter 398

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

28d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

Comments:
This requirement is not provided for by law. There are efforts to amend the relevant law.

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Chapter 398

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

28e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.
**Comments:**
The law is not enforced.

**References:**
Researcher’s observation

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

**28f.** In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

**Comments:**
The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced.

**References:**
Interviews

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.
28g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
This requirement is not provided for by law. There are efforts to amend the relevant law.

References:
Interview with lawyer

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

29. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

33

29a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, 1995, No. 13

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

29b. In practice, citizens can access these records within a reasonable time period.
Comments:
It is virtually impossible for the public or journalists to access the declarations of individual politicians or civil servants.

References:
Brian Cooksey
Wealth Declarations in East Africa – A Means of Combatting Corruption?, pp.27
Thematic paper III, Centra, Washington DC, 2004

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

29c. In practice, citizens can access these records at a reasonable cost.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
30. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

67

30a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Arts. 18 (1) and (2)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there are exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

30b. In practice, citizens can access these records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Translating legal and constitutional rights into bureaucratic mandates and operational practice remain a key challenge” (Hakielimu et al., 2005:1).

References:

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.
30c. In practice, citizens can access these records at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Translating legal and constitutional rights into bureaucratic mandates and operational practice remain a key challenge” (Hakielimu et al., 2005:1)

References:

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

50: Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

54

III-3. Judicial Accountability

31. Are judges appointed fairly?

33

31a. In practice, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

| YES | NO |

Comments:
Judges is recommended through a confidential process by professional lawyers in the public and private sectors. The names are then presented to the Judicial Service Commission for their recommendation to the President.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages.

NO: A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight.

31b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

References:
Interview with former state attorney

100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

31c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | NO

Comments:
Once appointed by the President there is no requirement of confirmation.

References:
Interview with former state attorney

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.
32. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

29

32a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
There is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

**References:**
Gloppen, Siri
The Accountability Function of the Courts in Tanzania and Zambia, Democratization, 10(4), Winter, pp. 112-136 2003

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

32b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**
Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, but the explanations may be vague, dubious and perfunctory.

**References:**
Interview with former state attorney

100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

75: 

50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

25:
0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

32c. In law, there is an ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Ombudsman equivalent (the Judicial Service Commission) is for lower levels of the judicial system only (magistrates and district courts) and does not apply to Judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal. High Court/Appeal Court judges' misconduct may be investigated by a panel of judges from the (British) Commonwealth. This has not happened recently, however.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a ombudsman or equivalent mechanism for the judicial system. A judicial ombudsman is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a judicial ombudsman.

32d. In law, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Ombudsman equivalent (the Judicial Service Commission) is for lower levels of the judicial system only (magistrates and district courts) and does not apply to Judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal. High Court/Appeal Court judges' misconduct may be investigated by a panel of judges from the (British) Commonwealth. This has not happened recently, however.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial ombudsman is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative or judicial branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial ombudsman. A NO score is given if the judicial ombudsman function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry or legislative committee.

32e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) initiates investigations.
Comments:
The Ombudsman equivalent (the Judicial Service Commission) is for lower levels of the judicial system only (magistrates and district courts) and does not apply to Judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal. High Court/Appeal Court judges' misconduct may be investigated by a panel of judges from the (British) Commonwealth. This has not happened recently, however.

References:

100: The ombudsman aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The ombudsman is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The ombudsman will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The ombudsman, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The ombudsman rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the ombudsman is partisan in its application of this power.

32f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

Comments:
The Ombudsman equivalent (the Judicial Service Commission) is for lower levels of the judicial system only (magistrates and district courts) and does not apply to Judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal. High Court/Appeal Court judges' misconduct may be investigated by a panel of judges from the (British) Commonwealth. This has not happened recently, however.

References:

100: When rules violations are discovered, the ombudsman is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The ombudsman enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The ombudsman may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:
The ombudsman does not effectively penalize offenders. The ombudsman may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The ombudsman may be partisan in its application of power.

III-4. Budget Processes

33. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

25

33a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

Comments:
The legislature can only approve or disapprove the budget.

References:

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

33b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

Comments:
Budgets and ‘mini budgets’ require parliamentary approval.

References:
100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

25:

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

33c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments: Legislators and committees are inadequately funded and staffed to perform these duties.

References:

100: Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

75:

50: Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

34. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

33

34a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).
Comments:
Budgets are rarely influenced by debates and are usually endorsed as presented. However, actual expenditures vary considerably from agreed budgetary allocations.

References:

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

34b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Citizens, through CSOs, participate in the public expenditure review process, but not at budget hearings.

References:
Interviews

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75:

50: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

25:

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

34c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.
According to the recent Open Budget Project assessment for Tanzania, the government provides citizens with some information on the central government’s budget and financial activities, but there is much room for improvement.

References:
The International Budget Project 2006, Open Budget Initiative, Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

**100**

35. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

**YES** | **NO**

Comments:
These committees have powers to question permanent secretaries on expenditures by ministries.

References:
The Public Expenditure Committee;
Various sectoral committees

**YES**: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if no such body exists. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not under the direction of the legislature.

36. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?
36a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There are the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) for central government accounts and the Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC) for local government authorities. The reports are not sent by department heads to the committee, but rather by the Ministry of Finance.

References:

Interviews with consultants

100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:

50: Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

25:

0: There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

36b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
An opposition MP chairs the Public Accounts Committees, but he/she can be influenced by vested interests.

References:
Interview with permanent secretary

100: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee’s work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.
### 75:

**50:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members’ ability to shape the committee’s activities.

### 25:

**0:** The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

### 36c.

In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

### Comments:

According to Carole Pretorius (2001), despite the recognition of the role of parliamentary committees, their oversight often came too late in the process and there were no mechanisms to ensure follow up of the committees’ recommendations."

### References:

Ministry of Finance, United Republic of Tanzania, 2001 Country Financial Accountability Assessment."

Interviews with consultants.

### 100: This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

### 75:

**50:** This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.

### 25:

**0:** This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee’s behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

### 36d.

In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

### Comments:

The PAC/LAAC have initiated investigations on specific issues, but there is usually no enforcement when wrongdoing is demonstrated.
Interview with consultants.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

75:

50: The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. Civil Service Regulations

37. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

37a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

References:
The Public Service Act, Chapter 298

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

37b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.
37c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

37d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

References:
The Public Service Act, Chapter 298
Standing Orders
38. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

33

38a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Civil servants are frequently the willing or reluctant objects of political interference. Promotion is often dependent on accepting the rationale for political patronage. The pact is a dangerous one, for juniors may take the rap for seniors, though this is relatively rare, since the ‘system’ is in part built around the principle of patron-client relations.

References:
Brian Cooksey
Wealth Declarations in East Africa – A Means of Combatting Corruption?, pp.27
Thematic paper III, Centra, Washington DC, 2004

100: Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

75:

50: Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:

0: Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

38b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
This is one criterion, favouritism and patronage are others that are also applied.
Interview with former head of the Civil Service

100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

38c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

References:
Newspaper reports and commentary, first half of 2006.

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

75:

50: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

25:

0: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

38d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.
Comments:
There are serious anomalies in job descriptions and reporting mechanisms—e.g., for agricultural extension workers and natural resource managers.

References:
Researcher’s observations

100: Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position’s authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

75:

50: Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

25:

0: Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position’s responsibilities, authority, or pay.

38e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Travel and sitting allowances and other benefits constitute a significant proportion of legal civil service pay. Rough estimates are that 50 percent of average civil service income is from corruption.

References:
United Republic of Tanzania
Budget Analysis to Facilitate Pay Reform, Theodore Valentine, Public Service Reform Programme, draft, Dar es Salaam, 2004;

President’s Office, Public Service Management
State of the Public Service Report 2004, Dar es Salaam, June 23, 2005

100: Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

75:

50: Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants’ bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

25:

0: Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.
38f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
This is not done systematically, but piecemeal information of this nature is available.

**References:**
Interview

- **100:** The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.
- **75:**
- **50:** The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.
- **25:**
- **0:** The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

38g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The executive may influence the Labour Tribunal’s decisions.

**References:**
Experiences of aggrieved civil servants

- **100:** The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.
- **75:**
- **50:** The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.
- **25:**
- **0:** The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward.
38h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

Comments:
Most civil servants are paid more or less on time. Some trainee teachers have not been paid for a year.

References:
Researcher’s conversations

38i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

Comments:
Corrupt and incompetent civil servants are frequently moved to undesirable districts and posts. Many junior officials are sacked for corruption.

References:
Researcher’s observations; Interviews

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

Comments:

References:

75:

A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:
39. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

58

39a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

References:
The Public Leadership Code of Ethics (Declaration of Interests, Assets and Liabilities), Chapter 398 – Regulations, Section 32(1) and (2) (a)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

39b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
The Public Leadership Code of Ethics (Declaration of Interests, Assets and Liabilities), Chapter 398 – Regulations, Section 6 (J) (i-iv), Section 32(1) and (2)(a)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

39c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

39d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The Public Leadership Code of Ethics (Declaration of Interests, Assets and Liabilities), Chapter 398 – Regulations, Section 6 (F), Section 32(1) and (2)(a)

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

50: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

39e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
General perceptions and expert opinion suggest the opposite.
**References:**
USAID
Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania, Section 3.5
ARD Inc.,
Burlington, Vermont, November 2003

---

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

---

39f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

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**Comments:**
Examples to the contrary are legion.
The higher civil servants breaking this requirement usually follow instructions from the political class.

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**References:**
ESRF/FACEIT
The State of Corruption in Tanzania, Annual Report,
2003

Brian Cooksey
Wealth Declarations in East Africa – A Means of Combatting Corruption?
Thematic paper III, Centra, Washington DC, 2004

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**100:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

**75:**

**50:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.
40. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

33

40a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | NO

References:
The Public Leadership Code of Ethics (Declaration of Interests, Assets and Liabilities),
Chapter 398 – Regulations, Section 32(1) and (2)(a)

YES: A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

40b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
As with senior politicians, records are virtually unaccessible to the public.

References:
Interviews

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

40c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.
Comments:
Cost is not an issue, since the records are de facto inaccessible.

References:
Researcher’s experience

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

41. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

19

41a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

References:
There is no whistle-blower protection legislation in place.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.
NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

41b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Comments:
The government is planning to introduce whistle-blower protection legislation, under pressure from donor agencies, in particular USAID.

References:
There is no law on whistle-blowers, those who report are treated and protected as informers.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.
41d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Comments:
This is difficult to measure, since such cases are very rare.

References:
Researcher’s observation

100: Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

42. Is there an effective internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) where civil servants can report corruption?

0

42a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

Comments:
There is no internal reporting mechanism established yet.

References:
Interview

100: The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:
The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

Comments:
Public servants are supposed to report corruption, but there is no specific funding for internal hotlines or e-mails.

References:
National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP)

The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Public servants are supposed to report corruption, but there is no specific funding for internal hotlines or e-mails.

References:
Interviews

The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.
50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

42d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Public servants are supposed to report corruption, but there is no specific funding for internal hotlines or e-mails.

References:
Interviews

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies’ investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

9

IV-3. Procurement

43. Is the public procurement process effective?

83

43a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private gain for public procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

43b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:
The Public Procurement Act, Chapter 410

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, or voluntary.

43c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
This is not the case, either for the procurement officials or for non-procurement officials.

References:
United Republic of Tanzania/World Bank
Tanzania: Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR), Volume I, Main Findings and Recommendations
April 2003

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75:
50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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43d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

**References:**
Public Procurement Act, Chapter 400

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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43e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

**Comments:**
Sole-sourcing is only allowed under specified conditions.

**References:**
Public Procurement Act, Chapter 400

<table>
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<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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43f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.
YES: A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

43g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

Comments:
It is very rare for unsuccessful bidders to lodge formal complaints.

References:
Public Procurement Act, Chapter 400, Regulation 53

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

43h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

Comments:
In law, yes, but in practice this does not happen.

References:
Public Procurement Act, Chapter 400, Section 68

YES: A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.
43i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

**YES** | **NO**

References:
Public Procurement Act, Chapter 400, Sections 60-64

**YES**: A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

43j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In practice this does not happen.

References:
Researcher’s experience

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

44. Can citizens access the public procurement process?
44a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

| YES | NO |

References:
Public Procurement Act, Chapter 400

YES: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public.

NO: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

44b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

| YES | NO |

Comments:
They are announced in newspapers of wide circulation.

References:
Public Procurement (Selection of Employment and Consultant), Regulation 14

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

44c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interviews
100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Accessing public procurement regulations is free of charge.

References:
Interviews

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

44e. In practice, major public procurements are widely advertised.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Major procurements are advertised in major national and regional newspapers.

References:
Researcher’s observation
100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government Web site, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

44f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

**Comments:**
Whilst names of the successful bidders are available, the basis for the selection of e.g. the required three firms is unclear and provides ample opportunity for abuse.

**References:**
United Republic of Tanzania
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Review 2005

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75:

50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

25:

0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.

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**IV-4. Privatization**

45. Is the privatization process effective?
45a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO

References:
The Public Corporations Act, Chapter 257
Rubambe, John
The Tanzanian Experience of Privatisation and the Role of the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission, presentation at a Privatisation Workshop organized by the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, Sea Cliff Hotel, Dar es Salaam, September 3-4, 2003

YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

45b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

References:
The Public Corporations Act, Chapter 257

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

45c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Senior politicians and retired officials are routinely appointed to the boards of the private entities.
### References:
- Researcher’s observation;
- Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 46. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

69

- 46a. In law, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**References:**
The Public Corporations Act, Chapter 257

- **YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of publishing the details of privatization bids that makes information available to all citizens.
- **NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no formal publication process, or if any citizens are excluded by law from accessing this information.

- 46b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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</table>

**References:**
The Public Corporations Act, Chapter 257

- **YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.
NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

46c. In practice, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
In practice, there may be important components of bids that are not made publicly available.

References:
Researcher’s observation;
Interviews

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

46d. In practice, citizens can access the terms and conditions of privatization bids at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
What is available is free.

References:
Interviews

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.
Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. National Ombudsman

47. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Art. 130; Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) Act, Chapter 391

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

48. Is the national ombudsman effective?

57

48a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

48b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
It doesn’t need to be, since its decisions are not binding on the government. In 2005, the Chairman of the Commission Justice Kisanga noted that the lack of institutional cooperation and good faith by the Government impeded investigations as public servants either delayed in answering the Commission’s letters of inquiry or outright refused to do so.”

References:
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) Report 2006:98

100: This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

75:

50: This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

48c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |
Comments:
It doesn't need to be, since its decisions are not binding on the government. In 2005, the Chairman of the Commission Justice Kisanga noted that the lack of institutional cooperation and good faith by the Government impeded investigations as public servants either delayed in answering the Commission's letters of inquiry or outright refused to do so.”

References:
Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) Act, Chapter 391

100: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

48d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Senior staff are still being recruited.

References:
Interviews

100: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

48e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
Comments:
Loyalties may not be to a party but to the overall political system.

References:
Interviews

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

48f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Funding has increased significantly in recent years, both from national budgets and donors.

References:
Interviews

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

48g. In practice, the agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.
References:
Interviews

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

48h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

References:
Interviews

100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

48i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.
Comments:
The agency makes recommendations which are not binding on the state.

References:
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)
Annual Report 2005,
Dar es Salaam, 2006

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

48j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the agency (or agencies).

Comments:
So far, there have been too few cases to draw firm conclusions.

References:
Interviews

100: Ombudsman’s reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, ombudsman’s reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.

48k. In practice, the agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.
Comments:
It depends on the importance of the case and the status of the complainant, but generally, the answer is no.

References:
Interviews

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

49. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

33

49a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | NO

Comments:
Although in practice they are reasonably accessible.

References:
Not specifically spelt out in the relevant law:
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Art. 130
The Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) Act, Chapter 391

YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.
49b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
The reports have to be tabled before the National Assembly, before the public can access them.

References:
Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) Act, Chapter 391

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.</td>
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</table>

49c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
The reports have to be tabled before the National Assembly, before the public can access them. The costs are reasonable.

References:
Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) Act Cap 391

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.</td>
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V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

50. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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</table>

References:
The Controller and Auditor General (CAG) is the supreme audit institution in Tanzania.
Public Finance Act, Chapter 348, Art. 143, Sections 26-29

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

51. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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</table>

References:
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Art.143 (6)

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.
NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

51b. In practice, the head of the agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
To date, no incumbent has been removed from office.

References:
Interview

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

51c. In practice, the agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Additional staff have been hired to manage an increased workload dealing with local government and development aid-funded projects.

References:
Researcher’s observation

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders it ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:
0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

51d. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 75 50 25 0

Comments:
In practice, staff may not act independently.

References:
Researcher’s observation

100: Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

51e. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

100 75 50 25 0

Comments:
The agency receives regular funding, including donor aid.

References:
Budget estimates

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:
Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

51f. In practice, the agency makes regular public reports.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The agency makes public reports annually.

References:
Researcher’s observation

100: The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

51g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the agency.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
It is frequently observed that the government rarely acts on these reports, including in cases of misuse of huge amounts of money.

References:
Researcher’s observation

100: Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:
0: Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

51h. In practice, the supreme audit institution is able to initiate its own investigations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
It is almost impossible to initiate politically sensitive investigations.

References:
Not a function of the Controller and Auditor General (CAG)

100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

52. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

67

52a. In law, citizens can access reports of the agency.

YES | NO

Comments:
Reports have been freely available for many years.

References:
Researcher’s experience

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.
NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

52b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The reports can be obtained on request, although in the past there have been delays in their preparation. Timeliness has improved in recent years.

References:
Researcher’s experience

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

52c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The reports are distributed free of charge.

References:
Researcher’s experience.

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.
Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

74
V-3. Taxes and Customs

53. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

100

YES | NO

Comments:
The agency is called Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA).

References:
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge
Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue Authority, Public Administration and Development, Chapter 23, pp.165-175
2003

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

54. Is the tax collection agency effective?

75

54a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.
100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

54b. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

55. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

25
Comments:
Tax laws are still regularly abused.

References:
Press reports, public opinion;
Brian Cooksey
Wealth Declarations in East Africa – A Means of Combatting Corruption?
Thematic paper III, Centra, Washington DC, 2004

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:

50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

25:

0: Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

56. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

56. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

References:
Customs and Excise Department

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

57. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

75
57a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Since the mid '90s Customs has been a department of the Tanzanian Revenue Authority (TRA).

References:
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge
Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue Authority, Public Administration and Development, Chapter 23, pp.165-175
2003

57b. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Public Expenditure Reviews from numerous years

58. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?
58. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments: 
Exemptions are still common.

References:
Researcher’s observation; 
Press reports; Fjeldstad;

Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge 
Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue Authority, Public Administration and Development, 
Chapter 23, pp.165-175 
2003

100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

75:

50: Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

25:

0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. Financial Sector Regulation

59. In law, is there a financial regulatory agency overseeing publicly listed companies?

100
**References:**
Capital Markets and Securities Authority Act

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency tasked with overseeing publicly listed companies in the public interest and ensuring that disclosure rules are met.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this function is spread over several agencies or does not exist.

---

60. Is the financial regulatory agency effective?

65

60a. In law, the financial regulatory agency is protected from political interference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
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**References:**
Capital Markets and Securities Authority Act

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

60b. In practice, the agency has a professional, full-time staff.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

---

**References:**
Interview

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**
0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

60c. In practice, the agency receives regular funding.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Capital Markets and Securities Authority Act

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

60d. In practice, when necessary, the financial regulatory agency independently initiates investigations.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Capital Markets and Securities Authority Act

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

75:

50: The agency starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.
60e. In practice, when necessary, the financial regulatory agency imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The law does not provide for penalties by the authority; only the courts can impose penalties after the matter has been reported for investigations to the police.

References:
Interview

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partis

61. Can citizens access the financial records of publicly listed companies?

63

61a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of publicly listed companies.

YES | NO

References:
Public Corporation Act, Chapter 257, Section 38;
Capital Markets and Securities Act, Chapter 79 through prospectus

YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all publicly traded companies is required by law to be public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any category of publicly- owned or publicly-traded company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

61b. In practice, the financial records of publicly listed companies are regularly updated.
Comments:
There are only a few publicly listed companies on the Dar es Salaam stock exchange, and their financial records are generally up-to-date.

References:
Interview

100: Publicly traded companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.
75:
50: Publicly traded companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.
25:
0: Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value to investors.

61c. In practice, the financial records of publicly listed companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

Comments:
The main international accounting companies have local offices, but this does not mean that the companies are necessarily audited according to international standards.

References:
Conventional wisdom

100: Financial records of all public companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.
75:
50: Financial records of public companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.
25:
0: Publicly traded companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.
61d. In practice, citizens can access the records of disciplinary decisions imposed by the government on publicly-listed companies.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
This is not applicable: no disciplinary decisions have been imposed until now (the stock exchange is of decent date).

References:
Researcher's observation

100: These records are freely available to all citizens through a formal official process.
75: 
50: These records are available to all citizens, with some exceptions.
25: 
0: These records are generally not available through official processes.

61e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of publicly listed companies within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.
75: 
50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.
25: 
0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

61f. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of publicly listed companies at a reasonable cost.
Comments:
Some records are published in the press.

References:
Interview

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

62. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

63

62a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

References:
The Business Licencing Act, Chapter 208, Section 3
Patrick, Abila
Doing Business in East Africa in Slow Motion
The East African,
Nairobi, December 5, 2005
YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required.

62b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

References:
The Business Licencing Act Chapter 208, Section 24

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

62c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Tanzania ranks lowest of the three East African countries in terms of time required and number of documents processed to register a company.

References:
World Bank, Investment Climate Assessment in East Africa, Washington, 2004

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months.

25:

0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

62d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.
Comments:
Time is money. Speed adds to cost of compliance.

References:
World Bank, Investment Climate Assessment in East Africa, Washington, 2004

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

63. Do businesses receive equitable regulatory treatment from the government?

50

63a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting health, safety, and environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

Comments:
To quote the IMF source, A key reason why private sector participation in economic activity in Tanzania has been modest is because the business environment is very poor. Based on the 2006 Doing Business In report of the World Bank, Tanzania ranks 140th in the overall ease of doing business out of 155 countries surveyed. Similarly, the World Economic Forum 2005, ranks Tanzania 82nd out of 116 countries in the quality of the national business environment, and 71st in the Growth Competitiveness Index out of 117 countries.”

References:
Business Licensing Act, Chapter 208, Section 27(1), Regulation 6(d), The Business Licensing Regulations

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting health, safety, and environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

63b. In practice, business inspections by the government are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
Business inspections are routinely carried out by the government in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

**References:**
Cooksey, Brian, Corruption and Governance in Tanzania: What Does the Literature Say?*
Report for the Royal Norwegian Embassy and the Governance Working Group, pp. 40-41
Dar es Salaam, June 2005

100: Business inspections by the government (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections (i.e. health, safety, or environmental inspections) are routinely carried out by the government in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

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**Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law**

**VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law**

64. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

89

64a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.
YES | NO

References:
Penal Code, Chapter 16, Section 380

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Penal Code, Chapter 16, Sections 289 and 290

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 329, Section 4

YES: A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.
YES  |  NO

References:
The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 329, Section 4

YES: A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.
NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES  |  NO

Comments:
There is no law addressing the bribing of a foreign official.

References:
Interviews

YES: A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.
NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES  |  NO

References:
First Schedule to the Economic and Organized Crime Control Act, Chapter 200, Paragraphs 7and 10; Penal Code, Chapter 16

YES: A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.
NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.
64g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
National Security Act, Chapter 47, Sections 4-5

YES: A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Proceeds of Crime Act, Chapter 256 (R.E.2002), Section 71

YES: A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

64i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Penal Code, Section 384

YES: A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.
VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

65. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

65. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

Comments:
The agency is called Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB).

References:
Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 3

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

66. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

50

66a. In law, the agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
Prevention of Corruption Act
YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

66b. In practice, the agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100  |   75  |   50  |   25  |   0

Comments:
Cases involving senior politicians and civil servants may be investigated and recommended for prosecution, but prosecutions do not take place because of ‘political interference’. The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) prosecutes very few of the cases brought to it and wins even fewer. Witnesses receive no protection and are said to receive threats and fear victimisation. The Registrar of Political Parties and civil society activists favour protection for whistle-blowers and witnesses.

References:
Interview with Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) staff member.

100: This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

75:

50: This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

66c. In practice, the head of the agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100  |   75  |   50  |   25  |   0

Comments:
The head of the agency is a political appointee. The agency does not have powers to prosecute.

References:
Researcher’s observation
The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

66d. In practice, appointments to the agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

Comments:
Most agency staff are law graduates.

References:
Researcher's observation

Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

66e. In practice, the agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
Researcher's observation

The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.
The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

In practice, the agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

In recent years, national budget allocations and foreign aid to the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) have risen significantly, leading to the expansion of the Bureau's activities across the country.

References:
Public Expenditure Reviews from numerous years

The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) only submits its reports to the President.

References:
Interview

The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.
The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

In practice, the agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

In practice, when necessary, the agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

Comments:
The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) cannot prosecute.
Public money and property recovered from successful prosecutions are minimal.

References:
Interviews
Cooksey, Brian
Corruption and Governance in Tanzania: What Does the Literature Say?
Report for the Royal Norwegian Embassy and the Governance Working Group, Section 6.2.3.
Dar es Salaam, June 2005

The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

In practice, when necessary, the agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

Comments:
The PCB independently initiates investigations, but very few cases are brought to court, and too many cases result in acquittals. The poor performance in prosecutions and sentencing contrasts with the increase in the number of cases reported to the PCB, which increased from 1,383 in 2002 to 2,223 in 2004 (Cooksey 2005).
### References:
Cooksey 2005 op. cit. section 6.2.3.; Legal and Human Rights Centre 2005:73.

| 100 | When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies. |
| 75 : |
| 50 | The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments. |
| 25 : |
| 0 | The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power. |

#### 67. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

| 100 | The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month. |
| 75 : |
| 50 | The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve. |
| 25 : |
| 0 | The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency. |

| 67a | In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period. |

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

#### Comments:
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the complainant will not be informed of progress in investigations without repeated follow-up.

### References:
Researcher’s experience

| 100 | The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month. |
| 75 : |
| 50 | The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve. |
| 25 : |
| 0 | The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency. |

| 67b | In practice, citizens can complain to the agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination. |
Comments:
This problem has not been reported.

References:
Researcher’s experience

100: Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

67
VI-3. Rule of Law

68. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

58

68a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Art. 13(9)
as amended by Act No. 1 of 2005 and all criminal legislation provide for right to appeal and judicial review.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.
68b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
The wheels of justice turn very slowly.

References:
Interviews

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:

0: Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

68c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle-class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

References:
Interview with state attorney

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

25:
69. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

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**Comments:**
There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes. Decisions are often made on the grounds of dubious technicalities and apparently irrelevant considerations.

**References:**
Researcher’s observation

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<th></th>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

100: Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

75:

50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

70. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

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**Comments:**
Many decisions are not enforced, e.g. libel claims. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.
100: Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

71. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

63

71a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Art. 107 (B)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

71b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There may be strong pressures on judges to rule in favour of officials (political interference) or businessmen (bribery).

References:
Media reports
National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

71c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

Comments:
Judges are assigned case files by their judge in-charge, within their respective areas.

References:
Interview with prosecutor

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

71d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Art. 110 (5-9)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.
### 72. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

#### 72a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

<table>
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<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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**References:**
Researcher's observation

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

#### 72b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

<table>
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<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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**References:**
Researcher's observation

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge’s involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

### 73. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

#### 73a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

33
Comments:
Officials may target Asian businesses for extortion.

References:
Researcher’s knowledge

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

73b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

Comments:
Courts frequently favour defendants in cases of violence against women and inheritance disputes.

References:
Interview with legal aid provider

100: Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system.

75:

50: Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes.

25:

0: Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence.

73c. In practice, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.
State Legal Aid is only guaranteed for homicide offences. There are legal aid schemes by CSOs with limited geographical coverage.

References:
Interview

100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well trained and effective in representing the rights of indigent defendants.

75:

50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some indigent defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

25:

0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most indigent defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

73d. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

Comments:
In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle-class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.

References:
Researcher’s observation

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.

73e. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.
Comments:
Few small businesses can afford this. Most businesses are in the ‘informal sector’ anyway and are therefore technically outside
the law.

References:
Researcher’s observation

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other
cases, the cost is prohibitive.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

73f. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

Comments:
In some remote areas there are no courts, or the courts are not within reach or not accessible.

References:
Interview with prosecutor

100: Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of
court magistrates.

75:

50: Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

25:

0: Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.
### VI-4. Law Enforcement

#### 74. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
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</table>

**74a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.**

### Comments:
Appointments may sometimes be based on willingness to pay ‘tribute’ to superiors. Example: traffic police have to pay a proportion of their bribes to their bosses.

### References:
- Media reports

| 100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations. |
| 75: |
| 50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however. |
| 25: |
| 0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties. |

**74b. In practice, the agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
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</table>

### Comments:
The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

### References:
- Public debate;
- Media reports
100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75: 

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

25: 

0: The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency’s ability to fulfill its mandate.

74c. In practice, the agency is protected from political interference.

Comments:
The police are frequently mobilized to control opposition political party rallies and demonstrations. Criminals may also be protected by political interference.

References:
Interviews;
Researcher’s observations;
Legal and Human Rights Centre
Tanzania Human Rights Report 2004
LHCR, Haki Elimu, 
Dar es Salaam, 2005

100: The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

75: 

50: The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25: 

0: The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

75. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

54

75a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism.

75b. In practice, the independent reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are numerous exceptions to this.

References:
Interview with lawyer

100: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

75c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PSB) investigates, but does not prosecute cases. Cases are referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions' Office, which has discretionary powers to block prosecutions.
**References:**
Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB);
Directorate of Public Prosecutions

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity is separate from the regular police department.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

75d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The police may be slow to act, or reject the findings of other investigations, e.g. by the Human Rights Commission.

**References:**
Interview

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:  
50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:  
0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

75e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
Only the President of the United Republic of Tanzania is immune from criminal proceedings, unless he is impeached. All other citizens including law enforcements are liable for prosecution.
YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

75f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In an on-going case, a former Dar es Salaam police chief and a number of police officers are on trial for ordering and carrying out the murder of four men, said to have been framed over a hold-up in which they were not involved. Such cases are very rare.

References:
Media reports

100: Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

75:

50: Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

25:

0: Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.