Overall Score:

58 - Very Weak

Legal Framework Score:

82 - Strong

Actual Implementation Score:

35 - Very Weak

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

100

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
The Law on Non-Governmental Organizations of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.
YES | NO

**References:**
The Law on Non-Governmental Organizations of the Republic of Armenia www.parliament.am www.arlis.am

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

**References:**
The Law on Non-Governmental Organizations of the Republic of Armenia www.parliament.am www.arlis.am

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

83

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

References:
Interview with Mihran Galstyan, the director of Akunk’ ethnosociological Research Center(August 6, 2007, at his office)
**Elegia** NGO's research among 57 non-governmental organizations in Armenia

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<td><strong>100:</strong></td>
<td>CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.</td>
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<td><strong>50:</strong></td>
<td>CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.</td>
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<td><strong>0:</strong></td>
<td>Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.</td>
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2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

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<td>Comments:</td>
<td>Despite the fact that anticorruption NGOs are active, they can only manage to raise public awareness on corruption risks or cases. Their influence on the policymaking process is still little.</td>
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References:
Interview with Mihran Galstyan, the director of Akunk” ethnosociological Research Center (August 6, 2007, at his office) 
“Elegia” NGO’s research among 57 non-governmental organizations

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<td><strong>100:</strong></td>
<td>Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.</td>
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<td><strong>50:</strong></td>
<td>Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>0:</strong></td>
<td>Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.</td>
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2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

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**References:**
Interview with the director of Transparency International, Armenia Amalia Kostanyan, at Transparency International Organization’s Office, July 26, 2007

**Media reports**

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO’s work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

### 3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

#### 3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
Many times, if not always, when it comes to investigating corruption cases by anticorruption activists, the police and governmental structures are trying to throw obstacles in the investigation process by suing these very activists. Typically the goal is to have the above authorities apply the irrelevant articles from Criminal Code.

**References:**
Interview with Vakhtang Siradegyan, the media representative of Transparency International Armenia

Elegia” NGO research among 57 non-profit organizations

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person’s work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned* is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

#### 3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

| YES | NO |
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist’s work. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

75

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with Vakhtang Siradegyan, the media representative of Transparency International Armenia Elegia NGO research among 57 non-profit organizations

Armenian Legislation on Trade Unions
www.parliament.am
www.arts.am
**YES:** A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**
Trade unions in Armenia exist but are functioning very formally. They do not have any influence on the political life of the country.

**References:**
Interviews with Mihran Galstyan, the director of Akunk" ethnosociological Research Center (August 6, 2007, at his office), and Stepan Danielyan, the chairman of “Collaboration for Democracy Union” (August 8, 2007, at his office)

100: Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

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**I-2. Media**

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.
5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

100

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

References:
Law on Mass Media
100: Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

| YES | NO |

References:
The Law on Media of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There is no need to obtain a license for print media. Everyone in Armenia can print a newspaper without a license.

References:
Law on Mass Media of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

Interview with Mesrop Harutyunyan, lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club)
100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is no need for license to print newspaper. Everyone in Armenia can print a newspaper without license.

References:
Interview with Mesrop Harutyunyan, lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club, (August 9, 2007 at Yerevan Press Club)

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

69

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
By making amendments to the law on the state tax and the law on TV and radio broadcasting, the government set the basic duty to the amount AMD 70.000 to be paid by foreign TV and broadcasting companies for each appearance on radio or TV and prior
consent by the Public Council on TV is available. The activities of foreign TV and broadcasting companies in Armenia might be banned. Evidently, this step was aimed against the Armenian Service of Liberty Radio Company, whose closure the government thought overdue. (See Aravot daily newspaper, June 28, 2007, p.1, June 29, 2007, p.2, and Haykakan Zhamanak daily newspaper, June 28, 2007, p.2, and June 29, 2007, p.2)

References:
Interviews with Mesrop Harutyunyan, journalist of Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club), and Stepan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union” (August 7, 2007, at his office)
Media reports

100: Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:
There are not any appeals mechanisms adopted in the Law on Mass Media, however, TV and broadcasting entities can appeal to court, as usually happens.

References:
The Law on Mass Media of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
Interview with Mesrop Harutyunyan, lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.
### References:
The Law on TV Broadcasting of the Republic of Armenia  
www.arlis.am

### 100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

---

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

### Comments:
The license is necessary to obtain only broadcasting and TV.

### References:
Interviews with Mesrop Harutyunyan, journalist of Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club), and Stepan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union” (August 7, 2007, at his office)  
Media Monitoring

### 100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

---

8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

100
8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published online.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
In Armenia only a small percentage of population (approximately 4% to 5%) have an opportunity to access the Internet.

References:

100: The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

75:

50: Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

25:

0: Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content online.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
In Armenia only a small percent of the population (approximately 4% to 5%) have the opportunity to access the Internet.

References:

100: The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

75:

50: In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons
posting political content.

25:

0: The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

67

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Mass Media of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is no problem publishing corruption-related stories with the opposition or neutral media (Haykakan Jamanak, Chorrord Ishkanutyun, 168 jam, Jamanak Yerevan, Aravot, Iravunq, etc.). However, pro-government media, especially state TV and radio companies, restrict or do not encourage corruption-related stories.

References:
Interviews with Mesrop Harutyunyan, lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club), and Stepan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union” (August 7, 2007, at his office)
Media reports
100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75:

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

25:

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

100  75  50  25  0

Comments:
There is no problem for publishing corruption-related stories in the opposition or neutral media (Haykakan Zhamanak, Chorrord Ishkhanutyun, 168 Zham, Zhamanak Yerevan, Aravot, Iravunq, etc.). However, pro-government media, especially state TV and radio companies, restrict or do not encourage corruption-related stories.

References:
Interview with Mesrop Harutyunyan, the lead journalist of the Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club)
Media reporting and observation

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

10. Are the media credible sources of information?

30

10a. In law, print media companies are required to disclose their ownership.
YES | NO

References:
The Law on Mass Media of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting of the Republic of Armenia is requiring the disclosure of the whole ownership team
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In practice, there are many cases when state-owned or pro-government media editors and journalists are publishing favorable stories for politicians and businessmen. Some journalists earn money this way. However, there are very few cases when journalists from independent media are making media coverage in favor of certain politicians in exchange for money.

References:
Interviews with Mesrop Harutyunyan, lead journalist of the Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club), and Stepan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 7, 2007, at his office)
100: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

25:

0: Editors and journalists are widely known to sell favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

Comments:
In Armenia political parties and independent candidates during the last elections were given unequal and unfair media coverage. State Television and Radio set very high fees for opposition parties and candidates. The private pro-government TV stations also avoid providing time to opposition leaders or they establish inaccessible fees for opposition parties and independent candidates.

References:
Interviews with Mesrop Harutyunyan, lead journalist of the Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club), and Stepan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union* (August 7, 2007, at his office)
Media Monitoring of the recent 2007 Parliamentary elections in Armenia

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75:

50: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25:

0: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.
Comments:
Very few candidates from opposition parties and independent candidates with opposition views have an opportunity to access state-owned media outlets.

References:
Interviews with Mesrop Harutyunyan, lead journalist of the Yerevan Press Club (August 9, 2007, at Yerevan Press Club), and Stepan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union* (August 7, 2007 at his office)

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

75:

50: The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

100

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club Mesrop Harutyunyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)
Media reports

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned* is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.
Comments:
In reality, the corrupted governmental structures are working” with the journalists with more “soft” methods like suing or frightening them.

References:
There are no any documented cases on this issue.
Interview with Vakhtang Siradegyan, the media representative of Transparency International-Armenia (July 27, 2007, at his office)

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

References:
There were no any documented cases or information on this issue.
Interview with Vakhtang Siradegyan, the media representative of the Transparency International Armenia (July 27, 2007)
Media reporting

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

81
I-3. Public Access to Information

12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?
12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | NO

Comments:
In practice, the formal process to access government records or get information is often met with many bureaucratic barriers.

References:
The Law of Freedom of Information of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Freedom of Information of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

Comments:
Each governmental office/institution has the post of press secretary — a person who is responsible for public relations and media. However, the information made by this structure sometimes is not complete and systemized.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

13. Is the right of access to information effective?

55

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In reality, for citizens it’s easier to get information from governmental, legislature-related bodies than from upper-governmental structures (Ministries and local governmental offices). They refused sometimes to give information because they were not familiar with laws or regulations. According to the Law on Freedom of Information, citizens are entitled to receive needed information that they have previously applied for within five days. However, this time frame is often violated because of the bureaucracy of civil servants, especially in certain regions of the country. A small part of the population (approximately 4% to 5%) can get information on laws adopted by the Parliament, governmental decrees, regulations, etc., via the Internet.

References:
Interview with lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club, Mesrop Harutyunyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)
Personal experience with governmental cases

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.
According to Article 10 of the Law on Freedom of Information, citizens can get up to 10 pages of information free of charge. Citizens also can get information by mail or online free of charge.

References:
The Law on Freedom of Information of the Republic of Armenia, Article 10
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
There is not a fixed time frame for resolving appeals to access to information.

References:
Interview with lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club, Mesrop Harutyunyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)
Personal experience with governmental cases

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.
13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
The citizens will pay the formal payment for beginning the case as is usual. For middle-class citizens it is affordable to take proceedings at the First Instance Court. However, costs for appeals to the Courts of Review and Court of Cassation are too high for middle-class citizens, as are fees for attorney services.

References:
Interview with lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club, Mesrop Harutyunyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)
Personal experience with governmental cases

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

Comments:
Often denials of information are unclear. Sometimes government officials explained refusals to give information with the argument that they have no right to give it or they cannot find it.

References:
Interview with lead journalist of Yerevan Press Club, Mesrop Harutyunyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)
Personal experience with governmental cases

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.
25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

Category II. Elections

II-1. Voting & Citizen Participation

14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Armenian Constitution guarantees to all adults, with some exceptions (prisoners and some military servants) the right to vote. However, during the 2006 Parliament elections, a large number of Armenian citizens who are living or working abroad or just traveling in foreign countries were not allowed to vote at Armenian Embassies and consulates as it usually was done before. According to the head of the Migration Department of Armenia, currently only in the Russian Federation 500,000 Armenian citizens are working (See Aravot daily newspaper July 26, 2007). Hundreds of thousands Armenian citizens are living in the U.S. and Europe. In this way the Armenian government deprived them of their rights, confining their suffrage to the limits of Armenia. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, article 30, in Armenia all of the adult citizens are eligible to vote at polling stations they are assigned based on their domicile registered. The government doesn’t hinder those citizens residing abroad to come and exercise their voting rights. However, in practice, many citizens experience a lot of money and time-related difficulties to assist and vote on the particular polling day.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

58

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

Comments:
By law, all adult citizens of Armenia can vote regardless of where they live. However, before 2007 parliamentary elections in Armenia, the government adopted an amendment to the law that allows citizens to vote only if they are in Armenia during the day of election. Taking into account that hundreds of thousands of Armenian citizens are living or working in foreign countries and many of them during the recent elections have voted for opposition parties, it is obvious that it is official policy to deprive these citizens of the right to vote. (For example, according to the head of Migration, Agency Gagik Eganyan, in Russia 500,000 Armenian citizens are now working. Most of them didn’t have the possibility to be in Armenia on May 12, and actually were deprived of their votes.

References:
Media reports and election monitoring
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.
15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
In Armenia, violations of election procedures have always occurred, particularly ballot counting.

References:
Media reports (See Aravot daily newspaper, May 13 and 14, 2007, pp. 2-5; Haykakan Jamanak, daily newspaper, May 13 and 14, p.2 and p. 1)

Election observation

100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

75:

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

25:

0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Only once, on February 3, 1998, when the first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, had resigned, were there organized presidential elections. The government is also able to influence local government elections by expressing mistrust about the acting local community head.

References:
Media reports on election
Observations on elections process

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:
16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

70

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
The Law on Political parties
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

Comments:
In practice, we have come across some cases when governmental structures ordered the Yerevan Municipality not to allow some opposition parties like the Armenian Democratic Party to rent offices in governmental buildings.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
Law on Political Parties
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.
16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
The Law on Political Parties of Armenia
www.parliament.am

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

75:

50: Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties’ political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

25:

0: Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
In practice there are very high costs for running a political campaign for a common citizen in Armenia. For example, before 2008 presidential elections in Armenia the candidates should pay average AMD 120,000 or $ 400 for one minute pre-electoral political advertisement on TV. See 168 Zham bi -weekly newspaper, Yerevan, November 20-21, 2007, p.1 These costs are unaffordable for many citizens and along with other organizational costs are much higher then for previous elections

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office), Media reporting

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

75:

50: Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing do may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.
Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office)

100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

75:

50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

II-2. Election Integrity

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

Comments:
In practice, some non-profit organizations like Voting is Yours are allowed to monitor the elections, however their roles are weak
influences on elections’ integrity.

References:
The Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

60

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES  |  NO

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
Electoral Code
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)
Media reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.</td>
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**References:**
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)
Personal experience working at the regional agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>18c</td>
<td>In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.</td>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.</td>
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**References:**
Monitoring report on 2007 Parliamentary elections
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of the Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)
100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

75:

50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
From thousand of offenders only 16 impose penalties after the 2007 parliamentary elections. (Aravot daily newspaper, August 1, 2007, p.3)

References:
2007 Parliamentary elections observation
Aravot daily newspaper, August 1, 2007, p.3
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of the Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

50

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.
Comments:
There are many cases when in the voter lists citizens could not find their names or they found the names of other ghost* persons who did not exist and lived in their address. This personally happened with me during the recent elections.

References:

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost* voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

References:
The Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.
Comments:
In fact, the election results can be claimed by the citizens at results of elections citizens can appeal at Court or political parties can appeal to Constitutional Court of Armenia. However, as it has happened before, there is very little likelihood that a court or even the Constitutional Court will be ready to fairly solve electoral appeals as all this is controlled by government. (Aravot daily newspaper, I am ordering to vote," May 3, 2007, p.4; Interview with Stepan Danielyan, chairman of" Collaboration for Democracy Union)

References:
Media report and election observations
Interview with Avetik Ishkanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee of Armenia on Human Rights (August 9, 2007, at his office)

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In reality no military and security forces remain neutral during any elections. For example, during last election the military forces had strict order by Serzh Sarkisyan the Primer Minister of Armenia and former Minister of Defense to vote for Republican Party which is governing party in Armenia. As to Aravot' daily newspaper the former Deputy Minister of Defense Arthur Agabekyan ordered to vote for pro-govermental party "Dashnaktsutyun" See "Aravot". May 3, 2007, p.4

References:
Aravot daily newspaper, “I am ordering to vote”, May 3, 2007, p.4
Interview with Stepan Danielyan the chairman of" Collaboration for Democracy Union"

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

75:

50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:
The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

**YES** | **NO**

References:
The Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

**YES**: A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In some cases, the bureaucratic hitches were posed to local observers from opposition parties.

References:

**100**: Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers’ activities.

**75**:

**50**: Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

**25**:

**0**: Election observers’ movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.
II-3. Political Financing

20. Are there regulations governing political financing?

100

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
According to the Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia, Article 25, there are restrictions on the contributions from foreign citizens. Anonymous donations and gifts are not allowed as well.

References:
The Law on Political Parties of The Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.
### Comments:
According to the Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia, Article 25, there are restrictions on the contributions from foreign citizens. Anonymous donations and gifts are also not allowed.

### References:
Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia, Article 25, Point 7
www.arlis.am

### 20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

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### Comments:
The Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia does not allow donations to political parties from religious, charitable and non-profit organizations.

### References:
The Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia, Article 25
www.arlis.am

### 20e. In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

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<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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YES: A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the political financing process.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around political financing. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

21. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

0
21a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

Comments:
In reality, as recent Parliamentary elections showed in Armenia, the vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party were made outside of the formal limitations. It has been especially obvious with pro-government parties Bargavach Hayastan and Hanrapetutiun, which have spent millions to bribe voters.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office)

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

Comments:
Armenia is governed by four to five oligarchs. They have tremendous influence on candidates and political parties, and make donations outside of the formal limitation system.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office)

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:
50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making to donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

Comments:
There are some limitations on funding of political parties during the elections. However, pro-government parties such as Bargavach Hayastan, Hanrapetutuin and Dashnaksutyun are outside of this limitation system.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office)

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

21d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.

Comments:
The Law on Parties regulates annual financial reports on the incomes and expenditures of parties and has clear-cut criteria on state budget allocations to parties. Only the political parties that earn at least five percent of the vote in the elections are funded from the state budget. Some political parties receive financial aid from abroad, which is prohibited by the law. However, the
Central Election Committee did not investigate these cases, as well as cases related to the political corruption of the parties sponsored by the government.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

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<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
The Central Electoral Commission imposes penalties only on opposition parties and candidates and has no power over pro-government parties and candidates.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21f. In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.
References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007 at his office)

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

100: Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

75:

50: Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

22. Can citizens access records related to political financing?

8

22a. In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Political parties and candidates are required to submit financial supporters to the State Electoral Commission, however these reports have not been published.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007 at his office)
Media observation

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

100: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public
22b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
For citizens it is practically impossible to access the financial records of political parties without allowance of Judicial or State Tax agencies.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007 at his office)

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

22c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
For citizens it is practically impossible to access the financial records of political parties without allowance of Judicial or State Tax agencies.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office)

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:
Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category III. Government Accountability

III-1. Executive Accountability

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | NO

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

References:
The Civil Code and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

24. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

50

24a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.
Comments:
There are very few cases when the government gives reasons for its decisions. Even former Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan had to confess that the government not always had ensured the publicity of its policy on TV.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia
Media observation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

References:
The Civil Code and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

24c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</table>
Comments:
There are few cases and limited effectiveness of judiciary reviewing executive actions.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia
Media observation

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to relay upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

24d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The president and Parliament almost do not interfere in governmental affairs. This indifference is due to the fact that the government is acting in keeping with the political directives of the president and Parliament’s majority. The Parliament formally is concerned with the government’s activities, adopts the budget and briefs the Parliament deputies’ different issues during questions-and-answer sessions. However, all of this is done for the form’s sake and does not have the required leverage to have well in hand government’s executive orders, its new regulations and policies.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia
Media observation

100: The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

75:

50: The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25:

0: The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.
25. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

100

25a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

Comments:
In compliance with Article 51, Point 1 of the Constitution, the president of the Republic enjoys immunity. The President, over the period of his tenure, shall not be prosecuted for his decision taken ex officio. However, actions not related to his office can be prosecuted but not before his tenure is over. Article 57 of the Constitution reads that the president can deposed for high treason or other grave offenses. The same goes for the head of the government.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

25b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

Comments:
Over the last four to five years, there were very few cases or registries on this. Usually these kind of officials change their work.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on
26. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

50

26a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Declaration of Income and Property of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

26b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Declaration of Income and Property of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

NO: A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

26c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

26d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Governmental Officials of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

26e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
No restrictions exist.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that
directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

26f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

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<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<th>75</th>
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**Comments:**
There are practically no regulations restricting post-government private-sector employment for heads of state and other government officials.

**References:**
Interview with Ashot Sarkoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia
Media observation

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

26g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
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</table>

**Comments:**
No regulations exist on this. According to the UNDP and Transparency International’s recent survey, the most corrupted executive institutions considered are the prime minister (52.9%), the staff of the government (51.3%), the ministers (63.8%), the staff of the Ministries (45.4%), structures affiliated with the government (32.1%), regional government bodies (Marzpetarans) (47.3%), Yerevan City Hall (38.9%), local self-government bodies (40.5%) and the Central Bank (30.3%). (See Corruption Perception in Armenia in 2006, 2007, Yerevan, p.13 )

**References:**
Interview with Ashot Sarkoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia
100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

26h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is no such kind of practice in Armenia.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia
Media observation

100: Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

27. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

58

27a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.
### YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

### NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

#### 27b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

#### 100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

#### 75:

#### 50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

#### 25:

#### 0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

#### 27c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
The Law on Declaration Income and Property of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

Comments:
In practice it is not easy for citizens and the media to access the asset-disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia
Media observation
Comments:
In reality, the Law on Declaration of Property and Income of the Republic to allow access to disclosure records of the heads of state or government is not a financial burden on citizens.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

Comments:
In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. The recent Parliament elections proved this as well. The leader of governing Republican Party, Serzh Sarkissyan, was appointed prime minister of Armenia.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia
Media observation

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

50: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:
The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

III-2. Legislative Accountability

29. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

67

29a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia has the right to review the law adopted by the Parliament of Armenia or the president's decrees if they don't comply with the precepts of the Armenian Constitution. However, it happens very rarely.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, Article 100
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

29b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

29c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | NO

Comments:
The members of the Armenian Parliament have immunity and only with the special resolution of Parliament could they be prosecuted for criminal allegations. However, this has happened very seldom; during the last four or five years, only one legislator, Hakop Hakopyan, was prosecuted.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.

30. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

0

30a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO
There is no such kind of regulation.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

30b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

**YES** | **NO**

**Comments:**
The newly elected Armenian Parliament mainly consists of businessmen and directors of trust and private companies. They need a mandate of a Parliament member to obtain immunity and political protection.

**References:**
No restrictions exist. Interview with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants non-governmental organization (August 8, 2007, at his office)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

30c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
There are no regulations and guideliness on this case.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

30d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.
References:
There are no regulatory requirements for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosure.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

30e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no regulations restricting post-government private sector for national legislators. A lot of members of the recently elected parliament are from the private sector. The businessmen need to have the legislature mandate to protect their business from tax and customs authorities and to have free economic activities in Armenia (even to evade paying taxes).

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses, Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

30f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.
100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

30g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.
31. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

0

31a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:
There are not any regulations, and asset disclosures are not available to the public.

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

31b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no regulations on this case.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.
31c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no regulations on this case.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75: 

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25: 

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

32. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

58

32a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

Comments:
There were some cases prior to the adoption of law when the draft law had been discussed among civic groups and non-profit organizations and their recommendations and suggestions were sent to Parliament — e.g., the Law on Non-governmental Organizations, the Law on Mass Media, etc.

References:
The records of legislative processes and documents are available when published. See www.parliament.am.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).
**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

32b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>75:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>25:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
The adopted laws of Parliament are published as separate booklets and they are placed on www.parliament.am, www.president.am and www.arlis.am.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
www.parliament.am

32c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>75:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
Citizens can obtain the effective laws adopted by Parliament at relatively small price (brochure price or photocopying cost) or can get them free via the Internet (www.parliament.am or www.arlis.am).

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
www.parliament.am
Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

### III-3. Judicial Accountability

#### 33. Are judges appointed fairly?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

33a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

**References:**
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

**NO:** A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

33b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

**Comments:**
As many as 13 members are elected by the general meeting of the judges for a five-year period. Two lawyer-experts are appointed by the president and two by the Parliament, but the dependence of the judicial power on the president remains unchanged.
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

33c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Status of Judges of the Republic of Armenia
www.arsline.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

34. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

67

34a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

34b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with former Vice Prosecutor of Yerevan City Rafik Pogosyan (August 1, 2007)

100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

75:

50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

25:

0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

34c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:
The Council of Justice is the only disciplinary agency for the national-level judicial system.

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.
NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

34d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:
In law, the judicial disciplinary agency in Armenia is protected from political interference. However, in practice, all Judicial systems, as well as the Council of Justice, depend on the political ambitions of the president and government.

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry, legislative committee, or by an internal judiciary committee or council that can only act with the approval of judges themselves.

34e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Council of Justice rarely conducts investigations, which is mainly dictated by the government, president or pro-government parties.

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

100: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:
The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

34f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

Comments:
When necessary, the Council of Justice can imposes penalties. However, it should have the informal approval of the president or other executive governmental bodies. The assistant to the First Instance Court of Lori region, Martun Mkoyan, had taken bribes from nine citizens and sold nine fraud judgments related to the export of the cars. (See Aravot daily newspaper, July 17, 2007, p. 5)

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

100: When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

35. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

36

35a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)
YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

35b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

YES  |  NO

References:
The Law on Governmental Officials of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

35c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES  |  NO

Comments:
There are no legal regulations on this case.

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

35d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.
Comments:
There are no restrictions on national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

References:
Interview with Zaruh Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses, Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

35e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no regulations restricting private-sector employment for national-level judges.

References:
Interviews with Zaruh Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses, Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

35f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.
According to the UNDP and Transparency International survey of 1,500 randomly selected households covering all regions of Armenia and Yerevan city, on the question How would you evaluate the level of corruption in the following state institution?:
- 44.9% of respondents consider the Courts of First Instance very corrupted
- 42.1% think that the Courts of Review are very corrupted
- 41.5% mentioned the Court of Cassation as the most corrupted state institution
(See Corruption Perception in Armenia in 2006, Yerevan, 2007, p.13)

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to judges Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

35g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.
National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

36. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

75

36a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES  |  NO

References:
The Law on Declaration Income and Property of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

36b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
In practice, it is very difficult for common citizens to access judicial asset records. It is easier for journalists and reporters. However, the government officials should provide to everyone this information, according to the law and Constitution of the Republic of Armenia.

The Council of Justice is the only disciplinary agency for the national judicial system. The Armenian Constitution defines the formation of a Board of Justice: nine of the 13 are elected by the general meeting of the judges for a five-year period; two candidate lawyers are appointed by the president, and two by Parliament. However, the judicial system of Armenia greatly depends on the president of Armenia and his executive power. (See Chorrord Ishkanutyun” daily newspaper, August 3, 2007, p.1)

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.
Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

36c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
If governmental bodies allowed access to the judicial asset disclosure records, which is most difficult thing, the records could be available for the cost of photocopying, or at the small cost of sending by mail.

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyun political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

III-4. Budget Processes

37. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

37a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.
YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

37b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
Media reports

100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive’s personal budget, or other expenses.

25:

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

37c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Chamber of Control monitors the budget process.
38. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

Comments:
There is a formally transparent deliberation on the budget and citizens can watch it on TV or listen to it on the radio, however, major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions.
Comments:
In Armenia NGOs make some suggestions and recommendations, however their impact is minimal at budget hearings.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
Media reports

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75:

50: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

25:

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

38c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

Comments:
Citizens cannot access any itemized list of budget allocations because the Armenian state budget, income and expenses are publicized in general, but not according to separate institutions. Itemized list of budget allocations are not available to citizens.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
Media reports

100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

75:

50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

25:

0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.
39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

YES | NO

References:
The Law of Chamber of Control of Parliament of the Republic of Armenia www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

40. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

19

40a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
On a quarterly and annual basis, the Ministries submit the reports to the government of Armenia on the budget execution. The government summarizes these reports and annually submits the final report to the Parliament of Armenia, which, as a rule, adopts it.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
Media reporting

100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:
Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

40b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
Media reports

The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

40c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

Comments:
The committee is commonly influenced by political forces, particularly by the Republican Party and the president of Armenia.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
Media reports
This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.

This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee’s behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

Comments:
The committee initiates some investigations but they are slow and not effective because the pro-government parties and the president are not interested in the results of these investigations.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia 9August 15, 2007
Media reports

When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

This committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. Civil Service Regulations
41. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

50

41a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is need to develop a code of conduct for civil servants. Exemplary legislation was adopted by Ethics Commission, which was confirmed by Civil Council. The state entities are free to establish Commissions on Ethics. During 2006-07 the Commissions on Ethics were active only with three Ministries: Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Health Care and Ministry of Social Welfare. Presently, a Commission on Ethics is active only in the Ministry of Social Welfare.

References:
The Civil Service Reforms
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

41b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

Comments:
Despite the Civil Service Reforms, nepotism and patronage are still widespread within all spheres of civil service in Armenia.

References:
The Armenian Civil Service Reforms
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.
41c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
There is no such kind of mechanism.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism’s decisions to the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

41d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

**YES** | **NO**

**Comments:**
There are no rules or requirements existing on this issue. Moreover, cases rarely are met when a civil servant convicted of corruption changes his current employment for another, yet higher post in the government structure.

**References:**
There are no regulations.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

42. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

42

42a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
Media reports

100: Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

75:

50: Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:

0: Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

42b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

References:
The Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
Interviews with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia, and Naira Jeyranyan, senior specialist of the State Agency of Intellectual Property at Ministry of Trade of Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007)
The Civil Servants Union

100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

42c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.
Comments:
Nepotism, cronyism and patronage are still high in hiring, promotion and firing procedures of civil servants. Most of high ranking civil service actions (hiring, firing and promotion) are mainly based on nepotism, cronyism, and patronage. For instance, recently for the post of the director of the Guymri Musical School the 22 year-old daughter of Vardan Gukhasyan (the Head of the Gyumri Municipality) was appointed without any experience in the field. However, according to the Law on Civil Service, the Board of Civil Services is responsible for hiring, dismissal and promotion of civil servants.

References:
Interview with Naira Jeyranyan, senior specialist of the State Agency of Intellectual Property at Ministry of Trade of Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007, at his office)

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

75:

50: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

25:

0: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

42d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

Comments:
According to the Law on Civil Service, all vacancies have to be furnished with job descriptions. However, in practice, civil servants have formal job descriptions and sometimes these job descriptions don’t outlines clear responsibilities and duties. Many job descriptions have not been updated for years.

References:
Interviews with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia, and Naira Jeyranyan, senior specialist of the State Agency of Intellectual Property at the Ministry of Trade of Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007)

100: Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position’s authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

75:

50: Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some
Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position’s responsibilities, authority, or pay.

In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

References:
Interviews with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia, and Naira Jeyranyan, senior specialist of the State Agency of Intellectual Property at the Ministry of Trade of Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007)

Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants’ bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.
50: The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

0: The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

42g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

References:
Interview with Naira Jeyranyan, senior specialist of the State Agency of Intellectual Property at the Ministry of Trade of Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007, at his office)

100: The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

75:

50: The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

42h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

References:
Interviews with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia, and Naira Jeyranyan, senior specialist of the State Agency of Intellectual Property at the Ministry of Trade of Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007)

100: In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

75:
50: In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

25:

0: In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

42i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In some cases the court can prohibit the civil servant accused of corruption to work in governmental structures, but it happens very rarely.

References:
Interviews with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia, and Naira Jeyranyan, senior specialist of the State Agency of Intellectual Property at the Ministry of Trade of Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007)

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

43. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

17

43a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

References:
There is no requirement or law for this case
YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

43b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

| YES | NO |

Comments:
Moreover, a lot of civil servants have their own business (which was often registered on the name of wife or some other relative). They use their position as civil servant to patronize their business, avoid paying taxes or reduce the taxes.

References:
There are no such restrictions.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

43c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

| YES | NO |

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article, 311, Point 15
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

43d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.
References:
There are no such kind of regulations.
Interview with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

43e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are not effective because of the mentality and widespread habits of civil servants.

References:
Interview with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

43f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.
### Comments:
The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

- **100:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.
- **75:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.
- **50:** Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

### 44. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

- **0**

  44a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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### Comments:
Only the ministers are required to submit asset-disclosure records to the Tax Committee.

### References:
There are no such kind of requirements.

Interview with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia
44b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

**Comments:**
There is a theoretical possibility for common citizens to access the asset-disclosure records guaranteed by the Law on Freedom of Information, however this never happens in practice. Moreover, Tax Committee authorities, without special permission from supreme governing bodies or the police department, never allow anyone to access the records of senior civil servants.

**References:**

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

**Comments:**
There is no possibility to access the asset-disclosure records of civil servants for citizens and it is natural that there is not any cost for this.

**References:**

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**
IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

45. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

0

45a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

References:
There are no legal provisions protecting whistleblowers working in the public sector.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

45b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no protection mechanisms for whistleblowers in Armenia. There is not even a law on the protection of the witness.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at his office)

100: Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.
Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Private-sector employees are also facing substantial negative consequences because of reporting about cases of corruption. For example, the director and two other employees of Royal Armenia Ltd. were imprisoned for having reported on corruption of the Customs Services. Only recently the court made a verdict of not guilty on this case.

Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.
25:
0: Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

0

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | NO

Comments:
Such mechanisms (like a phone hotline) are functioning at the Ministry of Education and Science for students and other citizens. However, in real life this is not effective.

References:
There are no internal mechanisms through which civil servants can report corruption.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

47. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

0

47a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is no such kind of mechanism.
**References:**
Interview with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007, at his office)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.</td>
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47b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

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<tr>
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<td>75</td>
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**References:**
Interview with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007, at his office)

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<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.</td>
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47c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

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<tr>
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<td>25</td>
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**Comments:**
No such kind of agency/entity exists.

**References:**
Interview with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007, at his office)
100: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

47d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

Comments:
No agency/entity exists and none investigates corruption cases.

References:
Interview with Vache Kalashyan, president of the Union of Civil Servants, member of Governance Reforms of the Republic of Armenia (August 3, 2007, at his office)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies’ investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

IV-3. Procurement

48. Is the public procurement process effective?
48a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

| YES | NO |

References:
The Law on Procurement of The Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

48b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

| YES | NO |

References:
The Law on Procurement of the Republic of Armenia, Article 16, 2g
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

48c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of
### Armenia (August 13, 2007)

#### Media observation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100:</td>
<td>Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>50:</td>
<td>Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:</td>
<td>Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.</td>
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48d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

**YES | NO**

**References:**
- There are no mandates or mechanisms.
  **YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.
  **NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

---

48e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

**YES | NO**

**References:**
- The Law on Procurement of the Republic of Armenia, Section 3, Article 17
  www.arlis.am
  **YES:** A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.
  **NO:** A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% of GDP).

---

48f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.
YES | NO

References:
There are no prohibitions fixed in law.

YES: A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

48g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Procurement of the Republic of Armenia, Section 7
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Procurement of the Republic of Armenia, Section 7
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.
48i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Government Purchase
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Law on Procurement in Armenia is ineffective because, in reality, companies with a record of previous of major violations of procurement regulations are not prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia (August 13, 2007)
Media observations

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

49. Can citizens access the public procurement process?
49a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Procurement of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

NO: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

49b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Procurement of the Republic of Armenia, Article 37
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

49c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The records are available, however, some delays take place.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of
Armenia

Media observation

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100  75  50  25  0

Comments:  In reality, citizens can access public-procurement regulations free of charge or for cost of photocopying. The problem is these regulations are often not publicized.


Media observation

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

49e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

100  75  50  25  0
Comments:
There is no process of advertising major public procurements. Often they are published in local newspapers in very small letters as to not attract attention.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia (August 13, 2007)
Media observation

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

49f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

Comments:
Although the Law on Freedom of Information guarantees to citizens access to the results of major public procurement bids, it is hard to get them through an official process.

References:
Interview with Ashot Sarkhoshyan, chief specialist of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia (August 13, 2007)
Media observation

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75:

50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

25:

0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.
IV-4. Privatization

50. Is the privatization process effective?

50a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

| YES | NO |

References:
The Law for Protection of Economic Competition of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

| YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period. |
| NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law. |

50b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

| YES | NO |

References:
The Law on Public Auction of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

| YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials. |
| NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations. |

50c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.
Comments:
In reality, the government and the president of Armenia regulate all privatization processes and government officials could even buy the governmental buildings with a little amount of money, having the patronage of President R. Kocharyan or Serzh Sarkissyan, the prime minister of Armenia.

References:
Interview with executive director of Foundation of Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

15

51a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

Comments:
Though the Law on Freedom of the Republic of Armenia theoretically covers privatization bids, there are no specific provisions, codes or regulations on this issue.

References:
There are no specific codes, provisions or rules on this case.

YES: A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privitization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

NO: A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

51b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.
References:
Interview with executive director of Foundation of Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007 at his office)

100: There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

51c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

References:
There is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

51d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Citizens can access privatization regulations through the announcements published or advertised in mass media, however, participating in it usually is very complicated.
References:
Interview with executive director of Foundation of Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

51e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Although citizens can access records of privatization free of charge, participating in it usually is very complicated for small businesses because the government often gives preference to oligarchs.

References:
Interview with executive director of Foundation of Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007, at his office)

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. National Ombudsman
52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Ombudsman of the Republic of Armenia
www.ombuds.am
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

53. Is the national ombudsman effective?

34

53a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Ombudsman of the Republic of Armenia
www.ombuds.am

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

53b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
Comments:
Because of political changes and Arthur Bagdasaryan, the head of the Board of Trustees of the European Regional Academy of Caucasus, resigning from his post as Parliament speaker, the government decided to deprive the majority of Academy male students of their right of being exempted from army service.
In September 3, 2006, after admission exams, from 230 male students only 30 were given privilege to retain that right. The parents of the remaining 200 students addressed the ombudsman in September 2006 requesting to restore their rights. However, true to the political instructions, the ombudsman turned down their solicitation. (See Ditord human rights journal in Armenia, 2006, # 6, October November, pp. 8-11)

References:
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)
Media reports

100: This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

75:

50: This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

53c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

Comments:
The first ombudsman in Armenia, Larisa Alaverdyan, was dismissed in February 2006 by order of the president, as her powers expired based on constitutional changes. In reality, the ombudsman had made a proclamation about the illegal and mass dislocation of the residents in Yerevan. The new ombudsman, Armen Harutyunyan, was appointed on February 16, 2006, However, no ombudsman is guaranteed from removal without relevant justification.

References:
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)
Media report (See Ditord, 2007, human rights journal, #6 October-November pp. 3-7)

100: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.
75:

50: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

53d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
www.ombuds.am
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

100: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

53e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

References:
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

Comments:
According to Ombudsman Armen Harutyunyan, there is no necessity for appointments with citizens. That’s why he has held very few appointments with the citizens. (See Ditord, Observer, journal of human rights in Armenia, 2006, #6, October-November, Yerevan, p.6)

References:
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)
Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

References:
Law on Ombudsman of the Republic of Armenia
www.ombuds.am

The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

Comments:
The first ombudsman of Armenia, Larisa Alaverdyan, made two reports. The second ombudsman, Armena Harutyunyan, has made one report.

References:
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)
www.ombuds.am

The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.
### 50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

### 25:

### 0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

### 53h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The present ombudsman, Armen Harutyunyan, didn't initiate any investigations.

**References:**
Ombudsman reports
www.ombuds.am
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)

### 100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

### 75:

### 50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

### 25:

### 0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

### 53i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The Ombudsman Agency in Armenia has no power or mandate to impose penalties on offenders.

**References:**
www.ombuds.am
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)
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<tr>
<td>100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.</td>
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<td>50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
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<td>0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.</td>
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53j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

Comments: In practice as it has happened before, ombudsman reports were not only ignored but the government criticized the annual report of first Ombudsman Larisa Alaverdyan. (See Ditord, Observer, Journal of Human Rights in Armenia, 2006, October-November, pp. 3-4.) There is no possibility for citizens to access the asset-disclosure records of civil servants and it is natural that there is no any cost for this.

Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human Rights (August 9, 2007)

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<tr>
<td>100: Ombudsman’s reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.</td>
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<tr>
<td>50: In most cases, ombudsman’s reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0: Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.</td>
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53k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

Comments: According the ombudsman’s statistics from February 2006 to November, 2508 complaints have been received from citizens; only 155 have been resolved. (See Ditord * (Observer) journal of human rights in Armenia, #6, 2006, October-November, Yerevan, p. 6.) From January 1 to June 30, 2007, the ombudsmen received more than 1353 complaints. (See www.ombuds.am.)
100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

54. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

92

54a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Ombudsman of the Republic of Armenia
www.ombuds.am

YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

54b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The Law on Ombudsman of the Republic of Armenia
Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Reports are available for the cost of photocopying.

References:
Law on ombudsman
www.ombuds.am

Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee in Armenia on Human rights (August 9, 2007)

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?
55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Chamber of Control of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

56. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

56a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Chamber of Control of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.
Comments:
The head of the Chamber of Control is not protected from political interference and could be removed without relevant justification.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
Media reports

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.
Comments:
Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed may have clear loyalties.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
Media reports.

100: Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

References:
Law on Chamber of Control of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

56f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.
References:
The Law on Chamber of Control of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

100: The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

References:
Report of Chamber of Control
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

100: Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

56h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.
Comments:
Though the Constitution of Armenia declared the Chamber of Control an independent body, it greatly depends on the President and has no any influence on the executive power in Armenia. The reports and investigation of the Chamber of Control have recommended character and are often ignored by the judicial institutions.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
www.parliament.am

100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

57. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

83

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Chamber of Control of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

57b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.
Comments:
Reports are available on the Internet (www.parliament.am). However, a limited number of citizens can access the Internet and the hard copies of the report.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
There is little cost for photocopying or obtaining the brochure. Citizens also can access the report via the Internet.

References:
Interview with Maria Vardanyan, senior expert of the Education Commission of the National Assembly of Armenia (August 15, 2007)
www.parliament.am

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Tax Services of the Republic of Armenia
Law on Property
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

59. Is the tax collection agency effective?

88

59a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Babik Najaryan, deputy head of the State Tax Committee (August 14, 2007, at office)

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.
25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 75 50 25 0

References:
Interview with Babik Najaryan, deputy head of the State Tax Committee (August 14, 2007, at office)

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

0

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 75 50 25 0

Comments:
In practice, tax laws in Armenia are forced with discriminations. Most oligarchs and close relatives of governmental authorities don’t pay taxes, or pay partly. Although they monopolize the main branches of the economy, they use their political power to avoid paying taxes. The main burden of tax collection lies on small and medium businesses. According to the recent survey of the Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses, the major problems for businesspeople are tax liabilities. In response to What is the greatest problem in doing business?” 90.4% of the respondents put in first place the tax collection procedure. (See “Combating Corruption: SME Sector Perception and Solutions,” Yerevan, 2006, p.12)

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)
Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Customs Services
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

62. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

100

62a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
Interview with Hovik Khalikyan, the deputy head of the Araratian Customs Committee on Security Services (July 31, 2007, at office)
100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Hovik Khalikyan, the deputy head of the Araratian Customs Committee on Security Services (July 31, 2007, at office)

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

0

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In reality, the customs laws are being enforced with discrimination. There is a need to improve the management system of customs authorities and simplify import and export procedures. (See Improvement and Main Priorities of Combating Corruption in Customs System of Armenia," Yerevan, 2002, pp. 26-29, publisher AFIC)
100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

75:

50: Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

25:

0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

0

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

Comments:
There is no mechanism overseeing state-owned companies. As with all other companies, these companies are overseen by State Tax Committees.

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if this function does not exist.

65. Is the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?
65a. In law, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
No mechanisms are existing.

**References:**
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

65b. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

**100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0**

**Comments:**
No mechanism and staff exist.

**References:**
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

**100:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65c. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.
Comments:
No mechanisms and funding exist.

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: The agency or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

65d. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

Comments:
No agency and mechanisms exist.

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.
65e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
No mechanisms exist.

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

66. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

50

66a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | NO

Comments:
Though the Law on Freedom of Information guaranteed to citizens access to the financial record of state-owned companies, in practice the formal process to access those records or get information is often met with a lot of bureaucratic barriers.

References:
The Law of Freedom of Information of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.
NO: A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

66b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: State-owned companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

75:

50: State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

25:

0: Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

66c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

75:

50: Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

25:

0: State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

66d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.
References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

66e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
The records can be obtained for free of charge or for the cost of photocopying. However, first of all, it’s hard to get allowance for accessing the records and it may be required to visit the office or national capital where the office is located. The Ombudsman Agency in Armenia has no power or mandate to impose penalties on offenders.

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
67. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

81

67a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required.

67b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on State Register
Law on Business Licence
Law on Trade and Commerce of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

67c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

References:
Comments:
A reasonable time period exists for obtaining any necessary business license. However, there exists a mechanism to get the license in one day by giving bribes to respective public officials. According to the Small and Medium Business Foundation's research, in cases in which unofficial payment is required, 24% of respondents answered registration of enterprise and getting a license. (See Combating Corruption: Small and Medium Business Sector Perception and Solutions, Yerevan, 2006, p.13.)

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.
75:
50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months
25:
0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

67d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
According to the Small and Medium Business Foundation's research, in cases where unofficial payment is required, 24% of respondents answered registration of enterprise and getting license. (See Combating Corruption: Small and Medium Business Sector Perception and Solutions, Yerevan, 2006, p.13.)

References:
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.
75:
50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.
25:
0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

68. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

100

68a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Environmental Protection
The Code of Trade and Commerce of the Republic of Armenia

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Environmental Protection of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Environmental Protection of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.
YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

**69. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?**

0

**69a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.**

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**
Even for sanitation inspections, business organizations are forced to do extra payments on a regular basis. (See Combating Corruption: Small and Medium Business Sector Perception and Solutions, “Yerevan, 2006, p.13.)

**References:**
Interview with the executive director of Foundation for Small and Medium Businesses Narine Mailyan (August 7, 2007)

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

**69b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.**
Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.
VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law

70. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

YES | NO

70a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is no existing law on corruption.

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>70c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**
There is not any law or legal regulation allowing bribes.

**References:**
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

**YES:** A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>70d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**
There is no law on corruption in Armenia nor any legal regulation allowing a bribe.

**References:**
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

**YES:** A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>70e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**
There is no law or legal regulation that allows giving a bribe a foreign official; all bribery is prohibited.
YES: A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is no law or legal regulation allowing the use of public resources for private gain.

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70h. In law, money laundering is illegal.
There is no special law or regulation allowing money laundering in Armenia. Recently the former minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Arzumanyan, was charged with money laundering. However, according to the media, it was a political prosecution against opposition.

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is no special law on corruption.

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

YES: A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?
71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
In June 2004 the Anti-Corruption Council was established by virtue of the decree of President R.Kocharyan. There was also established a Monitoring Committee, which executes the government's Anti-Corruption Strategy. (See www.gov.am.)

**References:**
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

---

72. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

0

72a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
The anticorruption agencies are a subordinate part of the Armenian government and are not protected from political interference.

**References:**
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

72b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.
Comments:
Functioning of the Anti-Corruption Council and Monitoring Committee on the whole depends on the President and Prime Minister of Armenia and is influenced by political and personal incentives of governmental officials.

References:
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)

100: This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

75: This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

50: This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

0: In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100: The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75: The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

50: The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.
72d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The appointments to the anti-corruption agencies are not based on professional criteria. They are based on loyality to the President or Prime-Minister. For example, now the Head of Anticorruption Strategy Monitoring Commision was appointed Gevorg Minasyan, Assistant of the President of the Republic of Armenia.

References:
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

72e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Anti-Corruption Council and Anticorruption Strategy Monitoring Commision have not a full time staff. They are functioning on voluntary basis.

References:
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)

100: The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**
There is no any regular funding of anti-corruption agencies in Armenia. However, USAID is funding the Mobilizing Action Against Corruption and UNDP is funding the development of the New National Anticorruption Strategy.

**References:**
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)
0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

72h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Anti-corruption commission and Council have not any power in Armenia.

References:
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)

100: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

72i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The are no any investigations carried out by Anti-corruption Council or Commission.

References:
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.
73. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

0

73a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Anti-corruption Council and Commision have not any mandate to resolve complaints

References:
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

73b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Anti-corruption Council and Committee in Armenia have not any mandate to resolve complaints of citizens and in practice citizens do not complain to them.

References:
Interview with Varushan Hoktanyan, public policy expert of Transparency International Armenia (August 15, 2007, at his office)
Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

---

### VI-3. Rule of Law

#### 74. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

67

74a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

**References:**
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
The Criminal Code of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

74b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.
Comments:
Appeals are generally acted upon quickly, with some exceptions.

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)
Media reporting with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union, (August 8, 2007, at his office)
Media reports

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:

0: Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

74c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Everyone must pay to appeal the court. However, there are cases when lawyers demand high fees for their services, which is not affordable for middle-class citizens.

References:
Interview with Avetik Ishkanyan, chairman of the Helsinki Committee of Armenia on Human Rights (August 9, 2007, at office)
Information from citizens having experience in appeal procedures

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?
75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are lots of cases when bribery, corruption and patronage affected the criminal judicial process. For example, there is the criminal case relating to the son of Vardan Gukasyan, the mayor of Gyumri, who was sentenced but not yet imprisoned. (See Media reporting Aravot, Haykakan Zhamanak in June-July 2007)

References:
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office) and with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)

100: Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

75:

50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

50

Comments:
In practice, there are lot of cases when state officials and political parties forcefully enacted judicial decisions and even evaded or delayed their enforcement.

References:
The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Compulsory Enforcement of Court Decrees
The Law of the Republic of Armenia on the Service Providing the Enforcement of Court Decrees
Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

77. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

88

77a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Status of Judges of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

77b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

Comments:
National judges are formally independent, however their decisions depend upon political incentives or ambitions of the president. For example, when the judge of First Instance Court of Center and Nork Marash Pargev Ohanyan decided a verdict of not guilty for the director and vice-director of Royal Armenia Ltd., the Council of Justice decided to discuss the disciplinary question of Pargev Ohanyan. (See Corrord Ishkanutyun daily newspaper, August 3, 2007 p.1.)
100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:

0: National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

77c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Status of Judges of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

77d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Status of Judges of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
www.parliament.am
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

---

78. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

78a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

Comments:
In the last year, no case was recorded on this matter, nor any publications on media.

References:
Interviews with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International) and with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)
Media reports

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

78b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

Comments:
In the last year there were not any documented cases where judges were killed because of their participation in a corruption trial. This is because very few cases of corruption were brought to court. Mainly these cases are not related to upper corruption,” e.g., corruption related to the senior governmental officials.

References:
Media research

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.
NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge’s involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

79. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

71

79a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Their is no racial discrimination in Armenia related to judicial decisions.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at office)

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

79b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
In Armenia there is no gender discrimination to access judicial system.

References:
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at office)
Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

79c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
Law on Bar Association
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

79d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia and the Law on Bar Association have guaranteed legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases, however, sometimes they prove unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

References:
Interviews with Zarushi Postanijyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International) and Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
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<td>50</td>
<td></td>
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<td>25</td>
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</table>

References:
Interview with Zaruhi Postanjyan, lawyer advocate, member of recently elected Armenian Parliament, member of Jarangutyu political party (August 16, 2007, at the office of Transparency International)
Media records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
Mainly small businesses did not want to have any relations with the courts. However, there are some cases when small businesses appeal to the court concerning to the unfavorable activities of tax organizations.
100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

79g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

Comments:
Only the citizens of regional centers and cities have the opportunity to access a court of law because there are not courts in the far villages of Armenia.

References:
Interview with Karen Zadoyan, president of the Armenian Young Lawyers Association (July 23, 2007, at office)

100: Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

75:

50: Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

25:

0: Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

VI-4. Law Enforcement

80. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?
80a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

Comments:
Appointments to law agencies are often based on protectionism, patronage and nepotism. There are cases of bribery also.

References:
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)
Media reports

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

80b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

References:
Media reporting
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)

100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.
80c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

Comments:
The government and governing parties are negatively influenced on the work of police and other enforcement agencies. The Ministry of Defense is privileged as former Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkissyan gave a lot of privileges to military authorities. The situation continued when Serzh Sarkissyan became the minister of Defense. The military police and military prosecution office are closed systems.

References:
Media reporting
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)

100: The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

81. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

50

81a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

References:
The Criminal Code and the Law on Ombudsman of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.
81b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen’s complaints within a reasonable time period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.arlis.am
81d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 75 50 25 0

Comments:
There are few cases of investigations of corruption related to police officials. According to the recent survey of Transparency International, 98.7% of respondents consider the most corrupted state institution as the traffic police. (See 2006 Corruption Perception Armenia, Yerevan, 2007, p.16.)

References:
Media reporting
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

81e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES NO

References:
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia
www.armis.am

YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

81f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.
**Comments:**
No law-enforcement authority has been punished in recent years, however, there are a lot of cases of violation of law by them.

**References:**
Media reporting
Interview with Stephan Danielyan, chairman of Collaboration for Democracy Union (August 8, 2007, at his office)

| 100: | Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution. |
| 75: |
| 50: | Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty. |
| 25: |
| 0: | Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself. |