Overall Score:

87 - Strong

Legal Framework Score:

91 - Very Strong

Actual Implementation Score:

80 - Moderate

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

YES | NO

67

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

References:
Constitution of RP, Article 44/1 and 3

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.
YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

NO: A NO score is earned if any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

Comments:
Certain non-governmental organizations are obliged to provide a report of their balance sheet, but these reports do not include details regarding funding sources.

References:
Law on Not-for-Profit Organizations. No specific requirement for disclosure.

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

92

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There have been no cases of government-initiated impediments to the registration of non-governmental organizations who deal with anti-corruption activities.
Overview of media reports

100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

75:

50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
These are the two most prominent anti-corruption non-governmental organizations. Their activities are rather diverse and very visible. Apart from them, there are a number of smaller organizations involved in anti-corruption activities. A consistent weakness of these efforts is the inability to involve business organizations and political organizations (including the parties and their foundations and institutes) in the anti-corruption efforts.

References:


100: Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

75:

50: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

25:

0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.
2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

References:
Media overview

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:
Nations in Transit 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned* is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist’s work. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

References:
Nations in Transit 2007

**4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?**

88

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution of Republic of Bulgaria of 1991, Art. 49
YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no impediments to the formation of trade unions, but they are not very important players in the political process in Bulgaria. The unions have not played any significant role in the anti-corruption efforts.

References:
Web sites of the biggest Bulgarian trade unions: http://www.knsb-bg.org/

100: Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.
YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

100

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no impediments imposed by the government on the establishment of print media. The only problem is the concentration of the advertising market in two of the major dailies, which are owned by the same owner. This is an anti-trust issue that has not been addressed by the government, but it in no way affects the freedom to establish print media entities.
100: Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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</table>

Comments:
Appeal mechanism is not necessary, since there is no licensing procedure.

References:
Appeal mechanism is not necessary, since there is no licensing procedure.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
No licensing required.

References:
No licensing required
100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
No such fees.

References:
No such fees

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

81

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Radio and TV stations are regulated by an independent body: The Council for Electronic Media (CEM). CEM has the power to register, license and monitor activities of electronic media in the country. In addition to that, when applying to start a new air-
based radio or TV channel, entities need an air frequency license, which is issued by the Communications Regulation Commission (CRC). Licenses are issued after a competition for available vacant frequencies is held.

There have been regular accusations of the lack of impartiality on the part of the regulatory body. Certain political biases have also been alleged. During the reviewed period there have been no major scandals involving CEM.

References:
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=354216
http://media.parliament.bg/?lang=bg&inc=page&id=239&pid=231&aid=145&type=10

Interview with Georgi Lozanov, published in Dnevnik, July 19, http://www.dnevnik.bg/show/?storyid=360598

100: Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:
The imposition of sanctions and the decision to revoke a license is to be appealed according to the provisions of the Administrative Penal Code (ZANN). Standard procedures exist for appealing to the courts in these cases.

References:
Radio and Television Act, 127(3, www.bnt.bg/content/download/908/5869/file/ZRT.pdf

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Fees are not excessive by any standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

100
8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published online.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There is no controlling of Internet publications, apart from cases of child pornography. In certain cases the content of Islamic groups’ Internet sites has been sited as evidence of their dangerous character.

References:
There is no controlling of Internet publications, apart from cases of child pornography. In certain cases the content of Islamic groups’ Internet sites has been sited as evidence of their dangerous character.

100: The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

75:

50: Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

25:

0: Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content online.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There are no reports of any type of government censure of Internet content. Sometimes the content of the Internet sites of marginal Islamic organizations may be cited as a reason for closer monitoring by authorities.

References:
There are no reports of any type of government censure of Internet content. Sometimes the content of the Internet sites of marginal Islamic organizations may be cited as a reason for closer monitoring by authorities.

100: The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

75:
In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

| YES | NO |

References:
Constitutional Court Decision 7/1996; Art. 10, ECHR

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Journalists actively report on corruption cases. The problem is that they are more interested in the outbreak of scandals, rather than in their resolution.

References:
Studies and projects of Center for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.
The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

10. Are the media credible sources of information?

75

10a. In law, print media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

References:
Studies of Transparency International and the Center for Study of Democracy

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

References:
No such regulation, although most publications reveal their owners.
YES: A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

References:

Interview with Ognian Zlatev, Director, Media Development Center

YES: A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Annual reports of the Bulgarian Media Coalition

Interview with Irina Nedeva, December 2007

100: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

25:

0: Editors and journalists are widely known to sell favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.
10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

Comments:
Media coverage of elections in Bulgaria is fair and comprehensive. The only matter of contention was the order of the press conferences of the political parties immediately after the local elections in October 2007. The government parties tried to delay the press conference of the new party GERB until late in the night. It was to be televised on national television.

References:
Nations in Transit 2007

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

Comments:
Apart from the mentioned exception, in the previous answer (regarding the ability of the GERB party to schedule their post-election press conference) there have been no serious problems regarding access to the media by politicians.

References:
Apart from the mentioned exception, in the previous answer (regarding the ability of the GERB party to schedule their post-election press conference) there have been no serious problems regarding access to the media by politicians.

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.
The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

100

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:
No such reports.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned* is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

References:
There are no reports.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.
11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES  |  NO

References:
No reports of journalist killings.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual’s work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

I-3. Public Access to Information

12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES  |  NO

References:
Law on the Access of Information

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.
Refusals are to be appealed before administrative courts or the Supreme Administrative Court, depending on which body has refused access to the document.

References:
Freedom of Information/Access of Information Act, Arts. 40-4
http://www.aip-bg.org/library/laws/zdoi.htm

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

The law describes in three sections and more than a dozen articles a detailed procedure for gaining access to different types of government information. Some of it must be published, while other requires a request from a citizen. There are specific deadlines for when the institutions must provide an answer, among other things.

References:
Sections IV and V.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

13. Is the right of access to information effective?

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.
### Comments:
By law, responses should be given within two weeks. Sometimes there are delays.

### References:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
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</table>

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

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<tr>
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<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0</th>
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</thead>
</table>

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

### Comments:
Costs are not high, and they relate mainly to paper, printing, copying, etc. This is regulated by law.

### References:
The Law on the Access to Public Information, Chapter III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Judicial proceedings in Bulgaria are generally not very fast.

References:
Studies of CLS Sofia

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Judicial proceedings in Bulgaria, especially in the administrative law area concerning the access to information are inexpensive.

References:
Judicial proceedings in Bulgaria, especially in the administrative law area concerning the access to information are inexpensive.

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:
0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Giving reasons is required by law, although sometimes the cited reasons might be uninformative.

References:

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

Category II. Elections

II-1. Voting & Citizen Participation

14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO
YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

100

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
There are no reports of denial or dilution of the right to vote.

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.
25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Recent Electoral Laws required the use of transparent ballot boxes and integrated ballots that could be folded or put in envelopes. Only during the latest local elections were there allegations that, due to thin and transparent ballots, it was possible to determine the vote of individual citizens in certain areas. Courts have thus far rejected such complaints.

References:
Recent Electoral Laws required the use of transparent ballot boxes and integrated ballots that could be folded or put in envelopes. Only during the latest local elections were there allegations that, due to thin and transparent ballots, it was possible to determine the vote of individual citizens in certain areas. Courts have thus far rejected such complaints.

100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

75:

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

25:

0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
There have been no problems regarding the rescheduling of elections or the manipulation of electoral dates.

References:
There have been no problems regarding the rescheduling of elections or the manipulation of electoral dates.

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:
50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

100

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, Articles 11/44

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

Comments:
Restrictions regarding age, professional qualifications and some other conditions may be applicable for certain public positions.

References:
Constitution, various electoral laws

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.
16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

**Comments:**
The party of the Macedonians in Bulgaria (OMO) was banned by the Constitutional Court. Hurdles against the party's registration continue to be erected by different authorities.

**References:**
Constitutional Court Decision, 2000/1

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

**Comments:**
The costs of running for office are not excessive in comparative terms. It is still possible for non-millionaires to run for office.

**References:**

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
Constitutional Court Decision, 2000/1

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

75:

50: Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

25:
Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
There has been opposition in Bulgarian parliaments since 1990.

**References:**
There has been opposition in Bulgarian parliaments since 1990.

100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

75:

50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature’s proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

**II-2. Election Integrity**

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

**YES** | **NO**
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

90

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:
The composition of the Electoral Commissions reflects the composition of the parliament.

References:
All electoral laws

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Usually lawyers and experts are appointed to the Commissions. In general, there is no open partisan behavior as far as the administration of the elections is concerned.
References:
Nations in Transit 2007

Media electoral reports

100: Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The agency has enough resources to fulfill its duties. It is important to point out, however, that it is not a permanent body and operates only during election time.

References:
The agency has enough resources to fulfill its duties. It is important to point out, however, that it is not a permanent body and operates only during election time.

100: The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0
Comments:
The commission has been quite efficient in announcing the results of the elections. Dealing with complaints and other matters has also been rather smooth.

References:
http://www.is-bg.net/cik2005/

100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

75:

50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The agency has imposed penalties on offenders. The weakest area of enforcement has proven to be party financing.

References:
Reports of Transparency International, Bulgaria, on the monitoring of campaign expenditure

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

100
19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Voters need not be registered in Bulgaria in order to vote. The process is done in a centralized way, which seems to be efficient. Residency requirements were introduced in 2007 for the European Parliament and the local elections, but, especially regarding the second case, there was no system of enforcement of these requirements.

References:
Voters need not be registered in Bulgaria in order to vote. The process is done in a centralized way, which seems to be efficient. Residency requirements were introduced in 2007 for the European Parliament and the local elections, but, especially in the second case, there was no system of enforcement of these requirements.

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:
For all electoral laws (parliamentary, presidential, local, European Parliament), the appeal process involves access to courts. In these specific cases, judicial proceedings are speedy and generally efficient.

References:
For all electoral laws (parliamentary, presidential, local, European Parliament), the appeal process involves access to courts. In these specific cases, judicial proceedings are speedy and generally efficient.

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.
19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There has been no noticeable politicizing or inefficiency of the justice system in the election law area.

References:
There has been no noticeable politicizing or inefficiency of the justice system in the election law area.

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
This has been the case in all elections since 1989.

References:
This has been the case in all elections since 1989.

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

75:

50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:
The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

References:
All election legislation. For EU Parliament elections see Art. 25, 0; 1, and Art. 57 of the Law on the Election of Deputies to the EU Parliament.

YES: A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no reports of impediments to monitoring of elections.

References:
Nations in Transit 2008 (in print)

100: Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers’ activities.

75:

50: Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

25:

0: Election observers’ movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.
II-3. Political Financing

20. Are there regulations governing political financing?

100

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
It limits anonymous donations, for instance.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

References:
Electoral laws
Law on Political Parties

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.
There is a 30,000 leva (US$22,500) limit for corporate donations and a 10,000 leva (US$7500) for individuals (1 euro equals 1.95 leva).

References:


YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on corporate contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to candidates or political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

References:

Art. 72: 1 million leva (US$750,000) for a party; 2 million leva (US$1.5 million) for a coalition.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
This law was amended, so that it is now possible to inquire about the names of the donors and the amount of their donations.
**References:**
The Law on Political Parties

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
The State Audit Office is monitoring the financing of the political parties and electoral candidates.

**References:**
The Law on Political Parties (Art. 34)
The Electoral Laws

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the political financing process.

| YES | NO |

**References:**
The State Audit Office

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around political financing. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.
21. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

21a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual’s ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

Comments:
The limits are not effective because of several problems:

1) the administration of such limits requires significant resources and prerogatives, which the Bulgarian electoral commissions and other bodies lack;

2) There is mutual understanding by candidates and parties not to begin proceedings against each other;

3) Full disclosure mechanisms have been introduced relatively recently in 2006;

4) There are no universally accepted foreign models of enforcement of such rules – these are problematic everywhere.

References:

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company’s ability to financially support a candidate or political party.
Comments:
There are various ways of avoiding limits:

1) intermediaries such as party foundations;
2) direct purchase of goods and services for the parties;
3) breaking up of big donations into a number of small ones.

Furthermore, there are problems in the enforcement mechanism. See my comments to the previous question regarding limits on individual contributions.

References:
regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

21d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Bulgarian enforcement mechanism of party funding regulations is very weak. In general, the State Audit Office has no independent powers to initiate investigations into party finances. It is only checking the consistency and authenticity of documentation. It could ask the prosecutor’s office to start investigations. The same is true of the electoral commissions.

References:

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

21e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Bulgarian enforcement mechanism of party funding regulations is very weak. In general, the State Audit Office has no independent powers to initiate investigations into party finances. It is only checking the consistency and authenticity of documentation. It could ask the prosecutor’s office to start investigations. The same is true of the electoral commissions.

References:
100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

21f. In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
These are audited by the State Audit Office. Yet, as mentioned above, the audit office works only on documents which are provided to it by the candidates. It cannot open independent investigations and generally has no investigative powers.

References:

100: Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

75:

50: Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

22. Can citizens access records related to political financing?

83

22a. In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.
Comments:
There are serious doubts about the quality of this data, however. Small parties often fail to report, but they are not involved in the political process anyway.

References:

100: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regularly withheld from public disclosure.

22b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
The State Audit Office publishes synthetic accounts of the party reports, and they are accessible via the Internet. Anyone who requires more detailed accounts needs to ask the State Audit Office via procedures defined by the Law on the Access to Public Information.

References:
Interviews with Dimo Grozdev, Transparency International


100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.
22c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
They are published on the Web site of the State Audit Office in a summary form.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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**Category III. Government Accountability**

**III-1. Executive Accountability**

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

| 100 |

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

**References:**
General clause of administrative liability in the Constitution.
YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

24. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

88

24a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The most important decisions of the government are explained to the public via the media and other outlets. It is a different question whether the reasons given are always convincing, but this is a matter of political judgment.

References:
The most important decisions of the government are explained to the public via the media and other outlets. It is a different question whether the reasons given are always convincing, but this is a matter of political judgment.

100: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

75:

50: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

25:

0: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

24b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

References:
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

24c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Judicial review of executive action is well entrenched.

References:

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to relay upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

24d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The Bulgarian government has limited independent legislative functions. It needs primary legislation by parliament on the basis of which it adopts secondary legislation.

References:
The Bulgarian government has limited independent legislative functions. It needs primary legislation by parliament on the basis of which it adopts secondary legislation.
The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

100

25a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

References:
Bulgarian Constitution, Chapter 5, Art. 103, http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

25b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

References:
Bulgarian Constitution, Chapter 5, Art. 103, http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.
NO: A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

### 26. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
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</table>

**References:**
Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-ranking State Officials, Art. 2

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**
Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-ranking State Officials

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

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<tr>
<td>26c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
26d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

26e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

26f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are effective.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

26g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The Code of Conduct of High-ranking Government Officials is non-enforceable in the courts. It is difficult to monitor the gifts given to government officials.

References:
The Code of Conduct of High-ranking Government Officials is non-enforceable in the courts. It is difficult to monitor the gifts given to government officials.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely
accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

26h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Reports of the State Audit Office
Public interviews with the head of the State Audit Office

100: Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

27. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

100

27a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | NO
YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

27b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

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Comments:
The whole reporting procedure is optional, although if magistrates submit wrong and incorrect information, they are liable for sanctions. Direct access to the files is granted only to members of the Supreme Judicial Councils. Some magistrates may give permission for publication of their declarations online. I could not find such declarations.

References:
Published on the Internet at [http://www.justice.bg/bg/start.htm](http://www.justice.bg/bg/start.htm), but only for those magistrates who give their permission for publication. At the time of the writing of the report, there were no declarations published there. However, there was a list of names of magistrates who have not submitted declarations – the Web site features the names of just a few high magistrates.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

27c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

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<th>100</th>
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</table>

References:
Published on the Internet only if permission is granted by the magistrate in question. [http://www.justice.bg/bg/start.htm](http://www.justice.bg/bg/start.htm)
Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

Comments:
This happens to the extent possible in a parliamentary government.

According to a constitutional court decision in 2004, members of the cabinet should not leave their office during an electoral campaign. This is probably a good decision, since the country needs a government even during elections, but it gives an opportunity for governing parties to use administrative resources and extra access to public media.

Also, the president of the republic always could lend some support for his party by making public appearances in his official capacity during campaigns. These issues are very difficult to regulate. In my judgment, there is no excessive abuse of administrative resources in Bulgaria, as compared to other countries in the region and in Europe in general.

References:
This happens to the extent possible in a parliamentary government

Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.
III-2. Legislative Accountability

29. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

67

29a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

Comments:
Not the ordinary judiciary: European model of constitutional review.

References:
Constitution, Chapter 8, is devoted to the Constitutional Court.

See also Law on the Constitutional Court, http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

29b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Bulgarian Constitutional Court has rendered a number of important decisions. All its decisions are published at the Web site of the court. One problem found for the period 2001-2007 is the relatively small number of cases per year – around ten on average.

References:
The Web site of the constitutional court: http://www.constcourt.bg/

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.
The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

29c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | NO

Comments:
Yes, but parliament needs to give a permission first. Parliament regularly gives permission for investigation of MPs though immunity must first be lifted. Furthermore MPs might waive their immunity themselves.

Article 70 reads: A Member of the National Assembly shall be immune from detention or criminal prosecution except for the perpetration of an criminal offense, and in such case the permission of the National Assembly or, in between its session, of the Chairperson of the National Assembly, shall be required. No permission shall be required when a Member is detained in flagrante delicto; the National Assembly or, in between its session, the Chairperson of the National Assembly, shall be notified forthwith. (2) (new, SG 27/06) No permission for initiating criminal prosecution shall be required, where the Member of the National Assembly has given his consent thereto in writing. “

References:
Constitution, Art. 70.

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.

30. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

30a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO
**References:**
Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-ranking State Officials, Art. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>YES</strong></th>
<th><strong>NO</strong></th>
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**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

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30b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>YES</strong></th>
<th><strong>NO</strong></th>
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**References:**
There is no such law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

---

30c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

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<tr>
<th><strong>YES</strong></th>
<th><strong>NO</strong></th>
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**References:**
Rules of Organization and Procedure of the National Assembly

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

---

30d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>YES</strong></th>
<th><strong>NO</strong></th>
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</table>
References:
Law on the Public Disclosure of Assets of High-ranking State Officials, Art. 7

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

30e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Not applicable. There are no such regulations.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

30f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Gifts and hospitality offered to MPs are generally not given public attention. There are few media reports on such issues. Monitoring of gifts in the assembly is rather lax. In fact no MPs have been reprimanded for taking gifts.
Using company cars and other facilities by MPs often happens: in fact one MP – Volen Siderov – was involved in a road rage scandal while driving a car that belonged to a TV station. The part of the story involving the car’s ownership attracted almost no public attention or criticism.

References:
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Using company cars and other facilities by MPs often happens: in fact one MP – Volen Siderov – was involved in a road rage scandal while driving a car that belonged to a TV station. The part of the story involving the car’s ownership attracted almost no public attention or criticism.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75: 

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25: 

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

30g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The practice is very new – generally, the State Audit Office, which is supposed to monitor the asset declarations, has no sufficient prerogatives to do it. In particular, this office has no independent investigative powers. Yet, it could examine documentation and spot obvious discrepancies between declarations and publicly available registers.

References:
The practice is very new – generally, the State Audit Office, which is supposed to monitor the asset declarations, has no sufficient prerogatives to do it. In particular, this office has no independent investigative powers. Yet, it could examine documentation and spot obvious discrepancies between declarations and publicly available registers.

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75: 

50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25: 
0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

31. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

100

31a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:
Law on the Public Disclosure of Assets of High-ranking State Officials, Art. 6

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

31b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
According to the written order of the chairman of the National Audit Office, access to MPs disclosure records is provided within one week.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

31c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.
Comments:
The cost is reasonable and may involve only the cost of the paper, printing, etc.

References:
The cost is reasonable and may involve only the cost of the paper, printing, etc.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

32. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

92

32a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

References:
There is no specific legal text providing for access to records of the legislative processes and documents. However, according to the Access to Public Information Act such information is considered public. According to the Rules of Organization and Procedure of the National Assembly, protocols from parliamentary sittings and drafts of laws and decisions are published on the Web site of the National Assembly.


A project to make the Official Gazette an online edition is in its final stages of realization.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).
NO: A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

32b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

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<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</tr>
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</table>

References:
Records are available online.

32c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:
Records are available online.
33. Are judges appointed fairly?

100

33a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

Comments:
The Constitution
Art. 129.
(1) Judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates shall be appointed, promoted, demoted, transferred and removed from office by the Supreme Judicial Council.

(2) The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General shall be appointed and removed by the President of the Republic upon a proposal from the Supreme Judicial Council for a period of seven years, and shall not be eligible for a second term in office. The President shall not deny an appointment or removal upon a repeated proposal.

(3) (amend., SG 85/03) Having completed a five year term of office as a judge, prosecutor or investigating magistrate, and upon attestation, followed by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council, the judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates shall become irremovable. They, including the persons referred to in para 2, shall be removed from office only upon:

1. completion of 65 years of age;
2. resignation;
3. entry into force of a final sentence imposing imprisonment for an intentional criminal offence;
4. permanent de facto inability to perform their duties for more than a year;
5. serious infringement or systematic neglect of their official duties, as well as actions undermining the prestige of the Judiciary.


In the cases under para 3, item 5, the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General shall be removed from office by the President of the Republic, also upon proposal of one-fourth of the Members of the National Assembly, adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the National Assembly. The President shall not deny the removal upon a repeated proposal.

(5) (new, SG 85/03, prev. para 4 SG 27/06) In cases of removal from office under para 3, items 2 and 4, the acquired irremovably shall be restored upon subsequent appointment to the office of a judge, prosecutor or investigating magistrate.

(6) (new, SG 85/03, in force from January 1, 2004, prev. para 5 SG 27/06)) The heads of the judicial bodies, except for those referred to in para 2, shall be appointed for a period of 5 years and are eligible for a second mandate.

References:
Constitutional Regulation of the Supreme Judicial Council – an independent body appointing judges and prosecutors.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.
A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

33b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Formal requirements are always met – it is virtually impossible to become a judge without certain professional qualifications. Chapter 10 of the Law on the Judiciary describes the necessary professional qualifications of the magistrates in detail. These include law degree and work experiences and vary depending on the specific position.

References:

100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

33c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

References:
Constitution, by the Supreme Judicial Council

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

34. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?
34a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

| YES | NO |

**References:**
Civil, Penal and Administrative Procedure Codes specify obligations for giving reasons.

| YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions. |
| NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security). |

34b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The reasons sometimes may be rather formalistic, referring to a specific article of the law. Often the reasons for judicial decisions are delayed months after the judgment has been issued.

**References:**
The reasons sometimes may be rather formalistic, referring to a specific article of the law. Often the reasons for judicial decisions are delayed months after the judgment has been issued.

| 100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements. |
| 75: |
| 50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals. |
| 25: |
| 0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations. |

34c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.
Comments:
Art. 130.
(1) The Supreme Judicial Council shall consist of 25 members. Sitting on it ex officio shall be the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General.
(2) Eligible for election to the Supreme Judicial Council besides its ex officio members shall be practising lawyers of high professional and moral integrity with at least 15 years of professional experience.
(3) Eleven of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be elected by the National Assembly, and eleven shall be elected by the bodies of the judiciary.
(4) The elected members of the Supreme Judicial Council shall serve terms of five years. They shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.
(5) The meetings of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be chaired by the Minister of Justice, who shall not be entitled to a vote.
(6) The Supreme Judicial Council shall:
1. appoint, promote, transfer and remove from office judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates;
2. impose the disciplinary sanctions demotion and "removal from office" to judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates;
3. organise the qualification of judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates;
4. adopt the draft budget of the judiciary;
5. determine the scope and the structure of the annual reports referred to in Article 84, point 16.
(7) The Supreme Judicial Council shall hold a hearing and pass the annual reports of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General on the application of the law and on the activity of the courts, the prosecution office and the investigating bodies and shall submit them to the National Assembly.
(8) The mandate of an elected member of the Supreme Judicial Council shall expire upon any of the following occurrences:
1. resignation;
2. final judicial act for a committed crime;
3. permanent de facto inability to perform his/her duties for more than one year;
4. disciplinary removal from office or deprivation from the right to pursue legal profession or activity.
(9) In case of termination of the mandate of an elected member of the Supreme Judicial Council, a new member from the same quota shall be elected, who shall hold the office until the expiry of the mandate.

References:
Constitution: Supreme Judicial Council

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

34d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

Comments:
The Supreme Judicial Council members are given a fixed mandate and operational independence from both the judiciary and the political branches of power. In 2007, the Supreme Judicial Council was transformed into a permanently acting body, which presumably is strengthening its independence.

References:
The Supreme Judicial Council members are given a fixed mandate and operational independence from both the judiciary and the political branches of power. In 2007, the Supreme Judicial Council was transformed into a permanently acting body, which presumably is strengthening its independence.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry, legislative committee, or by an internal judiciary committee or council that can only act with the approval of judges themselves.

34e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The SJC has carried out a number of disciplinary proceedings this year. Even the head of the Investigators was dismissed because of allegations of corruption.

References:
Interviews with senior prosecutors and judges, and Ionko Grozev (CLS)

100: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

34f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There have been certain allegations that sometimes the SJC is too lenient in its scrutiny and disciplinary measures. A case in point was the re-employment of Deyan Peevski as a magistrate – a former deputy minister dismissed for allegations (unproven in court) of corruption.

References:
There have been certain allegations that sometimes the SJC is too lenient in its scrutiny and disciplinary measures. A case in point was the re-employment of Deyan Peevski as a magistrate – a former deputy minister dismissed for allegations (unproven in court) of corruption.
100: When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

35. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

57

35a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is a law which provides for a voluntary asset declaration of senior magistrates.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

35b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

References:
Anti-bribery laws, Law on Judicial Power

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

35c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:
If a magistrate fails to submit a declaration, he or she is liable to pay a fine up to 2500 leva (US$1875).

If the State Audit Office finds a discrepancy between the asset declaration and other public registers, it informs the Tax Authorities, which carry out an official revision of the assets of the person in question.

Not all magistrates are covered by this law, however – only the most senior ones.

References:
There is a law on the disclosure of the assets of all public officials, which law requires magistrates to disclose their assets. Available online at the site of the State Audit Office, http://register.bulnao.government.bg/

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

35d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
There are no such restrictions.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.
35e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
There are no such restrictions.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

35f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The second source indicates that studies of the CSD show that perception of corruption among the judiciary is quite high.

References:
There are no reports of excessive abuses in this area. However, the system of control appears to be lenient.

www.csd.bg

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to judges Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:
The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

35g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The Supreme Judicial Council checks these assets and could initiate investigations in cases of irregularities. It is difficult to assess to what extent this system is working. On the one hand, it is very new. On the other hand, there have been dismissals of magistrates by the SJC, but it is not clear to what extent the asset declarations have played a role in that.

References:
There is no independent audit.

100: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

36. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

YES | NO

References:
http://www.justice.bg/bg/start.htm

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).
NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

36b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

36c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
37. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

100

37a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution, Powers of National Assembly

YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

37b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
All major public expenditures are approved by the parliament when passing the Law on the State Budget.

References:
All major public expenditures are approved by the parliament when passing the Law on the State Budget.

100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive’s personal budget, or other expenses.
25:

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

37c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

Comments:
There is a permanent budgetary committee. The Web site contain a description of the committee, which consists of 26 MPs and 3 experts.

The Bulgarian parliament is dominated by the government very much in the style of the British parliament. The function of the committees is more to spot problems, rather than to elaborate legislation – the government is mainly responsible for drafting the legislation.

References:
http://www.parliament.bg/?page=ns&lng=bg&nsid=5&action=show&Type=info&gid=155

100: Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

75:

50: Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

38. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

75

38a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

Comments:
The adoption of this year’s budget law has initiated a significant public debate concerning the salaries of teachers, the structure and character of taxes and other issues.
One problem is that the budget is, as a rule, the last law to be adopted before the Christmas break, which creates a certain time pressure in relation to the public discussion of the bill.

References:
Comment regarding the 2007 budget, http://tax-bg.org/?p=76

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

38b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Increasingly, pressure groups, interest groups, trade unions, and others play a role in the adoption of the budget law. This year, for instance, there was significant public pressure in the media to remove planned tax relief for gambling businesses.

References:
http://news.expert.bg/?id=138794

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75:

50: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

25:

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

38c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.
100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

75:

50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

25:

0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

References:
Standing Orders of Parliament. In may 2007 a subcommittee on the audit of public expenditure was set up in the Bulgarian parliament. See an interview with its chairman at http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=141702

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

40. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

56

40a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.


100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:

50: Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

25:

0: There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

---

40b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

---

References:  
http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=141702

The committees in the Bulgarian parliament reflect the composition of the chamber — there is no parity between government and opposition.

100: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee’s work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

75:

50: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members’ ability to shape the committee’s activities.

25:

0: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

40c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.
### References:
The committee composition reflects the clout of different parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee's behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40d. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

### Comments:
Other committees may carry out such functions, but they do very rarely.

### References:
It is a very new structure – it is difficult to draw conclusions about its overall activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
41. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

41a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

References:
Civil Servants Law, Art. 2

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

41b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

References:
Civil Servants Law, Art.18, 29

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.
YES | NO

Comments:
Chapter 7 of the law explains in detail how one can appeal decisions before an administrative body and then before the courts.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

41d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

References:
Civil Service Law, Arts. 7, 103

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

42. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

83

42a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Studies of the Center for Liberal Strategies (Populism in Central and Eastern Europe)
Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

The influence of political patronage is gradually being reduced in Bulgaria due to regulations of the administration and privatization. Yet, it has by no means disappeared, and there are regular reports of certain malpractices in the media.

References:
CLS projects (Populism in Central and Eastern Europe)
CSD reports
References:
Smilov and Toplak (eds.) Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe, Ashgate, 2007

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

75:

50: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family members or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

25:

0: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

42d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

Comments:
Most of the public authorities follow minutely regulated procedures, described in the Rules of Organization.

References:

100: Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position’s authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

75:

50: Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

25:

0: Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position’s responsibilities, authority, or pay.

42e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small faction of total pay.
**References:**

100: Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

75:

50: Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

25:

0: Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

42f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

**References:**
Civil Service Law, Art. 60

The Ministry of Public Administration has a very well maintained website, where information about competitions is regularly published. See [http://www.mdaar.government.bg/notices.php](http://www.mdaar.government.bg/notices.php)

100: The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

75:

50: The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

25:

0: The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

42g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.
Comments:
According to the second source the general impression of public administration experts is that, as a whole, the mechanism is efficient. In practice, though, sometimes court proceedings take a long time.

References:
There have been no independent studies on the issue.

Interview with Antoinette Primatarova, former chief negotiator on behalf of Bulgaria with the EU

100: The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

75:

50: The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

42h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

Comments:
This has not been a problem in Bulgaria for more than ten years.

References:
There are no reports of delayed payments.

100: In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

75:

50: In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

25:

0: In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.
42i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are no cases in which persons convicted of corruption have been reappointed to the public administration. There have been cases of reappointment of persons accused of corruption who have not been convicted.

References:
There are no cases in which persons convicted of corruption have been reappointed to the public administration. There have been cases of reappointment of persons accused of corruption who have not been convicted.

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

43. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

50

43a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

References:
Civil Service Law, Art. 29

YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.
43b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
There are no such restrictions.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

43c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
Civil Service Law

Codes of Conduct of different services

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

43d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

**References:**
There are no such restrictions.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or
seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

43e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interviews with Rumyana Kolarova, Ph.D, August 2007

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

43f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Interviews suggest that problems in this area still exist.

References:
There are no independent studies on this question.
Interviews with Rumyana Kolarova and Milena Stefanova, experts on public administration, October 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100:</th>
<th>The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75:</td>
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<tr>
<td>50:</td>
<td>The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.</td>
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<td>25:</td>
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<tr>
<td>0:</td>
<td>Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.</td>
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### 44. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

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44a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 2
(http://www.bulnao.government.bg/files/_bg/ZpubImust050906_010107new.doc)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

44b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

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**References:**
Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 6
(http://www.bulnao.government.bg/files/_bg/ZpubImust050906_010107new.doc)
Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

References:
Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 6
(http://www.bulnao.government.bg/files/_bg/ZpubImust050906_010107new.doc); Web site of the National Audit Office: http://www.bulnao.government.bg

Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

45. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

45a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

45b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
This year there was one case of a whistle-blower in one of the special agencies who was later dismissed from office. It is difficult to draw conclusions on the basis of such anecdotal evidence. Still, it is the case that there are no publicly reported stories of whistle-blowing.

References:
No objective information on the topic.

100: Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

45c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

45d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interviews with Georgi Ganev, CLS, October 2007

100: Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

100
References:
Although there are no special laws, many public bodies do publish telephone numbers for reporting cases of corruption.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

47. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

69

47a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
An Inspectorate at the Council of Ministers examines and reviews allegations of corruption.

100: The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

47b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
Yes, the Inspectorate is funded by the budget.

**100:** The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

47c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

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References:
there are no spectacular cases of corruption exposed by such mechanisms in Bulgaria.

**100:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

47d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

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References:
There are no spectacular cases of corruption exposed upon the initiative of administrative supervisors. It is difficult to assess objectively how the system operates in practice.
100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

58
IV-3. Procurement

48. Is the public procurement process effective?

93

48a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:
Civil Service Law, Art. 29
Public Procurement Law, Art. 35

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

48b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.
Comments:
There are requirements for professional qualification, but no specific requirements for training. All civil servants undergo periodic training courses, though.

References:
There are requirements for professional qualification, but no specific requirements for training. All civil servants undergo periodic training courses, though.

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

48c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interviews with Georgi Ganev, CLS, October 2007

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

48d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:
According to this law the heads of the Public Procurement Agency have to disclose their assets before the National Audit Office and their declarations are made public. The asset declarations of lower level officials are not public, however.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

48e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

References:
The Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-ranking State Officials

48f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

References:
Public Procurement Law, Art. 14

48g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.
## Comments:
Interested parties could also appeal to courts.

### References:
Public Procurement Law, Chapter 11

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

### References:
Public Procurement Law, Art. 122e

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

### References:
Public Procurement Act, Art. 47

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.
48j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

Comments:
Observers systematically doubt the fairness of procurement procedures. Objective studies on these practices do not exist, but interviews with experts suggest that malpractice is extensive.

References:
Interviews with Ivan Krastev, CLS, November 2007

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

49. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

92

49a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

References:
A Public Procurement Register has been set up in compliance with the Public Procurement Law, Arts. 21-22.

YES: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

NO: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

49b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.
YES | NO

References:
Public Procurement Law, Art. 22

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

49c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Second source specifies the creation of an agency and the setting up of a Public Register of public procurement. This register is open to the public.

References:
Interviews with Jana Papasova, CLS, October 2007

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.
References:
No reports in the media of excessive costs.

Law on Public Procurement, Arts. 21, 22, http://www.bcnl.org/doc.php?DID=68. There are no reports suggesting important violations of these legal provisions.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

49e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

Comments:
Regarding the first source, most of the procurement deals are advertised effectively although sometimes deadlines might be a little tight.

The second source discusses the recent controversy surrounding the competition to provide software for the administration.

References:
Announcements for major deals are published at the site of the agency http://www.aop.bg/ where the rest can be found as well.

see http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=409864

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:
0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

49f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

Comments:
The winner of the procurement competition is publicly announced, although not the exact content of the awarded contract, which impedes public assessment of efficiency. The announcements are made at the website of the agency for the first source.

The second source contains analysis of the recent practices.

References:
http://www.aop.bg.
http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=303213

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75:

50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

25:

0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.

IV-4. Privatization

50. Is the privatization process effective?

100

50a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO
**Comments:**
Specific requirements could be in place for certain privatization deals.

**References:**
Law on Privatization and Post-privatization Control

<table>
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<tr>
<th>YES</th>
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<tr>
<td>A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.</td>
<td>A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.</td>
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50b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

**References:**
Law on Privatization and Post-privatization Control, Chapter 4

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
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<td>A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.</td>
<td>A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.</td>
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50c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

**References:**
No media reports to the contrary.

Interviews with Georgi Ganev, CLS and Sofia University

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<td>Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.</td>
<td>Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.</td>
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25:
0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

100

51a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

Comments:
The law envisages the creation of public registers of concluded privatization deals.

References:
Law on Privatization and Post-privatization Control.

YES: A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

NO: A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

51b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Web site of the Privatization Agency: http://ppc.government.bg

100: There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:
0: There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

51c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

References:
Law on Privatization and Post-privatization, Art. 30

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

51d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Registers are available online and are updated on a regular basis.

Web site of the Privatization Agency: http://ppc.government.bg

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

51e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.
References:
Internet-based information – cheap access

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. National Ombudsman

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

Comments:
The Ombudsman became fully operative only in 2006. It is probably too early to assess its performance.

References:
Ombudsman Law
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

53. Is the national ombudsman effective?

95

53a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
Ombudsman Law, Arts. 4, 8

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

53b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The first ombudsman in Bulgarian history – Ginyo Ganev – is a former MP, and is generally a consensual figure in Bulgarian politics. His strategy thus far is non-confrontational vis-a-vis the government. Probably the idea is to establish and institutionalize the office, since it anyhow needs to rely on cooperation with other authorities.

There are no visible signs of political pressure on the ombudsman. The institution was set up as a fully operational only in 2006. It is not regarded as a political player (for better or worse).

References:

100: This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.
This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

References:
Daniel Smilov, The Impact of EU on the Quality of Democracy in Bulgaria, paper delivered in EUI, Florence, December 3, 2007

http://www.ombudsman.bg/
http://www.ombudsman.bg/index.php?item=team
50: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

53e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
www.ombudsman.bg/index.php?action=list&item=articles

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

53f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
There were initially difficulties in finding an appropriate building, but these were largely resolved in 2007. Most of the regional offices are also operative.

References:
No reports in the media regarding the underfunding of the institution.

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.
### 25:

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

### 53g.

In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

### Comments:

The Office of the Ombudsman is quite active. One may question some of his policies, but generally the Ombudsman has initiated a lot of investigations. The number of complaints is around 3000 per year as of 2006 and rising. Thus far there have been no independent studies of its efficiency.

### References:

[Reports of the institution](http://www.ombudsman.bg/index.php?action=list&item=articles)

All reports are published at the website of the institution. The report for 2005 is available in English as well.

### 100:

The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

### 75:

The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

### 50:

The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

### 53h.

In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

### Comments:

The Office of the Ombudsman is quite active. One may question some of his policies, but generally the Ombudsman has initiated a lot of investigations. The number of complaints is around 3000 per year as of 2006 and rising. Thus far there have been no independent studies of its efficiency.

### References:

[Reports of the institution](http://www.ombudsman.bg/index.php?action=list&item=articles)

### 100:

The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

### 75:
The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

This question should be clarified. In law, the Bulgarian Ombudsman has no powers to impose penalties. He could only address other institutions and ask them to impose penalties. Generally, the Ombudsman has been involved in such proceedings. Again, one could doubt some of the policies of this institution, but the fact is that it is operational and it uses its capacities, no matter how formally weak they are.

There have been no serious conflicts between the Ombudsman and other institutions. Generally, he has a working relationship with the government.
### References

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<td>Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.</td>
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<td>In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.</td>
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<td>Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.</td>
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53k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

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<td>The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.</td>
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<td>The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.</td>
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<td>The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.</td>
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### 54. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

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<td>In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).</td>
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| YES | NO |
YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

54b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
They are found online: http://www.ombudsman.bg/index.php?action=list&item=articles

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

References:
They are online: http://www.ombudsman.bg/index.php?action=list&item=articles

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:
Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

56. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

91

56a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

References:
YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
There is a seven-year-period mandate. Discretionary dismissals are not allowed. There are no reports in the media of attempts of governing majorities to remove the head of the office. Generally, this is an established and respected institution, as is its current chairman.

References:
Interview with Dimo Grozdev (TI, Bulgaria) October 2007.

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The National Audit Office has enough staff members who are well trained to fulfill its basic functions as described in the law. The agency covers all the territory of the country with its 28 regional offices, located in the 28 regional centers of the country.

References:
Interviews with Georgi Ganev, CLS, October 2007

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.
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50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

**Comments:**
The current chairman of the office is a respectable person who has managed to strengthen the autonomy of the institution.

**References:**
Interviews with Yonko Grozev, CLS, lawyer, November 2007

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100: Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

**References:**
There are no media reports or any other sources indicating funding problems.

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100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.
25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

56f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
All reports of the Audit Office can be found on its Web site, which is very well maintained.

References:

100: The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The government acts on the finding of the Audit Office. There are no important examples of the office’s decisions being disregarded. If the Audit Office finds irregularities, other bodies start investigations (prosecutors, etc.). It is another question altogether whether these investigations are always successful.

References:
Interviews with Katia Hristova, TI, Bulgaria, December 2007

100: Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:
In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

**Comments:**
The AO has no investigative powers, only as an instrument of financial control. This limits its efficiency because it has to rely on the input from other executive agencies. Usually its review is limited to thorough checks of available documentation. The Audit Office has very limited prerogatives especially in the area of the control of the funding of political parties. Its chairman has regularly publicly complained of limited institutional powers in this regard.

**References:**
Interviews with Katia Hristova, TI, Bulgaria, November 2007

The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

**57. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?**

**100**

In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

**References:**
Law on Audit Office, Art. 2, 10
**YES:** A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

57b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
Reports are available online. There are no significant delays in the uploading of the information.

**References:**

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
Reports are available online.

**References:**

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:
50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

97

V-3. Taxes and Customs

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

100

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

References:
National Revenue Agency regulation, http://www.nap.bg/ospage?id=100

Law on NRA, 2002

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

59. Is the tax collection agency effective?

100

59a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.
100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75: 

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25: 

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
No reports in the media of funding problems. No studies indicating such problems.

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75: 

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25: 

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

75

Comments:
There are allegations of widespread corruption among tax officers, which leads to differential treatment of companies. However, there is no group of companies that are systematically targeted by the officials – it seems that the corrupt practices, in this sense, are not discriminatory.
References:
Interviews with Katia Hristova and Dimo Grozdev, TI experts, Autumn 2007

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:

50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

25:

0: Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES  |  NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

62. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

100

62a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.
100: The agency has sufficient staff to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
This is a budget-funded agency and can receive additional funding on the basis of performance.

References:
No reports of underfunding found in the media or other studies.

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

50
The customs area is considered one of the most corrupt. There are systematic allegations that political protection is important for evading custom duties. There is very little hard evidence on this, however.

References:

100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

75:

50: Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

25:

0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

Comments:
In late 2006 there was ideas of establishing a single agency managing state-owned companies. The Minister suggesting this idea (Ovcharov) was sacked from the government and could not carry it through. See http://www.segabg.com/online/article.asp?issueid=2453&sectionid=5&id=0001201

References:
There are different mechanisms for overseeing the state owned companies. Some of them are supervised by the Ministries directly. Publicly listed companies are supervised also by the Financial Supervision Commission: see www.fsc.bg

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if this function does not exist.
65. Is the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

60

65a. In law, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
The enterprises, which are directly supervised by the ministries, are in fact controlled ultimately by political appointees (ministers), who appoint also board members. However, for the publicly listed companies, and the companies providing financial services, there is an independent agency, which exercises controlling functions. See the Law on the Financial Supervision Commission, Art. 5 (www.fsc.bg)

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

65b. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Both the ministries and the FSC have professional staff: Interview with Georgi Ganev (CLS) October 2007

100: The agency or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65c. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.
**References:**
No reports of funding problems in this regard.

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**100:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

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**References:**
Interviews with economists at the Centre for Liberal Strategies (October 2007)

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**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

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**65d.** In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

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**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

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**65e.** In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.
References:
Interviews with the economists of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, October 2007.

State owned enterprises are generally politically supervised in Bulgaria – either by the government or the municipalities in case of municipal property. The biggest scandal in 2007 concerned the Sofia Central Heating Company, which is jointly supervised by a ministry and the Sofia municipality. The former director of this company was accused of stealing serious amounts of public funds. The scandal led to changes in the supervisory board of the company, and indirectly, to the resignation of a cabinet minister.

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

66. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

95

66a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | NO

References:
Especially in case they are publicly listed. Law on the Public Offering of Shares, Chapter 8, Section IV

YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

66b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.
Comments:
The questions should probably differentiate between publicly listed state-owned companies and others.

References:
Different models for different types of companies: the publicly listed are regularly updated and published. Audit results are generally accessible for the public. Interviews with Alexander Menkadjiev (broker), Sofia, December 2007.

100: State-owned companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

75:

50: State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

25:

0: Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

66c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
This is especially true of publicly listed companies.

References:

100: Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

75:

50: Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

25:

0: State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

66d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.
### References:
online available for publicly listed companies – accessible for the others through different procedures, including the Law on Access to Public Information

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Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

66e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

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Comments:
Generally, the information is either free (when online) or inexpensive.

### References:

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Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
67. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

67a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES  |  NO

References:
Law on the Limitation of Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control over Economic Activity, rules on the implementation of this law, [http://www.mi.government.bg/doc_pub/Comment%206%20%5Ball%20administrative%20bodies%5D.doc](http://www.mi.government.bg/doc_pub/Comment%206%20%5Ball%20administrative%20bodies%5D.doc)

YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required.

67b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES  |  NO

References:
Law on the Limitation of Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control over Economic Activity, [http://www.mi.government.bg/doc_pub/Comment%206%20%5Ball%20administrative%20bodies%5D.doc](http://www.mi.government.bg/doc_pub/Comment%206%20%5All%20administrative%20bodies%5D.doc)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

67c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.
References:
Interviews with Georgi Ganev, CLS, October 2007

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

25:

0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

67d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

References:
Interviews with Ventsislav Karadzov, freelance consultant, October 2007

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

68. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

100

68a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.
YES  |  NO

**References:**
Law on the Limitation of Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control over Economic Activity

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES  |  NO

**References:**
Law on the Limitation of Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control over Economic Activity

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES  |  NO

**References:**
Law on the Limitation of Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control over Economic Activity

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.
69. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

58

69a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
No media reports or academic studies of gross abuses and violations, or targeted inspections of specific businesses.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In my judgment, the authorities are still too lenient in the enforcement of standards. Some examples involve the big enterprises that present environmental risks, such as Kremikovtsi and Lukoil Neftohim, in addition to the tourism business around the sea coast and the mountains.

References:
There are no reports of gross abuses.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**
Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

References:
There are no reports of systematic or serious abuses of power.

Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law

70. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

100

70a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.
YES | NO

**References:**
Penal Code, Art. 301(1)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**
Penal Code, Chapter 5, Section V. Arts. 213-214

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**
Penal Code, Chapter 8, Section IV

**YES:** A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.
YES | NO

References:
Penal Code, Chapter 8, Section IV

YES: A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Penal Code, Chapter 8, Section IV

YES: A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Penal Code, Chapter 8, Section II

YES: A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.
YES: A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | NO

70i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Penal Code, Chapter 8, Section II


Penal Code, Chapter 7

YES: A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

YES: A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

References:
Penal Code, Art. 321
VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

YES | NO

Comments:
In December 2007 the Parliament was discussing a draft law on a State Agency of National Security, whose prerogatives include the fight against serious cases of corruption. The draft law was passed at the very end of the year and the agency is going to become operative from 2008.

References:
There is a variety of agencies and commissions that are specifically designed to target corruption. Some of them have no investigative powers, such as the Commission on Prevention and Countering of Corruption (which is a coordinative body at the level of the government, headed by the Minister of Interior: See the website of the council of ministers: Penal Code, Art. 321. Several other executive agencies have prerogatives in the fight against corruption, including investigative powers.

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

72. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

61

72a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:
The commission in the first source is independent of the government.

The executive Commission on the Prevention and Countering of Corruption is a governmental body, which has no institutional guarantees for independence. The same is true of government agencies, such as the Unit for the Fight against Organized Crime.
The new State Agency on National Security will have institutional guarantees of independence, such as a fixed term in office for its chairman, direct accountability to parliament, etc.

References:

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

72b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The current model of control and monitoring is to a large extent government-dominated through a political majority in parliament.

References:
Interviews with Yonko Grozev, CLS, and Stefan Popov, risk monitor, November 2007

**100:** This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

72c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0
References:
Interviews with Yonko Grozev, CLS, and Stefan Popov, risk monitor, November 2007

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<td>100</td>
<td>The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.</td>
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<td>The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.</td>
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<td>The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.</td>
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72d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

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Comments:
The existing problems are not so much with the professional qualities of the appointees. Rather, the problems are more structural.

References:
There are no reports suggesting that appointments to these bodies are heavily politicized. See Report of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, [http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2152](http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2152)

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<td>100</td>
<td>Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.</td>
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72e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

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References:

Daniel Smilov, Anti-corruption Bodies as Discourse-Controlling Instruments (forthcoming in an edited volume (Peter Larmour and Luis de Sousa) from Routlege.

100: The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75: 

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25: 

0: The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

72f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100  75  50  25  0

References:
There are no reported problems of underfunding of existing structures. For a general overview, see http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2152

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75: 

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25: 

0: The agency’s funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

72g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100  75  50  25  0

Comments:
Reporting is quite regular: most of the agencies provide data, at least annually. Some of the data are included in the regular reports of the Public Prosecutor before parliament, which are Constitutionally required. Others are published electronically on the governmental Web sites. The source provides a recent example.
References:
http://www.government.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0011&n=000787&g=

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

72h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The combination between different anti-corruption commissions and executive agencies such as the structures of the Ministry of Interior and the anti-corruption units at the Prosecutor’s Office have all necessary powers.

References:
The combination between different anti-corruption commissions and executive agencies such as the structures of the Ministry of Interior and the anti-corruption units at the Prosecutor’s Office have all necessary powers.

100: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

72i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
I am skeptical of the possibility to assess the efficiency of such agencies in such general terms. Since there are no criteria for performance measurement, all such ratings will be questionable. The general opinion of Bulgarian experts is that the performance of these bodies deserves criticism. They do initiate investigations, but these rarely lead to convictions.
References:
I am skeptical of the possibility to assess the efficiency of such agencies in such general terms. Since there are no criteria for performance measurement, all such ratings will be questionable. The general opinion of Bulgarian experts is that the performance of these bodies deserves criticism. They do initiate investigations, but these rarely lead to convictions.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

73. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

63

73a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
The Parliamentary Commission can be appealed to by citizens, as well as bodies within the Ministry of Interior.

References:
There have been no reports of systematic disregard of complaints.

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.
73b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

Comments:
No legislative whistle-blowing protections exist.

References:

100: Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

VI-3. Rule of Law

74. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

YES | NO

74a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

References:
The Law on Judicial Power

The Constitution, Arts. 120, 121
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

74b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In general, the length of judicial proceedings in Bulgaria is comparable to those in other European countries. In certain areas there are more substantial delays, but aggregate figures do not indicate any gross deviation from average European standards.

References:
Studies of CEPEJ (a Commission of the Council of Europe)

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:

0: Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

74c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interviews with Jonko Grozev, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, October-November 2007

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

75:
In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100

Comments:
The Bulgarian judiciary is quite formalistic in its approach.

References:
Studies of the CLS (Sofia) at www.cls-sofia.org.

Interviews with Mila Georgieva, Supreme Prosecutorial Office, October 2007

100: Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

75:

50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

75

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?
Comments:
The private bailiffs and the mixed system of enforcement, which was recently introduced, have improved the enforcement situation to a degree. It is difficult to assess the current situation: there are reports in the media of problems, but it is difficult to say to what extent this is a systemic issue.

Since the problems of enforcement concern mostly civil law matters, the system of private bailiffs should speed up the process and address the enforcement issue.

References:
Interviews with Yonko Grozev
Media reports.

| 100 | Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state. |
| 75: |
| 50: Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement. |
| 25: |
| 0: Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions. |

77. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

94

77a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:
Chapter 6 of the Constitution

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

77b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.
Comments:
Judges have sufficient mechanisms to be protected from political interference. The Bulgarian Constitution and the Law on Judicial Power provide more than sufficient guarantees regarding fixed terms in office, the impossibility of being removed, functional independence, etc.

References:
Judges have sufficient mechanisms to be protected from political interference. The Bulgarian Constitution and the Law on Judicial Power provide more than sufficient guarantees: fixed terms in office, impossibility of being removed, functional independence, etc.

100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:

0: National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

77c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

Comments:
In most courts there are systems of random allocation of cases to judges.

References:
Law on the Judicial Power

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

77d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.
Comments:
The Constitution also guarantees the mandates of the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Prosecutor General.

References:
Law on Judicial System, various provisions (i.e., Arts. 28-29)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

78. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

78a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

References:
There are no such reports

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

78b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO
79. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

89

79a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments: There is no reliable research on this. The problem is that the population of the Roma, for instance, overlaps with that of the poor, who cannot afford a very good defense in court. In this sense, Bulgaria is hardly an aberration from the common trends for all countries.

References:
Interviews with Mila Georgieva, Supreme Prosecutorial Office.

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

79b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

79c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

**YES** | **NO**

References:
Legal Aid Law, effective since 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

79d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

**100** | **75** | **50** | **25** | **0**

**Comments:**
Many experts criticize the existing system for underfunding.

References:
Interviews with Yonko Grozev, CLS, October, 2007
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
All experts agree on this issue. Citizens who cannot afford to pay for services can resort to state legal aid.

References:
NGO monitoring of judicial reform in Bulgaria, [http://www.bili-bg.org/21/page.html](http://www.bili-bg.org/21/page.html)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
In my opinion the costs of legal proceedings in Bulgaria, including the lawyer’s fees, is not prohibitive. It is rather the quality and the length of the proceedings that have a more serious deterring effect.

References:
Interviews with Veselin Paskalev, lawyer, October 2007
In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location. Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates. Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location. Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

References:
Interviews with Yonko Grozev, CLS, October 2007

VI-4. Law Enforcement

80. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

80a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.
100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

80b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

Comments:
In proportional terms, the budget of the law enforcement agencies is substantial. There are no serious reports of underfunding, apart from some complaints about car parks and facilities.

References:
In proportional terms, the budget of the law enforcement agencies is substantial. There are no serious reports of underfunding, apart from some complaints about car parks and facilities.

100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

80c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.
Comments:
There is a formal separation of the political and the management sides of the Ministry. However, the law enforcement agencies are not fully protected from political interference.

References:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100:</th>
<th>The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50:</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0:</td>
<td>The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

92

81a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

| YES | NO |

Comments:
According to the Constitution citizen complaints can be submitted to the Ombudsman, the Minister of Interior and the courts. The first and the last of these three are independent from the government. The Prosecutors could also consider citizens’ complaints.

References:
According to the Constitution citizen complaints can be submitted to the Ombudsman, the Minister of Interior and the courts. The first and the last of these three are independent from the government. The Prosecutors could also consider citizens’ complaints.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism
81b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen’s complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
There are no reports of substantial delays in this regard.

100: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

81c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:
First Source: There are actually a number of agencies that target corruption within the Ministry of Interior. The National Security Service targets corruption which involves foreign participants.

Second source: The National Service for Countering Organized Crime targets corruption when it is linked with organized crime:

References:
Law on the Ministry of Interior, 46(1)9

Art. 90 (1)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.
81d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
There are no independent assessments of the efficiency of these bodies. All rankings in this regard are a bit speculative and rely on my interviews with most of the people mentioned thus far, as well as others.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

81e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
The Bulgarian Constitution does not grant such immunities.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

81f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |
Comments:
This year six police officers received heavy sentences for killing a suspect upon arrest. There was a significant outcry against these sentences, which suggests that apart from police solidarity, there are also public sentiments against penalizing law enforcement officers for misconduct in the fight against crime. The source shows an example.

References:
http://www.mediapool.bg/show/?storyid=111992

100: Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

75:

50: Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

25:

0: Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.