

Overall Score:

54 - Very Weak

Legal Framework Score:

71 - Moderate

Actual Implementation Score:

35 - Very Weak

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. ⁶⁵Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

67

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

Comments:

The government has control over anti-corruption nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Transparency International.

References:

In accordance with the Preamble of the Constitution of January 18, 1996 and Article 1, subparagraph 3 of Law N° 90/053 of December 19, 1990 on the right of association (<http://www.prc.cm> or <http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Cameroon.pdf>).

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 11 of Law N° 090 of December 19, 1990 on the freedom of association, CSOs must be declared to be of public utility.

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

NO: A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with the article 9 of the Law N°90/O53 of December 19, 1990 on the freedom of association.

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

75

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Pelagie Ngo'onana, Coalition for Transparency: un nouveau front anti-corruption” in La Nouvelle Expression, N° 2046 (June 2007), <http://www.lanouvelleexpression.net>
- Pierre Titti Nwell, De la corruption au Cameroun, Yaounde, Gerddes-Cameroon and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001.

100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

75:

50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Valentin Simeon Zinga, Lutte contre la corruption: le Cameroun tente de lutter...contre sa mauvaise réputation” in Rfi Service Pro, 24/05/2001 (www.rfi.fr/Fichiers/MFI/PolitiqueDiplomatie/353.asp)
- Fabien Eboussi Boulaga and Valentin Simeon Zinga, ” La lutte contre la corruption : impossible est-il camerounais?”, Yaounde, PUA, 2002

100: Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

75:

50: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

25:

0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

References:

– Alexandre Djimeli, “Transparency Cameroon s’upécise” in Le Messenger, 26/02/2007 (<http://www.lemessenger.net>).

– Interview of Jean-Bosco Talla, General Secretary of Coalition against Corruption (COAT) In Pelagie Ngo'onana, “Coalition for Transparency: un nouveau front anti-corruption”, La Nouvelle Expression, N°2046, juin 2007 (<http://www.lanouvelleexpression.net>).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:

– Lucien Ayissi, “Corruption et gouvernance”, Yaounde, PUA, 2003

– Dieudonne Oyono, “Cameroun: les chantiers de la gouvernance”, Published by the President of National program Governorship, Yaounde, 2004 (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. “Imprisoned” is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

References:

- Francis Ampère Simo, Cameroun: les secteurs les plus corrompus”, in Le Messenger, 20/02/2005 (<http://www.lemessenger.net>).
- Moïse Nembot, “Comprendre la corruption au Cameroun”, in Simon Pierre Sigué and Albert Roland Amougou (ed), Gérer pour la croissance au Cameroun, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2002.
- Dieudonné Oyono, “Cameroon: les chantiers de la gouvernance”, The National Program Governorship, Yaoundé, 2004.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist’s work. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

Comments:

The majority of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that fight corruption are of recent creation.

References:

- Samuel Nguiffo, Code contre la corruption et la transparence des Ong et des projets d’Eglises au Cameroun” in Les Chantiers de la société civile, 26 juin 2005 (<http://www.wagne.net/sc>).
- Pierre Titti Nwell, “De la corruption au Cameroun”, Yaoundé, Gerddes-Cameroon et Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual’s history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

88

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with the preamble to the constitution of January 18, 1996 (<http://www.prc.cm>).

YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Norbert Tchana Nganté, Histoire du syndicalisme au Cameroun, in

– Leopold Moume Etia, Cameroun: les années ardentes. Aux origines de la vie syndicale et politique”, Paris, JALIVRES, 1991.

100: Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

I-2. Media

5. Are media and free speech protected?

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:

- Preamble of the Constitution of January 18, 1996
- Article 1 of Law N° 90/052 of December 19, 1990 on Social Communication

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:

- Preamble of the Constitution of January 18, 1996 (www.prc.cm)

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

References:

- Alliance Nyobia, 'Pourquoi "Radio Veritas" a été autorisée,' in Cameroon Tribune, 15 December 2003 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Norbert N. Ouendji, "Médias et pouvoir politique au Cameroun – Les journalistes face à la santé présidentielle", Editions Les Belles Pages, Marseille, 2006.

100: Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

References:

in accordance with Article 3 of Law N°90/052 of December 19, 1990 on Freedom of Social Communication

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

References:

- Norbert N. Ouendji, Médias et pouvoir politique au Cameroun – Les journalistes face à la santé présidentielle”, Editions Les Belles Pages, Marseille, 2006.
- Albert Mbida, “Le contrôle administratif sur l’information au Cameroun (Radio-Télévision-Pressé écrite-Cinéma)”, Paris, 1980.
- Sy Koumbo Singa Galy, Modeste Mutinga, “Communiqué de presse : Opération 100.000 signatures pour freedom fm”, mai 2004 in Media Cameroun (<http://www.africultures.com>).

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Norbert N. Ouendji, Médias et pouvoir politique au Cameroun – Les journalistes face à la santé présidentielle”, Editions Les Belles Pages, Marseille, 2006.
- Albert Mbida, “Le contrôle administratif sur l’information au Cameroun (Radio-Télévision-Pressé écrite-Cinéma)”, Paris, 1980.
- Sy Koumbo Singa Galy, Modeste Mutinga, “Communiqué de presse : Opération 100.000 signatures pour freedom fm”, May 2004 in Media Cameroun (<http://www.africultures.com>).
- Alliance Nyobia, “Pourquoi Radio Véritas a été autorisée”, In Cameroon Tribune, 15 December 2003 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

38

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

References:

- Norbert N. Ouendji, Médias et pouvoir politique au Cameroun – Les journalistes face à la santé présidentielle”, Editions Les Belles Pages, Marseille, 2006.
- Albert Mbida, “Le contrôle administratif sur l’information au Cameroun (Radio-Télévision-Pressé écrite-Cinéma),” Paris, 1980.
- Sy Koumbo Singa Galy, Modeste Mutinga, “Communiqué de presse: Opération 100.000 signatures pour freedom fm”, May 2004 in Media Cameroun (<http://www.africultures.com>).
- Alliance Nyobia, “Pourquoi Radio Véritas a été autorisée”, In Cameroon Tribune, 15 December 2003 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Michel Tjade Eoné, Radios: publics et pouvoirs au Cameroun: utilisations officielles et besoins sociaux, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1986.

100: Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | **NO**

References:

In accordance with Article 4 (3) of the Decree N°91/287 of June 21, 1991, concerning the organization and operation of the National Council of Communication

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Sy Koumbo Singa Galy, Modeste Mutinga, Communiqué de presse : Opération 100.000 signatures pour freedom fm”, May 2004 in Media Cameroun (<http://www.africultures.com>).
- Alliance Nyobia, “Pourquoi Radio Véritas a été autorisée”, In Cameroon Tribune, 15 December 2003 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Jean-Dominique Geslin, “Cameroun: Bagarre des ondes”, in Jeune-Afrique.com, 21 December 2003 (<http://www.jeuneafrique.com>).

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Sy Koumbo Singa Galy, Modeste Mutinga, Communiqué de presse: Opération 100.000 signatures pour freedom fm”, May 2004 in Media Cameroun (<http://www.africultures.com>).
- Alliance Nyobia, “Pourquoi Radio Véritas a été autorisée”, In Cameroon Tribune, 15 December 2003 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Jean-Dominique Geslin, “Cameroun : Bagarre des ondes”, in Jeune-Afrique.com, 21 December 2003 (<http://www.jeuneafrique.com>).

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Baba Wamé, Internet au Cameroun: les usages et les usagers. Essai sur l'adoption des technologies de l'information et de la communication dans un pays en voie de développement", Thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris II Panthéon Assas, 12 December 2005

– Jean Lucien Ewangué, "Le phénomène Internet dans la ville de Yaoundé", Séminaire NTIC, ESSTIC, Yaoundé, juillet 1998.

100: The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

75:

50: Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

25:

0: Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Baba Wamé, Internet au Cameroun : les usages et les usagers. Essai sur l'adoption des technologies de l'information et de la communication dans un pays en voie de développement, Thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris II Panthéon Assas, 12 December 2005

– Jean Lucien Ewangué, Le phénomène Internet dans la ville de Yaoundé, Séminaire NTIC, ESSTIC, Yaoundé, juillet 1998

– Carine Koudjo Talla, Introduction, Tic et développement local au Cameroun," 12 June 2007, in <http://ticdevloc.celeonet.fr>

100: The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

75:

50: In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

25:

0: The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

33

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

When we talk about things that may not affect the public life. This is a crime that is punishable by law

References:

In accordance with Article 305 (1) and (2) of the Penal Code concerning Defamation

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

– Aimé-Francis Amougou, Lutte contre la corruption: une affaire de tous,” in Cameroon Tribune, 18 January 2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

– Dr Asafor Chi Cornelius, “Le Rôle du comité adhoc de lutte contre la corruption,” Rapport final de la première phase du PNG, 12 May 2000 (www.worldbank.org)

100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75:

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

25:

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Baba Wamé, Internet au Cameroun: les usages et les usagers. Essai sur l'adoption des technologies de l'information et de la communication dans un pays en voie de développement," Thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris II Panthéon Assas, 12 December 2005.

– Jean Lucien Ewangué," Le phénomène Internet dans la ville de Yaoundé," Séminaire NTIC, ESSTIC, Yaoundé, July 1998.

– Carine Koudjo Talla, "Introduction, Tic et développement local au Cameroun", 12 juin 2007, in <http://ticdevloc.celeonet.fr>

– Aimé-Francis Amougou, "Lutte contre la corruption : une affaire de tous" in Cameroon Tribune, 18 January 2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

-Dr Asafor Chi Cornelius, "Le Rôle du comité adhoc de lutte contre la corruption," Rapport final de la première phase du PND, 12 May 2000 (www.worldbank.org).

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

10. Are the media credible sources of information?

65

10a. In law, print media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 20 (1) of the Law N°90/052 of December 19, 1990 on the Freedom of Social Communications, each print media outlet must publish its advertising rates once per quarter. All companies are subject to declarative system in Cameroon, whether for the disclosure of advertising rates or for the disclosure of the owners of media companies. Such statements/disclosures are free.

YES: A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 20 (1) of the Law N°90/052 of December 19, 1990 on the Freedom of Social Communications, each print media outlet must publish its advertising rates once per quarter. All companies are subject to declarative system in Cameroon, whether for the disclosure of advertising rates or for the disclosure of the owners of media companies. Such statements/disclosures are free.

YES: A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Valentin Nga Ndongo, *Medias au Cameroun: mythes et délires d'une société en crise*, Paris, LHarmattan, 1993.
- "La presse écrite dans le paysage médiatique du Cameroun; une analyse dynamique," *Enquête du Centre de recherche et d'étude en Économie et Sondage*, Yaoundé, Fondation Friedrich Ebert au Cameroun, 1995.
- "Le régime camerounais de répression judiciaire des infractions de presse," Yaoundé, Fondation Friedrich Ebert, 1996.
- Francis B. Nyamnjoh, "Mass media and democratization in Cameroon," Yaoundé, Fondation Friedrich Ebert, 1996.

100: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

25:

0: Editors and journalists are widely known to sell” favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- François-Xavier Eya, Municipales et législatives 2007: Le Mincom, les médias et la propagande,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 17 July 2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net)
- Baugas-Orain Djoyum, “Elections législatives et municipales du 22 juillet 2007 : Le coup de pouce du Mincom à la presse privée,” 18 July 2007, <http://www.mincom.gov.cm/online>

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75:

50: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25:

0: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- François-Xavier Eya, Municipales et législatives : Le Mincom, les médias et la propagande,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 17 July

2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

– Baugas-Orain Djoyum, “Elections législatives et municipales du 22 juillet 2007: Le coup de pouce du Mincom à la presse privée,” 18 July 2007, in <http://www.mincom.gov.cm/online>

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

75:

50: The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

100

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:

– Alberto Nna, Offensive Judiciaire: Trois autres plaintes de Ministres,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 10/03/2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

– Alexandre T. Djimeli, “Presse camerounaise: un projet de loi liberticide,” in Syfia International, 04/05/2006 (<http://www.syfia.info/fr>).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist’s work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned” is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

Comments:

The former Minister of Finance, Polycarpe Abah Abah has brought many judicial actions against several journalists who uncovered official corruption. Minister Abah was dismissed from government on September 7, 2007. The journalists covering official corruption, such as Peter William Mandio (Le Front) or Michel Michault Moussala (Aurore Plus) are even celebrated in public opinion.

References:

- Alberto Nna, Offensive Judiciaire: Trois autres plaintes de Ministres,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 10/03/2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- Alexandre T. Djimeli, “Presse camerounaise : un projet de loi liberticide”, in Syfia International, 04/05/2006 (<http://www.syfia.info/fr>).
- Pierre Celestin Atangana, “Justice: des procès contre des publications,” in Repères, 05/09/2007 (<http://www.camerounlink.net/fr/news.php?nid=32057&vx=1&kat2=4>).
- Roland Tsapi, “Contre les gestionnaires indéliçats: Abah Abah et Cie annoncés au Sed,” in Le Messager, 10/09/2007(www.lemessager.net).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

Comments:

No journalist was killed in Cameroon in connection with corruption. However, the journalists who denounce corruption are informed upon by members of the government.

References:

- Alberto Nna, Offensive Judiciaire: Trois autres plaintes de Ministres,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 10/03/2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- Alexandre T. Djimeli, “Presse camerounaise: un projet de loi liberticide,” in Syfia International, 04/05/2006 (<http://www.syfia.info/fr>).
- Valentin Nga Ndongo, “Medias au Cameroun: mythes et délires d'une société en crise,” Paris, LHarmattan, 1993.
- “La presse écrite dans le paysage médiatique du Cameroun; une analyse dynamique,” Enquête du Centre de recherche et d'étude en Économie et Sondage, Yaoundé, Fondation Friedrich Ebert au Cameroun, 1995.
- Reporters Sans Frontières, Rapport 2006 sur le Cameroun, in www.rsf.org.
- “Le régime camerounais de répression judiciaire des infractions de presse,” Yaoundé, Fondation Friedrich Ebert, 1996.
- Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Mass media and democratization in Cameroon,” Yaoundé, Fondation Friedrich Ebert, 1996.
- Pierre Celestin Atangana, “Justice: des procès contre des publications,” in Repères, 05/09/2007 (<http://www.camerounlink.net/fr/news.php?nid=32057&vx=1&kat2=4>).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

I-3. Public Access to Information

71

12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

67

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with the preamble of the Constitution of January 18, 1996

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with the preamble of the constitution of January 18, 1996 (www.prc.cm).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

References:

– The law N° 90/O52 of December 19, 1999 on Social Communication make no mention of any such institution or mechanism (www.mincom.gov.cm).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

13. Is the right of access to information effective?

15

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Edouard Tamba, Contentieux: l'affaire Freedom Fm rebondit," in Le Messenger, 04/05/2007 (www.lemessenger.net).
– Norbert Ouendji, "Medias et pouvoir politique au Cameroun. Les journalistes face à la santé présidentielle," Marseille, Les Belles Pages, 2006.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Edouard Tamba, Contentieux: l'affaire Freedom Fm rebondit," in Le Messenger, 04/05/2007 (www.lemessenger.net).
- Norbert Ouendji, "Medias et pouvoir politique au Cameroun. Les journalistes face à la santé présidentielle," Marseille, Les Belles Pages, 2006.
- Interview of Norbert Ouendji, member of IJBA, "Le journalisme avec peine au Cameroun," in http://iutbdx.ouvaton.org/article.php3?id_article=102

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Interview of Norbert Ouendji, member of IJBA (Former student, School of journalism, Bordeaux), Le journalisme avec peine au Cameroun," in http://iutbdx.ouvaton.org/article.php3?id_article=102
- Edouard Tamba, "Contentieux: l'affaire Freedom Fm rebondit," in Le Messenger, 04 May 2007.
- Interview of Felix Zogo, Technical Adviser of the Ministry of communication, "Pourquoi Radio Veritas a été autorisée", in Cameroon Tribune, 15 December 2003. (http://www.cameroon-info.net/cmi_show_news.php?id=13837).

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Interview with Norbert Ouendji, member of IJBA (Former student, School of journalism, Bordeaux), Le journalisme avec peine au Cameroun," at http://iutbdx.ouvaton.org/article.php3?id_article=102
- Edouard Tamba, "Contentieux: l'affaire Freedom Fm rebondit," in Le Messenger, 04 May 2007.
- Interview of Felix Zogo, Technical Adviser of the Ministry of communication, "Pourquoi Radio Veritas a été autorisée," in Cameroon Tribune, 15 December 2003. (http://www.cameroon-info.net/cmi_show_news.php?id=13837).

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Interview of Norbert Ouendji, member of IJBA (Former student, School of journalism, Bordeaux), Le journalisme avec peine au Cameroun, at http://iutbdx.ouvaton.org/article.php3?id_article=102
- Edouard Tamba, "Contentieux: l'affaire Freedom Fm rebondit," in Le Messenger, 04 May 2007.
- Interview of Felix Zogo, Technical Adviser of the Ministry of communication, "Pourquoi Radio Veritas a été autorisée," in Cameroon Tribune, 15 December 2003. (http://www.cameroon-info.net/cmi_show_news.php?id=13837).

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

II-1. ⁵⁷Voting & Citizen Participation

14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with the preamble of the constitution of January 18, 1996 (www.prc.cm).

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with Article 6, subparagraph 2 and 3 of the constitution of January 18, 1996 for the election of the President of the republic
– in accordance with Article 1 subparagraph 1 of the law N°91/20 of December 16, 1991, fixing the conditions of eligibility of the deputies at the national assembly (<http://www.mincom.gov.cm/elections2007/index.asp?link=textes&text=ttext>).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

58

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Bernard Ngango, *Le droit des élections politiques au Cameroun: suffrage universel et démocratie*, Paris, Atelier national de reproduction des thèses, 2005.

-Olinga Alain Didier, “La Constitution de la République du Cameroun”, Ydé, Presses de IUCAC, les éditions Terre Africaine, 2006.

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Thierry Ngogang, *Présidentielle 2004: Il y a 25.000 urnes transparentes*,” in *Mutations*, 09/08/2004 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

-Antoine Socpa, “Les dons dans le jeu électoral au Cameroun,” in *Cahiers d’études africaines*, 157, 2000 (<http://etudesaficaines.revues.org/document5.html>).

100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

75:

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

25:

0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Bernard Ngango, Le droit des élections politiques au Cameroun: Suffrage universel et démocratie,” Paris, Atelier national de reproduction des thèses, 2005.
- Barrister Francis Djonko, “Le Déroulement du processus électoral du 23 juin 2002” in <http://www.maitrefrancisdjonko.com>.

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

75

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

References:

- An accordance with Article 2 of the law N°90/056 of December 19, 1990 on political parties.

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with Article 3 (1) of the law N°90/056 of December 19, 1990 on political parties.

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if Individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Alain Didier Olinga, Un parti politique d'opposition est-il banal? Le régime juridique des partis politiques,” in Sous la direction de Luc Sindjoun (ed), Comment peut-on être opposant au Cameroun? : Politique parlementaire et politique autoritaire, Dakar, Codesria, 2003.

– Rosine Moko, “Les partis politiques au Cameroun,” in http://www.izf.net/izf/ee/pro/index_frameset.asp?url=http://www.izf.net/izf/EE/pro/cameroun/2023.asp

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

75:

50: Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

25:

0: Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Antoine Socpa, Les dons dans le jeu électoral au Cameroun, Cahiers d'études africaines, 157, 2000
<http://etudesafriaines.revues.org/document5.html>
- Manasse Aboya Endong, Democracy inside Political parties in Cameroon: The case of CPDM," in Solon, African review of parliamentarism and democracy, volume II, N° 1, 2003.

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

75:

50: Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

25:

0: Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Alain Didier Olinga, Un parti politique d'opposition est-il banal? Le régime juridique des partis politiques", in Sous la direction de Luc Sindjoun (ed), Comment peut-on être opposant au Cameroun?: Politique parlementaire et politique autoritaire, Dakar, Codesria, 2003.
- Interview, Dr Manasse Aboya Endong, "Le pays est rentré au monolithisme politique," in Mutations, 2 août 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

75:

50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

References:

– The National Elections Observatory (NEO), created by the Law N° 2000/016 of December 19, 2000, modified and supplemented by the Law n°2003/015 of December 22, 2003

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

40

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 3, subparagraph 3 of the law N° 2000/016 of December 19, 2000, the members of the NEO are selected from among the independent personalities of Cameroonian nationality, known for their moral integrity, their intellectual honesty, their neutrality and their impartiality.

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dr Manasse Aboya Endong, De l'ONEL à ELECAM: le cahe-sexe d'une gestion partisane," in Cahiers de Mutations, July 2007.
- Christopher Fomunyoh, Regional Director for Africa, NDI (National Democratic Institute), LONEL ne peut organiser des élections crédibles, interview in Le Messenger, A Weekly Electronic Publication of the GMM Group, 17 July, 2001 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Interview with Diana Acha Morfaw, Vice-President of the National Elections Observatory (NEO) in <http://www.spm.gov.cm>.
- Interview with Dr Christopher Fomunyoh, Regional Director for Africa, NDI (National Democratic Institute), LONEL ne peut organiser des élections crédibles, interview in Le Messenger, A Weekly Electronic Publication of the GMM Group, 17 July 2001 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The report of the last elections was published only two years later. That could worry the Cameroon Tribune, the governmental daily newspaper.

References:

- Aimé Francis Amougou, “Présidentielle 2004: enfin le rapport de IONEL,” in Cameroon Tribune, 12 May 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Aimé Francis Amougou, “Présidentielle 2004: IONEL finalise son rapport,” in Cameroon Tribune, 14 April 2005 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

75:

50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Alain Didier Olinga, *L’ONEL: réflexions sur la loi camerounaise du 19 décembre 2000 portant création d’un Observatoire national des élections*, Yaoundé, Presses de IUCAC, 2001.
- Dr Christopher Fomunyoh, Regional Director for Africa, NDI (National Democratic Institute), *LONEL ne peut organiser des élections crédibles*, interview in *Le Messenger*, A Weekly Electronic Publication of the GMM Group, 17 July 2001 (www.lemessenger.net).
- Alexandre T. Djimeli, “Processus électoral: Les pouvoirs que l’Onel refuse”, in *Le Messenger*, 16/07/2004 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

63

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

- Christian Lang, “Législatives et municipales: Niels Marquardt dénonce les conditions d’inscription dans les listes électorales” in Le Messenger, 23 February 2007 (www.lemessenger.net).
- Jean-Bruno Tagne, “Elections : Les jeunes boudent les listes électorales”, in Mutations, 16 July 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and “ghost” voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

References:

- In accordance with Article 47 (2) of law n°91/20 of 16 December 1991, fixing the conditions for election of the deputies at the national assembly.
- In accordance with Article 12 subparagraph 3 of the ONEL, the failures made by the political parties, the candidates or the voters can also be carried by the ONEL in front of legal authorities.

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Jean-François Belibi, Contentieux électoral : annulation en cascade à la Cour Suprême”, in Mutations, 9/08/2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net)

– Augustin Fongang, “Cameroun: Contentieux électoral – Le Conseil constitutionnel rassure”, in Cameroon Tribune, 13/07/2007 (www.cameroon-tribune.net)

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Ambroise Ebonda, Yves Djambong, Honoré Foimoukom, Municipales Législatives : vers le parti unique: Le cameroun en Flammes,” in Le Messenger, 24 July /2007 (www.lemessenger.net).

– François Bimogo, “Douala: émeutes au quartier Bonamoussadi au lendemain des élections du 22 juillet”, in Cameroun-online actualités, mercredi, 25 July 2007 (<http://www.cameroun-online.com/actualite,actu-2876.html>).

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

75:

50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:

0: The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 18 of the Law N° 2000/016 December 19, 2000 creating a national elections observatory (NEO), modified by the Law n°2003/015 of December 22, 2003, in the supervision and control of the elections, the NEO can collaborate with the international observers invited by the Government. (<http://www.mincom.gov.cm>).

YES: A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

Comments:

Actually the international observers have evil to do their work because of the problems of their security. They prefer to remain in the Cameroonian large cities like Douala or Yaounde, where the importance of the frauds is less perceptible. In all the cases, their declarations are very diplomatic. They do not want to have problems with the government.

References:

– Zaire Djaouane, Cameroun : le Président Biya réélu sans surprise. Les observateurs internationaux acquiescent, pas les nationaux,” in Afrik.com, 15 October 2004 (<http://www.afrik.com>).
– Armand Essogo, “Des observateurs africains globalement satisfaits,” in Cameroon Tribune, 25 July (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers’ activities.

75:

50: Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

25:

0: Election observers' movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

68 II-3. Political Financing

20. Are there regulations governing political financing?

57

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

References:

- In accordance with Article 2 (1) and (2) of the Law N°2000/015 of December 15, 2000 relating to the public financing of political parties and election campaigns.
- In accordance with Article 13 (1) of the Law 90/56 of December 19, 1990 relating to the political parties.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | **NO**

References:

- In accordance with article 12 (2) of the law 90/56 of December 19, 1990 relating to the political parties
- In accordance with article 2 (1) and (2) of the law N°2000/015 of December 15, 2000 relating to the public financing of the political parties and the election campaigns

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | **NO**

References:

In accordance with Article 13 (2) of Law 90/56 of December 19, 1990 relating to political parties.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on corporate contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to candidates or political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | **NO**

References:

-In accordance with Article 13 (2) of Law 90/56 of December 19, 1990 relating to political parties.

-In accordance with Decree n° 2001/305 of October 8, 2001 fixing the organization, the composition, attributions and methods of operation of the Audit Board, and of the use of the intended funds for the public financing of political parties and election campaigns

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

YES | NO

References:

-In accordance with Article 2 of the Decree n° 2001/305 of October 8, 2001 fixing the organization, the composition, attributions and the methods of operation of the Audit Board of the use of the intended funds for the public financing of the political parties and election campaigns.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

YES | NO

References:

-In accordance with Article 3 of the Decree n° 2001/305 of October 8, 2001, fixing the organization, the composition, attributions and the methods of operation of the Audit Board for the use of the intended funds for the public financing of political parties and election campaigns.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the political financing process.

YES | NO

References:

– The Audit Board (The Commission) created by Decree n° 2001/305 of October 8, 2001.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around political financing. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

21. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

8

21a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Essama Essomba, Ombres et lumières sur l'argent des partis politiques,” in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Interview of Dr Manassé Aboya Endong: “Du désordre dans le financement de la vie politique,” by Aimé Francis Amougou, in Cameroon Tribune, 14/06/2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Essama Essomba, Ombres et lumières sur l'argent des partis politiques, in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Jean-Fabien Monkam Nitcheu, Advisor, Central Comity, CPDM, Lessentiel de nos ressources provient des militants”, interviewed by Aimé Francis Amougou in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making to donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party’s ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Michel Banock, *Le processus de démocratisation en Afrique : le cas camerounais*, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1993.
- Eyinga, Abel. *Introduction à la politique camerounaise*. Paris : Anthropos, 1978.
- Jean-François Bayart, *L’Etat au Cameroun*,” Paris, FNSP, 1985.

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

21d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Lucie Pekoua, Gare au financement des partis politiques,” in Ouest Echos, October 2001.
- Dagobert Bisseck and Joseph Youmsi, “Le financement des partis politiques au Cameroun,” in ACCPUF Bulletin N°6, November 2006 (www.accpuf.org).

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

21e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dagobert Bisseck and Joseph Youmsi, Le financement des partis politiques au Cameroun,” in ACCPUF Bulletin N°6, November 2006 (www.accpuf.org).
- Essama Essomba, Ombres et lumières sur l’argent des partis politiques, in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

21f. In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.

References:

- Essama Essomba, Ombres et lumières sur l'argent des partis politiques,” in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Jean-Fabien Monkam Nitcheu, Advisor, Central Comity, CPDM, “L'essentiel de nos ressources provient des militants”, interviewed by Aimé Francis Amougou in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Interview of Maidadi Sadou Yaya, Former Vice President, Social Democratic Front, “Tempête: revelations de Maidadi Sadou Yaya sur le SDF”, in Le Messager, 24 October 2005 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

75:

50: Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

22. Can citizens access records related to political financing?

8

22a. In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

References:

- Dagobert Bisseck and Joseph Youmsi, Le financement des partis politiques au Cameroun”, in ACCPUF Bulletin N°6, November 2006 (www.accpuf.org).
- Essama Essomba, Ombres et lumières sur l'argent des partis politiques, in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

22b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dagobert Bisseck and Joseph Youmsi, Le financement des partis politiques au Cameroun,” in ACCPUF Bulletin N°6, November 2006 (www.accpuf.org).
- Essama Essomba, Ombres et lumières sur l’argent des partis politiques, in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2004 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

22c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dagobert Bisseck and Joseph Youmsi, Le financement des partis politiques au Cameroun,” in ACCPUF Bulletin N°6, November 2006 (www.accpuf.org).
- Essama Essomba, Ombres et lumières sur l’argent des partis politiques, in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category III. Government Accountability

III-1. ~~40~~ Executive Accountability

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with the preamble to the Constitution of January 18, 1996.

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

24. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

63

24a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Luc Sindjoun, Cameroun : le système politique face aux enjeux de la transition démocratique (1990-1993), in Afrique politique, N° 1994.
- Marcelin Nguete Abada, Ruptures et continuités constitutionnelles en République du Cameroun : réflexions à propos de la réforme constitutionnelle du 18 janvier 1996, in RJPIC, Vol. 50, N° 3. 1996/09.

100: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

75:

50: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

25:

0: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

24b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 37 (3) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, the President of the Republic guarantees the independence of the judiciary (www.prc.cm). The Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court in Cameroon is the only jurisdiction able to hear disputes in which the state is involved, including the executive.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

24c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The judicial power is supposed to ensure the control of the legality of the acts coming from the executive power. But this control is not always guaranteed because the magistrates are not independent in front of political authorities. Their interpretation of the law is for that variable according to cases

References:

- Luc Sindjoun, La Cour suprême, la compétition électorale et la continuité politique au Cameroun : la construction de la démocratie passive”, in Africa Development, Vol. 19. N° 2. 1994
- Valentin Siméon Zinga, “Cameroun francophone : Le pouvoir judiciaire n’est qu’un mot”, in ANB-BIA Supplement, Issue/Edition Nr 337, octobre 1997 (<http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anb-bia/nr337/f05.html>).

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to relay upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

24d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Luc Sindjoun, Le Président de la République au Cameroun, 1982-1996 : les acteurs et leur rôle dans le jeu politique,” Talence, Cean, 1996.
- Pierre-Fabien Nkot, “les usages politiques du droit en Afrique : le cas du Cameroun,” Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2006.

100: The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

75:

50: The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25:

0: The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

100

25a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 53 (1) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, the High Court of Justice is qualified to consider the acts achieved in the performance of their duties by:

- the president of the republic in the event of high treason;
- the Prime Minister, other members of the government and assimilated, high persons in charge of the administration having received delegation of powers (www.prc.cm).

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

25b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 53 (1) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, High the Court of Justice is qualified to consider the acts achieved in the performance of their duties by:

- The Prime Minister, other members of the government and assimilated, high persons in charge for the administration having received delegation of powers.

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

26. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

25

26a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 66 of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, The president of the republic, the prime minister, members of government and persons ranking as such, the president and members of the Bureau of the National Assembly, the president and Members of the Bureau of the Senate, members of parliament, senators, all holders of an elective office, secretaries-general of ministries and persons ranking as such, directors of the Central Administration, general managers of public and semi-public enterprises, judicial and legal officers, administrative personnel in charge of the tax base, collection and handling of public funds, all managers of public votes and property, shall declare their assets and property at the beginning and at the end of their tenure in office.

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

26b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 66 of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, The president of the republic, the prime minister, members of government and persons ranking as such, the president and members of the Bureau of the National Assembly, the president and Members of the Bureau of the Senate, members of parliament, senators, all holders of an elective office, secretaries-general of ministries and persons ranking as such, directors of the Central Administration, general managers of public and semi-public enterprises, judicial and legal officers, administrative personnel in charge of the tax base, collection and handling of public funds, all managers of public votes and property, shall declare their assets and property at the beginning and at the end of their tenure in office.

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

NO: A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

26c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 66 of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, The president of the republic, the prime minister, members

of government and persons ranking as such, the president and members of the Bureau of the National Assembly, the president and Members of the Bureau of the Senate, members of parliament, senators, all holders of an elective office, secretaries-general of ministries and persons ranking as such, directors of the Central Administration, general managers of public and semi-public enterprises, judicial and legal officers, administrative personnel in charge of the tax base, collection and handling of public funds, all managers of public votes and property, shall declare their assets and property at the beginning and at the end of their tenure in office.

The other categories of persons to whom the provisions of this article shall apply and the conditions of implementation thereof shall be determined by law.

There are no provisions regulating gifts and hospitality, however.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

26d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | **NO**

References:

In accordance with Article 66 of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, The president of the republic, the prime minister, members of government and persons ranking as such, the president and members of the Bureau of the National Assembly, the president and Members of the Bureau of the Senate, members of parliament, senators, all holders of an elective office, secretaries-general of ministries and persons ranking as such, directors of the Central Administration, general managers of public and semi-public enterprises, judicial and legal officers, administrative personnel in charge of the tax base, collection and handling of public funds, all managers of public votes and property, shall declare their assets and property at the beginning and at the end of their tenure in office.

The other categories of persons to whom the provisions of this article shall apply and the conditions of implementation thereof shall be determined by law.

No auditing requirements are codified in law.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

26e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 7 (4) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, the office of President of the Republic shall be incompatible with any other elective public office or professional activity.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

26f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Interview, Robert Messi Messi (former General Manager, former Cameroonian Bank Company, in exile), *Le Cameroun n'est pas devenu un PPTE par hasard*," by Celestin Monga, in *Jeune Afrique Economie*, No 155, May 1992.

– Alex Gustave Azebaze, "Affaires et politique: La Cbc, Victor Fotso et Paul Biya," in *Le Messenger*, 25 December 2003 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

26g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

References:

- Magloire Ondo, “La dé-présidentialisation du régime politique camerounais,” in Solon, *Revue camerounaise de parlementarisme et de démocratie*, volume II, N° 1, 2003.
- Milton Krieger, *Cameroon’s democratic crossroads, 1990-1994/Le Cameroun à la croisée des chemins démocratiques, 1990-1994*, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 32. N° 4. 1994/12.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

26h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

References:

- Léger Ntiga, *Affaire Mounchipou : les plaidoiries souvrent enfin*,” in *Mutations*, 30 September 2003 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Christian Lang, “Siyam Siwé au Sed...,” in *Le Messenger*, 27 February 2007 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

0

27a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | **NO**

References:

- Luc Sindjoun, *Le Président de la République au Cameroun, 1982-1996 : les acteurs et leur rôle dans le jeu politique*, Talence, Cean, 1996
- Marcelin Nguete Abada, “Ruptures et continuités constitutionnelles en République du Cameroun : réflexions à propos de la réforme constitutionnelle du 18 janvier 1996”, in *RJPIC*, Vol. 50, N° 3. 1996/09

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

27b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

References:

- Marcelin Nguélé Abada, *Etat de droit et libertés fondamentales au Cameroun*,” in *RJPIC*, N° 3. 1995.
- Luc Sindjoun, *“Le Président de la République au Cameroun, 1982-1996 : les acteurs et leur rôle dans le jeu politique,”* Talence, Cean, 1996.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

27c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

References:

- Norbert N. Ouendji, Médias et pouvoir politique au Cameroun – Les journalistes face à la santé présidentielle”, Editions Les Belles Pages, Marseille, 2006
- Michel Banock, “Le processus de démocratisation en Afrique : le cas camerounais”, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1993

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

0

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

References:

- Manassé Aboya Endong, La démocratie interne dans les partis politiques au Cameroun : le cas du RDPC,” in Solon, revue africaine de parlementarisme et de démocratie, volume II, N° 1, 2003.
- Abel Eyinga, “Introduction à la politique camerounaise,” Paris, Anthropos, 1978.
- Jean-François Bayart, “L’Etat au Cameroun,” Paris, FNSP, 1985.

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

50: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:

0: The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

III-2. Legislative Accountability

29. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

42

29a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with article 47(1) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996 (www.prc.cm).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

29b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Alain Didier Olinga, *La Constitution de la République du Cameroun*, Yaoundé, Presses de l'UCAC, 2006.
– Luc Sindjoun, *La Cour suprême, la compétition électorale et la continuité politique au Cameroun : la construction de la démocratie passive*, in *Africa Development*, Vol. 19. N° 2. 1994.

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

29c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | **NO**

References:

In accordance with Article 14(6) of the Constitution in relation to Ordinance No 72/12 of August 26, 1972, fixing the mode of immunities of the deputies of the National Assembly.

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.

30. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

32

30a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 66 of the Constitution of January 18, 1996, concerning the declaration of goods.

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

30b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

References:

In accordance with Article 22(4) of Law n°91/20 of December 16, 1991 fixing the conditions for election of deputies of the National Assembly

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

30c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with articles 75, 76, 77, 79 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

30d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | **NO**

References:

In Accordance with Article 14 (6) of the Constitution, in relation to Ordinance No 72/12 of August 26, 1972, fixing the mode of immunities of the deputies of the National Assembly.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

30e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Manasse Aboya Endong, *Parlement et parlementaires au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire dun contenant sans contenu?*, in Solon, *revue africaine de parlementarisme et de démocratie*, volume 1, 1999.
- Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, *Député de la nation*, Yaoundé, Presses de l'Ucac, 2001.
- Janvier Onana, *Le sacre des indigènes évolués. Essai sur la professionnalisation politique (le cas du Cameroun)*, Paris, Dianoi'a, 2004.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

30f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, *Les immunités parlementaires en droit camerounais : réflexion sur une exception au principe de légalité des citoyens devant la loi*, in RJPIC, N°2, May 1998.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, *Parlement et parlementaires au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire dun contenant sans contenu?* in Solon, *revue africaine de parlementarisme et de démocratie*, volume 1, 1999.
- Jean-Claude Abaa Oyono, *un air de printemps dans le droit parlementaire du Cameroun*, "in *Juridis politique*, n°54, April-May-June 2003.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

30g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, Les immunités parlementaires en droit camerounais : réflexion sur une exception au principe de légalité des citoyens devant la loi”, in RJPIC, N°2, May1998.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, “Parlement et parlementaires au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l’histoire d’un contenu sans contenu ?” in Solon, revue africaine de parlementarisme et de démocratie, volume 1, 1999.
- Jean-Claude Abaa Oyono, “Un air de printemps dans le droit parlementaire du Cameroun,” in Jurdis politique, n°54, April-May-June 2003.
- Albert Mandjack, L’Assemblée Nationale au Cameroun dans le miroir de l’autoritarisme, Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, “Député de la nation”, Yaoundé, Presses de l’Ucac, 2001.
- Samuel Efova Mbozoo, “Pratiques et procédures parlementaires,” Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

31. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

0

31a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

Comments:

The implementation of personal asset disclosures has not yet fully taken effect. But citizens cannot access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature regardless.

References:

In accordance with Article 14 (6) of the Constitution in relation to Ordinance No 72/12 of August 26, 1972, fixing the mode of immunities of the deputies of the National Assembly.

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

31b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, Les immunités parlementaires en droit camerounais : réflexion sur une exception au principe de légalité des citoyens devant la loi”, in RJPIC, N°2, May 1998.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, “Parlement et parlementaires au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l’histoire d’un contenu sans contenu ?”, in Solon, revue africaine de parlementarisme et de démocratie, volume 1, 1999.
- Jean-Claude Abaa Oyono, “Un air de printemps dans le droit parlementaire du Cameroun,” in Juridis politique, n°54, April-May-June 2003.
- Albert Mandjack, “L’Assemblée Nationale au Cameroun dans le miroir de l’autoritarisme,” in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, “Député de la nation”, Yaoundé, Presses de l’Ucac, 2001.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

31c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Albert Mandjack, L’Assemblée Nationale au Cameroun dans le miroir de l’autoritarisme,” Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, “Député de la nation,” Yaoundé, Presses de l’Ucac, 2001.

- Samuel Efoua Mbozoo, “Pratiques et procédures parlementaires”, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Alim Garga, Cameroon National Assembly, “Innovations et opportunités du système d’information parlementaire,” in Library and Research Services for Parliaments Section, Research Day. IFLA Pre-Conference Meeting, Valparaiso Chile 17-19 August, 2004.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

32. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

25

32a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | **NO**

References:

there are no legal provisions in this field

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

32b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

- Jean-Claude Abaa Oyono, un air de printemps dans le droit parlementaire du Cameroun,” in Juridis politique, n°54, April-May-June 2003.
- Albert Mandjack, “L’Assemblée Nationale au Cameroun dans le miroir de l’autoritarisme,” Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.

- Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, “Député de la nation,” Yaoundé, Presses de IUcac, 2001.
- Samuel Efoa Mbozoo, “Pratiques et procédures parlementaires,” Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

32c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Alim Garga, Cameroon National Assembly, Innovations et opportunités du système d'information parlementaire,” in Library and Research Services for Parliaments Section, Research Day. IFLA Pre-Conference Meeting, Valparaiso Chile 17-19 August, 2004 (www.cm.refer.org/assnat-cm).
- Samuel Efoa Mbozoo, “Pratiques et procédures parlementaires,” Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

25 III-3. Judicial Accountability

33. Are judges appointed fairly?

50

33a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

Comments:

Although the process in practice is controlled heavily by the executive, the process is ostensibly transparent.

References:

The National School of Administration and Magistrature, created in 1961 (http://enam-cm.elope.biz/home.php?lang=fr&link=evolution_enam).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

NO: A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

33b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Crise à l'Enam : le Ministre de la fonction publique désavoué, in Journalchretien.net, vendredi 30 juin 2006 (<http://www.spcm.org/Journal/spip.php?article3049>).

– David Atemkeng, Enam: Amama désavoué,” in <http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=2363>

100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

33c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | NO

References:

there are no legal provisions in this field

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

34. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

54

34a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Ordinance N° 72/6 of August 26, 1972, fixing the organization of the Supreme Court.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

34b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun,; Groupe St-François, 1998.
– Joel Didier Engo, La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente, in La Nouvelle Expression, 2/07/2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

75:

50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

25:

0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

34c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

References:

The Supreme Council of the Magistrature (Article 37 (3) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

34d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

The President of the Higher Council of Magistrature is the head of state. The General Secretary of this council, Mr Foumane Akame is a close friend of the current head of state and a member of the ruling party.

References:

In accordance with Article 37 (2) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry, legislative committee, or by an internal judiciary committee or council that can only act with the approval of judges themselves.

34e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI, 2004-2005.
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, L'accès à la justice au Cameroun," cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

34f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI, 2004-2005.
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.
- Edouard Kitio, "La garde à vue administrative pour grand banditisme et respect des droits de l'homme au Cameroun", Application de la loi n° 90/054 du 19 December 1990 sur le maintien de l'ordre, Juris périodique, n°30, April-May-June 1997.

100: When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

35. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

29

35a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

Comments:

These provisions are not implemented in practice. Critics argue that the Cameroonian authorities adopt texts to satisfy the international community, but do not apply them in practice. For example, the Commonwealth has funded the creation of ELECAM (Elections of Cameroon) this year, but the government has not implemented it. The Senate, decentralization, and a Constitutional Council are provided for in the Constitution but none of them have been implemented in 10 years. Similarly, Article 66 has never been implemented.

References:

In accordance with Decree N°95/048 of March 4, 1995, concerning the statute of the magistrature in Cameroon, and Article 66 of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

35b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

References:

in accordance with Decree N°95/048 of March 4, 1995, concerning statute of the magistrature in Cameroon.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not

appropriate.

35c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

References:

In accordance with Article 66 of the Constitution of January 18, 1996.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

35d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

References:

There are no legal references concerning this aspect.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

35e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

References:

– Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l’origine de l’accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais),” Mémoire de DEA,

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

35f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI, 2004-2005.
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.
- Joel Didier Engo, "La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente," in La Nouvelle Expression, 2/07/2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to judges. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

35g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

References:

Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI, 2004-2005.

– Adolphe Minkoa She, "Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun", Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.

– Joel Didier Engo, "La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente," in La Nouvelle Expression, 2/07/2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

– Pierre-Etienne Kenfack, "L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker), Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

36. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

0

36a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

References:

There has been no practical implementation of the legal requirements for asset disclosure under Article 66 of the constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

36b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There has been no practical implementation of the legal requirements for asset disclosure under Article 66 of the constitution.

References:

– Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais),” Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI, 2004-2005.

– Adolphe Minkoa She, “Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun,” Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.

Joel Didier Engo, “La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 2/07/2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, “L'accès à la justice au Cameroun,” cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

36c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There has been no practical implementation of the legal requirements for asset disclosure under Article 66 of the constitution.

References:

– Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais),” Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI, 2004-2005.

– Adolphe Minkoa She, “Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun,” Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.

Joel Didier Engo, “La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 2/07/2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

– Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, “L'accès à la justice au Cameroun,” cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

III-4. Budget Processes

37. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

50

37a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of 18 January 1996 (www.camlaw.org).

YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

37b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.

– Efoua Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.

– Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.

– Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit damendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.

100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

25:

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

37c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

- Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.
- Efova Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenu sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit damendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.

100: Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

75:

50: Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

38. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

17

38a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.
- Efoa Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit d'amendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

38b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.
- Efoa Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit d'amendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75:

50: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

25:

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

38c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.
- Efova Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit d'amendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.

100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

75:

50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

25:

0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 16 of the Law N° 73/1 of 8 June 1973 concerning rules of procedure of the National Assembly of Cameroun, modified by the laws n° 89/13 of 28 July 1989 and n° 92/003 of 14 August 1992.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

40. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

50

40a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.
- Efoya Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit d'amendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.

100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:

50: Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

25:

0: There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

40b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.
- Efoya Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit d'amendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, Janvier-Juin 2002.
- Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, Député de la nation, Yaoundé, Presses de l'UCAC, 2001.

100: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in

the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

75:

50: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

25:

0: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

40c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.
- Efoa Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, Parti administratif, transitions démocratiques et patrimonialisme en Afrique noire francophone, in Solon, N°3, January 2007.
- Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit d'amendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.
- Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé., Député de la nation, Yaoundé, Presses de IUcac, 2001.

100: This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.

25:

0: This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee's behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

40d. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et l'exercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980.
- Efoa Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de l'histoire d'un contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, Parti administratif, transitions démocratiques et patrimonialisme en Afrique noire francophone, in Solon, N°3, January 2007
- Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit d'amendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.
- Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé., Député de la nation, Yaoundé, Presses de IUcac, 2001.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

75:

50: The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. ⁴⁸Civil Service Regulations

41. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

75

41a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES

NO

References:

The Cameroonian public office is governed by Decree N°90/199 of October 7, 1994, concerning statutes general of the public office of the State

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

41b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Articles 131, 135 and 136 of the Penal Code

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

41c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | **NO**

References:

There is no such mechanism in Cameroon.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

41d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 134 (3) of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

42. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

31

42a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, *Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun*, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, *L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique*, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, *Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone*, Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, *Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara)*, in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire » Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.

100: Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

75:

50: Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:

0: Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

42b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, *Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun*, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, *L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique*, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, *Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone*, Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, *Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara)*, in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.

100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

42c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, *Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun*, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, *L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique*, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, *Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone*, Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, *Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara)*, in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, *Parti administratif, transitions démocratiques et patrimonialisme en Afrique noire francophone*, in Solon, N°3, January, 2007.

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

75:

50: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

25:

0: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

42d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, *Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun*, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, *L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique*, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, *Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone*, Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, *Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara)*, in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.
- Manasse Aboya Endong, *Parti administratif, transitions démocratiques et patrimonialisme en Afrique noire francophone*, in Solon, N°3, January, 2007.

100: Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position's authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

75:

50: Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

25:

0: Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

42e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, *Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun*, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, *L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique*, Paris, Lgdj, 1986
- Maurice Kamto, *Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone*, Paris, Lgdj, 1987
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, *Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara)*, in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984
- Manasse Aboya Endong, *Parti administratif, transitions démocratiques et patrimonialisme en Afrique noire francophone*, in Solon, N°3, janvier, 2007
- Célestin Keutchua Tchapgna, *Les mutations récentes du droit administratif camerounais*, In Afrilex 2000/1

100: Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

75:

50: Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

25:

0: Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

42f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone, Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara », in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.
- Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, Les mutations récentes du droit administratif camerounais, In Afrilex 2000/1.
- Gina Clarisse Moneze, Michel Towa Koh, Les TIC dans la gouvernance et la lutte contre la corruption, in Newsletter N°1, ACSIS Cameroun, 2006 (http://gtounsi.free.fr/acsisNewsletter/tic_et_corruption.php).
- Guido Bertucci, L'éthique dans la fonction publique en Afrique, Vol. 2, UN, UNDP, New-York, 2002 (unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN006155.pdf).

100: The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

75:

50: The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

25:

0: The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

42g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone, Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara », in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.
- Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, Les mutations récentes du droit administratif camerounais, In Afrilex 2000/1.
- Gina Clarisse Moneze, Michel Towa Koh, Les TIC dans la gouvernance et la lutte contre la corruption, in Newsletter N°1, ACSIS Cameroun, 2006. (http://gtounsi.free.fr/acsisNewsletter/tic_et_corruption.php).
- Guido Bertucci, L'éthique dans la fonction publique en Afrique, Vol. 2, UN, UNDP, New-York, 2002 (unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN006155.pdf).

100: The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

75:

50: The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

42h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, "L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique", Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, "Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone", Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, "Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara) ", in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.
- Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, "Les mutations récentes du droit administratif camerounais," In Afrilex 2000/1.
- Gina Clarisse Moneze, Michel Towa Koh, "Les TIC dans la gouvernance et la lutte contre la corruption," in Newsletter N°1, ACSIS Cameroun, 2006 (http://gtounsi.free.fr/acsisNewsletter/tic_et_corruption.php).
- Guido Bertucci, "L'éthique dans la fonction publique en Afrique", Vol. 2, UN, UNDP, New-York, 2002 (unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN006155.pdf).
- Justin-Blaise Akono, "Endettement : L'Etat doit encore 994 milliards Fcfa à ses contribuables", in Mutations, 09/02/2007.
- François Bambou, "Révélations sur la hausse des salaires", in La Nouvelle Expression, 11/10/2006.

100: In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

75:

50: In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

25:

0: In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

42i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Alfred Ngando, *Affaire Titus Edzoa : Revue de presse camerounaise*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000.
- Benoît Balla, “Affaire Titus Edzoa : on attend le verdict,” in Cameroon-info.net, (http://www.cameroon-info.net/cmi_show_news.php?id=13426).
- Richard Touna, “Etonde Ekoto et Booto à Ngon livrés à la justice,” in Le Messager, 06/10/2006 (<http://www.cameroon-online.com/actualite.actu-2095.html>).
- Pierre Titti Nwell, “De la corruption au Cameroun,” Yaoundé, Gerddes-Cameroun et Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001.
- Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, Valentin S. Zinga, “La lutte contre la corruption: impossible est-il camerounais?” Yaoundé, PUA, 2002.

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

43. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

46

43a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

References:

- Article 132, 135 of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

43b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this aspect.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

43c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Decree n°90/199 of October 7, 1994 concerning the statutes general of the public offices of the State.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

43d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

References:

– Claude Momo Fomthim, *Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun*, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
– Roger-Gabriel Nlep, *L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique*, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
Maurice Kamto, *"Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire*

Francophone,” Paris, Lgdj, 1987.

– Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, “Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara »,” in Colloque sur « La problématique de l’Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre – 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.

– Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, “Les mutations récentes du droit administratif camerounais,” In Afrilex 2000/1.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off” period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

43e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

– Claude Momo Fomthim, Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l’exemple du Cameroun,” Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.

– Roger-Gabriel Nlep, “L’administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l’étude des systèmes africains d’administration publique,” Paris, Lgdj, 1986.

Maurice Kamto, “Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d’Afrique Noire Francophone,” Paris, Lgdj, 1987.

– Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, “Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara »,” in Colloque sur « La problématique de l’Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre – 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.

– Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, “Les mutations récentes du droit administratif camerounais,” In Afrilex 2000/1.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

43f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- François Bambou, Révélations sur la hausse des salaires, in La Nouvelle Expression, 11/10/2006.
- Alfred Ngando, Affaire Titus Edzoa : Revue de presse camerounaise, Paris, LHarmattan, 2000 .
- Benoît Balla, Affaire Titus Edzoa : on attend le verdict, in Cameroon-info.net, (http://www.cameroon-info.net/cmi_show_news.php?id=13426).
- Richard Touna, Etonde Ekoto et Booto à Ngon livrés à la justice, in Le Messenger, 06/10/2006 (<http://www.cameroon-online.com/actualite.actu-2095.html>).
- Pierre Titti Nwell, De la corruption au Cameroun, Yaoundé, Gerddes-Cameroun et Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001.
- Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, Valentin S. Zinga, La lutte contre la corruption: impossible est-il camerounais?, PUA, 2002.
- Lucien Ayissi, Corruption et gouvernance, Yaoundé, PUA, 2003.

100: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

75:

50: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

25:

0: Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

44. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

44a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | NO

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this aspect.

YES: A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

44b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone, Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara », in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.
- Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, Les mutations récentes du droit administratif camerounais, In Afrilex 2000/1.
- Gina Clarisse Moneze, Michel Towa Koh, Les TIC dans la gouvernance et la lutte contre la corruption, in Newsletter N°1, ACSIS Cameroun, 2006 (http://gtounsi.free.fr/acsisNewsletter/tic_et_corruption.php).
- Guido Bertucci, L'éthique dans la fonction publique en Afrique, Vol. 2, UN, UNDP, New-York, 2002 (unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN006155.pdf).

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Claude Momo Fomthim, Fonction publique et ajustement structurel en Afrique Noire : l'exemple du Cameroun, Thèse de Doctorat en droit public, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2002.
- Roger-Gabriel Nlep, L'administration publique camerounaise, Contribution à l'étude des systèmes africains d'administration publique, Paris, Lgdj, 1986.
- Maurice Kamto, Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique : Essai sur les fondements du constitutionnalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire Francophone, Paris, Lgdj, 1987.
- Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, Administration publique et politique en Afrique Francophone (Nord et Sud du Sahara », in Colloque sur « La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique Noire », Dakar, 29 novembre 3 décembre 1982, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1984.
- Célestin Keutcha Tchapgna, Les mutations récentes du droit administratif camerounais, In Afrilex 2000/1.
- Gina Clarisse Moneze, Michel Towa Koh, Les TIC dans la gouvernance et la lutte contre la corruption, in Newsletter N°1, ACSIS Cameroun, 2006 (http://gtounsi.free.fr/acsisNewsletter/tic_et_corruption.php).

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

45. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

0

45a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | **NO**

References:

There is no legal provision concerning this aspect

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

45b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

References:

- Adolphe Minkoa She, Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun, Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.
- Pierre Titti Nwell, De la corruption au Cameroun, Yaoundé, Gerddes Cameroun et Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001.
- Dr Asafor Chi Cornelius, Le Rôle du comité adhoc de lutte contre la corruption, Rapport final de la première phase du PND, 12 mai 2000 (www.worldbank.org).
- Aimé-Francis Amougou, Lutte contre la corruption : une affaire de tous, in Cameroon Tribune, 18/01/2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- François BMG, Cameroun : huit policiers suspendus dans laffaire du trafic des passeports, Agora Vox, 28/02/2006 (http://www.agoravox.fr/article.php3?id_article=12758).

100: Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

45c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

In Cameroon, corruption affects public offices than the private sector.

References:

There is no legal provision concerning this aspect.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

45d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Comments:

In Cameroon, the corruption affects more the public office than the private sector.

References:

– Valentin Simeon Zinga, Lutte contre la corruption : Le Cameroun tente de lutter... contre sa mauvaise réputation, MFI Hebdo, 24/05/2001 (www.rfi.fr).

-Cameroun : Biya crée une commission de lutte contre la corruption, AFP, 13 mars 2006 (<http://www.jeuneafrique.com>).

-Aimé-Francis Amougou, Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail, in Cameroon Tribune, 31 May 2007.

– Adolphe Minkoa She, Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun, Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.

-Pierre Titti Nwell, De la corruption au Cameroun, Yaoundé, Gerddes Cameroun et Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001.

– Denis Nkwebo, Cameroun: Affaire Sydonia – La Conac enquête à la douane, in Mutations, 16 aout 2007(www.lequotidienmutations.net).

– Dr Asafor Chi Cornelius, Le Rôle du comité adhoc de lutte contre la corruption, Rapport final de la première phase du PND, 12 mai 2000 (www.worldbank.org).

– Aimé-Francis Amougou, Lutte contre la corruption : une affaire de tous, in Cameroon Tribune, 18/01/2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

– François BMG, Cameroun : huit policiers suspendus dans l'affaire du trafic des passeports, Agora Vox, 28/02/2006 (http://www.agoravox.fr/article.php3?id_article=12758).

100: Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

0

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | **NO**

Comments:

CONAC (in French) or NACC (in English) still remains very discrete in its actions.

According to a presidential decree signed on March 11th 2006, a National Anti-Corruption Commission, code-named NACC, and placed under the direct authority of the Head of State, has been created to contribute to the fight against corruption.

References:

There is no internal reporting mechanism, though CONAC could take on some of these responsibilities in the future.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

47. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

50

47a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

Comments:

The Commission is composed of a Coordination Committee, and a Permanent Secretariat. The former is an eleven-member body appointed by presidential decree, headed by a president and vice president. The Permanent Secretariat is composed of three divisions: investigation, prevention and communication, and research and cooperation; and of three services, mails and archives, general affairs, and translation. Commission members have taken the oath of office at the Supreme Court. However, Conac has only been in existence for a few months. Initially, its activities appear to have been very timid.

References:

- François-Xavier Deutchoua, Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles,” in Mutations, 12 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde,” in Mutations, 18/03/2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 20/03/2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- François Bimogo, “Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption”, in Bonaberi.com (11/03/2006) (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, “Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail”, in Cameroon Tribune, 31 mai 2007(www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

47b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

Comments:

Conac has been in existence only a few months.

References:

- François-Xavier Deutchoua, Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles,” in Mutations, 12 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde,” in Mutations, 18/03/2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 20/03/2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- François Bimogo, “Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption”, in Bonaberi.com (11/03/2006) (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, “Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail”, in Cameroon Tribune, 31 mai 2007(www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

47c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

Comments:

Conac has only been in existence a few months. It has just made a significant mark concerning the corruption in the case of Sydonia.

References:

- Edmond Kanguia K., Le chant du cygne, in La Nouvelle Expression, 20/03/2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- François Bimogo, Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption, in Bonaberi.com (11/03/2006) (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail, in Cameroon Tribune, 31 May 2007 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Denis Nkwebo, Cameroun: Affaire Sydonia – La Conac enquête à la douane, in Mutations, 16 aout 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- François-Xavier Deutchoua, Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles, in Mutations, 12 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

47d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

Comments:

Conac has only a few months of existence. It has just made a significant descent on the ground concerning the corruption in the case of Sydonia.

References:

- Edmond Kanguia K., Le chant du cygne, in La Nouvelle Expression, 20/03/2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- François Bimogo, Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption, in Bonaberi.com (11/03/2006) (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail, in Cameroon Tribune, 31 May 2007(www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Denis Nkwebo, Cameroun: Affaire Sydonia – La Conac enquête à la douane, in Mutations, 16 aout 2007(www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- François-Xavier Deutchoua, Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles, in Mutations, 12 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

48a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:

Article 135 of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

48b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this aspect.

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

48c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Eugène Dipanda, Les fournisseurs de l'Etat se plaignent de la rupture du dialogue avec les pouvoirs publics, in Mutations, 04/01/2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

– Interview, François-Marie Kamgang, Spécial Adviser of MEDEC, Nous revendiquons plus de 45 milliards Fcfa, By Eugène Dipanda, in Mutations, 02/02/2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

– Marie-Noëlle Guichi, Medec : la paix revient après la poudre, in Le Messenger, 03/06/2005 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

48d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:

ARPM intends to assume the triple role of monitoring, control and evaluation of the system of public markets with particular emphasis:

– On the capacity building of actors, it should control the texts for their best implement;

– On the computerization which is a tool for the facilitation and transparency;

– On the Information, education and communication in order to mobilize the support of the actors of the new system and convince the national and international opinion of the efficiency and reliability of the system

References:

The Agency of Regulation of the Public Markets fulfills this function in Cameroon. It was created by Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

48e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 2 and 7 of Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

NO: A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).

48f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with Article 8 of Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

48g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with Article 92 of the Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with Article 92 of the Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with article 102 of Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

– Eugène Dipanda, Les fournisseurs de l'Etat se plaignent de la rupture du dialogue avec les pouvoirs publics, in Mutations, 04/01/2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

– Interview, François-Marie Kamgang, Spécial Adviser of MEDEC, Nous revendiquons plus de 45 milliards Fcfa, By Eugène Dipanda, in Mutations, 02/02/2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

– Marie-Noëlle Guichi, Medec : la paix revient après la poudre, in Le Messenger, 03/06/2005 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

49. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

67

49a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with article 119 of Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

NO: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

49b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with article 143 of Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

49c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Interview, François-Marie Kamgang, Spécial Adviser of MEDEC, Nous revendiquons plus de 45 milliards Fcfa, By Eugène Dipanda, in Mutations, 02/02/2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Marie-Noëlle Guichi, Medec : la paix revient après la poudre, in Le Messenger, 03 June 2005 (www.lemessenger.net).
- Firmin Eog, A l'école des marchés publics au Cameroun, in CCC/SNEC, 23 August 2006 (http://www.sneccameroun.com/article_fr.php?idac=56).
- Guy-Marie Eloundou Bidjogo, Adamaoua-Marchés publics : le temps des sanctions, In Cameroon-online, 14 March 2006 (<http://www.cameroun-online.com/actualite.actu-1457.html>).

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Interview, François-Marie Kamgang, Spécial Adviser of MEDEC, Nous revendiquons plus de 45 milliards Fcfa, By Eugène Dipanda, in Mutations, 02/02/2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Marie-Noëlle Guichi, Medec : la paix revient après la poudre, in Le Messenger, 03 June 2005 (www.lemessenger.net).
- Firmin Eog, A l'école des marchés publics au Cameroun, in CCC/SNEC, 23 August 2006 (http://www.sneccameroun.com/article_fr.php?idac=56).
- Guy-Marie Eloundou Bidjogo, Adamaoua-Marchés publics : le temps des sanctions, In Cameroon-online, 14 March 2006 (<http://www.cameroun-online.com/actualite.actu-1457.html>).

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

49e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

References:

- Interview, François-Marie Kamgang, Spécial Adviser of MEDEC, Nous revendiquons plus de 45 milliards Fcfa, By Eugène Dipanda, in Mutations, 02 February 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Firmin Eog, A lécole des marchés publics au Cameroun, in CCC/SNEC, 23 August 2006 (http://www.sneccameroun.com/article_fr.php?idac=56).
- Guy-Marie Eloundou Bidjogo, Adamaoua-Marchés publics : le temps des sanctions, In Cameroon-online, 14 March 2006 (<http://www.cameroun-online.com/actualite.actu-1457.html>).

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

49f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

References:

- Firmin Eog, A lécole des marchés publics au Cameroun, in CCC/SNEC, 23 August 2006 (http://www.sneccameroun.com/article_fr.php?idac=56).
- Guy-Marie Eloundou Bidjogo, Adamaoua-Marchés publics : le temps des sanctions, In Cameroon-online, 14/03/2006 (<http://www.cameroun-online.com/actualite.actu-1457.html>).
- Azzarius, Azzarius et l'ARMP lancent le projet de dématérialisation des documents et des procédures des marchés publics du Cameroun in http://www.daf.info/Azzarius-et-l-ARMP-lancent-le-projet-de-dematerialisation-des-documents-et-des-procedures-des-marches-publics-du_a565.html
- Audit a posteriori des marchés publics, Exercice 2003, ARMP, mars 2006, by 2AC and ACP (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75:

50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

25:

0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.

IV-4. Privatization

50. Is the privatization process effective?

67

50a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with Article 2 and 3 of the Ordinance of June 22, 1990 relating to the privatization of the public and parapublic companies.

– In accordance with the declaration of general policy relating to the public sector companies adopted in May 1994 by the government.

YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

50b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

Comments:

The government exerts an abusive, dominant position.

References:

In accordance with Article 12 of the law N°98/013 of July 14, 1998 relating to competition.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

50c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Pamphile Edgar Esteguet, Relations entre les autorités de concurrence et les instances sectorielles de réglementation : en ce qui concerne l'abus de position dominante, in Septième session du groupe d'experts intergouvernementaux sur le droit et la politique de la concurrence, CNUCED, Genève, 30 octobre 2 novembre 2006 (www.unctad.org).
- Pascal Nguihé Kanté, Les contraintes de la privatisation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques au Cameroun, in Revue Internationale de droit économique, 2002/4.

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

70

51a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

References:

- In accordance with Article 3 of the Ordinance of June 22, 1990 relating to the privatization of the public and paraprofit companies.

YES: A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

NO: A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

51b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Géraldine Lautour Entreprises camerounaises en mal d'investisseurs, Afrikeco.com, 30 June 2002 (http://www.afrikeco.com/articles/economie.php3?id_article=4640).
- Pamphile Edgar Esteguet, Relations entre les autorités de concurrence et les instances sectorielles de réglementation : en ce qui concerne labus de position dominante, in Septième session du groupe d'experts intergouvernementaux sur le droit et la politique de la concurrence, CNUCED, Genève, 30 October 2 November 2006 (www.unctad.org).
- Pascal Nguihé Kanté, Les contraintes de la privatisation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques au Cameroun, in Revue Internationale de droit économique, 2002/4.
- Jean Biwolé Fouda, Efficacité des Privatisations camerounaises : une analyse à travers la théorie de la Gouvernance partenariale, Mémoire de DEA, FSEGA, Université de Douala, July 2004 (<http://www.memoireonline.com/01/07/322/efficacite-privatisations-camerounaises-analyse-theorie-gouvernance-partenariale.html>).

100: There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

51c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with the ordinance of June 22, 1990 relating to the privatization of the public and parapublic companies.

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

51d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Géraldine Lautour Entreprises camerounaises en mal d'investisseurs, Afrikeco.com, 30 / 06 / 2002 (http://www.afrikeco.com/articles/economie.php3?id_article=4640).
- Pamphile Edgar Esteguet, Relations entre les autorités de concurrence et les instances sectorielles de réglementation : en ce qui concerne l'abus de position dominante, in Septième session du groupe d'experts intergouvernementaux sur le droit et la politique de la concurrence, CNUCED, Genève, 30 octobre 2 novembre 2006 (www.unctad.org).
- Pascal Nguihé Kanté, Les contraintes de la privatisation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques au Cameroun, in Revue Internationale de droit économique, 2002/4.
- Jean Biwolé Fouda, Efficacité des Privatisations camerounaises : une analyse à travers la théorie de la Gouvernance partenariale, Mémoire de DEA, FSEGA, Université de Douala, July 2004. (<http://www.memoireonline.com/01/07/322/efficacite-privatisations-camerounaises-analyse-theorie-gouvernance-partenariale.html>).
- Samuel Ngogang, Faire face aux conflits d'intérêts économiques dans un monde d'interdépendance, in Afrique et Développement, Vol. XXVI, Ns 3 & 4, 2001 (www.codesria.org).

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

51e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Géraldine Lautour Entreprises camerounaises en mal d'investisseurs, Afrikeco.com, 30 / 06 / 2002 (http://www.afrikeco.com/articles/economie.php3?id_article=4640).
- Pamphile Edgar Esteguet, Relations entre les autorités de concurrence et les instances sectorielles de réglementation : en ce qui concerne l'abus de position dominante, in Septième session du groupe d'experts intergouvernementaux sur le droit et la politique de la concurrence, CNUCED, Genève, 30 octobre 2 novembre 2006 (www.unctad.org).
- Pascal Nguihé Kanté, Les contraintes de la privatisation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques au Cameroun, in Revue Internationale de droit économique, 2002/4.
- Jean Biwolé Fouda, Efficacité des Privatisations camerounaises : une analyse à travers la théorie de la Gouvernance partenariale, Mémoire de DEA, FSEGA, Université de Douala, July 2004. (<http://www.memoireonline.com/01/07/322/efficacite-privatisations-camerounaises-analyse-theorie-gouvernance-partenariale.html>).
- Samuel Ngogang, Faire face aux conflits d'intérêts économiques dans un monde d'interdépendance, in Afrique et Développement, Vol. XXVI, Ns 3 & 4, 2001 (www.codesria.org).

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. ¹⁷National Ombudsman

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

0

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES

NO

Comments:

The Ombudsman does not exist in Cameroun. The tradition of the mediator does not yet exist.

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this aspect.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

53. Is the national ombudsman effective?

0

53a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

The Ombudsman does not exist in Cameroon. The tradition of the mediator does not exist yet.

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this aspect.

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

53b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

Comments:

The absence of ombudsman is one of the great weaknesses in the institutional mechanisms of protection of freedoms in French-speaking Africa. Consequently, there is no work devoted to this institution.

References:

- Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit”, Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), October 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).
- Léopold Donfack Sokeng, “Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques”, in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

75:

50: This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

53c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no Ombudsman in Cameroon

References:

– Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).

– Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

53d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no Ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

– Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).

– Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

53e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no Ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

- Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).
- Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

53f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no Ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

- Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).
- Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

53g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no Ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

- Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).
- Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

53h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no Ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

- Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).
- Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

53i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

No Ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

- Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).
- Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

53j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

– Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).

– Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.

53k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).

– Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

54. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

0

54a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | **NO**

Comments:

There is no ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

There no legal provisions concerning this institution.

YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

54b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

Comments:

There is no ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

– Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).

– Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no ombudsman in Cameroon.

References:

- Pierre-Yves Monette, Médiateur fédéral de Belgique, Les institutions de la démocratie et de l'état de droit", Rapport Général, Symposium international sur les pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans l'espace francophone, Bamako (Mali), octobre 2000 (www.federalombudsman.be).
- Léopold Donfack Sokeng, "Etat, autoritarisme, ajustement problématique aux libertés publiques," in La Révolution passive: Etat, société et changement au Cameroun, Dakar, Codesria, 1999.

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

References:

The Audit Bench created Article 38 (2) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

56. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

53

56a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 37 (2) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996 (Magistrates of the bench shall, in the discharges of their duties, be governed only by the law and their conscience.) (www.camlaw.org).

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– François Bambou, Comptes publics : mieux en assurer le contrôle de gestion,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 26 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).

– “La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers” (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- François Bambou, tChambre des comptes : les personnels à lécole des procédurest, 25 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- Comptes publics : mieux en assurer le contrôle de gestion”, 26 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- “La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers” (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Created by the Constitution of January 18, 1996, it is only into 2006 that the Audit Bench took on its functions. It has thus been fully operational only a year.

References:

- François Bambou, tChambre des comptes : les personnels à lécole des procédurest, 25 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- Comptes publics : mieux en assurer le contrôle de gestion”, 26 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- “La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers” (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political

party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

Comments:

Created by the Constitution of January 18, 1996, it was only in 2006 that the Audit Bench assumed its functions. It is thus been fully operational for only a year.

References:

- Alain Blaise Batongué, Chambre des comptes, Anif, Conac : La lutte contre la corruption bloquée, in Mutations, 27 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- François Bambou, tChambre des comptes : les personnels à l'école des procédures, 25 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- Comptes publics : mieux en assurer le contrôle de gestion," 26 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- "La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers"(<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

56f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

Comments:

Created by the constitution of January 18, 1996, it is only into 2006 that the Audit Bench took its functions. It is thus only one year old. As of this writing, it has not issued a report.

References:

- Alain Blaise Batongué, Chambre des comptes, Anif, Conac : La lutte contre la corruption bloquée, in Mutations, 27 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- François Bambou, tChambre des comptes : les personnels à lécole des procédurest, 25 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- Comptes publics : mieux en assurer le contrôle de gestion,” 26 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- “La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers”(<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

Comments:

The Audit Bench has only been operational for a year.

References:

- Alain Blaise Batongué, Chambre des comptes, Anif, Conac : La lutte contre la corruption bloquée, in Mutations, 27 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- François Bambou, tChambre des comptes : les personnels à lécole des procédurest, 25 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- Comptes publics : mieux en assurer le contrôle de gestion,” 26 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- “La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers”(<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

56h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

Comments:

The Audit Bench has hardly begun its activities, having only been in existence for a year.

The article intitled: "Gouvernance : Evaluation de l'exécution des marchés publics" published in the weekly Repères, 5 december 2007 contains all the informations concerning this aspect

In this paper, Mr. Thomas Mbeutcha, Inspector, Chief of the brigade in the ARMP, analyzes the system implementation, monitoring and regulation of public procurement

In the other hand, the ARPM have investigated the enterprises named: Tano Enterprise and Safric (Read: Francine Foumane: Marchés Publics: Danger chez Inoni, in La Détente Libre, 02/11/2006)

References:

– Alain Blaise Batongué, Chambre des comptes, Anif, Conac : La lutte contre la corruption bloquée, in Mutations, 27/03/2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

– La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers" (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

– Serges Olivier Okolé, 'Marché public: une délégation béninoise s'imprègne de l'expérience camerounaise', in Cameroon Tribune, 14/08/2006

– Francine Foumane: Marchés Publics: Danger chez Inoni, in La Détente Libre, 02/11/2006

100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

57. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

0

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

Comments:

The Audit Bench is a young institution which has hardly begun its activities. It is only one year old.

References:

– Alain Blaise Batongué, Chambre des comptes, Anif, Conac : La lutte contre la corruption bloquée, in Mutations, 27 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

– François Bambou, Chambre des comptes : les personnels à l'école des procédures, 25 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).

– La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers" (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

57b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The Audit Bench has only been in existence for a year. As such, it has only hardly begun its activities.

References:

- Alain Blaise Batongué, Chambre des comptes, Anif, Conac. : La lutte contre la corruption bloquée, in Mutations, 27 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- François Bambou, Chambre des comptes : les personnels à l'école des procédures, 25 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers” (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The Audit Bench is a young institution which has only hardly begun its activities. It has been in existence for only a year.

References:

- Alain Blaise Batongué, Chambre des comptes, Anif, Conac. : La lutte contre la corruption bloquée, in Mutations, 27 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- François Bambou, Chambre des comptes : les personnels à l'école des procédures, 25 April 2006 (<http://www.camerounlink.net>).
- La chambre des comptes instruit ses premiers dossiers” (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

51 V-3. Taxes and Customs

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

100

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

References:

The General Direction of Taxes (<http://www.impots.gov.cm>)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

59. Is the tax collection agency effective?

88

59a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

References:

- Laurent Nkodo, La fiscalisation du secteur informel au Cameroun : équité et rendement, Yaoundé, Saagraph et .F.Ebert, 1997.
- René Ossa, Administrer l'impôt en Afrique Sub-saharienne. Les nouveaux enjeux de la fonction d'assiette, Yaoundé, Editions Iroko, 2007.
- Alaka Alaka (P), « Systèmes fiscaux : l'expérience camerounaise des réformes », dans Idara, Volume 13, N° 2, 2003 .
- Pierre Alaka Alaka, Les difficultés du recouvrement de l'impôt au Cameroun : contribution à l'étude des dysfonctionnements administratifs », Thèse, Paris II, 1996.
- Florent Ndia (F), La gestion du personnel fiscal du littoral I : analyse de l'incidence de la motivation du personnel sur la performance, mémoire de DESS en Administration fiscale, Université de Douala, 2001.
- Olivier Kenne, Organisation des services et rendement fiscal au Cameroun, mémoire de DESS en Administration fiscale, Université de Douala, 2001.

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

References:

- Laurent Nkodo, La fiscalisation du secteur informel au Cameroun : équité et rendement, Yaoundé, Saagraph et .F.Ebert, 1997.
- René Ossa, Administrer l'impôt en Afrique Sub-saharienne. Les nouveaux enjeux de la fonction d'assiette, Yaoundé, Editions Iroko, 2007.
- Alaka Alaka (P), « Systèmes fiscaux : l'expérience camerounaise des réformes », dans Idara, Volume 13, N° 2, 2003 .
- Pierre Alaka Alaka, Les difficultés du recouvrement de l'impôt au Cameroun : contribution à l'étude des dysfonctionnements administratifs », Thèse, Paris II, 1996.
- Florent Ndia (F), La gestion du personnel fiscal du littoral I : analyse de l'incidence de la motivation du personnel sur la performance, mémoire de DESS en Administration fiscale, Université de Douala, 2001.
- Olivier Kenne, Organisation des services et rendement fiscal au Cameroun, mémoire de DESS en Administration fiscale, Université de Douala, 2001.

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

50

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Laurent Nkodo, La fiscalisation du secteur informel au Cameroun : équité et rendement, Yaoundé, Saagraph et .F.Ebert, 1997.
- René Ossa, Administrer l'impôt en Afrique Sub-saharienne. Les nouveaux enjeux de la fonction d'assiette, Yaoundé, Editions Iroko, 2007.
- Alaka Alaka (P), « Systèmes fiscaux : l'expérience camerounaise des réformes », dans Idara, Volume 13, N° 2, 2003.
- Pierre Alaka Alaka, Les difficultés du recouvrement de l'impôt au Cameroun : contribution à l'étude des dysfonctionnements administratifs », Thèse, Paris II, 1996.

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:

50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

25:

0: Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

References:

The General direction of Customs (<http://www.douanescustoms-cm.org/fr/actualite.php?rub=douaneimage&Theme=sydonia>).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

62. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

88

62a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Noe Ndjebet Massoussi, Les douanes ouvrent au public, in Le Messenger, 25 January 2006.
- Eugène Dipanda, Douanes camerounaises : Un objectif de plus de 400 milliards Fcfa en 2007, in Mutations, 22 May 2007.
- Léopold Chendjou, Douane : De nouveaux responsables pour plus de recettes, In Le Messenger, 01 January 2005.

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Noe Ndjebet Massoussi, Les douanes ouvrent au public, in Le Messenger, 25 January 2006.
- Eugène Dipanda, Douanes camerounaises : Un objectif de plus de 400 milliards Fcfa en 2007, in Mutations, 22 May 2007.
- Léopold Chendjou, Douane : De nouveaux responsables pour plus de recettes, In Le Messenger, 01 June 2005.
- Thomas Dakayi Kamga, Recettes douanières : Le Cameroun ne perdra pas 225 milliards de Fcfa, in Mutations, 9 February 2007.

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

50

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Noe Ndjebet Massoussi, Les douanes souvrent au public, in Le Messenger, 25 January 2006.
- Eugène Dipanda, Douanes camerounaises : Un objectif de plus de 400 milliards Fcfa en 2007, in Mutations, 22 May 2007.
- Léopold Chendjou, Douane : De nouveaux responsables pour plus de recettes, In Le Messenger, 01 June 2005.
- Thomas Dakayi Kamga, Recettes douanières : Le Cameroun ne perdra pas 225 milliards de Fcfa, in Mutations, 9 February 2007.
- Alexandre Djimeli, Point d'achèvement&la pression fiscale, encore et toujours, in Le Messenger, 03 May 2006.

100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

75:

50: Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

25:

0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

Comments:

The National Investment Corporation of Cameroon (SNI) was set up in 1964 as a public corporation, with the State as sole shareholder, for the mobilization and orientation of national savings and any other national and international financial resources. It has a capital of 22,000 million CFA F.

The SNI is a public establishment, whose share capital is held solely by the State, with a key mission to promote the economic and social development of Cameroon.

For over forty years, the SNI has effectively contributed to the economic and social development of Cameroon and encouraged private investment.

References:

– The National Investment Corporation of Cameroon (www.sni.cm)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if this function does not exist.

65. Is the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

70

65a. In law, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:

The Ministry is appointed by the head of state. He is a member of the ruling party.

References:

There is no legal provision concerning this aspect.

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

65b. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The SNI is a public company which has a permanent staff.

References:

- André Marie Mbili Onana, Pour l'amélioration des performances des entreprises publiques camerounaises: le rôle du conseil d'administration", Mémoire de DEA en Gestion, Université de Yaoundé II SOA, 2004
- Félix Zogning Nguimeya, "Introduction d'une société à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Douala – Enjeux et procédures, Mémoire de DESS Gestion financière et bancaire, Université de Douala, 2006
- Créer une entreprise au Cameroun in <http://camerouncontact.unblog.fr>

100: The agency or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65c. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- André Marie Mbili Onana, Pour l'amélioration des performances des entreprises publiques camerounaises: le rôle du conseil d'administration", Mémoire de DEA en Gestion, Université de Yaoundé II SOA, 2004
- Félix Zogning Nguimeya, "Introduction d'une société à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Douala – Enjeux et procédures, Mémoire de DESS Gestion financière et bancaire, Université de Douala, 2006
- Créer une entreprise au Cameroun in <http://camerouncontact.unblog.fr>
- Comment s'implanter au Cameroun? in <http://www.apce.com/cid16529/comment-s-implanter-au-cameroun.html?pid=92>

100: The the agency or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The the agency or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

65d. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- André Marie Mbili Onana, Pour l'amélioration des performances des entreprises publiques camerounaises: le rôle du conseil d'administration", Mémoire de DEA en Gestion, Université de Yaoundé II SOA, 2004
- Félix Zogning Nguimeya, "Introduction d'une société à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Douala – Enjeux et procédures, Mémoire de DESS Gestion financière et bancaire, Université de Douala, 2006
- Créer une entreprise au Cameroun in <http://camerouncontact.unblog.fr>
- Comment s'implanter au Cameroun? in <http://www.apce.com/cid16529/comment-s-implanter-au-cameroun.html?pid=92>
- Pascal Nguihé Kanté, Réflexions sur le régime juridique de dissolution et de liquidation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques au Cameroun depuis la réforme des procédures collectives OHADA, in Afrilex, N°4, 2004/12

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

65e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Three examples of cases where penalties were imposed are SAFRIC, Galerie des Beaux-Arts, and Titi Electric.

References:

- Guy-Marie Eloundou Bidjogo, Adamaoua-Marchés publics : le temps des sanctions, In Cameroon-online, 14 March 2006 (<http://www.cameroun-online.com/actualite.actu-1457.html>).
- Armand Essogo, 12 ans de prison ferme pour un fournisseur, in Cameroon Tribune, 21 April 2006 (www.cameroun-tribune.net).
- Eugène Dipanda, Marchés publics : les règles de jeu enfin claires, in Mutations, 28 September 2004 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Etudes sur les sanctions dans le domaine des marchés publics, By ARMP, March 2006 (www.droit-afrique.com).
- André Marie Mbili Onana, Pour l'amélioration des performances des entreprises publiques camerounaises: le rôle du conseil d'administration", Mémoire de DEA en Gestion, Université de Yaoundé II SOA, 2004
- Félix Zogning Nguimeya, "Introduction d'une société à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Douala – Enjeux et procédures, Mémoire de DESS Gestion financière et bancaire, Université de Douala, 2006
- Créer une entreprise au Cameroun in <http://camerouncontact.unblog.fr>

- Comment s’implanter au Cameroun? in <http://www.apce.com/cid16529/comment-s-implanter-au-cameroun.html?pid=92>
- Pascal Nguihé Kanté, Réflexions sur le régime juridique de dissolution et de liquidation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques au Cameroun depuis la réforme des procédures collectives OHADA, in Afrilex, N°4, 2004/12

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

66. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

75

66a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | NO

References:

- In accordance with Article 33 (4) of Decree n° 2004/275 of 24 September 2004 to institute the Public Contracts Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

66b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Firmin Eog, A l'école des marchés publics au Cameroun, in CCC/SNEC, 23 August 2006 (http://www.sneccameroun.com/article_fr.php?idac=56).
- Azzarius, Azzarius et l'ARMP lancent le projet de dématérialisation des documents et des procédures des marchés publics du Cameroun in <http://www.daf.info/Azzarius-et-l-ARMP-lancent-le-projet-de-dematerialisation-des-documents-et-des-procedures->

[des-marches-publics-du_a565.html](#)

- Audit a posteriori des marchés publics, Exercice 2003, ARMP, mars 2006, by 2AC and ACP (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).
- Eugène Dipanda, Marchés publics : les règles de jeu enfin claires, in Mutations, 28 September 2004 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: State-owned companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

75:

50: State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

25:

0: Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

66c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Firmin Eog, A lécole des marchés publics au Cameroun, in CCC/SNEC, 23 August 2006 (http://www.snec-cameroun.com/article_fr.php?idac=56).
- Azzarius, Azzarius et l'ARMP lancent le projet de dématérialisation des documents et des procédures des marchés publics du Cameroun in http://www.daf.info/Azzarius-et-l-ARMP-lancent-le-projet-de-dematerialisation-des-documents-et-des-procedures-des-marches-publics-du_a565.html
- Audit a posteriori des marchés publics, Exercice 2003, ARMP, mars 2006, by 2AC and ACP (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).
- Eugène Dipanda, Marchés publics : les règles de jeu enfin claires, in Mutations, 28 September 2004 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

75:

50: Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

25:

0: State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

66d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In practice, all informations can be obtained on request to the Company. To access the information, it is necessary to express the demand. Additional informations are available online in the website. They are intended for the public

References:

- Guy-Marie Eloundou Bidjogo, Adamaoua-Marchés publics : le temps des sanctions, In Cameroon-online, 14 March 2006 (<http://www.cameroun-online.com/actualite.actu-1457.html>).
- Eugène Dipanda, Marchés publics : les règles de jeu enfin claires, in Mutations, 28 September 2004 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Etudes sur les sanctions dans le domaine des marchés publics, By ARMP, March 2006 (www.droit-afrique.com).
- André Marie Mbili Onana, Pour l'amélioration des performances des entreprises publiques camerounaises: le rôle du conseil d'administration", Mémoire de DEA en Gestion, Université de Yaoundé II SOA, 2004
- Félix Zogning Nguimeya, "Introduction d'une société à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Douala – Enjeux et procédures, Mémoire de DESS Gestion financière et bancaire, Université de Douala, 2006
- Créer une entreprise au Cameroun in <http://camerouncontact.unblog.fr>
- Comment s'implanter au Cameroun? in <http://www.apce.com/cid16529/comment-s-implanter-au-cameroun.html?pid=92>
- Pascal Nguihé Kanté, Réflexions sur le régime juridique de dissolution et de liquidation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques au Cameroun depuis la réforme des procédures collectives OHADA, in Afrilex, N°4, 2004/12

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

66e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

All information can be obtained on request to the Company. To access the information, it is necessary to express the demand. Additional informations are available online in the website. They are intended for the public

References:

- Guy-Marie Eloundou Bidjogo, Adamaoua-Marchés publics : le temps des sanctions, In Cameroon-online, 14 March 2006 (<http://www.cameroun-online.com/actualite.actu-1457.html>).
- Eugène Dipanda, Marchés publics : les règles de jeu enfin claires, in Mutations, 28 September 2004 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Etudes sur les sanctions dans le domaine des marchés publics, By ARMP, March 2006 (www.droit-afrique.com).
- André Marie Mbili Onana, Pour l'amélioration des performances des entreprises publiques camerounaises: le rôle du conseil d'administration", Mémoire de DEA en Gestion, Université de Yaoundé II SOA, 2004
- Félix Zogning Nguimeya, "Introduction d'une société à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Douala – Enjeux et procédures, Mémoire de DESS Gestion financière et bancaire, Université de Douala, 2006
- Créer une entreprise au Cameroun in <http://camerouncontact.unblog.fr>
- Comment s'implanter au Cameroun? in <http://www.apce.com/cid16529/comment-s-implanter-au-cameroun.html?pid=92>
- Pascal Nguihé Kanté, Réflexions sur le régime juridique de dissolution et de liquidation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques au Cameroun depuis la réforme des procédures collectives OHADA, in Afrilex, N°4, 2004/12

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

82 V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

67. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

38

67a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

References:

In accordance with Article 2(1) of the Ordinance N° 90/007 of November 8, 1990, to institute Investments Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required

67b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this domain.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

67c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Alexandre Djimeli, Point d'achèvement&la pression fiscale, encore et toujours, in Le Messenger, 3 May 2006.
- Serge Olivier, Okolé, Sept bonnes raisons pour investir au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté, Comment attirer les investisseurs au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- François Bambou, Blocages: les investisseurs boudent le Cameroun, in La Nouvelle Expression, 07 March 2007.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté Cameroun : les préalables pour attirer les investisseurs, in Cameroon Tribune, 16 August 2007.

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

25:

0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

67d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Alexandre Djimeli, Point d'achèvement&la pression fiscale, encore et toujours, in Le Messenger, 3 May 2006.
- Serge Olivier, Okolé, Sept bonnes raisons pour investir au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté, Comment attirer les investisseurs au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- François Bambou, Blocages: les investisseurs boudent le Cameroun, in La Nouvelle Expression, 07 March 2007.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté Cameroun : les préalables pour attirer les investisseurs, in Cameroon Tribune, 16 August 2007.

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

68. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

0

68a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this domain.

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this domain.

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this domain.

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

69. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

25

69a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

- Alexandre Djimeli, Point d'achèvement&la pression fiscale, encore et toujours, in Le Messenger, 3 May 2006.
- Serge Olivier, Okolé, Sept bonnes raisons pour investir au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté, Comment attirer les investisseurs au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- François Bambou, Blocages: les investisseurs boudent le Cameroun, in La Nouvelle Expression, 07 March 2007.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté Cameroun : les préalables pour attirer les investisseurs, in Cameroon Tribune, 16 August 2007.
- Jean-François Medard, Décentralisation du système de santé publique au Cameroun, in Bulletin de l'APAD, N° 21, June 2001.
- Bernard Hours, L'Etat sorcier, santé publique et société au Cameroun, Paris L'Harmattan, 1985.

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Alexandre Djimeli, Point d'achèvement & la pression fiscale, encore et toujours, in Le Messenger, 3 May 2006.
- Serge Olivier, Okolé, Sept bonnes raisons pour investir au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté, Comment attirer les investisseurs au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
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- Rousseau-Joël Fouté Cameroun : les préalables pour attirer les investisseurs, in Cameroon Tribune, 16 August 2007.
- Jean-François Medard, Décentralisation du système de santé publique au Cameroun, in Bulletin de l'APAD, N° 21, June 2001.
- Bernard Hours, L'Etat sorcier, santé publique et société au Cameroun, Paris L'Harmattan, 1985.

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Alexandre Djimeli, Point d'achèvement & la pression fiscale, encore et toujours, in Le Messenger, 3 May 2006.
- Serge Olivier, Okolé, Sept bonnes raisons pour investir au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté, Comment attirer les investisseurs au Cameroun, in Cameroon Tribune, 4 October 2006.
- François Bambou, Blocages: les investisseurs boudent le Cameroun, in La Nouvelle Expression, 07 March 2007.
- Rousseau-Joël Fouté Cameroun : les préalables pour attirer les investisseurs, in Cameroon Tribune, 16 August 2007.
- Jean-François Medard, Décentralisation du système de santé publique au Cameroun, in Bulletin de l'APAD, N° 21, June 2001.
- Bernard Hours, L'Etat sorcier, santé publique et société au Cameroun, Paris L'Harmattan, 1985.

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

VI-1. ⁶⁶Anti-Corruption Law

70. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

100

70a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Article 134 and 161 of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Article 308 of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Article 312 of Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Article 134 (1) and (2) of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

– Article 1 of the Penal Code.
– Article 7 (1) and (2) of the Penal Code.

- Article 134 of the Penal Code.
- Article 312 of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Article 184 of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

- Article 107, 109 and 310 of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

The activities of GABAC are illustrated in those articles:

- Yves Djambong, Argent sale: La guinée équatoriale accuse le Cameroun & Cie”, in Le Messenger, 21 décembre 2006
- Marion Obam, Le Gabac chasse l'argent sale en zone Cemac, in Mutations, 23/10/2007

References:

- Article 1 and 2 of Additional Act N° 09/00/CEMAC-086 /CCEO2 creating GABAC (Action Group against Money Laundering in Central Africa)

YES: A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

- Article 9 and 95 of the Penal Code concerning conspiracy.

YES: A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

References:

CONAC – The CONAC is the National Commission Anti-corruption created by Decree n° 2006/088 of March 11, 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

72. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

33

72a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with article 2 (1) of Decree N° 2006/08 of march 11, 2006 (<http://www.spm.gov.cm>).

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

72b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles,” in Journalchretien.net, dimanche 12 mars 2006

(<http://www.spcm.org/Journal/spip.php?article1298>).

– Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde,” in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

– Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 March 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

75:

50: This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

72c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles,” in Journalchretien.net, dimanche 12 mars 2006 (<http://www.spcm.org/Journal/spip.php?article1298>).
- Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde,” in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 March 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

72d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles,” in Journalchretien.net, dimanche 12 mars 2006 (<http://www.spcm.org/Journal/spip.php?article1298>).
- Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde,” in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 March 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

72e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles,” in Journalchretien.net, dimanche 12 mars 2006 (<http://www.spcm.org/Journal/spip.php?article1298>).
- Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde,” in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 March 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

72f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles,” in Journalchretien.net, dimanche 12 mars 2006 (<http://www.spcm.org/Journal/spip.php?article1298>).
- Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde,” in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne,” in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 March 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

72g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- François Bimogo, "Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption", in Bonaberi.com, 11 March 2006. (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, "Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail", in Cameroon Tribune, 31 May 2007 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

72h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- François-Xavier Deutchoua, "Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles", in Mutations, 12 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Junior Binyam, "Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde", in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., "Le chant du cygne", in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 May 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- François Bimogo, "Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption", in Bonaberi.com (11 March 2006) (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, "Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail", in Cameroon Tribune, 31 May 2007 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

100: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

72i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

- François-Xavier Deutchoua, "Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles", in Mutations, 12 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Junior Binyam, "Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde", in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., "Le chant du cygne", in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 March 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- François Bimogo, "Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption", in Bonaberi.com (11 March 2006) (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, "Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail", in Cameroon Tribune, 31 May 2007 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Denis Nkwebo, "Cameroun: Affaire Sydonia – La Conac enquête à la douane", in Mutations, 16 August 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

73. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

25

73a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

- François-Xavier Deutchoua, Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles”, in Mutations, 12 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde”, in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne”, in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 March 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- François Bimogo, “Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption”, in Bonaberi.com (11 March 2006) (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, “Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail”, in Cameroon Tribune, 31 May 2007(www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Denis Nkwebo, “Cameroun: Affaire Sydonia – La Conac enquête à la douane”, in Mutations, 16 August 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

73b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- François-Xavier Deutchoua, Gouvernance : Du Conac après les ripailles”, in Mutations, 12 March 2006 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Junior Binyam, “Conac : Paul Biya monte sa vieille garde”, in Mutations, 18 March 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).
- Edmond Kanguia K., “Le chant du cygne”, in La Nouvelle Expression, 20 March 2006 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- François Bimogo, “Une Commission de lutte contre la corruption”, in Bonaberi.com (11 March 2006) (<http://www.bonaberi.com/article.php?aid=1993>).
- Francis-Aimé Amougou, “Cameroun: Lutte contre la corruption, la Conac au travail”, in Cameroon Tribune, 31 May 2007(www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Denis Nkwebo, “Cameroun: Affaire Sydonia – La Conac enquête à la douane”, in Mutations, 16 August 2007 (www.lequotidienmutations.net).

100: Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

53
VI-3. Rule of Law

74. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

67

74a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

References:

in accordance with article 436 of the Code of Penal Procedure.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

74b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The new code of procedure has been in effect for only a year.

References:

Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, *Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais)*, Mémoire de DEA,

Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI, 2004-2005.

– Adolphe Minkoa She, *Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun*, Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.

Roger Sockeng, *Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun*, Groupe St-François, 1998.

– Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, "L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, *dignité humaine en Afrique*, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:

0: Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

74c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA,

Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.

– Adolphe Minkoa She, Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun, Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.

Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun", Groupe St-François, 1998.

– Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, "L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

50

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.
- Adolphe Minkoa She, Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun, Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.
- Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun", Groupe St-François, 1998.
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, "L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.
- Edouard Kitio, "La garde à vue administrative pour grand banditisme et respect des droits de l'homme au Cameroun", Application de la loi n° 90/054 du 19 décembre 1990 sur le maintien de l'ordre, Jurispériodique, n°30, April-May-June 1997.

100: Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

75:

50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

25

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.
- Adolphe Minkoa She, Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun, Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.
- Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun", Groupe St-François, 1998.
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, "L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.
- Edouard Kitio, "La garde à vue administrative pour grand banditisme et respect des droits de l'homme au Cameroun", Application de la loi n° 90/054 du 19 décembre 1990 sur le maintien de l'ordre, Jurispériodique, n°30, April-May-June 1997.
- Joel Didier Engo, La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente, in La Nouvelle Expression, 2 July 2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

77. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

31

77a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:

Article 37 (2) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

77b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The president is the head of the Supreme Council of the magistrature.

References:

– Modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA,

Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.

– Adolphe Minkoa She, Droit de l'homme et droit pénal au Cameroun, Economica, Paris, collection « la vie du droit en Afrique », 1999.

Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun", Groupe St-François, 1998.

– Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, "L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

– Edouard Kitio, “La garde à vue administrative pour grand banditisme et respect des droits de l’homme au Cameroun”, Application de la loi n° 90/054 du 19 décembre 1990 sur le maintien de l’ordre, Jurispériodique, n°30, Avril-Mai-Juin 1997.
– Joel Didier Engo, La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente, in La Nouvelle Expression, 2 July 2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:

0: National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

77c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | **NO**

References:

There are no legal provisions concerning this aspect of the judiciary.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

77d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | **NO**

References:

Article 37 (3) of the Constitution of January 18, 1996 (The President of the republic shall appoint the members of the bench).

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

78. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

78a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

Comments:

No judge has been physically harmed in the performance of his duties due to corruption in Cameroon.

References:

- Joel Didier Engo, La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente”, in La Nouvelle Expression, 2 July 2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, “Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l’origine de l’accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais)”, Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d’ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.
- Aimé-Francis Amougou, “Lutte contre la corruption : une affaire de tous”, in Cameroon Tribune, 18 January 2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Dr Asafor Chi Cornelius, “Le Rôle du comité adhoc de lutte contre la corruption,” Rapport final de la première phase du PND, 12 May 2000 (www.worldbank.org).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

78b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

Comments:

No judge was killed in connection with the corruption in Cameroon.

References:

- Joel Didier Engo, La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente”, in La Nouvelle Expression, 2/07/2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).
- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, “Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l’origine de l’accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais)”, Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d’ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.
- Aimé-Francis Amougou, “Lutte contre la corruption : une affaire de tous”, in Cameroon Tribune, 18 January 2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge’s involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

79. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

61

79a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

– Joel Didier Engo, La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente, in La Nouvelle Expression, 2 July 2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

– Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l’origine de l’accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d’ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.

– Aimé-Francis Amougou, Lutte contre la corruption : une affaire de tous, in Cameroon Tribune, 18 January 2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

– Dr Asafor Chi Cornelius, Le Rôle du comité adhoc de lutte contre la corruption, Rapport final de la première phase du PND, 12 May 2000 (www.worldbank.org)

– Aimé-Francis Amougou, Lutte contre la corruption : une affaire de tous, in Cameroon Tribune, 18 January 2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).

– Joe La Conscience, Artiste, Homme de Culture : Lettre ouverte aux magistrats de la Cour suprême du Cameroun in Le Messenger 08 August 2007 (www.lemessenger.net).

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

79b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

References:

- Aimé-Francis Amougou, Lutte contre la corruption : une affaire de tous, in Cameroon Tribune, 18 January 2006 (www.cameroon-tribune.net).
- Joe La Conscience, Artiste, Homme de Culture : Lettre ouverte aux magistrats de la Cour suprême du Cameroun in Le Messenger 08 August 2007 (www.lemessenger.net).
- Nicole Gauthier, Polygamie au Cameroun: Une loi n'est pas coutume, in Libération, mardi 07 mars 2006 (<http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=364935>).
- Communiqué de presse, Le Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels poursuit l'examen du rapport du Cameroun, United Nations, HR/ESC/99/41, 24 November 1999.
- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.

100: Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

75:

50: Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

25:

0: Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

79c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

References:

- In accordance with the preamble of the Constitution of January 18, 1996.
- In accordance with article 417 (1) et (2) of the Code of Penal Procedure.

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

79d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.
- Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun”, Groupe St-François, 1998.
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, “L'accès à la justice au Cameroun”, cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

75:

50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

25:

0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

79e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.
- Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun”, Groupe St-François, 1998.
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, “L'accès à la justice au Cameroun”, cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.
- Joel Didier Engo, La justice au Cameroun : une imposture permanente&, in La Nouvelle Expression, 2/07/2007 (www.lanouvelleexpression.net).

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.

79f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.
- Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun," Groupe St-François, 1998.
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, "L'accès à la justice au Cameroun", cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

79g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Amadou Mbeyap Kutnjem, Le droit à la justice au Cameroun (à l'origine de l'accélération de la modernisation du code pénal camerounais), Mémoire de DEA, Chaire Unesco des Droits de la personne et de la démocratie, Université d'ABOMEY-CALAVI , 2004-2005.
- Roger Sockeng, Les institutions judiciaires au Cameroun," Groupe St-François, 1998
- Pierre- Etienne Kenfack, "L'accès à la justice au Cameroun," cahier de l'UCAC, n°1, dignité humaine en Afrique, (Hommage à Henri Decker) Presse Universitaire Catholique d'Afrique Centrale, 1997.

100: Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

75:

50: Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

25:

0: Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

VI-4. Law Enforcement

80. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

42

80a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Honoré Foimoukom, Moyens de lutte : Mebe Ngoo met en garde les policiers de Douala, in Le Messenger, 18 December 2006.
- Alberto Nna, Assainissement: Mebe Ngo'o prend la mesure, in La Nouvelle Expression, 5 March 2006.
- Junior Binyam, Edgar Alain Mebe Ngoo : Sur des charbons ardents, in Mutations., 24 January 2007.
- Bertille M. Bikoun, Police : Visages et défis des nouveaux directeurs, in Cameroon-info.net (<http://www.spyworld-actu.com/spip.php?article2766>).

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

80b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Honoré Foimoukom, Moyens de lutte : Mebe Ngoo met en garde les policiers de Douala, in Le Messenger, 18 December 2006.
- Alberto Nna, Assainissement: Mebe Ngo'o prend la mesure, in La Nouvelle Expression, 5 March 2006
- Junior Binyam, Edgar Alain Mebe Ngoo : Sur des charbons ardents, in Mutations, 24J anuary 2007.
- Bertille M. Bikoun, Police : Visages et défis des nouveaux directeurs, in Cameroon-info.net (<http://www.spyworld-actu.com/spip.php?article2766>).

100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

80c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

- Honoré Foimoukom, Moyens de lutte : Mebe Ngoo met en garde les policiers de Douala, in Le Messenger, 18 December 2006.
- Alberto Nna, Assainissement: Mebe Ngo'o prend la mesure, in La Nouvelle Expression, 5 March 2006
- Junior Binyam, Edgar Alain Mebe Ngoo : Sur des charbons ardents, in Mutations, 24 January 2007.
- Bertille M. Bikoun, Police : Visages et défis des nouveaux directeurs, in Cameroon-info.net (<http://www.spyworld-actu.com/spip.php?article2766>).

100: The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

81. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

71

81a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

References:

– In accordance with article 140 of the Penal Code.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

81b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

- Honoré Foimoukom, Moyens de lutte : Mebe Ngoo met en garde les policiers de Douala, in Le Messenger, 18 December 2006.
- Alberto Nna, Assainissement: Mebe Ngo'o prend la mesure, in La Nouvelle Expression, 5 March 2006.
- Junior Binyam, Edgar Alain Mebe Ngoo : Sur des charbons ardents, in Mutations, 24 January 2007 (<http://www.spyworld-actu.com/spip.php?article2766>).
- Bavures policières : 5 policiers suspendus, By PANA, 13 April 2005
- François BMG, Cameroun : huit policiers suspendus dans l'affaire du trafic des passeports, Agora Vox, 28 February 2006 (<http://www.agoravox.fr>).

100: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

81c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

References:

The National Commission on Anti-Corruption (www.prc.cm)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

81d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The CONAC has been in existence for only a few months. Its effect remains to be seen.

References:

- Richard Touna, Lutte contre la corruption : L'ultimatum de Paul Biya aux sceptiques, in *Le Messager*, 30 March 2006.
- Jacques Doo Bell, Lutte contre la corruption : la CONAC, un autre machin, in *Le Messager*, 13 March 2006.
- Alain Blaise Batongue, Chambre des comptes, Anif, Conac... : La lutte contre la corruption bloquée, in *Mutations*, 27 March 2006.
- Denis Nkwebo, Affaire Sydonia : la CONAC enquête à la douane, in *Mutations*, 16 August 2007.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

81e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES | NO

References:

The equality of all in front of the law is proclaimed in the preamble of the Constitution of 18 January 1996.

YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

81f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

- Honoré Foimoukom, Moyens de lutte : Mebe Ngoo met en garde les policiers de Douala, in Le Messenger, 18/12/2006
- Alberto Nna, Assainissement: Mebe Ngo'o prend la mesure, in La Nouvelle Expression, 5 March 2006
- Junior Binyam, Edgar Alain Mebe Ngoo : Sur des charbons ardents, in Mutations, 24 January 2007
- Bertille M. Bikoun, Police : Visages et défis des nouveaux directeurs, in Cameroon-info.net (<http://www.spyworld-actu.com/spip.php?article2766>).
- Bavures policières : 5 policiers suspendus, By PANA, 13 April 2005.
- François BMG, Cameroun : huit policiers suspendus dans l'affaire du trafic des passeports, Agora Vox, 28/02/2006 (http://www.agoravox.fr/article.php3?id_article=12758).

100: Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

75:

50: Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

25:

0: Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.