Overall Score:

72 - Moderate

Legal Framework Score:

78 - Moderate

Actual Implementation Score:

66 - Weak

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

67

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution 2:16

(i) Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the limits of the law.

(ii) Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.

(iii) The establishment of societies and political parties and the control of their resources shall be regulated by law

Also see:
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/06/jordan10430.htm
http://www.lob.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within
last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
On May 31, 2007, the government issued new regulations” (not law) for not-for-profit companies, requiring them to get permission from the Council of Ministers, based on the recommendation of the Minister of Trade and Industry. Article 9 A stipulates that “the company (not-for-profit) cannot receive donations or financial gifts from a none-Jordanian entity without the permission of the Council of Ministers, based on the recommendation of the Minister of Trade and Industry.”

**References:**
CSOs that are registered under the Social Charities and Societies Law issued in 1966 can receive funds from internal and external sources. The law does not prevent it.


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YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

NO: A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
According to Mr. sakkejha, by law they are required to disclose their sources of funding.
The Social Charities and Associations Law # 33 1966 does not require organizations authorized under its provisions to disclose sources of funding and expenditure.
If anti-corruption organizations are registered as not-for-profit companies, they have to disclose their financial resources by law. According to the new regulations issued 31 May 2007, they have to get permission from the Council of Ministers with respect to receiving funding and how to spend it.
If anti-corruption organizations are registered as NGOs (which are authorized by the Ministry of Interior), they are not required to disclose their sources of funding, but they are required to publish their budgets and expenditure.

**References:**
Basem Sakkejha, Former President, Transparency International Jordan Chapter and Currently Head of Jordan’s Transparency Forum (a unit of the Arab Archive Institute).
Phone interview with Dr. Omar Aljazy, director and managing partner of Aljazy and Associates Law Firm in Amman, Jordan, 15 October 2007
Phone interview with Dr. Ibrahim Saif, director and head of the Economics Unit at the Center for Strategic Studies University of Jordan, in Amman, Jordan, 15 October 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

83

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Transparency International did not have to register in Jordan, although it was operating freely without restrictions.

References:
Phone interview with Basem Sakejha, former president, Transparency International Jordan Chapter, 14 October 2007

Phone interview with HE Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, 14 October 2007

100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

75:

50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Although the government takes the reports coming from international organizations seriously, there is no clear channel of communication between government officials and anti-corruption organizations, such as an annual public meeting to debate the
issues. However, there are informal channels of communication between these groups and government officials. The initiatives run in both directions.

References:
Phone interview with Basem Sakkejha, former president, Transparency International Jordan Chapter, 14 October 2007

Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al Masri, researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Jordan, in Amman, Jordan, 13 October 2007

Phone interview with HE Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, 14 October 2007

On Sakkejha resignation form TI, see http://factjo.com/issues/86_24.pdf

100: Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

75:

50: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

25:

0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

Comments:
Newspapers have not reported any case over the past three months. Also, several NGOs were contacted to make sure there were no cases of shutting down. However, the president of TI in Jordan resigned in protest against TI using reports about Jordan other than his own.

References:
Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al Masri, Center for Strategic Studies University of Jordan, in Amman, Jordan, 14 October 2007

Interview with Mr. Jehad Mheisen, director of Al Mashreq Al Jadid Research Center, in Amman, Jordan, 13 October 2007

YES: A YES score is earned is there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.
3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

67

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

Comments:
The former Minister of Parliament was imprisoned because he accused some political figures of corruption.

Dr. Abbadi is widely known as very critical of the “public land transfer to investors.” He wrote letters to the king on several occasions voicing his concerns. Some observers argue that he was imprisoned because he was vocal about “high-level” corruption.

References:
http://jordantimes.com/?news=2767&searchFor=Abbadi

By Rana Husseini
AMMAN – The State Security Court (SSC) on Tuesday sentenced former deputy Ahmad Oweidi Abbadi to two years in prison after convicting him of undermining the country’s reputation by spreading false information abroad.

During a five-minute session, the court also declared Abbadi guilty of belonging to an illegal organization and distributing illegal pamphlets.

The SSC ordered Abbadi, 62, to pay JD30 in fines.

The verdict is unfair because the court sided with the military prosecution and disregarded evidence we presented and our request to summon 40 witnesses, Alwan said.

Abbadi's wife, Jamileh, also described the verdict as unjust and urged the international community to intervene and demand her husband’s release.

This case is a setup because when my husband was an MP, he accused many individuals of corruption and these individuals are now officials in power and they took revenge from him, the 42-year-old school principal told The Jordan Times.

The former MP, who served in the 11th and 13th parliaments, was arrested on May 3 following a complaint filed by Interior Minister Eid Fayez over the content of statements published on the Internet in April accusing Jordan and its officials – including the interior minister – of corruption.

The statement was included in an open letter in English addressed to US Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and was posted on the website of the Jordanian National Movement (JNM), which is chaired by Abbadi.

Abbadi denied the charges, claiming he was framed by the interior minister and that hackers entered the website and published the letter to set him up. The letter, dated April 30, claimed the country is suffering a setback in democratic freedoms, particularly freedom of the press and the abuse of detainees.

The letter was cosigned by JNM Secretary of Foreign Affairs Abdul Salam Mullah, who is a resident of Virginia in the US.

Abbadi is also standing trial at the Amman Court of Conciliation in connection with the letter.

He is charged by the Amman prosecutor with slander and violating laws governing e-mail practices.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned” is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.
## 3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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**Comments:**
No cases were reported.

**References:**
Phone interview with Basem Sakkejha, former president, Transparency International Jordan Chapter, 14 October 2007

Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al Masri, researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Jordan, in Amman, Jordan, 13 October 2007

Mr. Jehad Mhiesen, director of Al Mashreq Al Jadid Research Center, in Amman, Jordan

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist’s work. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

88
4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

References:
Article Sixteen of the Constitution:
(i) Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the limits of the law.
(ii) Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.
(iii) The establishment of societies and political parties and the control of their resources shall be regulated by law.

Trade Unions Law # 35, year 1953
Lawyers Association Law #11, year 1972
Medical Doctors Association Law # 13 1972
Engineers Association Law #15, 1972
Journalist Association Law #15, 1998
Dentists Association Law # 17, 1972
Nurses Association Law # 18, 1972
Geologists Association Law # 1972
Pharmacists Association Law #51 1972
Veterinarians Association Law # 70, 2001 (a provisional law; it has not been ratified by Parliament yet)

YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Trade Unions that represent blue collar workers (working class) are not as active as are the professional associations (middle class), which represent white collar workers.

References:
Articles of the Constitution:
Article 16
(i) Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the limits of the law.
(ii) Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.
(iii) The establishment of societies and political parties and the control of their resources shall be regulated by law.

Article 17: Jordanians are entitled to address the public authorities on any personal matters affecting them, or on any matter relative to public affairs, in such a manner and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law.

Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

I-2. Media

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

References:
Press and Publication Law # 8 1998 stipulates in article 3 the freedom of press (journalism), and publication is guaranteed for each Jordanian who may express his opinion through verbal expressions, writing, photographing, or drawing or other means of expression and media.

Phone interview with Mr. Yaser Abu Hilalah, director of Al Jazeera office and a leading columnist in daily Arabic newspapers, in Amman, Jordan, 15 October 2007

Phone interview with Mr. Sameer Hayari, editor of www.ammonnews.net, 15 October 2007

Phone interview with Mr. Sulieman Qbailat, editor at Petra news agency, Jordan, and a columnist, in Amman, Jordan, 15 October 2007

Phone interview with Mr. Alaa Tawalbeh, TV journalist, in Amman, Jordan, 15 October 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.
A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

**YES** | **NO**

References:
The Constitution states in Article 15:
(i) The State shall guarantee freedom of opinion. Every Jordanian shall be free to express his opinion by speech, in writing, or by means of photographic representation and other forms of expression, provided that such does not violate the law.
(ii) Freedom of the press and publications shall be ensured within the limits of the law.
(iii) Newspapers shall not be suspended from publication nor shall their permits be revoked except in accordance with the provisions of the law.
(iv) In the event of the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency, a limited censorship on newspapers, publications, books and broadcasts in matters affecting public safety and national defence may be imposed by law.
(v) Control of the resources of newspaper shall be regulated by law.

Phone interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, faculty of law and director of legal affairs at the University of Jordan, also an international human rights lawyer, 15 October 2007

A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

75

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There has been significant progress in the Press and Publication Law, which was amended on the 1 May 2007, with respect to abolishing the heavy financial requirements for establishing newspapers. Additionally, the amendment changes regulations about the censorship of publications. Previously, books were required to be approved by the Press and Publication Department prior to their publication. Under the amendment, the power of censorship is given to the courts, but only if a legal challenge is brought after the publication of the document. Moreover, the administrative detention of journalists has been banned.

The two major issues highlighted by critics of the Press and Publication Law are (1) the requirement that the editor be a member of the Journalists’ Association, which contravenes the international convention of Human Rights stipulation against compulsory membership unions and associations, and (2) the right of ownership is restricted by law.
References:
Phone interview with Mr. Marwan Qtaishat, former director (took up another job in September 2007) of the Press and Publication Department, 15 October 2007

Phone interview with Mr. Ali Snaid, writer, novelist, and journalist, 15 October 2007

Phone interview with Mr. Nedal Mansoor, director of the Center for the Defense of Journalists, 15 October 2007

100: Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:
In the case of license denial or revocation, citizens can go the Higher Court of Justice.

References:
Phone interview with Mr. Marwan Qtaishat, former director (took up another job in September 2007) of the Press and Publication Department, 15 October 2007

Phone interview with Hamza Albraizat, lawyer, 15 October 2007

Phone interview with Mr. Nedal Mansoor, director of the Center for the Defense of Journalists, 15 October 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.
References:

Press and Publications Law #8 / 1998 Article 17 states that licenses are to be given by a responsible minister within 30 days of receipt of request, and reasons for denial of request must be justified.

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

References:

Press and Publications Law #8 / 1998 Article 13, to obtain a license, the minimum paid capital requirements are:

a) JD 500,000 for a daily newspaper
b) JD 50,000 for a non-daily newspaper
c) JD 5,000 for a specialised publication
d) daily and non-daily newspapers belonging to political parties are exempt for capital requirements a and b

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?
7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Registering companies with the objectives of TV or radio media requires obtaining a license and permission from the Audio Visual Commission.

References:
Interview with Mr. Borhan Akrosh, who is in charge of company registration at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 12 October 2007

100: Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:
In the case of denial or revocation, citizens can appeal to the Higher Court.

References:
Interview with Dr Fares Braizat, Centre for Strategic Studies

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.
7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
The Arab Law Group [http://www.arablaw.org/Download/Media_Law_Jo.doc](http://www.arablaw.org/Download/Media_Law_Jo.doc)

Broadcast Media Law 71/2002

Article 8, (ii) License to be granted within 60 days of notification of responsible minister

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Any person or entity can obtain licenses, but the Audio Visual Commission requires official fees, ranging from 20,000 JD to 100,000 JD, for TV broadcasting and from 10,000 to 25,000 JD for radio broadcasting, as fees for obtaining the license.

References:
Mr. Borhan Akrosh, who is in charge of registering companies at the Ministry of Industry and Trade

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:
licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

75

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Dr. Omar Aljazy (Aljazy & Co law firm), 12 October 2007

100: The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

75:

50: Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

25:

0: Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Dr. Omar Aljazy (Aljazy & Co law firm), 12 October 2007

100: The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

75:
In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

83

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES    |    NO

References:
Press and Publication Law # 8 1998 stipulates in article 3 the freedom of press (journalism) and publication are guaranteed for each Jordanian who may express an opinion through verbal expressions, writing, or photographing, or drawing or other means of expression and media.

The Constitution states in Article 15:
(i) The State shall guarantee freedom of opinion. Every Jordanian shall be free to express his opinion by speech, in writing, or by means of photographic representation and other forms of expression, provided that such does not violate the law.
(ii) Freedom of the press and publications shall be ensured within the limits of the law.
(iii) Newspapers shall not be suspended from publication nor shall their permits be revoked except in accordance with the provisions of the law.
(iv) In the event of the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency, a limited censorship on newspapers, publications, books and broadcasts in matters affecting public safety and national defense may be imposed by law.
(v) Control of the resources of newspaper shall be regulated by law.

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.
100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75:

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

25:

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Although the government does not intervene in preventing or allowing stories about corruption to be published, the Press and Publication Law provides, in Article 38, a restriction on baseless accusations against people. Also, in Article 39, the law bans the publication of the records of court cases without permission of the court.

Interview with Mr. Alaa Tawalbeh, TV journalist, in Amman, Jordan, December 2007

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

10. Are the media credible sources of information?

40
10a. In law, print media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
Print media companies are required by law to disclose their ownership to the government. There is no requirement they disclose their ownership to the public. The information is available at the Ministry of Trade and Industry and is accessible if anyone wants to know some information about the company. However, print media companies publish the names of the owners on a regular basis.

**References:**
Companies Law (22) of 1997 requires that the articles and memorandum of the Association must state the name of the shareholders and they must submit their IDs or passports in order to register the company.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

**YES | NO**

**Comments:**
In law (companies law), broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to disclose their ownership to the government. The Audiovisual Commission Law of 2002 does not specify that media companies are required to disclose their ownership. There is no requirement that they disclose their ownership to the public. However, the owners of these companies are known to the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the public. One can find information that is publicly available.

**References:**
Companies Law (22) of 1997 requires that the articles and memorandum of the Association must state the name of the shareholders and they must submit their IDs or passports in order to register the company.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.
100: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

25:

0: Editors and journalists are widely known to sell favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy of Aljazy & Co. (Advocates & Legal Consultants), according to the Prints and Publication law of 1998, 12 December 2007

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75:

50: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25:

0: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

References:
Alrai Newspaper www.alrai.com
Comments:
Some of the presidents of political parties write columns on a regular basis in papers owned partly by government (i.e., Dr. Hazem Qashou) who writes for Alrai Newspaper (51% government owned). Fouad Dabbor writes for Addustour newspaper which is also partly owned by government (35%). According to Mr. Nimri, public TV is open for political parties leaders to express their views on issues. Sometimes, opposition parties such as the IAFP, is not invited to JTV programs because of political differences with the government. The official news agency Petra, had interviewed opposition figures such as the leaders of the IAFP. Also, the news of the coordination committee of opposition political parties appears in Alrai, Addustour in regular bases.

References:
Interview with Jamil Nimri, a presenter of political programs for public and private TV stations. Also, he is the head of Jordanian Commission for Democratic Culture. Also, a political activist and columnist for the private Al Ghad daily newspaper.
see the archive of Alrai newspaper www.alrai.com, and addustour.com

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

75:

50: The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

100

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:
Phone interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a
NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned* is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

**YES** | **NO**

References:
Phone interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

**YES** | **NO**

References:
Phone interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

77

I-3. Public Access to Information

12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?
12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
Right of Access to Government Information Law #2007 / 47 stipulates that citizens have the right to access written, recorded, and photographed government information and basic government records.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

**YES** | **NO**

**Comments:**
Citizens may appeal to the higher court in cases of denial.

**References:**
no source listed

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

**YES** | **NO**

**References:**
Right of Access to Government Information Law # 47/2007 stipulates that citizens have the right to access written, recorded, and
photographed government information and basic government records.

Article 9 states that requests for government records must accord with the following:
(i) name, address, and any other required information with regard to citizen requesting records
(ii) state subject matter of desired information clearly and accurately
(iii) acceptance or denial of requests for access to not exceed 30 days from request
(iv) denial of access to be given with clearly spelled out reasons and justification

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

13. Is the right of access to information effective?

75

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Article 9 Right of Access to Government Information Law #2007 / 47 states that acceptance or denial of requests for access not exceed 30 days from request; denial of access to be given with clearly spelled out reasons

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.
Article 11 (i) citizens requesting information bear the cost of photocopying

References:
Right of Access to Government Information Law #2007 / 47

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.
In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

Based on informal interviews with a few journalists, one can conclude there is selectivity in responding to requests and giving explanations about why information is denied. The overwhelming majority of requests by journalists are answered.

The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.
14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

References:
Article 3 a of the 2001 election law stipulates that all Jordanians above 18 years of age on the first day of the first month of the election year have the right to vote. http://www.parliament.jo/pdf/election-laws-new.pdf

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, Article 68 http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.
15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Mr. Jihad Mhiesen, director of Al Mashreq Al Jadid Center for Research, in Amman, Jordan

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Despite many claims of voting irregularities in the municipal and parliamentary elections, no claims of violation of the secret ballot have been made.

References:
Interview with Mr. Jihad Mhiesen, director of Al Mashreq Al Jadid Center for Research, in Amman, Jordan


100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.
75:

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

25:

0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Parliamentary elections have been held every four to six years since 1989. Parliamentary elections were postponed in 2001 for two years. The country had no legislative authority for two years.

References:
International Foundation for Election System (IFES)
http://www.electionguide.org/country-news.php?id=110
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

85

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.
References:
In the Constitution, Article 16
(i) Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the limits of the law.
(ii) Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.
(iii) The establishment of societies and political parties and the control of their resources shall be regulated by law http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

1992 Political Parties Law and its amendments, which passed through Parliament on 19 March 2007


YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution Article 2:6
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

Women’s rights in Jordan

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if Individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
A political parties law that passed in March places requirements on both the number of party members and requirements on support in different regions (minimum 500 members from 5 governorates). This barrier is relatively high, given the low level of membership in political parties among Jordanians at present. In principle, all eligible citizens can form parties. The government argued for this number to help in creating viable parties, given the high level of volatility among the nearly 33 legal parties that did not manage to send representatives to Parliament in the November 20, 2007 elections.
100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

75:

50: Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

25:

0: Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
When a 100 score is given, it means formal political barriers are not present. However, there are many ways in which political influence can be applied to people who did not run for office. These methods were practiced in some areas in the municipal elections of July 2007. Finance is a significant barrier to people, especially with the rising cost of living in general and the accession of new wealthy business elites to the political process, and the spending of large sums of money on campaigns. So far there is no official public funding for parties or candidates.

References:
My personal observations of the parliamentary elections of November 2007.

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

75:

50: Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing do may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

25:

0: Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.
Comments:
The IAF has a vocal presence in Parliament.

References:
Ellen Lust-Okar, Elections Under Authoritarianism
http://hei.unige.ch/sections/sp/agenda/colloquium/Lust-Okar_Elections%20in%20Jordan.pdf

100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

75:

50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition’s ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature’s proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

II-2. Election Integrity

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

0

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

Comments:
However, there is no independent agency for election observation. There are ad hoc seasonal coalitions from civil society organizations.
References:
Election Law # 27 of 2002, which stipulates that each candidate has the right to send representatives to the polling stations to observe the process.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

0

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES  |  NO

References:
Amman Center for Human Rights Studies

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Independent monitoring agencies were not allowed to observe the counting of votes in the November 2007 parliamentary elections. The government-appointed National Center for Human Rights worked hard to create an umbrella for election monitoring and had very little success because it deployed only 100 observers around the country.

References:
Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al Masri, researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Jordan, in Amman, Jordan
Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

The election monitoring was set up ad hoc and included temporary appointees.

The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

Although the Prime Minister and other officials have declared the elections to be free and fair, no report on the many alleged irregularities has yet been issued by the government. However, the National Center for Human Rights issued a report about municipal elections (held at the end of July 2007) and cited irregularities.
**References:**
Mohammad Ben Hussein, Jordan's Political Apathy Threatens Polls,” The Media Line, October 5, 2007
http://www.nchr.org.jo/pages.php?menu_id=-1&local_type=1&local_id=4&local_details=1&local_details1=0&localsite_branchname=NCHR

| 100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions. |
| 75: |
| 50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited. |
| 25: |
| 0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value. |

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
Despite evidence of many irregularities, no action has been taken against the offenders.

**References:**
Mohammad Ben Hussein, Jordan's Political Apathy Threatens Polls,” The Media Line, October 5, 2007

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

| 100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders. |
| 75: |
| 50: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments. |
| 25: |
| 0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power. |

19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?
19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

Comments:
Individuals must obtain a voter card (which is the ID card) to be allowed to vote. The ID card must have the name of the district in which a citizen wants to vote.

References:
Jordan Times, February 4, 2003
http://www.jordanembassyus.org/02042003004.htm

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and "ghost" voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

Comments:
There are means for challenging irregularities as they occur on election day, but no way to formally challenge the overall results of the election. People can challenge the credibility of an MP—not through the judicial system, but through the newly elected Parliament. For the 15th Parliament (elected on 20 November 2007), about 20 MPs were challenged, including the Speaker of the House.

References:
Chapter 5 of the Internal Law of the House, which contains Articles 22-34, covering the process and regulations for contesting the results of elections

Election Law # 27 of 2002
YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview with Adel Hawatmeh, researcher and former office manager at the House of Deputies

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The military did not use force, but evidence suggests they were bused across the country to increase support for certain candidates during the municipal elections of July 2007. No such evidence was reported for the parliamentary elections of November 2007.

References:
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.
50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:

0: The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

Comments:
Candidates are allowed to have delegates observe the election at each polling center, but there are no additional provisions allowing other domestic or foreign observers. Representatives of candidates are not allowed to oversee the counting of votes at the polling stations. However, they are allowed to be in the room.

Some local and international organizations were allowed to oversee the process from outside the polling stations. Representatives of the National Center for Human Rights were allowed in the polling stations, but did not oversee vote counting.

References:
Election Law # 27 of 2002.

YES: A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Local NGOs were prohibited from observing the municipal elections (July 2007), although US Embassy officials, among others, were allowed to observe.

References:
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers’ activities.

Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

Election observers’ movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

18
II-3. Political Financing

20. Are there regulations governing political financing?

YES | NO

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

References:
http://www.moi.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
Article 19 bans parties from receiving funding from non-Jordanians and it requires donations from Jordanians to be published. No
Jordanian citizen is allowed to donate more 10,000 Jordanian dinars (nearly $14,000) a year.

References:
Political Parties Law #19 of 2007
http://www.moi.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

References:
The Political Parties Law # 19 of 2007
http://www.moi.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on corporate contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to candidates or political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

References:
Political parties Law # 19 of 2007
http://www.moi.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.
20e. In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

| YES | NO |

**References:**
Political parties Law # 19 of 2007
http://www.moi.gov.jo

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor’s name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
Financial resources are subject to the Audit Bureau procedures. For candidates, the election law does not require candidates to disclose their financial sources. However, the Audit Bureau can only start an investigation when the government asks for it.

**References:**
Political Parties Law # 19 of 2007 considers political parties finances public finances.”

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the political financing process.

| YES | NO |

**Comments:**
Financial resources are subject to the Audit Bureau’s procedures only when the government asks the Audit Bureau to take action.
21. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

21a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007
Interview with Mr. Jihad Mhiesen, Director of Al Mashreq Al Jadid Cenetr for Research/ Amman – Jordan

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.
Comments:
There are many ways in which companies and the individuals from these companies can donate and support a party or a candidate beyond the limits of the law.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making to donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party’s ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

Comments:
In the recent election cycle of November 2007, some candidates spent millions on campaigns. There was no limit to what they could spend.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party.
Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations. Then it is the duty of the Audit Bureau to act accordingly.

Comments:
The government can ask the Audit Bureau to initiate investigations and to audit organizations, whether political or otherwise. Then it is the duty of the Audit Bureau to act accordingly.

References:
Interview with HE Mustafa Barari, president of the Audit Bureau

Phone interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

Comments:
The Audit Bureau sends the results of its investigations to the Parliament and the government. If the case requires further action, it is transferred to the courts.

References:
Phone interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.
The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.

Comments:
Audits only occur in the case of a company’s annual balance sheet. Also, although political parties are subject to auditing by the Audit Bureau upon government request, candidates in municipal and parliamentary elections are not audited. There are many reasons for this difference between parties and candidates. The overwhelming majority of candidates run as independents, and they come up with their own finances.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

Can citizens access records related to political financing?

In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Some parties and individuals will reveal how much they spent on their campaigns voluntarily and for their own reasons.
References:
Phone interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75: 

50: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25: 

0: Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regularly withheld from public disclosure.

22b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Some parties and individuals will reveal how much they spent on their campaigns voluntarily and for their own reasons.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Records are available online, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75: 

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25: 

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

22c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Some parties and individuals will reveal how much they spent on their campaigns voluntarily and for their own reasons.
References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category III. Government Accountability

III-1. Executive Accountability

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | NO

References:
Article 17 of the Constitution states Jordanians are entitled to address the public authorities on any personal matters affecting them, or on any matter relative to public affairs, in such a manner and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law.

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.
24. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

69

24a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

75:

50: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

25:

0: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely sensor such sessions.

24b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

Comments:
The higher court of Justice can review the actions of the executive.

References:
Constitution Ch 4, Article 38
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).
24c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

Comments:
The judiciary can review the actions of the executive when there is a court case against the executive. The Higher Court of Justice is the arbitrator in this regard between citizens and the executive. It is not evident that the Higher Court of Justice would initiate a review without someone filing a case.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to relay upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

24d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

75:

50: The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25:
25. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

50

25a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution Chapter 4, Article 30
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

25b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution Chapter 4, Article 58
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

26. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?
26a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution has no such provisions.

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

26b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution has no such requirement.

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

NO: A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

26c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO

Comments:
Article 171 a. of the Civil Service Statute No. (30) At 2007, issued in accordance with article No. (120) of the constitution: it stipulates that an employee will be fired if he or she received a court ruling convicting him of a criminal act such as bribery, or theft, or forging, or misuse of authority...

References:
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

26d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

References:
No such provisions exist in Chapter 4 of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

26e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
No such provisions exist in Chapter 4 of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

26f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.
100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

26g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

26h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.
Comments:
These records are not regularly audited. However, they are subject to auditing if a court asks for that action.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

27. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

0

27a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | NO

References:
No such provisions exist in Chapter 4 of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

27b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.
This information cannot be accessed by citizens.

References:
Dr. Nazim Aref, head of the Financial Disclosure Department

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

27c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

This information cannot be accessed by citizens.

References:
Dr. Nazim Aref, head of the Financial Disclosure Department

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.
28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

50: The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

25: 0: The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

III-2. Legislative Accountability

29. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

58

29a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

References:
Chapter 6 of the Constitution makes no such provision.
**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

---

29b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The Legislation Bureau has the authority to review all legislations and suggest opinions about them, especially when there is a contradiction or ambiguity. Then the government can send an amendment (to the legislation) to the Parliament for consideration. The Legislation Bureau is not a judicial body, but its members are seasoned judges and lawyers who have served in the judiciary for a long time.

**References:**
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

---

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

---

29c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

|   | YES | NO |

**References:**
Chapter 5 of the Constitution makes no provision limiting prosecution of members of the legislature.

---

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.
30. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

39

30a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
Financial Disclosure Law, Article 2 B, requires speakers and members of two houses of Parliament to disclose their financial assets.

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

30b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
No such provision exists in Chapter 5 of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

30c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.
The Financial Disclosure Law article 2 B requires speakers and members of two houses of parliament to disclose their financial assets. A more informal ethics code for members of the National Assembly loosely prohibits gifts and hospitality.

Though not directly related to this indicator, the Criminal Procedures Code of 1961, states that in case of any person convicted by corruption by a final judgment he shall not hold any future governmental position related to Parliament or judiciary or in the council of ministers.

References:

30d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

References:
No such provision exists in Chapter 5 of the Constitution.

30e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007
The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

Auditing these files takes place if there is a court order to do so.
Financial Disclosure Law # 54 of 2006, Article 2 B, requires speakers and members of two houses of Parliament to disclose their financial assets.

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

31. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

0

31a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

---

References:
No such provision exists in Chapter 5 of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

31b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

---

References:
Dr. Nazim Aref, head of the Financial Disclosure Department
100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

31c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

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References:
Dr. Nazim Aref, head of the Financial Disclosure Department

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

32. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

YES | NO

32a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

Comments:
Experience with obtaining information from Parliament suggests that it easy and straightforward.
The Right to Obtain Information Law #47 of 2007 obliges public institutions to make information available to people.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

Comments: There is very little cost to access legislative processes and documents. For example, researchers are not required to pay any amount to use the archives of the house or its documents. The cost entailed is limited to transportation to get there or the cost of the internet if the documents are available on line.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

Interview with Adel Hawatmeh, a researcher and former employee of the house of representatives.
Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

III-3. Judicial Accountability

33. Are judges appointed fairly?

33a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution Chapter 6, Article 98 says that judges shall be appointed by royal decree.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

NO: A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

33b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.
100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

33c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | NO

References:
Constitution Article 6 does not give the legislature power of review over judges.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

34. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

92

34a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.
NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

34b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

75:

50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

25:

0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

34c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:
Higher courts (e.g., the Higher Court of Justice and the Cessation) are appeal courts rather than disciplinary courts. However, the Judicial Council has a moral authority that it can exercise over the judicial system and its members.

References:
Interview Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.
Interview with Dr. Nawaf Tell, lawyer and political scientist, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

34d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.
YES | NO

Comments:
There is no judicial disciplinary agency. However, the Judicial Council has a moral and legal authority that is protected from political interference, according Article 3 of the Judicial Independence Law #15 of 2001, which stipulates that judges are independent and no one has authority over them.

References:
Judicial Independence Law #15 of 2001
http://www.jc.jo/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=0PyNncFib2M%3d&tabid=58&mid=465

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry, legislative committee, or by an internal judiciary committee or council that can only act with the approval of judges themselves.

34e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is no judicial disciplinary agency per se. The Judicial council can initiate investigations. Also the Judicial Inspection department at the ministry of Justice can initiate investigations.

References:
Interview with Dr. Nawaf Tell, lawyer and political scientist, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan
Interview with Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.

100: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.
34f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

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**Comments:**
There is no judicial disciplinary agency per se. The Judicial council can impose penalties. Also the Judicial Inspection department at the ministry of Justice can impose penalties.

**References:**
Interview with Dr. Nawaf Tell, lawyer and political scientist, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.
Interview, Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.

100: When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

35. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

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<td>YES</td>
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35a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

**Comments:**
Financial Disclosure Law, Article 2 A2 requires judges to disclose their assets.

**References:**
Financial Disclosure law
YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

35b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:
The code is available at http://www.jc.jo/Portals/0/c.pdf

References:
In the Judicial Behavior Code of Ethics article 17 there is a ban on Judges accepting gifts and hospitality form anyone.

35c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:
Article 7 A stipulates that a commission formed by the Judicial council inspects the records.

References:
Financial Disclosure law

35d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

35e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Judges can work as Lawyers or in other jobs as soon as they leave the Judicial system.

References:
Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy (teaching human rights at the University of Jordan)
9/12/2007 Aljazy & Co.

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75: 

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25: 

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

35f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.
Comments:
In the Judicial Behavior Code of Ethics article 17 there is a ban on Judges to accept gifts and hospitality form anyone. The code is available at http://www.jc.jo/Portals/0/c.pdf

References:
Dr. Ibarhim Aljazy (teaching human rights at the University of Jordan)
9/12/2007 Aljazy & Co.

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to judges. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

35g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

Comments:
Financial Disclosure Law, Article 2 A2 requires judges to disclose their assets. These records can be audited, based upon a court order.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

Financial Disclosure Law, Article 2 A2

100: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:
36. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

0

36a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

References:
No such provisions exist in Chapter 6 of the Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

36b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
This information cannot be accessed by citizens.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.
36c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
This information cannot be accessed by citizens.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

III-4. Budget Processes

37. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

42

37a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution Chapter 7, Article 112
(iv) The National Assembly, when debating the General Budget draft law or the provisional laws relating thereto, may reduce the expenditures under the various chapters in accordance with what it considers to be in the public interest, but it shall not increase
such expenditures either by amendment or by the submission of a separate proposal. However, the Assembly may after the close of the debate propose laws for the creation of new expenditures.

http://kinghussein.gov.jo/documents.html

| YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget. |
| NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process. |

37b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:  

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive’s personal budget, or other expenses.

25:  

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

37c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

75:  

50: Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.
Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

38. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

50

38a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

38b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.
Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

38c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

Comments:
The budget is made available in book format (the budget law) and it can be accessed by citizens if they wish to do so.

References:
Dr. Ibrahim Saif, economist and director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

75:

50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

25:

0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

Comments:
The lower house of Parliament establishes committees (according to its internal code). The finance committee is in charge of the oversight of public expenditure and can hold the government accountable.

Although the internal legal code that specifies the duties of the finance committee does spell out an oversight role for the committee, the committee assumes that role under its mandate because it studies 7 areas (e.g., the general budget, financial laws, final accounts of the government, and the Audit Bureau reports).
**References:**
There is no such provision in Chapter 7 of the Constitution.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

### 40. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

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**References:**
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

**40a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.**

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**References:**
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

**100:** Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

**75:**

**50:** Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

**25:**

**0:** There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

**40b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.**

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**Comments:**
Members of the committee are elected or alternatively appointed by agreement among MPs. Often it is decided by influential blocs in the house, given the lack of political parties in Parliament (with the notable exception of the IAFP). The committee also invites experts to testify and provide expert knowledge to members of the committee. Given the very low level of political diversity in Parliament and in the Finance Committee, it is fair to say that all views within the committee are taken into consideration.
**References:**
Dr. Ibrahim Saif, economist and director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

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<td>100</td>
<td>The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members’ ability to shape the committee’s activities.</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.</td>
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40c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

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<td>100</td>
<td>This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.</td>
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<td>This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.</td>
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<td>This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee’s behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.</td>
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Comments:
The committee functions independently from the political process, but it is not totally free from political pressure because its work is political and its members are politicians (i.e., PMs). Members of the committee need the government, and it is very likely they will work with the government to pass the budget by agreement. This method has happened previously, and it would not be surprising if it happened again.

References:
Dr. Ibrahim Saif, economist and director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007
40d. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

Comments:
The committee can initiate investigations by collecting 10 signatures and initiating the process through the house.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

Dr. Ibrahim Saif, economist and director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

100: When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

75:

50: The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. Civil Service Regulations

41. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

41a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO
Article 4, principles of civil service:

- a. equal opportunity regardless of sex, race, religion, or marital status.
- b. competence and merit
- c. equal opportunity among employees regarding their rights, duties, and responsibilities.
- d. transparency and accountability through documented, clear, and published procedures

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

41b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

41c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.
NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

41d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

References:
HE Mazen Saket, president of the Civil Service Bureau, confirmed in an interview that a convicted employee cannot resume a public job.

Article 171a of the Civil Service Statute No (30) in 2007, issued in accordance with Article No (120) of the Constitution, which stipulates that an employee will be fired if he or she received a court ruling convicting him or her of a criminal act, such as bribery, or theft, or forging, or misuse of authority.
http://www.csb.gov.jo/csbwebpage/Arabic_Web_Page/Main/Main.htm

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

42. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

81

42a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

75:

50: Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:
Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

42b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

Comments:
The basis of choosing and appointing employees in governmental posts is as follows. These bases are issued due to a cabinet decision and the Civil Service Council's recommendation. They aim to regulate and organize the number of applicants; prepare applicants' competition tables, based on their competitive status and classified by their specializations and districts; determine how to calculate applicants' points according to their qualifications and served period; set a mechanism for filling vacancies in ministries and governmental departments and establishments; run competition tests and invite candidates and job winners; determine which departments are excluded from applying this system; and set appointment conditions and mechanisms for choosing special needs candidates, who account for 6% of the total vacancies in governmental departments.

References:
Interview with HE Mazen Saket, president of the Civil Service Bureau

Articles 70 – 76 of the Civil Service Statute No (30) in 2007

100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

42c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007
Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position’s authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position’s responsibilities, authority, or pay.

In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small faction of total pay.

Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

References:
Mr. Borhan Akrosh, in charge of registering companies at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 12 August 2007
Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants’ bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

There is employment outside of that recommended by the Civil Service Bureau (CSB). Often, potential employees turn down jobs coming through CSB.

The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, former minister of legal affairs, former minister of justice, currently head of the Anti-Corruption Commission.

Mustafa Barari, head of the Audit Bureau, in Amman, Jordan

Basem Sakkejha, former president, Transparency International Jordan Chapter, and a journalist
100: The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

75:

50: The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

42h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

References:
Mr. Borhan Akrosh, in charge of registering companies at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 12 August 2007

100: In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

75:

50: In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

25:

0: In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

42i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

References:
Interview with Mazen Saket, president of Civil Service Bureau

The Criminal Procedures Code of 1961 states that any person convicted of corruption by a final judgment shall not hold any future governmental position related to the Parliament, judiciary, or Council of Ministers.
100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

43. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

54

43a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

References:
Article (68) of the Civil Service Statute No (30) in 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

43b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
No such stipulations exist in Civil Service Statute No. (30) in 2007.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.
43c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

**YES | NO**

**References:**
Article 68 of the Civil Service Statute No. (30) At 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

43d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
It is often the case that civil servants leave office and join private sector firms shortly after.

**References:**
Phone interview with Basem Sakkejha, former president, Transparency International Jordan Chapter, and a journalist

Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al Masri, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

43e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.
References:
Phone interview with Basem Sakkijha, former president, Transparency International Jordan Chapter, and a journalist

Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al Masri, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

43f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

Comments:
There is a code of ethics for public employees that serves as a general orienting set of rules, but there is not a specific legal code governing this issue.

References:
Interview with HE Salem Khazaleh, former minister of Trade and Industry, and former minister of Public Sector Development

100: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

75:

50: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

25:

0: Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.
44. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

8

44a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | NO

Comments:
The records are made available to the court only if there is a case against the person concerned.

References:
Nazem Aref Geyoussi, director of the financial disclosure department in the Ministry of Justice

YES: A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

44b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Because citizens cannot access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants without a court case, the time depends on the length of the court case, and not on other conditions. Thus, it is evident that citizens are not free to acquire the information whenever they want.

References:
Nazem Aref Geyoussi, director of the financial disclosure department in the Ministry of Justice

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.
44c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
The cost is what is required by the court. Because the records can be made available only to a judicial committee, the cost of litigation in Jordan is reasonable.

References:
Nazem Aref Geyoussi, director of the financial disclosure department in the Ministry of Justice

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

50: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

45. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

88

45a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Comments:
There are no provisions in any law that restrain civil servants from reporting a case of corruption.
References:
Articles 21 A and B of Anti-Corruption Commission #62 of 2006 stipulates that all information, documents, and data and copies of these materials, that reach the Commission or are seen by the Commission’s staff are secretive and cannot be shown to anyone except by law.

Interview with HE Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

45b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Comments:
Based on a number of interviews with people involved in the field of anti-corruption, and the fact that anti-corruption was a department of intelligence until last year, whistle-blowers were protected through various means. The most important means of protection was secrecy of information.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

45c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Comments:
There are no provisions in any law that restrain private sector employees from reporting a case of corruption.
References:
Articles 21 A and B of Anti-Corruption Commission #62 of 2006 stipulates that all information, documents, and data and copies of these materials, that reach the Commission or are seen by the Commission’s staff are secretive and cannot be shown to anyone except by law.”

Interview with HE Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

45d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Based on a number of interviews with people involved in the field of anti-corruption, and the fact that anti-corruption was a department of intelligence until last year, whistle-blowers were protected through various means. The most important means of protection was secrecy of information.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

**100:** Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

100

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?
YES | NO

Comments:
The Anti-Corruption Commission performs this role through its various hot lines.

References:
no source given

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

47. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

69

47a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Yes, the Anti-Corruption Commission can be accessed through phone, fax, e-mail, or visit. Also, the commission staff can receive any complaints.

References:
Interview with Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

47b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.
References:
Interview with Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

47c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

References:
Interview with Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

47d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.
Comments:
The commission has the right to investigate financial and administrative corruption; it initiates its investigations.

References:
Interview with Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan
Anti-Corruption Commission Law No 62 of 2006, Article (7)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

IV-3. Procurement

48. Is the public procurement process effective?

78

48a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is no specific article in the government Public Work Law No 71 of 1986 that governs conflict of interest, all procedures are done in a transparent way and through a committee representing different entities.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

48b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:
There are no provisions in related laws that govern professional training, but all officials are well trained.

References:
www.gtd.gov.jo

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

48c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.
48d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:
There are no mentioned provisions.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

48e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

References:
Government Public Work Law of 1987

YES: A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

NO: A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% of GDP).

48f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with Mustafa Barari, president of the Audit Bureau, in Amman, Jordan

YES: A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.
NO: A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

48g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

Comments:
unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions though a court case.

References:
Interview with Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

Comments:
Court cases can indeed be initiated to challenge procurement decisions.

References:
interview with Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.

YES: A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO
**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

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48j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

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**References:**

Interview with Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.

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100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

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**References:**

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, 12 September 2007

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100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

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49. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

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100

49a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

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**References:**

Government Public Law of 1987

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**YES:** A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

49b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

| YES | NO |

References:
Government Public Work Law of 1987

| YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log. |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process. |

49c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, 12 September 2007

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

50: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.
100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

49e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

49f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.
References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75:

50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

25:

0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.

IV-4. Privatization

50. Is the privatization process effective?

92

50a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

Comments:
The Board of Privatization has the sole authority to select such companies/business. Some observers commented that not all privatized companies have gone through a transparent process especially in the 1990s.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.
50b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

References:
Privatization Law #25 of 2000
Article (17):
It is prohibited for any member of the Council, or any person working at the Commission, or a consultant or a member of a committee of experts connected to a privatization transaction, to participate, directly or indirectly, in the said privatization transaction. This prohibition also applies to the spouses of the above described persons, descendants to the first degree, and to anyone who has a business, beneficial, or ownership relationship in any form with the persons named in this article.
http://www.epc.gov.jo/law.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

50c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

75: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

50: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

100

51a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.
References:
Privatization Law No (25) of 2000

Article (5):
In implementing privatization transactions, the following shall be observed:
Compliance with the principles of transparency, openness, and fair competition

Article (15):
I. Before the commencement of any privatization transaction, the Commission shall publish in at least two daily newspapers and
over two extended intervals the conditions of and requirements for any such privatization transaction at a date specified by the
Council for this purpose.
II. The Commission shall publish in the Official Gazette a detailed report on each privatization transaction upon its completion
stating the following:
1. The name of the institution or entity which has been privatized, the method adopted and the procedures followed.
2. Names of the financial and legal advisers and the experts who were consulted in relation to the privatization transaction in
question, in addition to the names of their local agents, if any.
3. The name and address of the entity(ies) with whom the privatization transaction has been closed or the beneficiary thereof and
the said entity’s local agents, if any.
4. Any other information the publication of which is deemed necessary by the Chairman of the Commission.
http://www.epc.gov.jo/law.html

YES: A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process)
are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the
basis for scoring this indicator.

NO: A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

51b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising,
or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to
respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising
process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.
51c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

**YES | NO**

**References:**
Privatization Law No (25) of 2000
Article (5):
In implementing privatization transactions, the following shall be observed:
Compliance with the principles of transparency, openness, and fair competition
Article (15):
I. Before the commencement of any privatization transaction, the Commission shall publish in at least two daily newspapers and over two extended intervals the conditions of and requirements for any such privatization transaction at a date specified by the Council for this purpose.
II. The Commission shall publish in the Official Gazette a detailed report on each privatization transaction upon its completion stating the following:
1. The name of the institution or entity which has been privatized, the method adopted and the procedures followed.
2. Names of the financial and legal advisers and the experts who were consulted in relation to the privatization transaction in question, in addition to the names of their local agents, if any.
3. The name and address of the entity(ies) with whom the privatization transaction has been closed or the beneficiary thereof and the said entity's local agents, if any.
4. Any other information the publication of which is deemed necessary by the Chairman of the Commission.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

51d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

**100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0**

**References:**
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available online, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.
51e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Regulations are published in the official Gazette and Newspaper.

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. National Ombudsman

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO
Many organizations do the functions of the national ombudsman, such as the National Center for Human Rights
http://www.nchr.org.jo/
and the Higher Council for Media, which acts as ombudsman for media issues
http://www.hmc.org.jo
and the Audit Bureau, which exists according to Audit Bureau Law No 28 of 1952 and its amendments, with the mandate to:
1. Monitor the entries of the state, its expenditure, the methods of spending, the accounts related to deposits advances, loans,
settlements, and warehouses/storage
2. Offer consultancy to the institutions subjected to monitoring in the fields of accountancy
3. Monitor public finances in order to ensure that money is spent in a legal and effective way
4. Ensure the application of environmental legislation that is in force, in coordination with the competent parties
5. Ensure that the administrative decisions and procedures adopted by the institutions subjected to monitoring are in accordance
with the legislation in force
6. Present a yearly report for each financial year to the Chamber of Deputies, including the opinion and remarks of the Audit
Bureau, as well as the infractions and the accountability for such infractions, at the beginning of each term of Parliament or
whenever required by the Chamber of Deputies

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the
actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with
seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger
body, such as the legislature.

53. Is the national ombudsman effective?

89

53a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
National Center for Human Rights Law No (51) of 2006
Article 3:
(A) A center, called The National Center for Human Rights shall be established in the Kingdom as a legal personality enjoying
financial and administrative independence. In this capacity, the Center may exercise the full right of legal disposal, including
drawing of contracts and ownership of movable and immovable properties, and resort to the judiciary for litigation.

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the
government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department
of Interior or the Justice Department.

53b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
**Comments:**
There is a widely spread opinion that the National Center for Human Rights and the Higher Media Council do enjoy political independence and their ability to remain independent depends on the character and strength of the president of each entity.

**References:**
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

Interview with Kinda Hattar, former employee at the National Center for Human Rights

Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al Masri, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.

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<td><strong>100:</strong> This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.</td>
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<td><strong>50:</strong> This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.</td>
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<td><strong>0:</strong> This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.</td>
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53c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

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<td><strong>100:</strong> The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.</td>
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<td><strong>50:</strong> The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.</td>
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**Comments:**
The law allows for the removal of the president. From this angle, there is no protection, but it is a fair process of deliberation and negotiations.

**References:**
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan
The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

### 53d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

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**References:**
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan.

The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

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Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

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Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

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Comments:
The National Center for Human Rights is an independent body that has jurisdiction over its staff appointments.

**References:**
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former President of the Higher Media Council. Currently serves on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan.

Ibrahim Al Jazy, professor of human rights law at the University of Jordan.
Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

53f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

Comments:
The National Center for Human Rights and the Higher Media Council receive public funding on a regular basis.

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

53g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

Comments:
The National Center for Human rights produces and publishes frequent reports on Prisons, Elections, Jordan’s commitments to international treaties to which Jordan is signatory.

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.
The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

53h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

Ibrahim Al Jazy, professor of human rights law at the University of Jordan

100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

53i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Citizens can follow up on complaints. NCHR also can mediate and publish cases of offense in its annual reports and/or recommend a referral to a legal or judicial body.

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

Ibrahim Al Jazy, professor of human rights law at the University of Jordan

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.
The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

Comments:
Citizens can follow up on complaints. NCHR also can mediate and publish cases of offense in its annual reports and/or recommend a referral to a legal or judicial body.

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.

In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.
54. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

100

54a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | NO

Comments:
The reports of the National Center for Human rights are available online, in print, and free of charge to interested individuals.

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

54b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The reports are available online and can be accessed by anyone.

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.
Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

The reports are available free of charge.

References:
Interview with HE Ibrahim Ezzeddin, former president of the Higher Media Council, currently serving on the boards of the National Center for Human Rights, Central Bank of Jordan, and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?
References:
The Audit Bureau, which exists according to Audit Bureau Law No 28 of 1952 and its amendments, with the mandate to:
1. Monitor the entries of the state, its expenditure, the methods of spending, the accounts related to deposits advances, loans, settlements, and warehouses/storage
2. Offer consultancy to the institutions subjected to monitoring in the fields of accountancy
3. Monitor public finances in order to ensure that money is spent in a legal and effective way
4. Ensure the application of environmental legislation that is in force, in coordination with the competent parties
5. Ensure that the administrative decisions and procedures adopted by the institutions subjected to monitoring are in accordance with the legislation in force
6. Present a yearly report for each financial year to the Chamber of Deputies, including the opinion and remarks of the Audit Bureau, as well as the infractions and the accountability for such infractions, at the beginning of each term of Parliament or whenever required by the Chamber of Deputies

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

56. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

100

56a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
The Constitution, Chapter 6, Article 19 stipulates that:
An Audit Office shall be set up by law for controlling the state's revenues, its expenses, and the manner of expenditure:
(i) The Audit Office shall submit to the Chamber of Deputies at the beginning of each ordinary session, or whenever the Chamber demands, a general report embodying its views and comments and indicating any irregularities committed and the responsibility arising therefrom.
(ii) The law shall provide for the immunity of the Head of the Audit Office.
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.
References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders it ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.
**References:**
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

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<td>100</td>
<td>Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.</td>
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<td>Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.</td>
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<td>Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.</td>
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56e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

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<td>100</td>
<td>The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.</td>
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<td>The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.</td>
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<td>Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.</td>
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56f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

**References:**
Mustafa Barari, head of the Public Audit Bureau

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<td>Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.</td>
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**Comments:**
Reports are submitted to Parliament and can be accessed by citizens if they request them.
### References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

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<td>100: The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.</td>
<td>75:</td>
<td>50: The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.</td>
<td>25:</td>
<td>0: The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.</td>
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56g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

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### Comments:
The Audit Bureau investigated a supply order for the Ministry of Municipalities in which the minister was questioned by a parliamentary committee. Reports on this case are available online.

### References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

http://www.al-hadath.com/look/article.tpl?IdLanguage=17&IdPublication=1&NrArticle=1810&NrIssue=573&NrSection=2
http://www.jcss.org/UploadPolling/212.doc

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<td>100: Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.</td>
<td>75:</td>
<td>50: In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.</td>
<td>25:</td>
<td>0: Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.</td>
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56h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

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References:
Mustafa Barari, head of the Audit Bureau

100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

57. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

33

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

References:
Right of Access to Government Information Law #2007 / 47 stipulates that citizens have the right to access written, recorded, and photographed government information and basic government records.

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

57b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Audit reports are not accessed by citizens. These reports are submitted to parliament and not published.
### References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

| 100 | Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. |
| 75 | |
| 50 | Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced. |
| 25 | |
| 0 | Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. |

57c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

### Comments:
Audit reports are not accessed by citizens.

### References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

| 100 | Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. |
| 75 | |
| 50 | Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital. |
| 25 | |
| 0 | Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information. |

### V-3. Taxes and Customs

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?
58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

**YES | NO**

Comments:
Jordanian citizens have a burden of more than 200 taxes collected through different agencies.

References:
The two main tax collection agencies:
The Income Tax Department follows Income Tax Law #14 of 1995
www.incometax.gov.jo
The General Sales Tax Department follows Sales Tax Law #36 of 2000
www.vat.gov.jo

Phone Interview with Mr Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

59. Is the tax collection agency effective?

**88**

59a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The issue of staff is not one of insufficient numbers, rather it is an issue of efficiency, capacity, and accountability.

References:
Phone Interview with Mr Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**
0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Income and Sales Tax Department receives regular funding from the public budget, which is approved by Parliament. There is also a specific item for the Tax Department.

References:
Phone Interview with Mr Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

25

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Discrepancies are created in the incentive system. With regard to income tax, most individual tax payers are found in the lower-income strata of professionals. With regard to corporate tax, the largest companies comprise the largest group of tax payers. There is a high degree of income tax evasion. Most taxes are collected through VAT.

References:
Phone Interview with Mr Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.
Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

**61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?**

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**Comments:**
The first law that organized the responsibility of customs was issued in 1926 and was called the Customs and Duties Law. This law was amended many times to cope with continuous national, regional, and international developments. The last amendment on this law was approved in August 1998 by the Parliament and was officially implemented at the beginning of 1999.

**References:**
The Customs Department, Customs and Duties Law #20 of 1998

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

**62. Is the customs and excise agency effective?**

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**62a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.**

**References:**
Phone Interview with Mr Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007
100: The agency has sufficient staff to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Phone Interview with Mr. Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007
V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

**100**

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

**YES | NO**

Comments:
The Jordanian Foundation for Investment (Law #18 of 1991) is the government body that oversees its investment. However, each state-owned company has its laws and regulations. Therefore, various bodies have a role in overseeing state-owned companies; accordingly, there is no one mechanism for overseeing state-owned companies. Each enterprise is governed by its own commission, laws, and regulations. However, public enterprises are under the supervision of the Audit Bureau, Anti-Corruption Commission, and Parliament.

References:
Phone interview with Mr. Faisal Tabbaa, legal consultant, Sanad Law Group, 4 December 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this function does not exist.

65. Is the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

**70**
65a. In law, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES  |  NO

Comments:
By its nature, a public enterprise is subject to political intervention. The Jordanian Investment Foundation (Law #18 of 1991) is under the control of the Ministry of Finance and its president reports to the Minister of Finance.

References:
no source given

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

65b. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The law of the Jordanian Investment Foundation specifies in Article 8 that the Foundation shall have a director and employees, and it has them in practice.

References:
Mr. Mazen Saket, president of the Civil Service Bureau

100: The agency or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65c. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.
References:
Mazen Saket, president of the Civil Service Bureau

Article 10 of the Jordanian Investment Foundation Law #18 of 1991

100: The agency or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

65d. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

Comments:
A corruption case in Magnesium Company was investigated by the authorities. The case was closed without charges.

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan.
Interview HE Mazen Saket, president of the Civil Service Bureau, in Amman, Jordan.

for references in the case of the Magnesium Company see:

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The
agency may be partisan in its application of power.

65e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

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Comments:
The penalties imposed are imposed through courts if there was a conviction.

References:
Interview with HE Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan.

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

66. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

40

66a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

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Comments:
A private citizen does not have access to the financial records of state-owned companies. However, citizens can have access to the annual reports published by the companies. Also, in companies where the government owns 50% or more, the Audit Bureau can have access to the records of the company and audit it.

References:
Interview with ME Mustafa Barari, president of the Audit Bureau.
YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

66b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview with HE Mustafa Barari, president of the Audit Bureau

100: State-owned companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

75:

50: State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

25:

0: Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

66c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Interview with HE Mustafa Barari, president of the Audit Bureau

100: Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

75:

50: Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

25:

0: State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.
66d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Citizens can access published financial records. The Audit Bureau can have access to the records of state-owned companies.

References:
Interview with HE Mustafa Barari, president of the Audit Bureau

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

66e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Because access to financial records is limited to the Audit Bureau, the question about cost is irrelevant.

References:
Interview with ME Mustafa Barari, president of the Audit Bureau

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
67. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

88

67a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

References:
Companies Law # 22 of 1997 and its amendments
Article (4): Formation and Registration of the Company
The formation and registration of companies in the Kingdom shall be realized in accordance with this law. And every company formed and registered under this law shall be considered a Jordanian corporate entity, with its headquarters situated in the Kingdom.
Article (5): Registration Arresters and Objection to Registration
a) No company shall be registered with a name chosen for a fraudulent or an illegal objective. And no company shall be registered with the name of another company already registered in the Kingdom, or with a name so similar thereto that may lead to confusion or deception. The controller may reject the registration of a company with such name in any such cases.
Article (6): Company Forms
a) Subject to the provisions of Articles (7) and (8) of this law, companies registered under this law shall be divided into the following forms:*
   General Partnership
   Limited Partnership
   Limited Liability Company
   Limited Partnership in Shares
   Private Shareholding Company
   Public Shareholding Company
b) It is not stipulated that a prior approval be received from any other entity to register any company, provided that no legislation in force requires otherwise.
c) The department may declare, in pursuance to instructions issued by the minister, any evidence or information not related to the company accounts or financial statements.


YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required.

67b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.
References:
Companies Law # 22 of 1997 and its amendments
Article 11
b) The controller shall issue his decision approving the registration of the company within fifteen days from the date of the submission of the registration application. The controller may reject the said application if there is evidence in the company agreement or its memorandum of a violation of this Law, public order or the provisions of all legislations in force and if the partners do not take action to rectify the said violation within the period determined by the controller. The partners may submit an objection to the Minister against the rejection decision of the controller within 30 days from the date of notifying them of the said rejection.
Should the minister decide to reject the objection, the objectors shall have the right to contest his decision before the High Court of Justice within 30 days from the date of their notification of the decision.


YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

67c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
In practice, this process can take from 3 days up to 6 months, depending on which specific industry category the company falls under, and on various industry requirements and regulations.

References:
Phone Interview with Mr Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007

Companies Law #22 of 1997 and its amendments
Article 11
b) The controller shall issue his decision approving the registration of the company within fifteen days from the date of the submission of the registration application. The controller may reject the said application if there is evidence in the company agreement or its memorandum of a violation of this law, public order or the provisions of all legislations in force and if the partners do not take action to rectify the said violation within the period determined by the controller. The partners may submit an objection to the minister against the rejection decision of the controller within 30 days from the date of notifying them of the said rejection.

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

25:

0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.
67d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Licenses cost between JD 50 and 300 for registration and/or annual renewal.

References:
Phone Interview with Mr Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

75: 

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25: 

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

68. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

100

68a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:
Phone Interview with Mr Fadi Otaqui, project coordinator, Young Entrepreneurs Association, 29 November 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.
68b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:
Interim Law No (1) of 2003
Environment Protection Law
Article (7)(A)
For the purposes of this law, the competent employee, nominated in writing by the minister as per the recommendation of the secretary general, shall be given the capacity of judicial police and shall be entitled to enter any industrial, commercial, handicraft, agricultural place or any establishment, institution or any other body, the impact of its activities may involve in any way the environment elements & components, to make sure of its conformity and the conformity of its works with the established environmental requirements.

(B)(1)
The minister, pursuant to the recommendation of the secretary general, shall warn the firm, the institution or the business place in violation, shall set a period for the removal of the violation if the place in question fails to do so, its shall be referred to the court.

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:
Instructions issued by the Amman Municipality require certain public measures to be applied.

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

69. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

75
69a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

References:
Batir Wardam, a researcher and activist in environmental affairs, in Amman, Jordan

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

References:
Batir Wardam, a researcher and activist in environmental affairs, in Amman, Jordan

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.
69c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
Batir Wardam, a researcher and activist in environmental affairs, in Amman, Jordan

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

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**Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law**

**VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law**

70. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

| 100 |

70a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

| YES | NO |

**References:**
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan
Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission # 62 of 2006

Article 5 defines corruption under the law as:

a) All crimes pertaining to job responsibilities and duties in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
b) All crimes pertaining to public trust in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
c) Economic crimes as defined in Economic Crimes Law # 11 of 1993 and its amendments
d) Every action, or prevention, that leads to violation of public money
e) Abusing public office in violation of the law
f) All acts of cronyism, nepotism, and intergroup bias that lead to illegal action, or conflict with the principles of justice, are classified as corruption and are punishable by law
g) All actions present in international agreement regarding anti-corruption that the Kingdom is a signatory to


YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:
Reference is made to punishment law when necessary.

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission # 62 of 2006

Article 5 defines corruption under the law as:

a) All crimes pertaining to job responsibilities and duties in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
b) All crimes pertaining to public trust in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
c) Economic crimes as defined in Economic Crimes Law # 11 of 1993 and its amendments
d) Every action, or prevention, that leads to violation of public money
e) Abusing public office in violation of the law
f) All acts of cronyism, nepotism, and intergroup bias that lead to illegal action, or conflict with the principles of justice, are classified as corruption and are punishable by law
g) All actions present in international agreement regarding anti-corruption that the Kingdom is a signatory to


Punishment law
Economic crimes law
International agreement on anti-corruption, which the Kingdom joined

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.
Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission # 62 of 2006
Article 5 defines corruption under the law as:
a) All crimes pertaining to job responsibilities and duties in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
b) All crimes pertaining to public trust in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
c) Economic crimes as defined in Economic Crimes Law # 11 of 1993 and its amendments
d) Every action, or prevention, that leads to violation of public money
e) Abusing public office in violation of the law
f) All acts of cronyism, nepotism, and intergroup bias that lead to illegal action, or conflict with the principles of justice, are classified as corruption and are punishable by law
g) All actions present in international agreement regarding anti-corruption that the Kingdom is a signatory to

YES: A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission # 62 of 2006
Article 5 defines corruption under the law as:
a) All crimes pertaining to job responsibilities and duties in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
b) All crimes pertaining to public trust in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
c) Economic crimes as defined in Economic Crimes Law # 11 of 1993 and its amendments
d) Every action, or prevention, that leads to violation of public money
e) Abusing public office in violation of the law
f) All acts of cronyism, nepotism, and intergroup bias that lead to illegal action, or conflict with the principles of justice, are classified as corruption and are punishable by law
g) All actions present in international agreement regarding anti-corruption that the Kingdom is a signatory to

YES: A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.
References:
Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission # 62 of 2006
Article 5 defines corruption under the law as:
   a) All crimes pertaining to job responsibilities and duties in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
   b) All crimes pertaining to public trust in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
   c) Economic crimes as defined in Economic Crimes Law # 11 of 1993 and its amendments
   d) Every action, or prevention, that leads to violation of public money
   e) Abusing public office in violation of the law
   f) All acts of cronyism, nepotism, and intergroup bias that lead to illegal action, or conflict with the principles of justice, are classified as corruption and are punishable by law
   g) All actions present in international agreement regarding anti-corruption that the Kingdom is a signatory to

YES: A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Anti-Corruption Commission Law # 62 of 2006
Article 5: All acts of cronyism, nepotism, and intergroup bias that lead to illegal action, or conflict with the principles of justice, are classified as corruption and are punishable by law.

Constitution, Chapter 4, Article 44
No minister may purchase or lease any government property even if the sale or lease thereof has been offered in public auction. He shall not, while holding his ministerial office, become a member of the board of directors of any company or take part in any commercial or financial transaction or receive a salary from any company.
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

Punishment law
Criminal law

YES: A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.
### References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission # 62 of 2006
Article 5 defines corruption under the law as:
- a) All crimes pertaining to job responsibilities and duties in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
- b) All crimes pertaining to public trust in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
- c) Economic crimes as defined in Economic Crimes Law # 11 of 1993 and its amendments
- d) Every action, or prevention, that leads to violation of public money
- e) Abusing public office in violation of the law
- f) All acts of cronyism, nepotism, and intergroup bias that lead to illegal action, or conflict with the principles of justice, are classified as corruption and are punishable by law
- g) All actions present in international agreement regarding anti-corruption that the Kingdom is a signatory to


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70h. In law, money laundering is illegal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission # 62 of 2006
Article 5 defines corruption under the law as:
a) All crimes pertaining to job responsibilities and duties in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
b) All crimes pertaining to public trust in Penalties Law #16 of 1960 and its amendments
c) Economic crimes as defined in Economic Crimes Law # 11 of 1993 and its amendments
d) Every action, or prevention, that leads to violation of public money
e) Abusing public office in violation of the law
f) All acts of cronyism, nepotism, and intergroup bias that lead to illegal action, or conflict with the principles of justice, are classified as corruption and are punishable by law
g) All actions present in international agreement regarding anti-corruption that the Kingdom is a signatory to

YES: A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan
Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission #62 of 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.
72. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

89

72a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Law of the Anti-Corruption Commission # 62 of 2006
Article 3 stipulates that the Anti-Corruption Commission is to conduct its work freely and independently without interference. And the commission is independent financially and administratively.

72b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

Comments:
The anti-corruption commission is independent form political interference according to many observers. There is a serious will to halt and track corruption despite the skeptical atmosphere in the country.

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights and director of legal affairs, at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.
This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

For the first time, the president and council of the commission are appointed based upon the recommendation by the prime minister to the king, who issues a royal decree approving the recommendation.
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

72e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The staff must be full time and cannot occupy any other job, even on part-time basis. Now the commission is recruiting staff with a minimum of 12 years experience in similar jobs.

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

72f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.
**Comments:**
The commission has a budget that is approved by the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. The commission is allowed to receive funding, provided it is approved by the Council of Ministers.

**References:**
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights and director of legal affairs at the University of Jordan, 12 September

| 100: | The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding. |
| 75: | |
| 50: | The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding. |
| 25: | |
| 0: | The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions. |

72g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Comments:**
The commission will produce an annual report to be presented to the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. Because the commission is a new entity and its regulations were issued by the government in September 2007, there has been little time available to produce a report about its activities. But the commission has dealt with a number of issues so far and implemented the commission’s law regarding these issues.

**References:**
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights and director of legal affairs at the University of Jordan, 12 September

| 100: | The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work. |
| 75: | |
| 50: | The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete. |
| 25: | |
0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

72h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100  75  50  25  0

Comments:
The commission's law allows the president and the council to carry out the mandate as they see appropriate.

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

Article 7 especially A, B, and C

100: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

72i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100  75  50  25  0

Comments:
The commission has investigated over 50 cases since its inception

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights and director of legal affairs at the University of Jordan, 12 September

Article 7 of the Commission's law
100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

73. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

88

73a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The commission starts immediately and must produce a report within 3 months from initiation of the case.

References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights and director of legal affairs at the University of Jordan, 12 September

Article 7 D

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

73b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.
References:
Interview with HE Dr. Abed Shakhanbeh, president of the Anti-Corruption Commission, in Amman, Jordan

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights and director of legal affairs at the University of Jordan, 12 September

Article 7 C

100: Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

92

VI-3. Rule of Law

74. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

100

74a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

Comments:
Citizens have the right to appeal to the Higher Court.

References:
Constitution, Chapter 2, Article 17:
Jordanians are entitled to address the public authorities on any personal matters affecting them, or on any matter relative to
public affairs, in such a manner and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law.
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

74b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:

0: Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

74c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

25:
0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

75:

50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

75

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.
Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

77. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

100

77a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:
Constitution, Chapter 6, Article 98
Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other than that of the law.

Article 101 (i) The courts shall be open to all and shall be free from any interference in their affairs.

Independence of Judiciary Law #15 of 2001

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

77b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Judicial Council, which plays a central role in judges’ appointments, is an independent body.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007
100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:

0: National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

77c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

[YES] | [NO]

Comments:
The system in Jordan is based on leveled courts. Cases are distributed depending on the amount and subject of the case. Additionally, the new computerized courts follow an automatic allocation of cases to Judges and it has proved to be an effective mechanism in load distribution.

References:
Civil Procedures Code No 24 of 1988
Criminal Procedures Code No 9 of 1961

[YES]: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

[NO]: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

77d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

[YES] | [NO]

References:
Interview with Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.
Article 3 of the Judicial Independence Law # 15 of 2001 which stipulates that Judges are independent and no one has authority over them.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

78. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

78a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

78b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

79. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?
79a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

79b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Women can access the Judicial System as any other citizen.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007.

100: Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

75:

50: Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

25:
0: Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

79c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

References:
Criminal Procedures Law of 1961

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

79d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

75:

50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

25:

0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

79e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.
In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.

In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.
Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

**VI-4. Law Enforcement**

80. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

80a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

80b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007.

80c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007.
Fayiz Shahin, Lawyer.

81. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?
81a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

**YES** | **NO**

Comments:
The police department has a Human Rights Unit that is linked to the director of public security and receives citizens' complaints. I have personally used this mechanism and it is effective.

References:
Constitution, Chapter 2, Article 17:
Jordanians are entitled to address the public authorities on any personal matters affecting them, or on any matter relative to public affairs, in such a manner and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law.

**YES**: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

81b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

**100** | **75** | **50** | **25** | **0**

Comments:
I have used this mechanism many times and the police responded immediately, especially traffic police.

References:
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

**100**: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75**: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**50**: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.
81c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

| YES | NO |

**References:**
Anti-Corruption Commission Law # 62 of 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

81d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Aljazy, a professor of human rights at the University of Jordan, 12 September 2007

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

81e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.
**References:**
There is no provision in any law that states law enforcement officials are immune from criminal proceedings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>YES</strong></th>
<th><strong>NO</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.</td>
<td>NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

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</thead>
</table>

**Comments:**
There have been a few cases in which law enforcement personnel were put on trial and lost their jobs, including a director of one agency.

**References:**
Dr. Omar Aljazy, managing partner at Aljazy law firm, 12 October, 2007


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>100</strong></th>
<th><strong>75</strong></th>
<th><strong>50</strong></th>
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<th><strong>0</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100: Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.</td>
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<td>75:</td>
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<tr>
<td>50: Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.</td>
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<td>25:</td>
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<tr>
<td>0: Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.</td>
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