

Overall Score:

**54 - Very Weak**

Legal Framework Score:

**66 - Weak**

Actual Implementation Score:

**41 - Very Weak**

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

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## I-1. <sup>58</sup>Civil Society Organizations

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### 1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

100

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

This section contains a general provision to ensure the right to peaceful assemblies and associations. The exception is the powers conferred on the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in respect to registering political parties.

**References:**

Section 40, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

<http://www.nigeria-law.org/>

**YES:** A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

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1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This is the law that governs CSO incorporation and it has no clause preventing foreign or domestic funding.

**References:**

The Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This whole part of CAMA obliges companies to make annual returns to The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). They contain their whole financial details includig sources of funding.

**References:**

1. Part XII , Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

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## 2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

75

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

**Comments:**

The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) handles the registration of CSOs. They mostly register CSOs without hitches, but may raise objections in connection with the proposed name in relation to prohibited names listed in CAMA.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), ACE Abuja office, Aug. 23, 2007
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) Abuja, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 23, 2007

**100:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

**75:**

**50:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

**Comments:**

Increasingly, CSOs are becoming relevant in policy and governance decision making. They are increasingly being recognized for their expertise on different issues and more formal spaces are being created. There are still issues of access to government officials and confrontational relationships based on distrust of both parties. For instance in the recently constituted Electoral Reform Committee, three CSO leaders were nominated in the committee of 21 members.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), ACE Abuja office, Aug. 23, 2007
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) Abuja, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 23, 2007

**100:** Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

**75:**

**50:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They

have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

**25:**

**0:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Anti-corruption NGOs have not been shut down in the period under review, but there have been instances of intimidation by the State Security Services, especially in the period leading to the elections.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), ACE Abuja office, Aug. 23, 2007
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) Abuja, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 23, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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### 3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

There have not been any known cases at the national level; there may be cases at the state level that are not attaining national visibility.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), ACE Abuja office, Aug. 23, 2007

2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) Abuja, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 23, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), ACE Abuja office, Aug. 23, 2007
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) Abuja, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 23, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist's work. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), ACE Abuja office, Aug. 23, 2007
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) Abuja, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 23, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on

corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

#### 4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

75

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

##### References:

Section 40, the Nigerian 1999 Federal Constitution;

Section 2, the 2005 Trade Union (Amendment) Act

[http://www.nigeria-law.org/TradeUnion\(Amendment\)Act2005.htm](http://www.nigeria-law.org/TradeUnion(Amendment)Act2005.htm)

**YES:** A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

##### Comments:

Trade Unions are more recognized in the public sector; in the private sectors this right is being infringed on. The private sector has refused unionization and workers who attempt to form unions are punished. Also in the public sector they have been able to influence policy decisions through the instruments of industrial strikes (e.g. increase in VAT and fuel hike).

##### References:

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), ACE Abuja office, Aug. 23, 2007

2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) Abuja, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 23, 2007

**100:** Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

**75:**

**50:** Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

**25:**

**0:** Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

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## I-2. Media

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### 5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

This section guarantees the right to freedom of the press.

**References:**

Section 39, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
<http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Section 39, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

<http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

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## 6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

69

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This process is that if a media outlet meets the criteria, it will be granted a license. It is usually handled at the state level. The only barrier is the time of processing the application.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.



YES | NO

**Comments:**

This is covered as a civil action and this can be appealed under the various civil procedure rules of various courts. The hierarchy of courts as stated in the constitution implies a right of appeal for both civil and criminal cases.

**References:**

1. Chapter V11, 1999 Federal Constitution of Nigeria

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This varies from state, because these licenses are given at the state levels by the States Ministries of Information. Due to the bureaucratic nature of the ministries, the process usually takes more than two months.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;  
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The costs of the licenses are fairly reasonable. The additional costs are the required visits to a particular office.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

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## 7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

50

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The challenge in forming a broadcast media entity is in the very prohibitive cost charged by the license agency. This means that the medium is concentrated in the hands of the very wealthy.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

**25:**

**0:** Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

This is covered as a civil action and this can be appealed under the various civil procedure rules of various courts. The hierarchy of courts as stated in the constitution implies a right of appeal for both civil and criminal cases.

**References:**

1. Chapter V11, 1999 Federal Constitution of Nigeria

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The process is very time consuming. In terms of the NBC procedure, any person intending to apply for a broadcast license must first incorporate a limited liability company, with Nigerians holding a majority of the shares. A prospective applicant must then fill in and return an application form, to the secretary of the Commission. The application is then processed by the Commissions staff who makes a recommendation to the board of the Commission. The board then sends its recommendation through the Minister of Information to the president, who gives the final approval.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;  
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The categories of broadcast licenses fees are expensive – which is why there have not been community radios in Nigeria. These fees only apply to privately-owned stations, while government-owned stations have flat rates.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

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## 8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

100

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This has never happened.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

**75:**

**50:** Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

**25:**

**0:** Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There aren't any known cases.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

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## 9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

75

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is no law prohibiting this, aside from civil libel laws.

**References:**

1. Section 22, 1999 Federal Nigerian Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Self-censorship exists, mostly by media owners, depending on their interests. Media owners often have high ranking government officials friends and may not report corrupt news on them, but this would be reported by another media outlet with no such relationship with the individual. Most journalists working with individual media outlets know their untouchable figures.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

**75:**

**50:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

**25:**

**0:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This hardly ever happens. Most of the times, the State Security Service clamps down on the media outlet after the story has been published.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

**75:**

**50:** The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

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## 10. Are the media credible sources of information?

65

10a. In law, print media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Print media companies must be registered as media companies and as corporate entities at the CAC. The CAC requires, amongst other things, a document showing the directors of the company.

**References:**

1. Section 35, Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Print media companies must be registered as media companies and as corporate entities at the CAC. The CAC requires, amongst other things, a document showing the directors of the company.

**References:**

1. Section 35, Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Nigerian journalists have not completely abided by the formalistic code of conduct. Many times, journalists cover events only after they have been given money, in what is now popularly known as "Brown Envelope". It is well known that for media outlets to cover some events, they have to be remunerated. A contributing factor is that most journalists are not paid salaries or are poorly paid.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

**75:**

**50:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

**25:**



**0:** Editors and journalists are widely known to sell” favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the period leading up to the election, the ruling Party PDP got the most media coverage. Few other political parties like the AC, ANPP, AD and DPP got time allocation but not as much as PDP. This was mostly in broadcast media, as most national and state media outlets with wide coverage are government-owned.

**References:**

1. Analysis of Media Performance in 2007 Elections” by Media Rights Agenda on Behalf of Global Rights Partners for Justice, May 2007 Global Rights Newsletter;
2. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007

**100:** All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

**75:**

**50:** Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

**25:**

**0:** The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Generally, in the process of the last elections, many political parties could not access state-owned media. They were even instances when they offered money and they were refused coverage.

**References:**

1. Analysis of Media Performance in 2007 Elections” by Media Rights Agenda on Behalf of Global Rights Partners for Justice, May 2007 Global Rights Newsletter;

**100:** The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

**75:**

**50:** The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

**25:**

**0:** The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

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## 11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

67

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES

NO

### Comments:

This is not a frequent occurrence at the national level. Two Nigerian journalists were arrested for a story on a presidential aircraft and charged with treason, then released on bail by a court in Abuja. They spent some days in jail, before being released on bail.

### References:

1. "Detained Nigerian Journalists Out on Bail,"  
Voice of America Report on newsVOAcom, June 29, 2000  
<http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-06/2006-06-29-voa54.cfm?;>
2. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) ,  
Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. "Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This happened to journalists mostly when covering election activities at state-level. There were a few reported incidents of journalists being harassed during the gubernatorial elections, while trying to get coverage of rigging by politicians. Anambra state is an instance.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There are no documented cases known.

**References:**

1. Lanre Arogundade, coordinator, International Press Center (IPC) , Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Tunde Aremu, Communications officer, Action Aid International Nigeria, Abuja Office, Aug. 24, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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## 12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

0

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | **NO**

### Comments:

These laws compel public officers not to give out official secrets. CSOs have been undertaking advocacy for a Freedom of Information law for the last eight years. The bill was passed by the National Assembly in January but the president refused to sign it into law. There are moves now by CSOs to begin advocating with the new National Assembly, whose tenure just began.

### References:

1. Section 1 (1) , Official Secrets Acts, 1962
2. Section 97(1), Nigeria Criminal Code Act, 1990

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | **NO**

### Comments:

The is no legal right to access information, so there cannot be a formal process for citizens to have the right of appeal.

### References:

1. Section 1 (1) , Official Secrets Acts, 1962
2. Section 97(1), Nigeria Criminal Code Act, 1990

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws or government policies.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

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### 13. Is the right of access to information effective?

25

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Since there is no law, citizens generally have no rights to get public information and are at the mercy of relevant public officers, who may or may not grant access.

**References:**

1. Edet Ojo, executive director, Media Rights Agenda (MRA)/Freedom of Information Coalition (FOIC), Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Onyinye Ugonna, program officer, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC) seconded to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Abuja Office, Aug. 26, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

When granted, records are generally received at low costs, mostly the costs of photocopying. Many government information, such as laws, are given out for free. The public officer may want a small tip" for this service though.

**References:**

1. Edet Ojo, executive director, Media Rights Agenda (MRA)/Freedom of Information Coalition (FOIC), Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Onyinye Ugonna, program officer, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC) seconded to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Abuja Office, Aug. 26, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are really no appeal mechanisms in place.

**References:**

1. Edet Ojo, executive director, Media Rights Agenda (MRA)/Freedom of Information Coalition (FOIC), Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Onyinye Ugonna, program officer, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC) seconded to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Abuja Office, Aug. 26, 2007

**100:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This cannot be challenged, because there is no law giving the right of information in the first instance.

**References:**

1. Edet Ojo, executive director, Media Rights Agenda (MRA)/Freedom of Information Coalition (FOIC), Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Onyinye Ugonna, program officer, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC) seconded to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Abuja Office, Aug. 26, 2007

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This rarely happens, as public officers are compelled by the Official Secrets Act not to give out public information. Government generally gives the excuse of national security<sup>7</sup> when refusing to give out information.

**References:**

1. Edet Ojo, executive director, Media Rights Agenda (MRA)/Freedom of Information Coalition (FOIC), Sheraton Hotel, Aug. 24, 2007;
2. Onyinye Ugonna, program officer, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC) seconded to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Abuja Office, Aug. 26, 2007

**100:** The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

**75:**

**50:** The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

**25:**

**0:** The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

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## Category II. Elections

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### II-1. <sup>56</sup>Voting & Citizen Participation

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#### 14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

These sections basically set out conditions for qualifications for voter registration. They do not precisely give the right to vote, which is implied.

**References:**

1. Third Schedule, F, Section 2(e), 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Section 13, Electoral Act 1990

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.



YES | NO

**References:**

1. Third Schedule, F, Section 2(a), 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Section 26, Electoral Act 1990

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

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## 15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

42

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Various monitors throughout the country noted and documented numerous lapses, massive irregularities and electoral malpractice that characterized the elections. This resulted in massive disenfranchisement of citizens in the April 2007 general elections, widely acknowledged as the worst in the country's history.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE)  
ACE's Abuja Office, Aug. 19, 2007;
2. Statement of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) International Election Observer Delegation to Nigerias April 21 Presidential and National Assembly Elections  
Abuja, April 23, 2007  
[http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2151\\_ng\\_election\\_statement\\_042307.pdf](http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2151_ng_election_statement_042307.pdf)

**100:** Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

**75:**

**50:** Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

All observer reports in the just concluded little or no ballot secrecy across the nation.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE)  
ACE's Abuja Office, Aug. 19, 2007;
2. Statement of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) International Election Observer Delegation to Nigerias April 21  
Presidential and National Assembly Elections  
Abuja, April 23, 2007  
[http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2151\\_ng\\_election\\_statement\\_042307.pdf](http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2151_ng_election_statement_042307.pdf)

**100:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

**75:**

**50:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

**25:**

**0:** Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

INEC, which has the constitutional duty to fix election dates, adhered to this dates during the 2007 general elections, but it defaulted in timelines for the voter-registration and list-displaying.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE)  
ACE's Abuja Office, Aug. 19, 2007;
2. Press Conference Statement by the Electoral Act Observatory Team of the Electoral Reform Network (ERN) on the level of Compliance with the 2006 Electoral Act and Proposals for Constitutional and Electoral Reforms, on May 2007

**100:** Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

**75:**

**50:** Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

**25:**

**0:** Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

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## 16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

75

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The constitution, while guaranteeing the freedom of association, exempts political parties by insisting that they must be registered by the National Electoral Body after fulfilling some conditions that are set out.

**References:**

1. Sections 40 and 222, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
2. Section 78 of the Electoral Act 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

These sections state criteria for the qualification for running for office, with some exemptions on age and educational qualification.

**References:**

1. Sections 65, 106, 131, & 177 of the 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if Individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

After a Supreme Court judgment, the National Electoral Body relaxed their very stringent rules for registration of political parties. Consequently, there are now 50 political parties in Nigeria.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE) ACE's Abuja Office, Aug. 19, 2007;
2. Press Conference Statement by the Electoral Act Observatory Team of the Electoral Reform Network (ERN) on the level of Compliance with the 2006 Electoral Act and Proposals for Constitutional and Electoral Reforms, on May 2007

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

**25:**

**0:** Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The law allows citizens to run for elections, but the practices of political parties nomination process were deemed undemocratic. People called it selections and not nominations. The processes of the nominations and elections were heavily manipulated by the ruling party and the National Electoral Body. Some candidates were illegally barred from running. Many of these petitions are brought before the Elections Tribunals.

**References:**

1. United States Institute of Peace, Special Report Nigeria's 2007 elections the fitful Path to Democratic Citizenship", page 4 Jibrin Ibrahim , January 2007 www.usip.org
2. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), ACE's Abuja Office, Aug. 19, 2007

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Most of the legislature is composed of PDP members, so the level of impact of the opposition parties is quite minimal. For instance, the ruling party PDP got leadership of the just composed 6th National Assembly Committees.

**References:**

1. ThisDay Newspaper, June 14, 2007, page 5
2. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE) ACE's Abuja Office, Aug. 19, 2007

**100:** The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

**75:**

**50:** The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

**25:**

**0:** The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

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## II-2. Election Integrity

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17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Third Schedule Part F, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

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18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

50

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Third Schedule Part F, 1999 Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Independent National Electoral Commission is a federal executive body established in accordance with the provisions of section 153 of the constitution. The appointment of the chairman and National Electoral commissioners is also governed by the provisions of section 153 and section 14 of the Third Schedule to the constitution. The lacuna in section 156(1)(a) requiring such persons to possess the same qualifications as a member of the House of Representatives has led to the appointment of card-carrying members of political parties as chairpersons and members of the Electoral Commission. These card-carrying members of parties have influenced activities in favor of their party.

**References:**

1. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007
2. Press Conference Statement by the Electoral Act Observatory Team of the Electoral Reform Network on the Level of Compliance with the 2006 Electoral Act and Proposals for Constitutional and Electoral Reform, page 4, May 2007

**100:** Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has reportedly spent the 6.45 billion naira (US\$54.2 million) for the payment of Ad hoc staff who participated in the just concluded April general elections as elections officers. The Commission mostly relies on ad-hoc staff for conducting elections and this affects the quality of the elections.

**References:**

1. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. INEC Expends Six Billion Naira On AD Hoc Staff"  
Nneka Eluogu  
May 13, 2007  
<http://www.inecnigeria.org/newsview.php?newsid=322>

**100:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The Electoral Body rarely makes any official reports, except press statements in newspapers and media outlets. These reports are very contentious and contain contrary things to the real situation on the ground.

**References:**

1. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007
2. Press Conference Statement by the Electoral Act Observatory Team of the Electoral Reform Network on the Level of Compliance with the 2006 Electoral Act and Proposals for Constitutional and Electoral Reform, May 2007

**100:** Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

**75:**

**50:** Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Commission proved powerless in enforcing the provisions of sections 92-93 of the Electoral Act relating to the contributions to political parties and limitations on campaign expenses, as there was no significant improvement in the influence of money in the 2007 electoral process compared with past elections. It also did not enforce the provisions of sections 96-98 of the Act relating to the acceptable conduct at rallies and processions and the use of force or violence during campaigns. Throughout the campaigns, we observed that there was use of abusive language and private security personnel by politicians; yet the Commission failed to invoke the provisions of section 97 of the Act.



**References:**

1. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007
2. Press Conference Statement by the Electoral Act Observatory Team of the Electoral Reform Network on the Level of Compliance with the 2006 Electoral Act and Proposals for Constitutional and Electoral Reform, page 4, May 2007

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

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## 19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

58

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

For the 2007 elections, INEC started the voter registration process late and introduced the direct data capture machine for the first time. These machines were grossly inadequate at the beginning, broke down because of power failure and INEC's staff was mostly untrained to use them. This affected the number of eligible voters who could register for the elections. The voter list was displayed late with no time for complaints and revisions.

**References:**

1. 2007 Nigerian National Elections Pre-Election Assessment Final Report", pages 8-9  
The International Republican Institute (IRI)  
www.iri.org
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

**75:**

**50:** There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

**25:**

**0:** The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost” voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Part IX, the 2006 Electoral Act
2. Section 285, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the period under review, there have been judgements by higher courts on the standard of election petitions.

**References:**

1. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007
2. Press Conference Statement by the Electoral Act Observatory Team of the Electoral Reform Network on the Level of Compliance with the 2006 Electoral Act and Proposals for Constitutional and Electoral Reform, page 4, May 2007

**100:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

**75:**

**50:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

**25:**

**0:** The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

In the April 2007 general elections, the security forces worked largely in favor of the ruling party (PDP) intimidating opposition and aiding rigging.

**References:**

1. Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?, pages 4-5  
Crisis Group Africa Report N°126, May 30, 2007  
[http://www.amanaonline.com/126\\_nigeria\\_failed\\_elections.pdf](http://www.amanaonline.com/126_nigeria_failed_elections.pdf);
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

**75:**

**50:** The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The Act does not specifically say there must be observers, but makes mention of persons allowed in the polling booths to include observers.

**References:**

1. Section 62(1), Electoral Act 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the process leading to the general elections, the federal electoral coordinating body INEC said there would not be monitors but observers in the elections. It imposed stringent conditions for registrations. Many local CSOs were refused accreditations, especially those very critical of INEC. The State Security Service was also used to screen" groups that wanted accreditations, a process that many criticized as intimidations.

**References:**

1. Emma Ezeazu, executive secretary Alliance for Credible Elections, ACE's Office in Abuja, Aug. 16 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers' activities.

**75:**

**50:** Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

**25:**

**0:** Election observers' movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

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69  
II-3. Political Financing

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20. Are there regulations governing political financing?

71

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This section gives the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) the power to place limitations on the monetary or other resources that can be contributed. It does not actually state a cap to contributions.

**References:**

Section 92(1), Electoral Act 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Sections 92 (1) and 93 (9), Electoral Act 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The constitution and CAMA out rightly prohibit any donations by corporate entities, while the Electorate Act sets a cap. Any law contrary to the constitution is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency.

**References:**

1. Sections 38(2), Company and Allied Matters Act, 1990
2. Sections 221, Nigeria's Federal Constitution, 1999
3. Sections 92(1) and 93 (9), Electoral Act, 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on corporate contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to candidates or political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

This provision does not state the amount, but it gives INEC the right to regulate it in consultation with political parties.

**References:**

Section 94(2), Electoral Act 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

1. Section 225 (2), 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Sections 88 (3) and (4), Electoral Act 2006

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This section provides that every political party shall submit to INEC a detailed statement and analysis of its expenses. No mention is made of independent audits of the finances of parties and candidates.

**References:**

1. Section 225 (2), 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the political financing process.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This is the Independent National Elections Commissions (INEC). It is charged with a myriad of functions like voter registration, conduct of elections, and observing political financing processes.

**References:**

- 1.Third Schedule, Part F, 1999 Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around political financing. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

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## 21. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

8

21a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Independent National Elections Commissions (INEC) never set a limit on contributions as tasked by the laws. There is little or no monitoring done by INEC, and this is hardly complied with.

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Nigeria's Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis Africa Report N°123, March 28, 2007 International Crisis Group, March 28, 2007 <http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02269.pdf>

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

There is supposed to be no corporate donations at all, but this rule is disobeyed and companies are publicly donating to the ruling political party.

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making to donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates



or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The limits as stated by the Electoral Act are specific on individual candidates expenditures and vague on political parties expenditures. It says that these limits should be decided in consultation with the parties themselves by the Electoral Commission, and this has not been done by the Independent National Elections Commissions (INEC).

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007
3. Press Statement by the Electoral Act Observatory Team of the Electoral Reform Network on the Level of Compliance with the 2006 Electoral Act and Proposals for Constitutional and Electoral Reform, May 2007

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

21d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency rarely ever does this. It even has no basis to monitor political financing, because it did not determine limits on

elections expenses as stated by the Electoral Act.

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

21e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It does not monitor political financing, so it cannot impose fines on offenders.

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

21f. In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the period under review, the Electoral Commission has not done this, because it is not compelled by law to do so. Despite this, a few parties have sent in audited reports of their accounts to the Commission.

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

**75:**

**50:** Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

**25:**

**0:** Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

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## 22. Can citizens access records related to political financing?

0

22a. In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the period under review, none of the parties published their expenses.

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

**75:**

**50:** Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

**25:**

**0:** Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

22b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens have not been able to access records of candidates or political parties at all. There aren't any known cases of citizens even trying to access these reports.

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

22c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

They do not try to access these reports.

**References:**

1. Jide Ojo, senior program officer, IFES Nigeria, IFES Abuja Office, Aug. 18, 2007;
2. Olufunto Akinduro, program manager, the Electoral Reform Network (ERN), ERN's office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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### Category III. Government Accountability

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#### III-1. <sup>54</sup> Executive Accountability

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23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Section 46, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

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24. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

69

24a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The executive sometimes gives reasons for policy decisions. The outgoing president had a call in the program "The President Speaks", where citizens could call in and ask questions. Other top government officials also frequently give reasons for policy decisions. The challenge is that there is not always full disclosure of all facts and no formalized way of presenting policy decisions. Also, the explanations are mostly reactive to press speculations.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. Nigerian Minister Defends Government's Corruption Policy", James Butty Washington, D.C, on Voice of America, Nov. 21, 2006 <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-11/2006-11-21-voa7.cfm?CFID=119276574&CFTOKEN=15811550>
3. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

24b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

These sections talk about the various jurisdictions of the federal courts.

**References:**

Sections 232, 233, 239, 240, 241, and 251, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

24c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The judiciary in the period under review has voided some very controversial executive actions. An example is the withholding of the Lagos state government funds by the presidency. Enforcement of these decisions is the key challenge in the Nigerian environment.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to rely upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

24d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the period under review there were a lot of executive lawlessness and unconstitutional actions.

A few instances are:

1. The Obasanjo government withheld funds for the Lagos state government despite a Supreme Court order stating the contrary.
2. Spending funds for two extra days of the 2006 census and power sector projects without legislative approval
3. Increasing of fuel prices and VAT without due process by the Obasanjo government in the twilight of his administration.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007
3. Lending a Helping Hand, Anza Philips-Abuja Bureau News Watch Magazine, Monday, Aug. 28, 2006, <http://www.newswatchngr.com/editorial/allaccess/special/10828102706.htm>;
4. President Olusegun Obasanjo's Embarrassing Jitters BABAJIDE KOLADE-OTITOJU, Sahara Reporter, Feb. 21, 2007, 10:48 <http://www.ocnus.net/cgi-bin/exec/view.cgi?archive=108&num=27883>

**100:** The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

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## 25. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

50

25a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

This section confers immunity from criminal proceedings to the president and vice president while in office.

**References:**

1. Section 308, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

25b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.



YES | NO

**Comments:**

The above section does not confer immunity to them, only to the heads of the nation and states.

**References:**

Section 308, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

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## 26. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

53

26a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 140, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

26b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**References:**

Fifth Schedule, Section 11, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

26c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

1. Section 6, 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Section 10, Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 1991

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

26d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The law mandates every public officer immediately after taking office and thereafter every four years and at the end of their term of office to submit to the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) a written declaration of all their properties, assets and liabilities. It also mandates the CCB to examine these declarations and follow up with investigations where necessary.

**References:**

1. Fifth Schedule, Section 11, 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 1991

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

26e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

This provision only restricts the president, vice president, and chief of justice from service or employment in foreign companies or enterprises.

**References:**

1. Fifth Schedule, Section 5, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

26f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

There are no regulations except for employment with foreign companies.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues.

Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

26g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These regulations are breached, mostly because of the weak monitoring and enforcement abilities of the agency responsible.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

26h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The position of the Commission is that their Act does not mandate them to independently audit, so they don't.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007
3. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

## 27. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

0

27a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | **NO**

### Comments:

This provision states that for the CCB to make publicly available the assets declared by public officers, the National Assembly must provide terms and conditions. This has never been done.

### References:

Paragraph 3 (c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

27b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

### Comments:

These documents are not made publicly available, unless the public officer does so on his/her own.

### References:

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;

2. .Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007
3. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

27c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These records cannot be accessed at all.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. .Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007
3. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It has been difficult to distinguish between the executive and the ruling party (PDP) functions. During the April elections, government resources were used to campaign. The party frequently intervened in the proceedings of the National Assembly dictating which way member legislators should vote.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

**75:**

**50:** The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

**25:**

**0:** The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

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## III-2. Legislative Accountability

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29. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

92

29a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

**References:**

Sections 6 and 233, (2)b, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

29b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The judiciary is bold in reviewing the legislature's decisions, if asked to. Much of these kinds of situations have not arisen in the period under review.

**References:**

1. Clement Nwankwo, acting country representative, National Democratic Institute (NDI) NDI's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) , Cislac's Abuja Office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

29c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This clause does not exempt judicial officers from criminal proceedings.



**References:**

1. Section 308, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.

---

30. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

46

30a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 52, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

30b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Constitution and the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) do not have this restriction.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

30c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Section 6, Fifth Schedule, 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Section 10, Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 1991

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

30d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The law mandates every public officer immediately after taking office and thereafter every four years and at the end of their term of office to submit to the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) a written declaration of all their properties, assets and liabilities. It also mandates the CCB to examine these declarations and follow up with investigations where necessary.

**References:**

1. Fifth Schedule, Section 11, Federal Constitution
2. Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 1991

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

30e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no such regulations.

**References:**

1. Clement Nwankwo, acting country representative, National Democratic Institute (NDI) NDI's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) Cislac's Abuja Office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

30f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

They are rarely enforced by the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and the NASS Ethic Committees.

**References:**

1. Clement Nwankwo, acting country representative, National Democratic Institute (NDI) NDI's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) Cislac's Abuja Office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

30g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is never done.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), ZCC's Abuja Office, Aug. 10, 2007;
2. .Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007;
3. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

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31. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

0

31a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This provision states that for the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) to make publicly available the assets declared by public officers, the National Assembly must provide terms and conditions. This has never been done.

**References:**

Paragraph 3 (c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

31b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is never done.

**References:**

1. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Clement Nwankwo, acting country representative, National Democratic Institute (NDI) NDI's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

31c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is never done.

**References:**

1. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Clement Nwankwo, acting country representative, National Democratic Institute (NDI) NDI's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## 32. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

33

32a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | **NO**

### References:

There is no legal document stating this.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

32b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

### Comments:

There is no formal way of obtaining these documents. Citizens approach individual staff and get the documents, and some are made available on-line.

### References:

1. Clement Nwankwo, acting country representative, National Democratic Institute (NDI) NDI's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) Cislac's Abuja Office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

32c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Records can be obtained at little cost, but some times visiting the NASS is required to get the records.

**References:**

1. Clement Nwankwo, acting country representative, National Democratic Institute (NDI) NDI's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Auwal Musa, executive director, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) Cislac's Abuja Office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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43  
III-3. Judicial Accountability

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33. Are judges appointed fairly?

67

33a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

These sections give conditions on appointments of federal level judges, mostly made by the president on the recommendations of the National Judicial Council.

**References:**

Sections 231, 238, 250, Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

**NO:** A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

33b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

National level judges are appointed based on years of formal legal training and experience in practicing, which varies depending on the court. These conditions are stated in the constitution and are strictly followed. In addition, the National Judicial Council sends a notice to the Nigerian Bar Association and the State Security Service asking them to give moral and legal reasons, if any, why the candidate should not be appointed.

**References:**

1. Barrister Rommy Mom, chairman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007
2. Barrister Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator, Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

**75:**

**50:** Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

33c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).



YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The constitution stipulates that these appointments be done by the president, on recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission. It is only the appointments of the chief judges of the various courts that must be confirmed by the Senate.

**References:**

Sections 231, 238, 250, Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

---

### 34. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

67

34a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Judges are required to give their opinion in writing, but there is no requirement for them to explain the opinion in writing.

**References:**

Section 294, Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

34b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

**100** | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

All judges give reasons for their decisions, backing them up with precedents and (where available) statutes. There aren't any known cases of other practices by federal judges.

**References:**

1. Barrister Rommy Mom, chairman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007
2. Barrister Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator, Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

**25:**

**0:** Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

34c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

**References:**

Federal Judicial Service Commission, Third Schedule, Section 12, Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

34d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Nothing in this section of the constitution guarantees this independence or talks about this specifically.

**References:**

Third Schedule, Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry, legislative committee, or by an internal judiciary committee or council that can only act with the approval of judges themselves.

34e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This Commission rarely initiates investigations without petitions from the public or members of the Bar. It also rarely cooperates with other agencies.

**References:**

1. Barrister Rommy Mom, chairman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007
2. Barrister Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator, Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

34f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency has been fairly effective in imposing penalties on judicial officers, after it establishes wrongdoing.

**References:**

1. Barrister Rommy Mom, chairman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007
2. Barrister Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator, Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

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### 35. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

79

35a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Section 290, Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

35b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

1. Section 6, Fifth Schedule, 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Section 10, Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 1991

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

35c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) is to receive and examine the asset declarations of public officers.

**References:**

1. Fifth Schedule, Section 11, 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 1991

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

35d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

This section restricts any person who has held a position as a judicial officer to appear or act as a legal practitioner before a court of law upon ceasing his appointment. It only focuses on appearances before a law court in Nigeria.

**References:**

Section 292(1)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

35e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There has been no need to enforce the only restriction of non-appearance before a court of law imposed by the law. Judges do not ever try this. They generally retire after their appointment ceases.

**References:**

1. Barrister Rommy Mom, chairman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007
2. Barrister Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator, Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

35f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Federal judges generally try to conform to these regulations, although there have been instances of abuses of these regulations. The situation is worse at the state courts.

**References:**

1. Barrister Rommy Mom, chairman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007
2. Barrister Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator, Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to judges. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

35g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This has never been done. The position of the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) is that the law does not require this of them.

**References:**

1. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Barrister Rommy Mom, chairman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007

**100:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

### 36. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

0

36a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There is no legal document stating this.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

36b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

These documents cannot be accessed as a matter of practice or law. The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) says the law empowers the National Assembly to make appropriate legislation, but they have failed to do so.

**References:**

1. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Barrister Rommy Mom, chariman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

36c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**



**Comments:**

These documents cannot be accessed as a matter of practice or law.

**References:**

1. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Barrister Rommy Mom, chariman of the Benue State, Nigerian Bar Associations and executive director, Lawyers Alert, Phone interview, Sept. 4, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## III-4. Budget Processes

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### 37. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

75

37a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The constitution gives the legislature the power to make laws by passing bills. The budget is always in the form of a bill.

**References:**

Sections 58 ,59 & 80, Nigeria's Federal Constitution, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

37b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The legislature has this power, but most of the times they do not change anything significant in the budget, and pass it mostly as it is presented by the executive.

**References:**

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

**75:**

**50:** Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

**25:**

**0:** The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

37c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The challenge for the legislature is more of capacity, than overwork. The legislature mostly has low capacity for technical budget issues and the staff are not professionals, but mostly family members.

**References:**

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

**75:**

**50:** Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

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## 38. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

67

38a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The debating process is mostly open, there is even a public hearing held at the National Assembly. The impact of public input is debatable.

### References:

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

**25:**

**0:** Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

38b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

Citizens can attend the public hearings, but the process of getting approval to present a memorandum is tedious. Even when citizens get this approval, their input carries little weight.

**References:**

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

38c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This information is on the Web site of the Ministry of Finance and is easily accessible. The interest is low on the part of the public.

**References:**

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

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39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

In practice, there is the Public Accounts Committee, which is not specifically provided for in the law. It gives the legislature oversight and monitoring powers.

**References:**

Section 62, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

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#### 40. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

44

40a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Public Accounts Committee is largely ineffective and moribund. Reports are rarely submitted to it.

**References:**

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

**75:**

**50:** Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

**25:**

**0:** There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

40b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, this Committee is headed by a member of the opposition party.

**References:**

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

**75:**

**50:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

**25:**

**0:** The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

40c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This Committee is fairly independent, but largely ineffective.

**References:**

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

**75:**

**50:** This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.

**25:**

**0:** This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee's behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

40d. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

This Committee rarely conducts investigations. Other specific committees conduct investigations in the areas they have oversight on.

**References:**

1. Hillary Ogbanna, program coordinator Budget Advocacy, Action Aid International Nigeria (AAIN), AAIN's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Budget Monitoring & Advocacy, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

**75:**

**50:** The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

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Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

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IV-1. <sup>33</sup> Civil Service Regulations

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41. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

41a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

These sections say there should be a federal civil service that can delegate its powers with the consent of the president, but they mention nothing about its independence. Section 169 of the constitution says there must be a Federal Civil Service. Section 170 establishes a Federal Civil Service Commission, which, with the approval of the president, can delegate its power to any of its members or officers of the Federal Civil Service.

**References:**

Section 169-170, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

41b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Part 11, Sections 2 & 3 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Guidelines for Appointments, Promotion and Discipline, 2004

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

41c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

These rules say that appeals should be made to the head of Service or the Federal Civil Service Commission, routing it through your immediate supervisor regarding civil service management actions. They are silent on appeals.



**References:**

1. Chapter 11, Sections 11101, 11102, & 11104 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2000
2. Part V1, Guidelines for Appointments, Promotions, and Discipline, 2004

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

41d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

No such rules exist in the civil service rules . The above mentioned sections state grounds for disqualification for running for elective offices.

**References:**

Sections 107, 137, and 182 of 1999 Federal Constitution of Nigeria.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

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## 42. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

39

42a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Civil servants are commonly influenced by political and personal motivations. The ruling party has tremendous influence in what happens in the federal service, in terms of appointments, executive actions and other management decisions. Recourse can be obtained in courts, but this is not a very popular option because of the fear of being victimized.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;

**100:** Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

42b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Appointments to the Federal Civil Service are made mostly on cronyism and based on connections of families, loyalties of friendship, and other socio-cultural factors. It is hardly an open and fair process of recruitment.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

42c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These are discouraged, but there a a lot of instances where appointments and promotions are unfairly done.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

**75:**

**50:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

42d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Civil servants generally have clear job descriptions. The only challenge is that of redundancy by many staff.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position's authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

42e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The bonuses constitute a small fraction of the substantive pay, which can be broken down into different categories.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

42f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This rarely happens.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

**75:**

**50:** The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

**25:**

**0:** The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

42g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The appeal mechanisms are rarely effective. The federal civil servants have little faith in them, as they are very susceptible to outside influence.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

**75:**

**50:** The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

42h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the period under review, they have been constantly paid eight to 10 days late.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;

**100:** In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

**75:**

**50:** In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

**25:**

**0:** In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

42i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The system is not effective. In fact, there are no effective mechanisms in place to ensure this. Also the level of convictions for corruption charges is very low in the civil service.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

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## 43. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

25

43a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

**References:**

There are no rules.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

**NO:** A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

43b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This regulation only exists for the president, vice president, chief justice, governor and deputy governor.

**References:**

Section 5, Fifth Schedule, Part 1, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

43c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This section tries to restrict public officers from accepting gifts. The implementation of this section is very poor, because the task is left for the Code of Conduct Bureau, which is severely under-funded, thus weak in implementation.

**References:**

1. Code of Conduct for Public Officers, Section 6, Fifth Schedule of Nigeria's 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

43d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This regulation only exists for the president, vice president, chief justice, governor and deputy governor. There are rarely enforced by the Code of Conduct Bureau. These mentioned individuals rarely take jobs in companies, but form their own companies. They do not take active participation in the runnings of these companies, but remain in politics to be able to influence policies.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

43e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The provision is rarely enforced or even monitored. Civil servants routinely violate this provision, without any repercussions.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007



**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

43f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These regulations are not there, although few officials try to comply. Though this is not very common in place.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

**75:**

**50:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

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#### 44. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

44a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

They cannot be accessed.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

44b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

These records cannot be accessed.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

These records cannot be accessed.

**References:**

1. Kehinde Isiaku, CSO liaison officer, National Orientation Agency, Telephone Interview, Sept. 11, 2007;
2. Essienawan Essien, National Security Agency, Cyber crime working group, Telephone interview, Sept. 11, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

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45. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

25

45a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no whistleblowers protection laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

45b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There have been cases of unofficial victimization of whistleblowers, although this happens a lot more at the states level.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

45c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no laws covering whistleblowers in the private sector.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

45d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

**Comments:**

This is the same as the public sector, although cases of harassment are fewer in this sector because the management would be eager to hear of corrupt practices that is costing them profit. The whistleblower can be punished in an unofficial way, and there are no avenues for redress.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

---

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

0

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Even though there are no laws, the ICPC has a unit in most government establishments where corrupt practices can be reported to. A few agencies also have their own corruption hotlines.

**References:**

There is no such provision in law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

47. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

13

47a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Staff is drawn within the ministries to form these units, and most of the times they are not professionals. This is considered a dry" posting.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

47b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These units receive little or no funding, so largely they cannot do anything.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

47c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Units are affected by the usual civil service bureaucracy and have very limited funding, so they can rarely perform their duties. Their independence is debatable, as staff are drawn from the government establishment itself.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

47d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Units are affected by the usual civil service bureaucracy and have very limited funding, so they rarely perform their duties. Their independence is debatable, as staff are drawn from the government establishment itself.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, Aug. 14, 2007

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

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13  
IV-3. Procurement

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48. Is the public procurement process effective?

83

48a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Section 57 of the Public Procurement Act specifies a code of conduct for procurement officials, while section 58 of the same law outlines the sanctions .

**References:**

Sections 57 and 58 of the Public Procurement Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.



48b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Under section 5 (k) of the Public Procurement Act 2007, the Bureau of Public Procurement is empowered to undertake training programs and human resources development for procurement officials.

**References:**

Section 5 (k) of the Public Procurement Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

48c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Bureau (just established two months ago) intends to enforce this law 100 percent. Before, The Bureau was operating as a department under the presidency. There were no conflicts of interest regulations until the law was passed, although, in practice, the Bureau was conscious of this.

**References:**

1. Dr. Orji Orji, Director, Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP), BPP's Office Sept. 3, 2007;
2. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director, Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

48d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 57 of the Public Procurement Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

48e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Sections 24 & 25 of the Act provide comprehensively for open competitive bidding process for all procurements of goods and services.

**References:**

Sections 24 & 25 of the Public Procurement Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).

48f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Section 40 of the Act gives details of conditions for sole sourcing.

**References:**

Section 40 of the Public Procurement Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

48g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Sections 53-54 of the law provide for petitions, investigations and the recourse mechanism in a procurement process.

**References:**

Sections 53-54 of the Public Procurement Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Section 38 provides reasons and avenues for legal proceedings.

**References:**

Section 38, Public Procurement Law, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Sections 53, 54-58 provide comprehensively for sanctions.

**References:**

Sections 53, 54-58 of the Public Procurement Law, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Compliance to the law in quantitative terms is not yet available because the law is only three months old. This is possible in the next year of operation. Implementation plans have not been drawn up yet.

**References:**

1. Dr. Orji Orji, Director, Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP), BPP's Office Sept. 3, 2007;
2. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director, Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

---

## 49. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

54

49a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There is no specific provision enabling or disabling public access. Although it is not in the law, the public procurement manual is available and is distributed widely, free of charge, by the BMPIU. The manual was last published in April 2007 with the support of the UNDP. It is being updated currently to conform with the new law, which came into being on June 4, 2007.

**References:**

Public Procurement Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

49b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Section 30 of the Procurement Act provides for open and transparent bidding.

**References:**

Section 30 of the Procurement Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

49c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Regulations are easily available and published in national dailies and other sources.

**References:**

1. Dr. Orji Orji, Director, Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP), BPP's Office Sept. 3, 2007;
2. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director, Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The financial costs are reasonable.

**References:**

1. Dr. Orji Orji, Director, Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP), BPP's Office Sept. 3, 2007;
2. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director, Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

49e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

**Comments:**

They are advertised in national dailies and on Web sites.

**References:**

1. Dr. Orji Orji, Director, Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP), BPP's Office Sept. 3, 2007;
2. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director, Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

49f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

**Comments:**

There is no formalized process for the public to access these bids.

**References:**

1. Dr. Orji Orji, Director, Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP), BPP's Office Sept. 3, 2007;
2. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director, Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

**75:**

**50:** Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

**25:**

**0:** This information is not available to the public through an official process.

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## IV-4. Privatization

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### 50. Is the privatization process effective?

8

50a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The law only mentions strategic investors and blueprint. Nigeria's Privatization and Commercialization Program defines core investors as one with the financial muscle and managerial know-how.

**References:**

Section 4, Public Enterprise Privatization and Commercialization Act, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

50b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

No specific mention is made anywhere in the law.

**References:**

Public Enterprise Privatization and Commercialization Act, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.



**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

50c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Although there are no formal regulations, the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) in theory claims to strive to maintain this ethical standard. There are no records of these enforcements.

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

---

## 51. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

35

51a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There are no specific provisions in the law.

**References:**

Public Enterprise Privatization and Commercialization Act, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the

basis for scoring this indicator.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

51b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Most privatization has been effectively advertised in international and local media. Some have been poorly or not at all advertised.

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

51c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There is no specific provision in the law.

**References:**

Public Enterprise Privatization and Commercialization Act, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

51d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Records are available on request, but this involves most times getting in touch with the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE).

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

51e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These are usually given out for free.

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, Aug. 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## Category V. Oversight and Regulation

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### V-1. <sup>53</sup>National Ombudsman

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52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

**YES** | NO

**References:**

1. Public Complaints Commission, Public Complaints Commission Act (1975 as amended)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

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53. Is the national ombudsman effective?

43

53a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

Sections 1 -5, Public Complaints Commission Act (1975 as ammended)

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

53b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency is sometimes independent, but being unlawfully under the presidency, there are sometimes interferences.

**References:**

1.Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;

2 Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

53c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency is really a moribund one, so there has been no interest in its leadership.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;  
2 Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

53d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Public Complaints Commission is fully staffed, and like most government institutions may even be over staffed.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;  
2 Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

53e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Mostly it is done without political bias, but like with lots of government institutions, the ruling party sometimes influences appointments.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

53f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Commission receives regular funding, but is really under-funded. Funds are not sufficient to carry out activities effectively.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

53g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Not much is ever heard about this agency, even in the news. Many Nigerians have forgotten it exists, because it is largely ineffective and does not make reports available.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

53h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency initiates investigations, but not much is known about the outcome. It is fair in its application of power.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007



**100:** The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

53i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the period under review, the agency has not been able to effectively penalize offenders.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

53j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Reports by the Commission are hardly acted upon by appropriate authorities. The law itself is vague about the specific agencies to report complaints to. It says "appropriate person or body".

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
- 2 Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.

53k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Commission is very slow in investigating complaints and sometimes complaints are not dealt with at all and feedback is rarely given.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
- 2 Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

---

## 54. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

0

54a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There is no specific provision in the law.

**References:**

Public Complaints Commission Act (1975 as ammended)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

54b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

Reports are almost never available.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;  
2 Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

**Comments:**

There are no reports to retrieve.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;  
2 Dr. Uyim Akpabio, director, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), CCB's Abuja office, August 14, 2007

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

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55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

**References:**

The Auditor General's Office, Section 85, Federal Constitution, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

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## 56. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

59

56a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

**YES** | NO

### Comments:

These provisions give security of tenure and speak on appointments that can be done by the president and the Senate to provide a balance.

### References:

Sections 86 – 87, Federal Constitution, 1999

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

**100** | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The constitution lays down processes through which the auditor general can be removed by the president with two thirds concurrence by the Senate. Aside from that, he/she acts until the legal retiring age.

### References:

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria, Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The office of the Auditor General is staffed by the Civil Service Commission. The staff have fair skills to carry out its mandate.

**References:**

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria, Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is not a very powerful agency, because it is not effectively carrying out its role, hence appointments have not been politicized. There is not much public interest in the office. Recruitments are made according to the civil service rules.

**References:**

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative,

Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;  
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria,  
Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This office receives regular funding from the national budget, like any government department.

**References:**

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria, Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

56f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It rarely makes reports available to the public. In fact, in the period under review it has not made any report available. It even rarely makes reports to the National Assembly, which it is constitutionally bound to do.

**References:**

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria, Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the period under review no report has been known to be acted on.

**References:**

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria, Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

56h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.



100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The office of the Auditor General is constitutionally supposed to initiate investigations on its own. Section 85(B) gives it the power of periodic checks. Though this is rarely done, it does not need approval from the executive or the legislature to do this.

**References:**

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria, Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

**75:**

**50:** The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

---

## 57. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

0

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This section obligates them to only report to the legislature.

**References:**

Section 85(1), 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

57b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These reports, when they exists, cannot be accessed.

**References:**

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria, Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

They cannot be accessed formally.

**References:**

1. Ray Onyegu, deputy executive director, Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Telephone interview, Sept. 20, 2007;
2. Dominic Ogankpa, program coordinator, Pact Nigeria, Pacts Office, Sept. 7, 2007

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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53  
V-3. Taxes and Customs

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58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

100

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

**References:**

Federal Inland Revenue Service, Federal Inland Revenue Service Act, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

---

59. Is the tax collection agency effective?

63

59a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The FIRS has staff, but these staff are insufficient to handle taxation issues for the whole country.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29,

2007;  
2. Lawrence Ogwuche, senior Finance and Administration officer, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Abuja Office, Sept. 6, 2007;  
3. Multiple Taxation In Nigeria”  
Ifueko Omoigui  
Business Day, Monday, Sept. 4, 2007

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Government funding for this institution is not a problem. Their source of funding has been constant and predictable. They suffer the inadequate funding challenge that most government establishments complain of.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Lawrence Ogwuche, senior Finance and Administration officer, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Abuja Office, Sept. 6, 2007;
3. Multiple Taxation In Nigeria”  
Ifueko Omoigui  
Business Day, Monday, Sept. 4, 2007

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

50

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The tax laws as they stand place more burdens on certain people. For instance, tax reliefs are given to an individual only for four children and more. Tax laws are also unequally applied; poor people pay taxes more frequently than rich people. This is because tax collectors harass them on the roads to pay their taxes without adequate computation of income and taxable income. Nigerians also generally have a poor culture of paying taxes, and the FIRS do not have the capacity to enforce these laws across the board. Nigeria also generally has a culture of multiple taxation.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Lawrence Ogwuche, senior Finance and Administration officer, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Abuja Office, Sept. 6, 2007;
3. Multiple Taxation In Nigera"  
Ifueko Omoigui  
Bussiness Day, Monday, Sept. 4, 2007
4. Multiple Taxation: Threats to the Manufacturing Sector Paper Presented  
Mr. Foluso Fasoto  
Chartered Institutes of Taxation of Nigeria Web site  
<http://citn.org/newsdt.php?newdid=55>

**100:** Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

**75:**

**50:** Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

**25:**

**0:** Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

---

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

**References:**

Nigeria Customs Service, Customs & Excise Management Act (CEMA) 2004

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

---

## 62. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

88

62a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency has fair enough staff to carry out its mandate. It is an income generating organization, so training is also given to staff members.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Lawrence Ogwuche, senior Finance and Administration officer, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Abuja Office, Sept. 6, 2007

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The organization has a regular source of funding from the government. This source is predictable and not hindered by the political environment. The organization generates a lot of money for Nigeria, so it is considered important.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;

2. Lawrence Ogwuche, senior Finance and Administration officer, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Abuja Office, Sept. 6, 2007

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

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### 63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

75

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Customs and excise duties are generally enforced uniformly, although there are certain stated exemptions in customs duties. Various persons through corrupt means try to evade customs duties, but this is not an organizational policy. Customs and excise duties are consistently applied, more than other forms of taxations in Nigeria.

**References:**

1. Emeka Ononamadu, deputy executive director, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), CAPP office, Aug. 29, 2007;
2. Lawrence Ogwuche, senior Finance and Administration officer, Pact Nigeria, Pact's Abuja Office, Sept. 6, 2007

**100:** Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

**75:**

**50:** Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

**25:**

**0:** Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

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## V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

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64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

**References:**

There is no individual agency overseeing state-owned agencies. Agencies are attached to different government ministries and parastatal bodies for oversight and are owned either by federal or states governments.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this function does not exist.

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65. Is the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

45

65a. In law, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

There is no individual agency overseeing state-owned agencies. Agencies are attached to different government ministries and parastatal bodies for oversight and are owned either by federal or states governments. These ministries have a unit under them that supervise state owned companies.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

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65b. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These ministries have professional full time staff.

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, August 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65c. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The ministries are regularly funded.

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, August 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** The the agency or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The the agency or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

65d. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The federal government does not specially establish anti-graft bodies but passes on information to existing bodies. This transmission of information is rarely done by the government. The Special Committees are only set up to investigate allegations of corruption and none has been set up in the past year. This is because unless there are reports of frauds, no action will be taken by the anti-graft bodies and no special committee would be set up. Only one of the Anti-graft agencies (EFCC) would normally initiate investigations, but in the period under review it has not done this. EFCC has been focused on prosecuting high ranking government officials, like governors and ministers.

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, August 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

65e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

There is no individual government agency overseeing state-owned enterprises. According to their focus, they are attached to individual government ministries. The ministries do not effectively penalize offenders.

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, August 14, 2007;

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

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## 66. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

0

66a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | **NO**

### References:

There are no access to information laws in place.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

66b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

### Comments:

Financial data are of little value.

### References:

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Publi Enterprises (BPE),

BPE's office, August 14, 2007;  
2.Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University,  
Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** State-owned companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

**25:**

**0:** Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

66c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

They are not audited by a third party.

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Publi Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, August 14, 2007;
- 2.Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

**75:**

**50:** Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

**25:**

**0:** State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

66d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

0

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, August 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

66e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

1. Eloka Uzoma Chuks-Nwosu, assistant director, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), BPE's office, August 14, 2007;
2. Prof. Sam Egwu, head of the Department of Political Sciences, Kogi State University, Gubabi Hotel, Abuja, Aug. 30, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## 67. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

31

67a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

### Comments:

This Act covers incorporation of companies for business purposes, or profit gain. Although there are exemptions of kinds of people who cannot apply for incorporations, these are reasonable exemptions: e.g. underage people, unsound mind, and undercharged bankruptcy.

### References:

Part 11, Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990

**YES:** A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required

67b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

### References:

The Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 and the Corporate Affairs Commission, which is the agency set up by CAMA to handle the incorporation of businesses do not have any provisions for a redress mechanism.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

67c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Business licensing generally takes at least three months and this is with a lot of kickbacks being involved. If these are refused, the process is further delayed.

**References:**

1. Ime Enang, senior program manager, Convention for business Integrity, Office of the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja, Sept. 14, 2007;
2. Zipporah Aguh, executive director, Public Private Collaborations for Development (PPCD), PPCD Abuja office, Sept. 17, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

67d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The cost is about US\$400, which is bit out of the reach of small businesses. The official cost is much lower than this, but with all the unofficial costs it would come near to the aforementioned amount. It also requires for applicants to go to the particular offices, and this is mostly done at the Federal Capital Territory.

**References:**

1. Ime Enang, senior program manager, Convention for business Integrity, Office of the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja, Sept. 14, 2007;
2. Zipporah Aguh, executive director, Public Private Collaborations for Development (PPCD), PPCD Abuja office, Sept. 17, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

## 68. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

33

68a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

### Comments:

It is a Parastatal of the Federal Ministry of Health, regulating and controlling quality standards for local and imported products. It includes banned substances, blacklisted companies, forms and regulations. Its mandate is to regulate and control quality standards for foods, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, chemicals, detergents and packaged water imported, manufactured locally and distributed in Nigeria.

### References:

The National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), established by Decree No. 15 of 1993 as amended is a Parastatal of the Federal Ministry of Health.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

### References:

Federal Environment Protection Agency (FEPA) with Decree 58 of 1988 with the overall mandate of protecting Nigerias environment

The Decree also empowered the Agency to promulgate regulations.

To date, the Agency has promulgated or issued a number of regulations including:

S.1.8 of 1991: National Effluent Limitation Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, No 42, Vol 78, August, 1991”;

” S.1.9 of 1991: Pollution Abatement in Industries, industries Generating Wastes, Official Gazette, Federal Republic of Nigeria No 42, Vol 78, Aug. 20, 1991 (4)”;

” S.1.15 OF 1991: Management of Hazardous and Solid Wastes Official Gazette, Federal Republic of Nigeria, No 102, Vol 78, Dec. 31, 1991.”



**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

**References:**

Federal Environment Protection Agency (FEPA) with Decree 58 of 1988 with the overall mandate of protecting Nigerias environment

The Decree also empowered the Agency to promulgate regulations.

To date, the Agency has promulgated or issued a number of regulations including:

S.1.8 of 1991: National Effluent Limitation Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, No 42, Vol 78, August, 1991”;

” S.1.9 of 1991: Pollution Abatement in Industries, industries Generating Wastes, Official Gazette, Federal Republic of Nigeria No 42, Vol 78, Aug. 20, 1991 (4)”;

” S.1.15 OF 1991: Management of Hazardous and Solid Wastes Official Gazette, Federal Republic of Nigeria, No 102, Vol 78, Dec. 31, 1991.”

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

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## 69. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

50

69a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These inspections are carried in an organized manner. This organization is considered a success story of the overseeing role of the government. The management of the organization is transparent and accountable and any staff found to be corrupt would be held accountable.

**References:**

1.Ime Enang, senior program manager, Convention for business Integrity, Office of the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja, Sept. 14, 2007;

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These are done in an adhoc manner mostly because of low capacity.

**References:**

1. Ime Enang, senior program manager, Convention for business Integrity, Office of the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja, Sept. 14, 2007;
2. Zipporah Aguh, executive director, Public Private Collaborations for Development (PPCD), PPCD Abuja office, Sept. 17, 2007

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

**Comments:**

These are done in an adhoc manner mostly because of low capacity.

**References:**

1. Ime Enang, senior program manager, Convention for business Integrity, Office of the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja, Sept. 14, 2007;
2. Zipporah Aguh, executive director, Public Private Collaborations for Development (PPCD), PPCD Abuja office, Sept. 17, 2007

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

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## Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

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### VI-1. ~~Anti~~ Anti-Corruption Law

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#### 70. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

100

70a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

These laws attempt to punish attempted corrupt acts.

**References:**

1. Sections of 8, 9, 10, and 26 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000
2. Chapter 49, Criminal Code Act, Laws of the Federation 1990
3. Sections 15(C), and 17(b), of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70b. In law, extortion is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

1. Sections 10,18, 21and 22 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000
2. Chapter 36 of the Criminal Code Act, Laws of the Federation 1990

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

1. Sections 18, 21 and 22 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000
2. Chapter 49, Criminal Code Act, Laws of the Federation 1990
3. Sections 15(C), and 17(b), of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004

**YES:** A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Sections 10, 18 and 22 (b) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

**YES:** A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 24, Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

**YES:** A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 19, Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 12, Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Part 11 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004

**YES:** A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 19, Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

**YES:** A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

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## VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

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71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Code of Conduct Bureau, Fifth Schedule of the 1999 Federal Constitution and Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Cap 56, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990
2. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 [www.efccnigeria.org](http://www.efccnigeria.org)
3. The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

**YES:** A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

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72. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

56

72a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The constitution gives the federal Attorney General (A.G) the right to institute, take over and discontinue any criminal prosecution in Nigeria. The A.G is a political appointee. In the previous administration, the A.G did not exercise this right. In the present administration, the A.G has been interfering with some high profile prosecutions of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). He took take over the prosecution of the former Abia state governor. A recent change to the EFCC's status (with the National Assembly providing oversight) took place outside of the study period.

**References:**

1. Section 174, 1999 Federal Constitution
2. Section 43, Economic and Financial Crimes Establishment Act 2004

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

72b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was generally seen as being very selective in their prosecution of high ranking government officials and was accused of being manipulated by the presidency. During the just concluded electoral process, the EFCC was accused of being used as an intimidation machine for many politicians. The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) is seen as being non-performing.

**References:**

1. Atiku/ Obasanjo Feud II Destabilise the Politics  
Paul Odili,  
Vanguard newspaper, Sept. 15, 2006 <http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/politics/september06/15092006/p415092006.html>
2. Nigeria's Elections: Big Men, Big Fraud and Big Trouble,  
CALABAR AND KANO,  
The Economist, April 26, 2007  
[http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=1198560&story\\_id=9070922](http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=1198560&story_id=9070922)

**100:** This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

72c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.



100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The tenures are five years for the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and four years for the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Their heads can be removed by the president and the Senate on some stated grounds in their laws. In practice, only ICPC's head has been removed after his tenure finished.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
- 2.John Ikubaje, program officer, Center for Democracy and Development Telephone interview, Aug. 29, 2007

**100:** The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

72d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Appointments to these agencies have been strictly based on the professional criteria stated in their laws. The agencies are relatively new and appointments have not become political. People with known integrity have been chosen to also head these agencies.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
- 2.John Ikubaje, program officer, Center for Democracy and Development Telephone interview, Aug. 29, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

72e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These agencies are all fully staffed, in some cases over-staffed.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
- 2.John Ikubaje, program officer, Center for Democracy and Development Telephone interview, Aug. 29, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

72f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agencies have been running mostly on donor funds. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) enjoys a lot of support from the international community and is seen as the most vibrant agency. The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) enjoys less donor support. The two agencies are also supported consistently by government funds.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
- 2.John Ikubaje, program officer, Center for Democracy and Development Telephone interview, Aug. 29, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

72g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The agencies do not make reports available to the public as a matter of routine. Reports are mostly to the legislators when they are called on to respond to emerging issues from their practice. Annual reports are not available to the public.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
- 2.John Ikubaje, program officer, Center for Democracy and Development Telephone interview, Aug. 29, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

72h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) have power and have prosecuted high profile cases, even if there have been some allegations of political manipulations of the EFCC by the outgoing president. They have been accused of being restricted from going after some high profile individuals. Their staff have the powers conferred on police officials in their Acts.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

72i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is more proactive than the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) in initiating investigations and are not afraid of going after high profile individuals. The ICPC complains that they cannot initiate investigations without a complaint, because their law stipulates so. So they generally wait for a report before initiating investigations.

**References:**

1. Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. John Ikubaje, program officer, Center for Democracy and Development Telephone interview, Aug. 29, 2007

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

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### 73. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

50

73a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agencies act faster on high profile cases and are slow on low profile cases. Many citizens lodge complaints but the agencies do not take action and do not provide feedback.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
- 2.John Ikubaje, program officer, Center for Democracy and Development Telephone interview, Aug. 29, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

73b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no official whistleblowers protection mechanism, but generally these agencies do not disclose sources of information.

**References:**

- 1.Lilian Ekeanyanwu, national coordinator, Zero Corruption Coalition, Pact's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
- 2.John Ikubaje, program officer, Center for Democracy and Development Telephone interview, Aug. 29, 2007

**100:** Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

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69  
VI-3. Rule of Law

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74. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

58

74a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The whole hierarchy of courts gives a right of appeals for both civil and criminal cases. The Supreme Court is the apex court.

**References:**

1. Chapter VII, 1999 Federal Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

74b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The process of litigation in Nigeria really takes time. The process can take years, if the parties are persistent in the case.

**References:**

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;  
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

74c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The cost of living in the country is generally high, and this includes the costs of legal representation as well.

**References:**

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007
3. U.S Department of State, Nigeria Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2006” Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 6, 2007  
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78751.htm>

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

---

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

75

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The judgments mostly follow strictly the written laws. There may be a few isolated cases of non-compliance. The challenge is really in the interpretation of the law in cases of ambiguity.

**References:**

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

**75:**

**50:** Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

**25:**

**0:** Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

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## 76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

50

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Judicial decisions are mostly enforced, although in some cases the state has been weak in enforcing decisions that affect the government negatively. The case for the release of Lagos state funds comes to mind, as an act of lawlessness.

**References:**

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.



75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

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## 77. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

69

77a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

### Comments:

The judiciary normally gets guaranteed tenure and their funding comes from the consolidated funds without interference from the executive once they are approved by the legislature.

### References:

Chapter V11, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts ).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

77b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

National level judges, especially the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges are mostly independent. They can be influenced by the government and public criticism sometimes and give political judgments. The Supreme Court's judgment on whether the vice president can down the road change political parties and still retain office has been argued by many jurists as being a political judgment.

### References:

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

**75:**

**50:** National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

**25:**

**0:** National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

77c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

**References:**

There is no specific law. The practice is that the head of each court allocates cases to various judges.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

77d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Section 292, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

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## 78. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

78a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

### Comments:

There have been no known cases.

### References:

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

78b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

### Comments:

There have not been any known cases.

### References:

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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## 79. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

50

79a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

This generally does not happen. When it happens, it depends on the personal bias of the judge in question.

### References:

1. Chibuzor Ekwewwu, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

79b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

There were no legal provisions barring women from accessing the courts and from testifying in civil or criminal proceedings, but the testimonies of women and non-Muslims are usually given less weight in Sharia courts. Aside from the Sharia courts which operate in some states, women mostly do not face discrimination in the courts.

### References:

1. Chibuzor Ekwewwu, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007
3. U.S Department of State, "Nigeria Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2006" Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

March 6, 2007

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78751.htm>

**100:** Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**75:**

**50:** Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**25:**

**0:** Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

79c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 46, 1999 Federal Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

79d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

These state defenders are from the Legal Aid Council and are under-funded and under-staffed. As a result, many accused persons remain awaiting trial due to lack of representations.

**References:**

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;

**100:** State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

**75:**

**50:** State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

**25:**

**0:** State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

79e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Some middle-income citizens can afford lawsuits, although this is not a very popular option because of the usual length of a trial.

**References:**

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.

79f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The cost of the initial lawsuit is not very exorbitant, but the process tends to stretch out and the final accumulative cost tends to be high. This discourages small businesses to file lawsuits and follow through to the end.

**References:**

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

79g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Courts are available to most people, but in some remote areas it involves traveling to the court room. The federal courts are mostly in the Federal Capital Territory (F.C.T) and major cities of the country and this involves significant costs in traveling expenses.

**References:**

1. Chibuzor Ekwewuo, executive director Public and Private Rights Watch, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007;
2. J.A Kalu, principal partner, J.A Kalu and Associates, Pact Nigeria's Office, Aug. 28, 2007

**100:** Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

**75:**

**50:** Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

**25:**

**0:** Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

---

## 80. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

33

80a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The Nigerian Police and Drug Law Enforcement Agencies are the two top law enforcement agencies. Appointments to their leadership positions, while being based on professional qualifications, are also colored by loyalties like connections and ethnic biases. Political loyalties are not a big factor, but the process is most times based on who wields the most influence. Recruitments in the lower cadre are also sometimes subject to connections.

### References:

1. Dorothy Gimba, assistant commissioner of Police, Head Anti-Trafficking Unit, WOTCLEF's Abuja Office, Sept. 23, 2007;
2. Dapo Olorunyomi, chief of staff to the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, CDD Office, Sept. 13, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

80b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The Nigeria Police Force is grossly under-funded and has many times been unable to carry out its core mandate because of lack of equipments and sufficient manpower. Its management is also accused of being corrupt and has recently been involved in scandals of embezzlement of establishment funds. The Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement has little more funds to carry out its mandate because it has considerably less manpower than the police force.

### References:

1. Dorothy Gimba, assistant commissioner of Police, Head Anti-Trafficking Unit,



WOTCLEF's Abuja Office, Sept. 23, 2007;

2. Dapo Olorunyomi, chief of staff to the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, CDD Office, Sept. 13, 2007;

3. The Police Service Commission and IGP Ehindero

John Ikubaje

Leadership, Sept. 24, 2007

[http://www.leadershipnigeria.com/product\\_info.php?products\\_id=3355&osCsid=9a6daf7db442f3201d53efd7ce2a791f](http://www.leadershipnigeria.com/product_info.php?products_id=3355&osCsid=9a6daf7db442f3201d53efd7ce2a791f)

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

80c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agencies initiate investigations on their own, but many times they are influenced by family, governmental and other loyalties in enforcing their mandates. These agencies are really open to manipulations.

**References:**

1. Dorothy Gimba, assistant commissioner of Police, Head Anti-Trafficking Unit, WOTCLEF's Abuja Office, Sept. 23, 2007;

2. Dapo Olorunyomi, chief of staff to the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, CDD Office, Sept. 13, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

---

81. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

81a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Police Service Commission is the civilian overseeing body established under the Nigerian Constitution for the Nigeria Police Force. It has power to appoint, promote, discipline and dismiss all officers of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) except the inspector-general of the police (IGP).

The Public Complaints Commission is the agency that oversees the general public sector.

**References:**

1. Police Service Commission Establishment Act, 2001
2. Section 2, Public Complaints Commission Act, 1975

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

81b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It rarely responds on time, mostly because of the bureaucracy of the Nigeria public sector. Also, many citizens are unaware of the function of this establishment.

**References:**

1. Dorothy Gimba, assistant commissioner of Police, Head Anti-Trafficking Unit, WOTCLEF's Abuja Office, Sept. 23, 2007;
2. Dapo Olorunyomi, chief of staff to the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, CDD Office, Sept. 13, 2007

**100:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

81c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Police Service Commission, Police Service Commission Establishment Act, 2001;
2. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act, 2004;
3. Independent and Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

81d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agencies rarely initiate investigations on their own. The Police Service Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC) must first receive reports before they undertake investigations. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) does, but it targets only top level police officers. There is also very low collaboration between any of the agencies.

**References:**

1. Dorothy Gimba, assistant commissioner of Police, Head Anti-Trafficking Unit, WOTCLEF's Abuja Office, Sept. 23, 2007;
2. Dapo Olorunyomi, chief of staff to the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, CDD Office, Sept. 13, 2007

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

81e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES | NO

**References:**

There are no laws exempting them.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

81f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Public Complaints Commission is the agency overseeing the general public sector.

Law enforcement officers are not immune from criminal prosecution, but there is a general reluctance on the part of the public to prosecute these officers. This is why prosecution levels are very low.

**References:**

1. Dorothy Gimba, assistant commissioner of Police, Head Anti-Trafficking Unit, WOTCLEF's Abuja Office, Sept. 23, 2007;

2. Dapo Olorunyomi, chief of staff to the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, CDD Office, Sept. 13, 2007

**100:** Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

**75:**

**50:** Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

**25:**

**0:** Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.

