

Overall Score:

**58 - Very Weak**

Legal Framework Score:

**73 - Moderate**

Actual Implementation Score:

**43 - Very Weak**

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

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## I-1. <sup>62</sup>Civil Society Organizations

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### 1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

100

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

**YES** | NO

#### References:

Section 26 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone  
Interview with Felix Marco Conteh

**YES:** A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

YES | NO

**References:**

Interview with Felix Marco Conteh, Anti-Corruption Commission  
Interview with valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There are, however, multiple agencies for registration and some of these other agencies do not require disclosure of sources of funding.

**References:**

The National NGO policy requires CSOs registered with the Ministry of Development to disclose their sources of funding.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

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## 2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

92

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown  
Interview with Ensa Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2007, Freetown

**100:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

**75:**

**50:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Civil Society input into national policy is growing. A number of civil society groups were instance included in the review of the Anti-Corruption strategy and they are also members of the War Victim Repatriation Task Force.

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007  
Ensa Bockarie, September 4, 2007

**100:** Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

**75:**

**50:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

**25:**

**0:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, September 5, 2007, Freetown  
Ensah Bockarie, September 4 2007, Freetown

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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### 3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007  
Ensah Bockarie, September 4, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007  
Ensah Bockarie, September 4, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist's work. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007  
Ensah Bockarie, September 4, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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#### 4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

88

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Chapter 2 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone

**YES:** A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Whilst nothing in law prevents the formation of trade unions, only one umbrella trade Union, The Sierra Leone Labor Congress, has official recognition. Recognition here is tied with the fact that the Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act of 1971 recognizes the Labor Congress as the union the government can negotiate or do business with.

**References:**

Fallah Ensa Ndayma, National Coordinator, Civil Society Alternative Process; National President, Trade Union Confederation of Sierra Leone

**100:** Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

**75:**

**50:** Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

**25:**

**0:** Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

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## I-2. Media

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### 5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Section 25 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Section 25 of the constitution guarantees the freedom of expression.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

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## 6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

100

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

**100** | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, Freetown, September 11, 2007

Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**100:** Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, Freetown, September 11, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

**100** | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, Freetown, September 11, 2007

Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, Freetown, September 11, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

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## 7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

94

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, Freetown, September 11, 2007

**100:** Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

**25:**

**0:** Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Independent Media Commission Act grants rights of appeal to the High Court.

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, Freetown, September 11, 2007.

Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is easier to get a radio license than one for a TV station

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, Freetown, September 11, 2007

Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, Freetown, September 11, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

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## 8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

100

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Mustapha Katta, Information Specialist, World Bank Sierra Leone Office, September 4, 2007, Freetown

Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**100:** The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

**75:**

**50:** Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

**25:**

**0:** Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Mustapha Katta, Information Specialist, World Bank Sierra Leone Office, September 4, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

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## 9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

58

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Public Order Act (1965) criminalizes even accurate reports that damage the reputation of a government official

**YES:** A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Independent Radio Network, September 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

**75:**

**50:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

**25:**

**0:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Independent Radio Network, September 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

**75:**

**50:** The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

## 10. Are the media credible sources of information?

60

10a. In law, print media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

### References:

Print media editors are required to affix their names to every copy of their newspapers. However, there are no requirements for print media companies to disclose the names of individuals who own them on their newspapers. However, the Independent Media Commission Act (2000) does require the disclosure of ownership.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

### References:

Independent Media Commission Act (2000) requires the disclosure of ownership.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Independent Radio Network, September 11, 2007, Freetown  
Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**100:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

**75:**

**50:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

**25:**

**0:** Editors and journalists are widely known to sell" favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown  
Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown,

**100:** All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

**75:**

**50:** Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

**25:**

**0:** The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown  
Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown,

**100:** The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

**75:**

**50:** The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

**25:**

**0:** The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

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## 11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

67

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The Editor of the Standard Times, Philip Neville, was detained for more than 48 hours for publishing a story about alleged corruption involving some shipment of rice from Libya.

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studios, September 11 2007, Freetown

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Talking Drum Studios, September 11, 2007, Freetown

Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

**References:**

Abdul Rashid, Talking Drum Studios, September 11, 2007, Freetown

Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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83  
I-3. Public Access to Information

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12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

0

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Though no law gives citizens the formal right to access government documents, recent legislation — the Local Government Act and The Public Procurement Act — makes provisions for citizens' access to documents related to those processes.

**References:**

There is are no laws that generally give citizens the right to access government records.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

No such laws exist.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

No such overarching mechanism exists

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information system laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

### 13. Is the right of access to information effective?

15

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

#### References:

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004  
Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

#### References:

Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

No appeal process exists if information is not granted.

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004  
Ensa Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004

**100:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

No appeal process exists.

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004  
Ensa Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The general reasons given by civil servant is that the official secrecy codes do not allow disclosure of government information.

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004  
Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004

**100:** The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

**75:**

**50:** The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

**25:**

**0:** The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

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Category II. Elections

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II-1. <sup>62</sup> Voting & Citizen Participation

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14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

**References:**

Constitution of Sierra Leone, Section 31  
The Electoral Laws Act, Section 4

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

**References:**

The constitution of Sierra Leone Section 43 states that the presidential elections takes place at the end of the president's term ,which according to Section 46 of the Constitution is 5 years. The constitution also calls for parliamentary elections every fifth year.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

---

## 15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

75

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Macksood Sesay, Voter Education Officer, National Electoral Commission, September 1, 2007  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007

**100:** Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

**75:**

**50:** Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Statement from NEC Chairperson to the Media, New Citizen Newspaper, September 18, 2007, p2, cites instances of ballot box stuffing in the presidential run-off elections held on September 8, 2007.

**100:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

**75:**

**50:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

**25:**

**0:** Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007  
Ensah Bockarie, September 4, 2007

**100:** Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

---

## 16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

65

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

### References:

Section 35 of the constitution of Sierra Leone

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

### References:

Section 73-78 of the Constitution disqualifies illiterates (in English) from being members of parliament, and Section 41 states that those who are not eligible to be members of parliament are ineligible to become president.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007

Interview with Macksood Sesay, Voter Education Officer, National Electoral Commission, September 1, 2007, Freetown

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

**25:**

**0:** Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Ensa Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2007, Freetown

Interview with Macksood, Voter Education Officer, National Electoral Commission, September 1, 2007

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The country just held its parliamentary and presidential elections, in which an opposition party has won the presidency and the majority of seats in Parliament. The previous governing party is now the opposition with 43 seats. The governing party has 59 seats. In the previous parliament the then opposition party had very limited power to force parliamentary debate on issues.

**References:**

Interview with Kemoh Sesay, APC member of Parliament, Freetown, August 20, 2007

**100:** The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

**75:**

**50:** The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

**25:**

**0:** The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

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## II-2. Election Integrity

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17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There are a number of organizations that monitor elections or elections related activities. These include the National Electoral Commission, National Political Party Registration Commission.

**References:**

The National Political Party Registration Commission; the National Electoral Commission

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

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## 18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

60

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Constitution of Sierra Leone Section 32 (11)

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown  
Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, Freetown, September 19, 2007  
Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007

**100:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown  
Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, Freetown, September 19, 2007  
Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown, October 19, 2007.

**100:** Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

**75:**

**50:** Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Invalidation should not be construed here as imposing penalties on offenders, the commission has not imposed penalties on persons responsible for this. Sure some administrative actions were recently taken within the commission on staff members who breached administrative procedures relating to the elections, but no penalty has been imposed on candidates or persons accused on electoral malpractices. The score may be adjusted to 50.

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown  
Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, Freetown, September 19, 2007  
Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Freetown. October 19, 2007.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

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## 19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

75

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

**75:**

**50:** There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

**25:**

**0:** The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost" voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Electoral Laws Act 2002 makes provision for any citizen of Sierra Leone to challenge the results of a presidential election in the Supreme Court.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is yet early to evaluate the newly established Elections Court that tries offenses relating to elections. In previous elections the courts were overtly biased in favor of the wants of the Presidency.

**References:**

Interview with Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of Sierra Leone, September 12 2007, Freetown.

**100:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

**75:**

**50:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

**25:**

**0:** The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The security forces were blamed by both the government and opposition as being biased against them. Towards the end of the elections and after the announcement of run-off presidential elections results, some members of the outgoing government accused the police of bias whilst the victorious opposition praised them for their neutrality.

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance.

**100:** The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

**75:**

**50:** The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

There is no law that prohibits domestic or international observation. Both the past Presidential and Parliamentary elections (2002) and the just concluded one were monitored by domestic elections and international observers.

**References:**

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Ensa Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, Freetown, September 4, 2007

**100:** Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers' activities.

**75:**

**50:** Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

**25:**

**0:** Election observers' movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

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78  
II-3. Political Financing

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20. Are there regulations governing political financing?

57

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Political Parties Act (2002/3 Part IV, Section 19

Interview with Lucy Vandi Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Section 19 states that the Political Parties Registration Commission shall make laws that limit the influence of money in the political process. This provision could also be found in the Political Parties Code of Conduct paragraph 15. However, the commission has not actually set a specified ceiling to political parties contributions.

**References:**

Political Parties Act (2002/3 Part IV, Section 19

Interview with Lucy Vandi Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Political Parties Act (2002/3 Part IV, Section 19.

Interview with Lucy Vandi Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on corporate contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to candidates or political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

**References:**

Political Parties Act (2002/3 Part IV, Section 19 grants powers to the Political Parties Registration Commission to set regulations that may limit contributions to or set limits to political party expenditures, but this has not been done  
Interview with Lucy Vandi Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Political Parties Act, Section 20 and 21.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Whilst there are requirements for auditing of political party finances, there are no such requirements for individual candidates' finances.

**References:**

Section 25, Political Parties Act (2002).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the political financing process.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Political Parties Act mandates the Political Parties Registration Commission to set regulations and monitor political parties finances

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around political financing. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

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## 21. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

4

21a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or

parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making to donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

21d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency responsible is less than three years old. It is too early to make an assessment on them.

**References:**

Interview with Lucy Vandi Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

21e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

21f. In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no evidence of any auditing of political party finances, although such requirements exist in law.

**References:**

Interview with Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

**75:**

**50:** Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

**25:**

**0:** Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

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## 22. Can citizens access records related to political financing?

25

22a. In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

**75:**

**50:** Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

**25:**

**0:** Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regularly withheld from public disclosure.

22b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Lucy Vandí Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission, September 19, 2007, Freetown  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

22c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.

**Comments:**

No costs are charged; but most people do not know about this.

**References:**

Lucy Vandi Lamin, Information Officer, Political Parties Registration Commission

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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Category III. Government Accountability

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III-1. <sup>45</sup>Executive Accountability

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23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 28 (1) Constitution of Sierra Leone; Section 133 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

---

## 24. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

50

24a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

### References:

Interview with Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 4, 2007, Freetown  
Abdul Rahman Rashid, Search for Common Ground, Freetown, September 11, 2007

**100:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

24b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

**YES** | NO

### References:

Constitution of Sierra Leone, Section 127 grants powers to the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of actions from any branch of government.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

24c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to rely upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

24d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown

**100:** The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25:

**0:** The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

---

## 25. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

50

25a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | **NO**

### References:

Section 48 (4) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

25b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

**YES** | NO

### References:

The constitution only exempts the president from criminal and civil proceedings. The Anti-Corruption Act (section 5, 7, 8) makes all public officials, including ministers, subject to investigation and indictment for corrupt practices.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

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## 26. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

26a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

The law (Local Government Act 2004) only requires local council officials to declare assets.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

26b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

The law (Local Government Act 2004) only requires local council officials to declare assets

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

26c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Anti-Corruption Act 2004, Section 8; General Orders of the Civil service

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

26d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

26e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

26f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no such regulations, so there is no question of the regulations being implemented.

**References:**

Valnora Edwin  
Abdul Rahman Rashid

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

26g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown September 11, 2007  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

26h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no requirements for disclosures of assets by executive branch members.

**References:**

Interview with Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown September 11, 2007  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007

**100:** Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

## 27. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

0

27a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | NO

**References:**

There are no laws requiring the head of state to disclose assets.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

27b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no laws for asset disclosure by the executive.

**References:**

Interview with Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown September 11, 2007  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

27c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no laws for asset disclosure by the executive

**References:**

Interview with Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown September 11, 2007  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

50

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown September 11, 2007  
Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, September 5, 2007

**100:** Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

**75:**

**50:** The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

**25:**

**0:** The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

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## III-2. Legislative Accountability

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29. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

83

29a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 127 (1) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

29b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

29c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

**YES** | NO

**References:**

The Constitution only prohibits criminal or civil proceedings against the president. Civil or criminal proceedings can be instituted against MPs. Section 99 of the Constitution only grants immunity from prosecution for things said in Parliament by a member of Parliament

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.

---

### 30. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

14

30a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such requirements.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

30b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

30c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The law prohibits all public officials, including MPs, from accepting gifts (except with the approval of the President).

**References:**

The Anti-Corruption Act, 2000, Section 8 (2&3).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

30d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

**References:**

There are no such requirements.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

30e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

30f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no such regulations.

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

30g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no regulations for auditing of legislators' asset declarations.

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

**31. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?**

0

31a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

31b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

There are no laws requiring asset declaration by members of the legislature.

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

31c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no laws requiring asset disclosure by legislators.

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## 32. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

50

32a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

**References:**

Parliamentary rules requires the publication of Hansards which are public documents that could be accessed.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

32b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

32c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Retrieving legislative documents requires visiting the capital, Freetown.

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## 37 III-3. Judicial Accountability

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### 33. Are judges appointed fairly?

92

33a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

#### References:

Constitution of Sierra Leone, Section 135.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

**NO:** A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

33b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

**75:**

**50:** Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

33c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Parliamentary approval is, however, flaunted in the appointed of contract judges.

**References:**

Section 135 (2), Constitution of Sierra Leone Requires parliamentary Approval for appointed judges.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

---

## 34. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

54

34a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Rules of Court Requires Judges to give reasons for their decisions.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

34b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

**25:**

**0:** Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

34c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 137 and 141 grants the Judicial Service Commission power to recommend disciplinary actions.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

34d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Section 140 (3) c grants powers to dismiss members of the judicial service commission to the president for 'any other cause.' It does not specify which cause.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry, legislative committee, or by an internal judiciary committee or council that can only act with the approval of judges themselves.

34e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

34f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

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### 35. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

18

35a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

35b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

The Anti-Corruption Act 2000, Section 8

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

35c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

35d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

35e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

There are no regulations restricting post judicial employment in the private sector for judges.

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

35f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to judges. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

35g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no requirements for asset disclosures.

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

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**36. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?**

0

36a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

**References:**

There are no asset disclosure laws for judges.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

36b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no asset disclosure laws for judges.

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

36c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no asset disclosure laws.

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law,  
Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

## III-4. Budget Processes

### 37. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

50

37a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

#### References:

Constitution of Sierra Leone Section 110,111,112

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

37b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

#### References:

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

**75:**

**50:** Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

**25:**

**0:** The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

37c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

**75:**

**50:** Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

**25:**

**0:** Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

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## 38. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

58

38a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

**25:**

**0:** Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

38b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

38c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

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39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 93 Of the Constitution grants powers to parliamentary committees to investigate and provide oversight. The Public Accounts Committee provides oversight of public funds.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

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40. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

25

40a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The committee should be informed, but they were not regularly informed or or report submitted to the committee, nor did the committee have the clout or capacity in practice to effectively demand or act upon reports

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

**75:**

**50:** Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

**25:**

**0:** There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

40b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

**75:**

**50:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

**25:**

**0:** The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

40c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

**75:**

**50:** This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.

**25:**

**0:** This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee's behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

40d. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Safie Koroma, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007  
Abu Bakarr Kamara, Programme Assistant, National Accountability Group, Freetown, October 17, 2007

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

**75:**

**50:** The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

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Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

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IV-1. <sup>52</sup> Civil Service Regulations

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41. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

41a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

**References:**

Financial and General Orders of the Civil Service; Code of Conduct of Civil Servants, Constitution of Sierra Leone Section 151; The Code, Regulations and Rules of the Sierra Leone Civil Service (2004)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

41b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

**References:**

Financial and General Orders of the Civil Service; The Code, Regulations and Rules of the Sierra Leone Civil Service (2004) 12 &13; , Constitution of Sierra Leone Section 151

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

41c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

**References:**

Public Service Commission Regulations. Section 146 of the Constitution also mandates the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and recommend appropriate actions to redress actions omitted or taken by public officials.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

41d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

**References:**

Public Service Regulations bar public officers with criminal records from being re-employed in the public service.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

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## 42. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

50

42a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown.

**100:** Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

42b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown.

**100:** Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

42c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown.

**100:** Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

**75:**

**50:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

42d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position's authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

42e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

42f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Annual Estimate lists posts and vacancies in government departments.

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

**75:**

**50:** The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

**25:**

**0:** The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

42g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

**75:**

**50:** The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

42h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There were delays in the payment of salaries to some local government employees and teachers, but these are not considered part of the national civil service per se.

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

**75:**

**50:** In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

**25:**

**0:** In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

42i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, Freetown, Sierra Leone

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

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43. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

43a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

The is no legislation that specifically deals with conflicts of interest. See Sonnia-Magba Bu-Buakei Jabbi and Salia Kpaka (2007), 'Reconstruction Public Integrity System Survey,' National Accountability Group, Freetown P45

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

**NO:** A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

43b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

43c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Anti-corruption Act Section 8

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

43d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no such regulations.

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

43e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

43f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

**75:**

**50:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

---

#### 44. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

44a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Laws and practices relating to disclosure are slowly emerging. The Local Government Act of 2004 requires local council members to declare assets; the new President of the Republic has said that he will declare his assets. Officers at the National Procurement Authority are required to fill out an asset declaration form.

**References:**

There are no such laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

44b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no such laws.

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no such laws.

**References:**

Baba Fortune, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education, October 11, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

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45. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

31

45a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This is a general protection clause for anybody who informs the commission of corrupt practices.

**References:**

Section 42 of the Anti-Corruption Act

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

45b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Office, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown, September 11, 2007.

**100:** Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

45c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There have been no cases to test the effectiveness of the non-disclosure of names as part of the protection of private sector whistle-blowers.

**References:**

Whistle-blowers are only protected from disclosure of their names by Section 42 of the Anti-Corruption Act.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

45d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relation Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown, September 11, 2007.

**100:** Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and

accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

---

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

0

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relation Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown, September 11, 2007.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

---

47. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

6

47a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The Anti-Corruption Commission appointed integrity officers from among staff members of various ministries and agencies to liaise with the commission on corruption issues, but these are ad hoc arrangements.

**References:**

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relation Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown, September 11, 2007.

**100:** The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

47b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relation Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown, September 11, 2007.

**100:** The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

47c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relation Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown, September 11, 2007.

**100:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

47d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relation Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown, September 11, 2007.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

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13  
IV-3. Procurement

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48. Is the public procurement process effective?

80

48a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Public Procurement Act 2004, section 33

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

48b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

Public Procurement Act (2004) Section 17.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

48c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Sylvester Demby, Admin Assistant, National Public Procurement Authority, Freetown, September 13, 2007

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

48d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Employees at the National Public Procurement Authority fill out an Asset and Liability form on recruitment, but no mechanism as yet exists to monitor their assets and liability.

**References:**

Sylvester Demby, Admin Assistant, National Public Procurement Authority, Freetown, September 13, 2007.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

48e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

The Public Procurement Act (2004) Section 38-40

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).

48f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Public Procurement Act (2004) Section 46.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

48g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Public Procurement Act (2004), Section 65.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Public Procurement Act (2004), Section 65 (8) makes provisions for judicial review.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Public Procurement Act (2004) Section 35.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is too early to assess the Procurement Process on this score.

**References:**

Sylvester Demby, Admin Assistant, National Public Procurement Authority, Freetown, September 13, 2007.

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

---

49. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

79

49a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Public Procurement Act (2004) Section 26, 32 (3).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

49b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Public Procurement Act (2004) Section 26

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

49c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Sylvester Demby, Administrative Assistant, Public Procurement Authority, Freetown.

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Sylvester Demby, Administrative Assistant, Public Procurement Authority, Freetown

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

49e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Sylvester Demby, Administrative Assistant, Public Procurement Authority, Freetown

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

49f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The huge illiteracy rates in the country, over 60 percent, means that even when results are published they may only be accessible by a small minority.

**References:**

Interview with Sylvester Demby, Administrative Assistant, Public Procurement Authority, Freetown  
Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

**75:**

**50:** Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

**25:**

**0:** This information is not available to the public through an official process.

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## IV-4. Privatization

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50. Is the privatization process effective?

75

50a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

National Commission for Privatization Act, Section 2

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

50b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

**References:**

National Commission for Privatization Act, Section 9

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

50c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The commission has mainly been inactive, so there has hardly been an opportunity to gauge the enforcement of conflict of interest regulations.

**References:**

Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Business October 12, 2007

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

---

## 51. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

70

51a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

### References:

The National Commission for Privatization Act requires to make publicly available regulations relating to privatization.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

51b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

Privatization bids are advertised on the internet; most Sierra Leoneans do not use the internet

### References:

Privatization bids are advertised on the internet; most Sierra Leoneans do not use the internet

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

51c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

**References:**

The National Commission for Privatization act requires privatization decisions to be laid before parliament.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

51d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Privatization documents are not generally difficult to access, but very few businesses have interests in accessing them

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

51e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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Category V. Oversight and Regulation

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**63**  
V-1. National Ombudsman

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52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 146 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone provides for the establishment of the office of the ombudsman.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

### 53. Is the national ombudsman effective?

39

53a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

#### References:

The Ombudsman Act, 1997.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

53b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

#### Comments:

The Ombudsman is a member of the former ruling Party and conducted elections for that party's national executive members. Many Sierra Leoneans do not see him as non partisan.

#### References:

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone.

**100:** This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

53c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This indicator could not be evaluated now as the present occupant is the first since the establishment of the office

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

53d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

53e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There seem to be no clear cut criteria for appointing the staff of the Ombudsman. The office is operated from the private offices of the Ombudsman.

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone.

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

53f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Funding for the Ombudsman is provided in the Government's annual Appropriation Bill; and the office does receive funding from the government.

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

53g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

53h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

53i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Ombudsman can only recommend to the President that actions be taken; it cannot penalize offenders.

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

53j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.

53k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

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#### 54. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

67

54a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | NO

**References:**

The Ombudsman Act requires the ombudsman to present its report to the president, parliament and the general public

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

54b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

---

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The reports of the ombudsman are hardly seen as documents worthy of the time and effort to access by many citizens

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The ombudsman gives out free copies of reports to those very few who seek to access them

**References:**

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

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55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 119 of The Constitution of Sierra Leone Section establishes the Office of the Auditor General and specifies its functions. Parliament has also passed the Audit Service Act.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

---

56. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

59

56a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 119, Constitution of Sierra Leone

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The constitution of Sierra Leone stipulates the same stringent removal process for the Auditor General as it does for judges. The fact that other similarly protected officials have been removed gives one reason for pause, however.

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

56f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

**Comments:**

The Audit Report of the Auditor General for 2004 got stalled in parliament and has not been published; no audit report has since been published.

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

56h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown

**100:** The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

**75:**

**50:** The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

---

## 57. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

33

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 119 of the Constitution requires the auditor general to lay his report before parliament, and this report could be made public following the report to parliament.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

57b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

**Comments:**

The last report of the Auditor General (2004) is still outside the public domain.

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The last report from 2004 is still not available publicly.

**References:**

Fatorma Koroma, Internal Financial Controller, Plan International, Sierra Leone; until May 2007, Audit Assistant, Sierra Leone Audit Service. October 9, 2007, Freetown.

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

100

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

**References:**

The National Revenue Authority Act establishes the income tax department as an arm of the National Revenue Authority.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

---

59. Is the tax collection agency effective?

75

59a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Gbessay Kanu, Economist, National Revenue Authority, Freetown, October 5, 2007.

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Bureaucratic sclerosis at the Ministry of Finance often delays disbursements to the agency.

**References:**

Gbessay Kanu, Economist, National Revenue Authority, Freetown, October 5, 2007.

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

## 60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

50

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Gbessay Kanu, Economist, National Revenue Authority, Freetown, October 5, 2007.

**100:** Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

**75:**

**50:** Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

**25:**

**0:** Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

---

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

**References:**

The National Revenue Authority Act establishes the Department of Customs as an arm of the National Revenue Authority.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

---

62. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

75

62a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Following the merger of the Income Tax Department and the Customs and Excise Department to form the National Revenue Authority, a massive recruitment of degree holders into the new organization took place. They are also well paid and receive training; they may have some taints of unprofessionalism (bribery) but are considered to meet key Weberian criteria of a professional, full-time, well-paid staff.

**References:**

Gbessay Kanu, Economist, National Revenue Authority, Freetown, October 5, 2007.

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Bureaucratic delays at the Ministry of Finance often delay disbursements to the Authority

**References:**

Gbessay Kanu, Economist, National Revenue Authority, Freetown, October 5, 2007.

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

50

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Gbessay Kanu, Economist, National Revenue Authority, Freetown, October 5, 2007.

**100:** Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

**75:**

**50:** Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

25:

0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

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## V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

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64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

**References:**

The National Commission for Privatization Act (2002) sets up the National Commission for Privatization to privatize state enterprises and oversee their operations before such privatization.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this function does not exist.

---

65. Is the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

45

65a. In law, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

Section 5 of the National Commission for Privatization Act stipulates that most of the members of the Commission are elected by Civil Society organizations. This should insulate the commission against political interference.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

65b. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Business, October 12, 2007.

**100:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65c. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Business, October 12, 2007.

**100:** The the agency or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The the agency or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

65d. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

65e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Business, October 12, 2007.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

---

## 66. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

65

66a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

**YES** | NO

### References:

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, PRO, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007. State-owned enterprises are required to submit annual statements of accounts to the Auditor General, who shall institute an audit and lay the audit report before parliament. Reports laid before parliament are public documents which citizens can access.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

66b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

### References:

Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Business, October 12, 2007.

**100:** State-owned companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

**25:**

**0:** Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

66c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Business, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

**75:**

**50:** Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

**25:**

**0:** State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

66d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Business, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

66e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens can access these records, but there are usually difficulties as to where to go to access them; most citizens are not interested in accessing these records.

**References:**

Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Business, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## 70 V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

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67. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

75

67a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The law does not bar anyone from registering a business in Sierra Leone. It does, however, require registration of such businesses as explicitly stated in the act.

**References:**

The Registration of Business Act (2007)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required

67b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Registration of Business Act (2007), Section 10 (3) and Section 14 (3)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

67c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

67d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

---

**68. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?**

0

68a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There are laws relating to standards for meeting public health, but these are not easily accessed.

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Whilst there are number of laws for meeting environmental standards, these are difficult to access.

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, October 12, 2007.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Alhaji Unisaa Alim Sesay, Public Relations Officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

---

69. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

33

69a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Alhaji Unisa Alim Sesay, Public Relations officer, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Freetown, October 12, 2007.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

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## Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

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### VI-1. <sup>66</sup>Anti-Corruption Law

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70. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

89

70a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Anti Corruption Act (2000) Section 8-9.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Anti-Corruption Act (2000), Part IV.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Anti Corruption Act (2000), Section 9.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Anti Corruption Act, Section 8.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

The Anti-Corruption Commission does not explicitly criminalize bribing foreign officials. The law is limited to dealings with public officials or misappropriating monies from donors or international organizations.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Anti-Corruption Act (2000), Section 12 and 13.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

The general provisions of the Anti Corruption criminalize using public resources for private gain. The term 'public resources' here could also be interpreted as including confidential government information or one's access to such information to solicit or receive an advantage. Interview with Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission, September 6, 2007, Freetown.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Anti-Money Laundering Act (2004) Section 2.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Interview with Keh Kamara, Barrister at Lwa. There are numerous laws that criminalize aiding and abetting someone in the commission of a crime, or conspiring with someone to commit a felony.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

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## VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

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71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

**YES** | NO

**References:**

The Anti-Corruption Act (2000) establishes the Anti-Corruption Commission to address corruption.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

---

## 72. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

44

72a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

### References:

Anti-Corruption Act (2000) Section 48 subjects prosecutions by the Anti Corruption Commission to the Attorney General who is a member of the cabinet and a political appointee.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

72b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

### References:

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004.

Ensaah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004.

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission.

**100:** This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or

other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

72c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004.  
Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004.  
Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission.

**100:** The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

72d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004  
Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004  
Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission.

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

72e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004  
Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004  
Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti- Corruption Commission

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

72f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004.  
Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004.  
Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

72g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004.

Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004.

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

72h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Whilst the commission has full power to educate the public and investigate corruption cases, its lack of enforcement powers seriously undermines its ability to combat corruption.

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004.

Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004.

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

72i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004

Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

---

### 73. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

50

73a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004.

Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004.

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

73b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens don't complain because they are afraid; they don't complain because they think nothing will come of it.

**References:**

Valnora Edwin, Coordinator, Campaign for Good Governance, September 5, 2004.

Ensah Bockarie, Civil Society Movement, September 4, 2004.

Felix Marco Conteh, Community Relations Officer, Anti-Corruption Commission.

**100:** Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

---

65  
VI-3. Rule of Law

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74. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

42

74a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

**References:**

The constitution provides establishes an Appeals Court unto which cases from lower level courts can be appealed. Cases can also be appealed from the Appeals Court to the Supreme Court.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

74b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

74c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

---

## 75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

25

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

### References:

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

**75:**

**50:** Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

**25:**

**0:** Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

---

## 76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

25

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

**Comments:**

Cases involving jail sentences are enforced. But civil rulings against the government or powerful citizens are difficult to enforce.

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

**25:**

**0:** Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

---

## 77. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

56

77a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Constitution of Sierra Leone, Section 120 (3).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts ).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

77b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

**Comments:**

The practice of hiring contract judges that can be removed at the whim of the president seriously subjects the judiciary to political interference.

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

**75:**

**50:** National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

**25:**

**0:** National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

77c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

**References:**

Distributing cases lies within the administrative powers of the Chief Justice, but the process is hardly transparent, equitable or random.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

77d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The stringent requirement for removal of judges do not however relate to 'contract judges'. These are judges hired on contract by the president and who can be removed at his discretion.

**References:**

Constitution of Sierra Leone Section 137 requires justification by a tribunal before a judge of the Superior Court can be removed.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

---

## 78. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

78a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

78b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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## 79. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

50

79a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

79b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**75:**

**50:** Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**25:**

**0:** Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

79c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

**References:**

Interview with Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

79d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

**75:**

**50:** State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

**25:**

**0:** State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

79e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.

79f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

**25:**

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

79g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Osman Keh Kamara, Barrister at Law, Freetown, September 10, 2007.

Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Courts Monitoring Programme, Freetown September 11, 2007.

100: Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

75:

50: Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

25:

0: Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

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## VI-4. Law Enforcement

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80. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

50

80a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Inspector Paul Bannister, Police Headquarters, October 16, 2007, Freetown.

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone.

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

80b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Inspector Paul Bannister, Police Headquarters, October 16, 2007, Freetown.  
Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.  
Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

80c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**References:**

Interview with Inspector Paul Bannister, Police Headquarters, October 16, 2007, Freetown.  
Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.  
Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

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## 81. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

75

81a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

**YES** | NO

### References:

The Ombudsman Act stipulates that citizens can complain about the actions of public officials (police are public officials) to the Office of the Ombudsman. The police have also set up a Complaint, Discipline and Investigation Department within the Police Department to receive complaints about police officials.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

81b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

### References:

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.  
Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone.

**100:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

81c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Anti-Corruption act mandates the Anti Corruption Commission to investigate acts of corruption by public officials. The police are considered public officials under the Act.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

81d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Inspector Paul Bannister, Police Headquarters, October 16, 2007, Freetown.  
Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.  
Interview with Elvis Hollowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

81e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Constitution of Sierra Leone gives only the President immunity from criminal and civil proceedings during his/her tenure.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

81f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Inspector Paul Bannister, Police Headquarters, October 16, 2007, Freetown.

Interview with Mohamed Suma, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program.

Interview with Elvis Hallowell, Country Director, Journalists for Human Rights, Sierra Leone.

**100:** Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

**75:**

**50:** Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

**25:**

**0:** Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.

