

Overall Score:

81 - Strong

Legal Framework Score:

85 - Strong

Actual Implementation Score:

74 - Moderate

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. ⁸⁶Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

67

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

Comments:

According to the Constitution — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 22

1. The right of association is granted.
2. Associations which pursue ends or use means legally defined as criminal offenses are illegal.
3. Associations set up on the basis of this section must be entered in a register for the sole purpose of public knowledge.
4. Associations may only be dissolved or have their activities suspended by virtue of a court order stating the reasons for it.
5. Secret and paramilitary associations are prohibited.

Taking into account the Constitutional right of freedom of association the Spanish Constitution contains the regulation of associations with constitutional status such as Political Parties (Art. 6), Trade Unions (Arts. 7 & 28), Religious Institutions (Art. 16), Consumer and Customer Associations (Art. 51) and, Professional Associations (Art. 52). Thus, for other associations that are not considered of constitutional status, the Congress passed the Organic Law 1/2002, of March 22.

References:

Spanish Constitution
<http://www.constitucion.es/>

See also, Organic Law 1/2002, of 22 March, regulating the right of association
BOE No. 73 Published on 26 March 2002 pp. 11981-11991
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/03/26/pdfs/A11981-11991.pdf>

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

YES | NO

Comments:

For example, the anti-corruption CSO the Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE) (based in Malaga) gets funding from the European Union.

References:

Organic Law 1/2002, of 22 March, regulating the right of association

BOE No. 73 Published on 26 March 2002 pp. 11981-11991

<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/03/26/pdfs/A11981-11991.pdf>

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

NO: A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

Comments:

The disclosure of the sources of funding is not regulated and, thus, it is not common (if done at all).

References:

Organic Law 1/2002, of 22 March, regulating the right of association.

BOE No. 73 Published on 26 March 2002 pp. 11981-11991

<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/03/26/pdfs/A11981-11991.pdf>

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

83

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez

Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia

July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas

Attorney and member of anti-corruption group the Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

75:

50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas
Attorney and member of anti-corruption association AYRE (Association for Analysis and Reflection)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

75:

50: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

25:

0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas
Attorney and member of anti-corruption association AYRE (Association for Analysis and Reflection)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

Comments:

But then again, there are so few anti-corruption/good governance CSOs operating in the country that the no imprisonment" may be the result of no one threatening those who engage in corruption deals.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren
Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

Comments:

Those working on anti-corruption issues are never physically harmed. However, intimidation and lack of funding (usually from public funds) are issues facing those working on anti-corruption issues.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto
Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July, 19 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren
Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist's work. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

Comments:

As mentioned earlier, there are so few anti-corruption/good governance CSOs operating in the country that nobody has been killed because there is no one (or nearly no one) to kill in the first place. Also, those engaged in corruption may not see anti-corruption CSOs as threatening.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto
Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July, 19 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren
Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

100

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

Comments:

Spanish Constitution — Preliminary Title, Section 7
Trade unions and employers' associations contribute to the defense and promotion of the economic and social interests that they represent. Their creation and the exercise of their activities shall be free in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law. Their internal structure and their functioning must be democratic.

Spanish Constitution — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 28
1. All have the right to freely join a trade union. The law may restrict or except the exercise of this right in the Armed Forces or Institutes or other bodies subject to military discipline, and shall lay down the special conditions of its exercise by civil servants. Trade union freedom includes the right to set up trade unions and to join the union of one's choice, as well as the right of trade unions to form confederations and to found international trade union organizations, or to become members thereof. No one may be compelled to join a trade union.

2. The right of workers to strike in defense of their interests is recognized. The law governing the exercise of this right shall establish the safeguards necessary to ensure the maintenance of essential public services.

References:

Spanish Constitution
<http://www.constitucion.es/>

See, also Law of Trade Union Freedom:
Ley Orgánica 11/1985, de 2 de agosto, de Libertad Sindical
BOE No. 189 — Published on Aug. 8, 1985 http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1985/16660

Amended by Organic Law 14/1994, of 19 May
BOE No. 120 Published on May 20, 1994
http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1994/11417

YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Fernando Vivas
Head of National Police Union in Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

José Ramón Mendiguren
Social Activist
Aug. 7 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Trade unions are common and are an important part to the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

I-2. Media

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

YES | NO

Comments:

Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 20

1. The following rights are recognized and protected:

a) The right to freely express and spread thoughts, ideas and opinions through words, in writing or by any other means of reproduction.

b) The right to literary, artistic, scientific and technical production and creation.

c) The right to academic freedom.

d) The right to freely communicate or receive truthful information by any means of dissemination whatsoever. The law shall regulate the right to the clause of conscience and professional secrecy in the exercise of these freedoms.

References:

The Spanish Constitution (1978)

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

YES | NO

Comments:

Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 20

1. The following rights are recognized and protected:

- a) The right to freely express and spread thoughts, ideas and opinions through words, in writing or by any other means of reproduction.
- b) The right to literary, artistic, scientific and technical production and creation.
- c) The right to academic freedom.
- d) The right to freely communicate or receive truthful information by any means of dissemination whatsoever. The law shall regulate the right to the clause of conscience and professional secrecy in the exercise of these freedoms.

References:

The spanish Constitution (1978)

<http://www.constitucion.es/index.html>

(Chapter 2, section 1, Article 20)

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

94

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Grupo Ser is part of the main Media Group PRISA, which publishes newspaper El Pais.

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro

Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events

Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga

Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6

29010 Malaga

Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 716

July 27, 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

100: Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:

Any public administration is subject to perform under a common administrative procedure where an appeal mechanism is established. One can appeal to the public administration of the Autonomous Community (Spanish political divisions).

References:

Organic Law 30/1992, of 26 November, of Legal provisions of the public administrations and common administrative procedure:

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN (BOE No. 285, 27 Noviembre 1992)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no such a thing as time period." It all depends on the entrepreneur and his contacts.

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga.
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 71627
July 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There is no cost. In fact, there has been proliferation of free newspapers in the last three years.

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga.
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 71627
July 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

63

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Licenses and authorization are granted by Autonomous Communities (Spanish political divisions) under certain conditions and public tenders. The availability is limited and many proposals are usually dismissed.

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga.
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 71627
July 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

100: Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:

Any public administration is subject to perform under a common administrative procedure where an appeal mechanism is established. One can appeal to the public administration of the Autonomous Community (Spanish political divisions).

References:

See, Organic Law 30/1992, of 26 November, of Legal provisions of the public administrations and common administrative procedure:

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN (BOE No. 285, 27 Noviembre 1992)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Licenses are offered every three or four years.

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga.
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 71627
July 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Licenses are not expensive but the investment needed to establish a broadcast entity is usually very high.

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga.

Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 71627
July 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

100

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 716
July 27, 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

José Ramón Mendiguren
June 30, 2007 — Telephone interview

100: The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

75:

50: Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

25:

0: Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content online.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga

Juan Area
Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

100: The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

75:

50: In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

25:

0: The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

83

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | NO

Comments:

According to the Spanish Constitution — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 20

1. The following rights are recognized and protected:

- a) The right to freely express and spread thoughts, ideas and opinions through words, in writing or by any other means of reproduction.
- b) The right to literary, artistic, scientific and technical production and creation.
- c) The right to academic freedom.
- d) The right to freely communicate or receive truthful information by any means of dissemination whatsoever. The law shall regulate the right to the clause of conscience and professional secrecy in the exercise of these freedoms.

Spanish Constitution — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 18

1. The right to honor, to personal and family privacy and to the own image is guaranteed.

This is quite a thorny issue. On the one hand the law regulates freedom of speech and expression but on the other hand, the law also regulates the right of privacy and own image. It very much depends on the subject and object.

References:

Spanish Constitution

<http://www.constitucion.es/>

Spanish Criminal Code

<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/11/24/pdfs/A33987-34058.pdf>

Chapter II, Title XI regulates Crimes against honour⁷ including defamation, libel and slander

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

Comments:

Self-censorship is common but quite subtle and thus, it goes very much unnoticed. Most cases of corruption in Spain are related to the planning and development industry" and, ironically, development and construction companies are by far major contributors (i.e., publicity ads) to the budgets of national, regional and local newspapers and radio/TV broadcast entities. In short, yes, self.censorship is very common but more as the result of economic interests as opposed to outright censorship.

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 716
July 27, 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

Juan Area , Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75:

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

25:

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

Comments:

There is a constant and usual intimidation against journalists and, sometimes, against media entities. Prior censorship is non-existent but once information is published there can be censorship via court orders. As in the case of political humor magazine El Jueves," which was removed from distribution points after the Attorney General ruled it violated the honor of the Crown.

At some other times, as in the case of Magazine El Observador, private entrepreneurs brought criminal charges against the magazine on the grounds of "Crimes against Honor". However, it has been the case that a few hours prior to the trial, entrepreneurs drop the charges.

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 716
July 27, 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

Juan Area , Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
July 31, 2007 and Aug. 9, 2007 — Telephone interviews (Although I know the editor personally)

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

10. Are the media credible sources of information?

85

10a. In law, print media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

Comments:

By law, any society must disclose the composition of its board of administration and any changes taking place.

References:

Law 2/1995, of 23 March, Societies of Limited Responsibility
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/24/pdfs/A09181-09206.pdf>

Royal Decree 1564/1989, of 22 December, Anonymous Societies
http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1989/30361

YES: A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

Comments:

By law, any society must disclose the composition of its board of administration and any changes taking place.

References:

Law 2/1995, of 23 March, Societies of Limited Responsibility
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/24/pdfs/A09181-09206.pdf>

Royal Decree 1564/1989, of 22 December, Anonymous Societies
http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1989/30361

YES: A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Due to a lack of a professional code of conduct for journalists, there is in the Congress a proposal of legislation regulating this area:

Proposición de Ley: Estatuto del periodista profesional (June 14, 2006)
http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L8/CONG/BOCG/B/B_044-58.PDF

References:

Daniel Guerrero Navarro, Chief of Sales, Agencies and Events, Multimedia Grupo Ser Malaga
Avda. Doctor Manuel Domínguez, 6
29010 Malaga
Tlf: 952076940 / 600 950 716
July 27, 2007 — Personal interview — House of common friend.

Juan Area , Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

100: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

25:

0: Editors and journalists are widely known to sell" favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug.7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75:

50: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25:

0: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The law ensures equal access and fair treatment. However, there are constant complaints of especially small or independent

candidates/parties that claim unfair treatment.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

75:

50: The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

100

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

Comments:

In practice, no journalists have been imprisoned for the publication of corruption-related issues. Nevertheless, all interviewees agree that threats and intimidation are common.

References:

Juana Viudez, Journalist of El Pais (in Marbella)
July 31, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the journalist personally)

Pablo G. Almoguera, Journalist of newspaper Malaga Hoy
Aug. 7, 2007 — By email (Although I know the journalist personally)

Juan Area, Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

Comments:

Not in the past year, but there have been instances of harm to journalists. For example, a few years ago journalist Jose Carlos Villanueva (El Mundo) was beaten up allegedly under the orders of the then mayor of Marbella Jesus Gil. Antonio Garcia (from Diario 16 and correspondent to Marbella) received death threats. Felix Bayón (El Pais) and Felix Gil (TVE) were also constantly intimidated.

References:

Juana Viudez, Journalist of El Pais (in Marbella)
July 31, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the journalist personally)

Pablo G. Almoguera, Journalist of newspaper Malaga Hoy
Aug. 7, 2007 — By email (Although I know the journalist personally)

Juan Area, Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

Comments:

In practice, no journalists have been killed for the publication of corruption-related issues. Nevertheless, all interviewees agree that threats and intimidation are common.

References:

Juana Viudez, Journalist of El Pais (in Marbella)
July 31, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the journalist personally)

Pablo G. Almoguera, Journalist of newspaper Malaga Hoy
Aug. 7, 2007 — By email (Although I know the journalist personally)

Juan Area, Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

89
I-3. Public Access to Information

12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

100

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 30/1992, of 26 November, of Legal provisions of the public administrations and common administrative procedure (regulates access to registries, any public information and mechanisms of appeal):

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN (BOE No. 285, 27 Noviembre 1992)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 30/1992, of 26 November, of Legal provisions of the public administrations and common administrative procedure (regulates access to registries, any public information and mechanisms of appeal):

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN (BOE No. 285, 27 Noviembre 1992)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 30/1992, of 26 November, of Legal provisions of the public administrations and common administrative procedure (regulates access to registries, any public information and mechanisms of appeal):

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN (BOE No. 285, 27 Noviembre 1992)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

13. Is the right of access to information effective?

65

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Records may take less than two months to obtain but still, politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

References:

Juan Area, Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Fátima Pérez Jiménez, Criminologist
Head of the Andalusian Crime Observatory University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Of course the cost of the document depends very much on the type of document one demands. Documents from public registries (Property registry, Company registry, etc.) may range from US\$0.85-US\$9.00(0.60 to 6.00 euros) per page.

References:

Juan Area, Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Fátima Pérez Jiménez, Criminologist
Head of the Andalusian Crime Observatory University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Appeals may not be resolved as quickly, but perhaps more as the result of a heavy workload with very little staff as opposed to enforced delays.

References:

Juan Area, Editor in chief of Magazine El Observador
Aug. 9 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know the editor personally)

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Fátima Pérez Jiménez, Criminologist
Head of the Andalusian Crime Observatory University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Government holds sensitive information on the grounds of classified information” although such information should be made public (i.e., criminal statistics). On the other hand, regarding administrative procedures, the government has a legal and legitimate way for denying any information by saying that the records are being used or revised elsewhere. You usually get the response for the denial of access and, although you can appeal, one usually looks for the information via other non-official channels.

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law / School of Law University of Malaga, School of Law
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

Category II. Elections

II-1. ⁹¹Voting & Citizen Participation

14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

Comments:

According to the Spanish Constitution Preliminary Title, Section 6
Political parties are the expression of political pluralism, they contribute to the formation and expression of the will of the people and are an essential instrument for political participation. Their creation and the exercise of their activities are free in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law. Their internal structure and their functioning must be democratic.

Spanish Constitution — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 23

1. Citizens have the right to participate in public affairs, directly or through representatives freely elected in periodic elections by universal suffrage.
2. They also have the right to accede under conditions of equality to public functions and positions, in accordance with the requirements laid down by the law

References:

The Spanish Constitution
<http://www.constitucion.es/>

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations (BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

- Law 1/1987, of 2 April
- Law 8/1991, of 13 March
- Law 6/1992, of 2 November
- Law 13/1994, of 30 March
- Law 3/1995, of 23 March
- Law 1/1997, of 30 may
- Law, 3/1998, of 15 June
- Law 8/1999, of 21 April
- Law 1/2003, of 10 March

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

100

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

75:

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

25:

0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

100

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

According to the Spanish Constitution Preliminary Title, Section 6

Political parties are the expression of political pluralism, they contribute to the formation and expression of the will of the people and are an essential instrument for political participation. Their creation and the exercise of their activities are free in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law. Their internal structure and their functioning must be democratic.

Spanish Constitution — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 23

1. Citizens have the right to participate in public affairs, directly or through representatives freely elected in periodic elections by universal suffrage.

2. They also have the right to accede under conditions of equality to public functions and positions, in accordance with the requirements laid down by the law

References:

The Spanish Constitution

<http://www.constitucion.es/>

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

Comments:

According to the Spanish Constitution — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 23

1. Citizens have the right to participate in public affairs, directly or through representatives freely elected in periodic elections by universal suffrage.

2. They also have the right to accede under conditions of equality to public functions and positions, in accordance with the requirements laid down by the law.

References:

Spanish Constitution

<http://www.constitucion.es/>

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if Individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

Natividad Raya, Electoral Observer
July 30, 2007 — Personal Interview at her house

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

75:

50: Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

25:

0: Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

Natividad Raya
Electoral Observer
July 30, 2007 — Personal Interview at her house

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

75:

50: Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office.

25:

0: Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

Natividad Raya, Electoral Observer
July 30, 2007 — Personal Interview at her house

100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

75:

50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

II-2. Election Integrity

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

Comments:

For a comprehensive collection of legislation on the electoral process and procedure, see the Web site of the Ministry of the

Interior at:
http://www.mir.es/DGPI/Normativa/Normativa_Estatal/Procedimiento_Electoral/

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations (BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)

<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 may
Law, 3/1998, of 15 June
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

95

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:

The national election monitoring agency is constituted prior to the electoral period and it is composed by Magistrates of the Supreme Court and Professors of Law and/or Sociology. The same parameters are considered when constituting agencies at the regional and provincial levels.

References:

For a comprehensive collection of legislation on the electoral process and procedure, see the Web site of the Ministry of the Interior at:

http://www.mir.es/DGPI/Normativa/Normativa_Estatal/Procedimiento_Electoral/

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law / School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
19 July 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law / School of Law University of Malaga, School of Law
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law / School of Law University of Malaga, School of Law
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

75:

50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Diéz Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law / School of Law University of Malaga, School of Law
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

100

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Natividad Raya, Electoral Observer
July 30, 2007 — Personal Interview at her house

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost" voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations (BOE No. 158, published on July 3, 1985)

<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 May
Law, 3/1998, of 15 June
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law / School of Law University of Malaga, School of Law July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In fact, neither the military nor the security forces (actively exercising their functions) are eligible to vote. See, Article 6 of the Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations, on the eligible adults who can exercise their right to vote.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

75:

50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:

0: The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overtly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law / School of Law University of Malaga, School of Law
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

YES: A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

Natividad Raya, Electoral Observer
July 30, 2007 — Personal Interview at her house

100: Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers' activities.

75:

50: Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

25:

0: Election observers' movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

98
II-3. Political Financing

20. Are there regulations governing political financing?

100

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations
Art. 129.- Establishes that no person or corporation may donate more than US\$8,500 (6,000 euros) during the electoral campaign period (which lasts 15 days).
2. Organic Law 3/1987, of 2 July, on the financing of political parties
Art. 5.3b.- Establishes that no person or corporation may donate more than US\$85,900 (60,000 euros) outside the electoral campaign period.

In other words, political parties can get up to US\$8,500 (6,000 euros) from any person or corporation during the electoral campaign period. Nevertheless, if no electoral campaign is taking place, such contribution may reach US\$85,900 (60,000 euros) per person or per corporation.

A new law passed in the summer of 2007 regulates more strictly the financing of political parties. The Organic Law 8/2007, of 4 July, on the financing of political parties (BOE No. 160, published on 5 July 2007) establishes the limits of private contributions (either from private citizens or companies) to political parties. In that respect, Art. 5 establishes the prohibition of anonymous donations and, a limit of 100,000 (one hundred thousand Euros) in the case of donations made by one person or company.

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations
(BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)

<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 may
Law, 3/1998, of 15 June
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

2. Organic Law 3/1987, of 2 July, on the financing of political parties
(BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1987)

<http://www.boe.es>

This law was partially amended by Law 1/2003, of 10 March (BOE No. 60, published on 11 March 2003)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations
Art. 129.- Establishes that no person or corporation may donate more than US\$8,590 (6,000 euros) during the electoral campaign period (which lasts 15 days).
2. Organic Law 3/1987, of 2 July, on the financing of political parties
Art. 5.3b.- Establishes that no person or corporation may donate more than US\$85,900 (60,000 euros) outside the electoral campaign period.

In other words, political parties can get up to US\$8,590 (6,000 euros) from any person or corporation during the electoral campaign period. Nevertheless, if no electoral campaign is taking place, such contribution may reach US\$85,900 (60,000 euros) per person or per corporation. Donations are only given to parties not to individual political candidates.

A new law passed in the summer of 2007 regulates more strictly the financing of political parties. The Organic Law 8/2007, of 4 July, on the financing of political parties (BOE No. 160, published on 5 July 2007) establishes the limits of private contributions (either from private citizens or companies) to political parties. In that respect, Art. 5 establishes the prohibition of anonymous donations and, a limit of 100,000 (one hundred thousand euros) in the case of donations made by one person or company.

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations
(BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 may
Law, 3/1998, of 15 June
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

2. Organic Law 3/1987, of 2 July, on the financing of political parties
(BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1987)
<http://www.boe.es>

This law was partially amended by Law 1/2003, of 10 March (BOE No. 60, published on 11 March 2003)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on individual contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

Corporate contributions and personal contributions are the same.

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations
Art. 129.- Establishes that no person or corporation may donate more than US\$8,590 (6,000 euros) during the electoral campaign period (which lasts 15 days).
2. Organic Law 3/1987, of 2 July, on the financing of political parties
Art. 5.3b.- Establishes that no person or corporation may donate more than US\$85,900 (60,000 euros) outside the electoral campaign period.

In other words, political parties can get up to US\$8,590 (6,000 euros) from any person or corporation during the electoral campaign period. Nevertheless, if no electoral campaign is taking place, such contribution may reach US\$85,900 (60,000 euros) per person or per corporation.

A new law passed in the summer of 2007 regulates more strictly the financing of political parties. The Organic Law 8/2007, of 4 July, on the financing of political parties (BOE No. 160, published on 5 July 2007) establishes the limits of private contributions (either from private citizens or companies) to political parties. In that respect, Art. 5 establishes the prohibition of anonymous donations and, a limit of 100,000 (one hundred thousand euros) in the case of donations made by one person or company.

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations (BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)

<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 may
Law. 3/1998, of 15 June
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

2. Organic Law 3/1987, of 2 July, on the financing of political parties (BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1987)

<http://www.boe.es>

This law was partially amended by Law 1/2003, of 10 March (BOE No. 60, published on 11 March 2003)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on corporate contributions to political candidates and political parties. A YES score is earned if contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to candidates or political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties/candidates in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

Comments:

Initially, the total political party expenditure is estimated over the total number of inhabitants living in the cities and towns in which the political party(s) is running for electoral positions. For example, in the general political elections of March 12, 2000, political parties running in all electoral districts across the country the amount of expenditure was approximately US\$16.4 million (11.5 million euros). Out of that amount, no more than 25 percent can be spent on publicity (banners, posters, etc.) and no more than 20 percent can be spent on private media entities.

See, Articles 55.3 and 58.1 of the Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations.

In all, the total estimate of expenditure is very complex and sometimes it is not until the Court of Audit completes its electoral report (once the elections have taken place) that any error can be amended, if amended at all.

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations (BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)

<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 may
Law. 3/1998, of 15 June <http://survey.wordpress-158395-729720.cloudwaysapps.com/editor/SocialScientist/editSurveyQuestions.cfm?questionID=68&subCategoryID=27&userID=87&countryID=44>
Global Integrity Online Reporting System
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits, regardless of size, on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

During the electoral campaign period, Article 126 of the Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations, establishes that all donations must be disclosed. That is, any person or corporation must out personal or company details. Outside the electoral campaign period there can be anonymous" contributions. Annually, the Court of Accounts audits the books of political parties but to my knowledge, the Court of Accounts has never published anything like a list of donors for any party.

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations (BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 may
Law, 3/1998, of 15 June
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties or candidates.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties or candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:

A new law passed in the summer of 2007 regulates more strictly the financing of political parties. The Organic Law 8/2007, of 4 July, on the financing of political parties (BOE No. 160, published on 5 July 2007) establishes the limits of private contributions (either from private citizens or companies) to political parties. In that respect, Art. 5 establishes the prohibition of anonymous donations and, a limit of 100,000 (one hundred thousand euros) in the case of donations made by one person or company. The new law also codifies auditing requirements for party finances.

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations (BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)

<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 may
Law, 3/1998, of 15 June
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of candidate and party finances. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates or parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the political financing process.

YES | NO

Comments:

During the electoral campaign period, the Electoral Committees (organized at the national and/or provincial levels) oversee the correct management of electoral funds (Art. 132 of Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations).

Outside the electoral campaign period, the Court of Accounts audits political parties and the conclusions are disclosed before the Parliament.

References:

1. Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations (BOE No. 158, published on 3 July 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

This law has been amended by the following legal provisions:

Law 1/1987, of 2 April
Law 8/1991, of 13 March
Law 6/1992, of 2 November
Law 13/1994, of 30 March
Law 3/1995, of 23 March
Law 1/1997, of 30 May
Law, 3/1998, of 15 June
Law 8/1999, of 21 April
Law 1/2003, of 10 March

A new law passed in the summer of 2007 and regulates more strictly the financing of political parties. The Organic Law 8/2007, of 4 July, on the financing of political parties (BOE No. 160, published on 5 July 2007).

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around political financing. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

21. Are the regulations governing political financing effective?

58

21a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Limits are not too high. Political parties can get up to US\$8,590 (6,000 euros) from any person or corporation during the electoral campaign period (lasting 15 days). If no electoral campaign is taking place, such contribution may reach US\$ 85,900 (60,000 euros) per person or per corporation.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or

parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Limits are not too high. Political parties can get up to US\$8,590 (6,000 euros) from any person or corporation during the electoral campaign period (lasting 15 days). If no electoral campaign is taking place, such contribution may reach US\$85,900 (60,000 euros) per person or per corporation.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a candidate or political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support candidates or political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate or party; unregulated loans to candidates or parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to a candidate or political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

21c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Initially, the total political party expenditure is estimated over the total number of inhabitants living in the cities and towns in which the political party(s) is running for electoral positions. For example, in the general political elections of March 12, 2000, political parties running in all electoral districts across the country the amount of expenditure was approximately US\$16.4 million (11.5 million euros). Out of that amount, no more than 25 percent can be spent on publicity (banners, posters, etc.) and no more than 20 percent can be spent on private media entities.

See, Articles 55.3 and 58.1 of the Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations. In all, the total estimate of expenditure is very complex and sometimes it is not until the Court of Audit completes its electoral report (once the elections have taken place).

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

21d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Yes, the Public Prosecutor may start investigations but to my knowledge, there have never been any independent investigations into the financing of political parties. And, if investigations arise (usually due to someone reporting irregularities) they rarely end up in a sentence.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas
Attorney and member of anti-corruption association Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to political financing. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

21e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In theory, the public prosecutor or any judge could impose penalties on offenders but in practice, it has never happened.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

21f. In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Donations made to political parties are audited by the Court of Accounts once a year. During electoral periods parties should stick to certain expenditure limits but since the limits are difficult to estimate, parties can very well go beyond the limits. Initially, the total political party expenditure is estimated over the total number of inhabitants living in the cities and towns in which the political party(s) are running for electoral positions. For example, in the general political elections of March 12, 2000, political parties running in all electoral districts across the country could be spending approximately US\$16.4 million (11.5 million euros). Out of that amount, no more than 25 percent can be spent on publicity (banners, posters, etc.) and no more than 20 percent can be spent on private media entities. See, Articles 55.3 and 58.1 of the Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, on the general electoral regulations.

In all, the total estimate of expenditure is very complex and sometimes it is not until the Court of Auditors completes its electoral report (usually 200 days after the election has taken place) that accounts are made public. During the electoral campaign period the Electoral Committee (s) can demand accounting reports, which don't really show many irregularities. Irregular donations, if any, take place outside the electoral campaign period as the latter is well regulated.

There are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties and candidates.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez
Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas
Attorney and member of anti-corruption association Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Political party and candidate finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

75:

50: Political party and candidate finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party or candidate may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party and candidate finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

22. Can citizens access records related to political financing?

67

22a. In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Disclosure is made on an annual basis.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Political parties and candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Political parties and candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

22b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The reports of the Court of Accounts take over half a year to be taken to the Parliament and even longer to be published on the official gazette (BOE). Thus, if one wants to access the ongoing financial records of candidates and their parties, one must wait a minimum of six months once the fiscal year is closed.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

22c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.

Comments:

It will not be before 2009 that one can access such information on the Official Gazette (BOE) under the new Organic Law 8/2007, of 4 July 2007, on the financing of political parties (BOE No. 160, published on 5 July 2007).

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

 Category III. Government Accountability

III-1. Executive Accountability

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

23. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | NO

References:

Spanish Constitution, Article 53

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

24. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

24a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Each and every piece of legislation should be introduced with an explanation of the reasons motivating that law or act (exposición de motivos).

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

75:

50: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

25:

0: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

24b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 2/1979, of 3 October on the Constitutional Court
(BOE published on 5 October 1979, pp. 23186)

See, the Web site of the Constitutional Court
<http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/tribunal/leyorganica.html>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

24c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law / School of Law University of Malaga, School of Law
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to relay upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

24d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

On the contrary, once in power the executive makes the most of its political power before his administration ends.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

75:

50: The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25:

0: The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

100

25a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

Comments:

Spanish Constitution, Article 102

1. The President and other members of the Government shall be held criminally liable, should the occasion arise, before the Criminal Section of the Supreme Court.

2. If the charge were treason or any offence against the security of the State committed in the discharge of office, it may only be brought against them on the initiative of one quarter of Members of Congress and with the approval of the overall majority thereof.

3. The Royal prerogative of pardon shall not apply any of the cases provided for under the present section.

References:

Spanish Constitution, Article 102

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

25b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

References:

Spanish Criminal Code on the crimes committed by civil servants

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

26. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

75

26a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:

Law 12/1995, of 11 May, on Incompatibilities of members of the government and high ranking officials of the States Administration

[Ley 12/1995, de 11 de mayo, de Incompatibilidades de los Miembros del Gobierno de la Nación y de los Altos Cargos de la Administración General del Estado, (Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) nº 113, published on 12 May 1995)

Ley 5/2006, de 10 de abril, de regulación de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del gobierno y de los altos cargos de la Administración General del Estado.

<http://www.senado.es/otrasdis/legislac/normas/LEY506.html>

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a

YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

26b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:

Law 12/1995, of 11 May, on Incompatibilities of members of the government and high ranking officials of the States Administration.

[Ley 12/1995, de 11 de mayo, de Incompatibilidades de los Miembros del Gobierno de la Nación y de los Altos Cargos de la Administración General del Estado, (Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) nº 113, published on 12 May 1995)

Ley 5/2006, de 10 de abril, de regulación de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del gobierno y de los altos cargos de la Administración General del Estado.

<http://www.senado.es/otrasdis/legislac/normas/LEY506.html>

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

NO: A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

26c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO

Comments:

There are the same provisions for any civil servant, although the regulation is rather ambiguous.

References:

Organic Law 30/1992, of 26 November, of Legal provisions of the public administrations and common administrative procedure (regulates access to registries, any public information and mechanisms of appeal):

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN (BOE No. 285, 27 Noviembre 1992)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

26d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

References:

LEY 5/2006, de 10 de abril, de regulación de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del Gobierno y de los Altos Cargos de la Administración General del Estado.
(BOE n. 86 published on April 11, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

26e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

Comments:

The legislation only limits the employment of high-ranking officials; two years after leaving their public position.

References:

LEY 5/2006, de 10 de abril, de regulación de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del Gobierno y de los Altos Cargos de la Administración General del Estado.
(BOE n. 86 published on April 11, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

26f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

26g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto
Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
3 August 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa
Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
14 August 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

26h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

27. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

67

27a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | NO

Comments:

Legislation establishes a difference between (a) registry of activities and (b) registry of personal assets. The registry of personal assets (which comprises latest assets declaration income, properties and investments) of all high-ranking officials and their partners is not open to the public except for the declarations made by the government Ministers and State Secretaries which are published on the official Gazette (BOE).

The registry of activities includes curricular information and functions of all high-ranking officials (from state institutions). It is available to public access with prior and specific authorization.

The registry of personal assets (which comprises latest assets declaration income, properties and investments) of all high-ranking officials and their partners is not open to the public except for the declarations made by the government Ministers and State Secretaries which are published on the official Gazette (BOE).

At the regional level, every autonomous community has its own regulation. In Andalusia, for instance, the registry (comprising one sole registry of activities and personal assets) is published on the Internet. However, the assets/activities of high-ranking-officials partners and other dependents is voluntary (in practice, the assets/activities of partners/dependents are not published at all).

References:

Law 5/2006, of 10 April, on the regulation of conflicts of interest for government officials and high-ranking State officials (Published on BOE, No. 86, on April 11, 2006).

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

27b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Citizens cannot access the registry per se but they can access the Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) where those assets are published.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

27c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

Comments:

Citizens cannot access the registry per se but they can access the Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) where those assets are published. Access to the BOE is free and available online

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

100

28. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug.14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

50: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:

0: The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

29. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

67

29a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 2/1979, of 3 October, on the regulations of the Constitutional Court (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) published on 5 October 1979)

See also the Web site of the Constitutional Court:

<http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/index.html>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

29b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal Interview University

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

29c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | NO

Comments:

Spanish Constitution, Article 71

1. Members of Congress and Senators shall enjoy freedom of speech for opinions expressed in the exercise of their functions.
2. During their term of office, Members of Congress and Senators shall likewise enjoy freedom from arrest and may be arrested only in the event of flagrante delicto. They may be neither indicted nor tried without prior authorization of their respective House.
3. In criminal proceedings brought against Members of Congress and Senators, the competent court shall be the Criminal Section of the Supreme Court.

References:
Spanish Constitution, Article 71

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings.

30. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

39

30a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
LEY 5/2006, de 10 de abril, de regulación de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del Gobierno y de los Altos Cargos de la Administración General del Estado.
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) n. 86 published on April 11, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

30b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
LEY 5/2006, de 10 de abril, de regulación de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del Gobierno y de los Altos Cargos de la Administración General del Estado.
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) n. 86 published on April 11, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

30c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

Comments:

The same provisions exist for any civil servant, although the regulation is rather ambiguous.

References:

Organic Law 30/1992, of 26 November, of Legal provisions of the public administrations and common administrative procedure:

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 285, Nov. 27, 1992)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

30d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:

LEY 5/2006, de 10 de abril, de regulación de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del Gobierno y de los Altos Cargos de la Administración General del Estado.
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) 86 published on April 11, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

30e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

30f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to legislators. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

30g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

A recent newspaper article (EL PAÍS, 7 December 2007) stated that 63% of the Andalusian Representatives had not updated their asset declarations since 2005. Auditing is extremely sporadic and inconsistent.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

31. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

50

31a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:

LEY 5/2006, de 10 de abril, de regulación de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del Gobierno y de los Altos Cargos de la Administración General del Estado.
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) n. 86 published on April 11, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

31b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Legislative asset declarations (at least updated asset declarations) are difficult to obtain. One encounters more difficulty when one tries to access the declarations of the National Legislative Chambers (as opposed to regional ones).

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

31c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Only some Parliaments at the regional level (e.g. Andalusia) publish such information on the Internet.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

32. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

100

32a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

Comments:

Yes, once proceedings are completed and rulings have been passed.

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there are exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

32b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

www.congreso.es
www.senado.es

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

32c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Documents are free and they are available online:
www.congreso.es
www.senado.es

References:

Ana Maria Prieto , Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

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75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

64
III-3. Judicial Accountability

33. Are judges appointed fairly?

100

33a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

Comments:

Judges are selected by public competition, seniority and professional experience.

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
 (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING ORGANIC LAWS: 4/1987 (BOE nº 171, 18-07-1987), 7/1988 (BOE nº 313, 30-12-1988), 4/1992 (BOE nº 140, 11-06-1992), 7/1992 (BOE nº 280, 21-11-1992), 16/1994 (BOE Nº 268, 9-11-1994), 5/1995 (BOE nº 122, 23-05-1995), 5/1997 (BOE nº 291, 5-12-1997), 6/1998 (BOE nº 167, 14-07-1998), 11/1999 (BOE nº 104, 1-05-1999), 13/1999 (BOE nº 116, 15-05-1999), 7/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 9/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 2/2001 (BOE nº 155, 29-06-2001), 2/2002 (BOE nº 109, 7-05-2002), 6/2002 (BOE nº 154, 28-06-2002), 8/2002 (BOE nº 258, 28-10-2002), 9/2002 (BOE nº 296, 11-12-2002), 2/2003 (BOE nº 65, 17-03-2003), 4/2003 (BOE nº 122, 22-05-2003), 5/2003 (BOE nº 127, 28-05-2003), 7/2003 (BOE nº 156, 1-07-2003), 8/2003, (BOE nº 164, 10-07-2003), 13/2003 (BOE nº 257, 27-10-2003), 19/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 20/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 1/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2004), 2/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2003), 3/2005 (BOE Nº 163, 9-07-2005), 5/2006 (BOE Nº 134, 6-06-2006), 3/2007 (BOE Nº 71, 23-03-2007), 6/2007 (BOE Nº 125, 25-05-2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

NO: A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

33b. In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Judges are selected based on public competition, seniority and professional experience.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
 Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
 Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

33c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | NO

Comments:

Once they have been offered the position they have to be appointed by the Ministry of Justice.

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
 (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING ORGANIC LAWS: 4/1987 (BOE nº 171, 18-07-1987), 7/1988 (BOE nº 313, 30-12-1988), 4/1992 (BOE nº 140, 11-06-1992), 7/1992 (BOE nº 280, 21-11-1992), 16/1994 (BOE Nº 268, 9-11-1994), 5/1995 (BOE nº 122, 23-05-1995), 5/1997 (BOE nº 291, 5-12-1997), 6/1998 (BOE nº 167, 14-07-1998), 11/1999 (BOE nº 104, 1-05-1999), 13/1999 (BOE nº 116, 15-05-1999), 7/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 9/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 2/2001 (BOE nº 155, 29-06-2001), 2/2002 (BOE nº 109, 7-05-2002), 6/2002 (BOE nº 154, 28-06-2002), 8/2002 (BOE nº 258, 28-10-2002), 9/2002 (BOE nº 296, 11-12-2002), 2/2003 (BOE nº 65, 17-03-2003), 4/2003 (BOE nº 122, 22-05-2003), 5/2003 (BOE nº 127, 28-05-2003), 7/2003 (BOE nº 156, 1-07-2003), 8/2003, (BOE nº 164, 10-07-2003), 13/2003 (BOE nº 257, 27-10-2003), 19/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 20/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 1/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2004), 2/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2003), 3/2005 (BOE Nº 163, 9-07-2005), 5/2006 (BOE Nº 134, 6-06-2006), 3/2007 (BOE Nº 71, 23-03-2007), 6/2007 (BOE Nº 125, 25-05-2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

34. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

92

34a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | NO

Comments:

1. Judicial proceedings shall be public, with the exceptions contemplated in the laws on procedure.
2. Proceedings shall be predominantly oral, especially in criminal cases.
3. Judgments shall always specify the grounds and they shall be delivered in a public hearing.

References:

-Spanish Constitution, Article 120
Sentence of the Constitutional Court 193/1996, of 26 November

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

34b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Yes, and if the sentence does not specify the grounds for its judgment it can be annulled.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

75:

50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

25:

0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

34c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:

The General Council of the Judicial Power (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) is a disciplinary agency for the national-level judicial system.

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

34d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:

In law, the independence of the judges is reiterated in the legislation.

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is operationally independent from political interference by the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry, legislative committee, or by an internal judiciary committee or council that can only act with the approval of judges themselves.

34e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The case of Judge Pilar Ramirez
Former Head Judge of Marbella, Pilar Ramirez of Marbella, had apparently gained power beyond his position in the system, and was the subject of a report by Judge Baltasar Garzón in 1987. This report warned of the power and influence of the civil servant,

who had acted as intermediary in a property deal involving the then vice-president of the General Council for Judicial Power, the highest judicial body in the land.

In 1993, Marbella Judge Blanca Díez charged Ramírez with corruption and ordered her to be imprisoned. She, in turn, was accused of irregularities of form in the case, and a year later, was suspended by the Andalusian Superior Court of Justice. A year after that, the Supreme Court reinstated her. Judge Ramírez also overruled the imprisonment (dictated by Judge Santiago Torres) of former Major of Marbella Jesús Gil for a fraud scandal involving Spanish football team Atlético de Madrid (e.g. t-shirts case).

In 1999, Judge Pilar Ramírez was declared unsuitable to be a judge by the General Council for Judicial Power and suspended for four years by the Supreme Court, accused of having failed to act in a matter relating to Marbella Town Hall and being a judge in a town of fewer than 100,000 inhabitants in which her father had important businesses. In fact, her father, Juan Ramírez, was a civil servant in the Marbella courts. Ramírez left Marbella shortly afterwards. However, she appealed and was reinstated in office. She is now a Judge in the town of Torremolinos (Malaga).

The case of former judge Luis Pascual Estevill

Former judge Luis Pasqual Estevill is currently serving a nine-year sentence. He was also fined US\$2.5million (1.8 million euros) after being convicted of leading the largest corruption racket discovered in the Spanish judicial system in 25 years. Estevill, a former judge in Barcelona and one-time member of the General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial), was found to have accepted bribes and helped run an extortion racket between 1990 and 1994. A former high-profile Catalan lawyer, Joan Piqué Vidal, was also sentenced to seven years imprisonment and fined US\$1.3 million (900,000 euros) in relation to the case. According to the court ruling, Estevill and Piqué Vidal abused their positions to demand bribes from businesses involved in lawsuits. The extortion allowed them to accumulate hundreds of thousands of euros in bribes over the four-year period. As part of the sentence, they have been ordered to compensate victims with amounts ranging between US\$4,300 - US\$129,000 (3,000-90,000 euros). Several other people found guilty of participating in the scam, including Estevill's son, were fined and sentenced to up to one year in prison. Estevill has been disqualified from office.

In fact, prior to this scandal, Estevill had been removed from office. The disciplinary commission of the General Council of the Judiciary banned him from the judiciary for a six-year period on the grounds of illegal arrest. However, he appealed and gained his post back. See, the case at: <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/spanish/1004-2001.html>

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

34f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The case of Judge Pilar Ramirez

Former Head Judge of Marbella, Pilar Ramírez of Marbella, had apparently gained power beyond his position in the system, and was the subject of a report by Judge Baltasar Garzón in 1987. This report warned of the power and influence of the civil servant, who had acted as intermediary in a property deal involving the then vice-president of the General Council for Judicial Power, the highest judicial body in the land.

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In 1999, Judge Pilar Ramírez was declared unsuitable to be a judge by the General Council for Judicial Power and suspended for four years by the Supreme Court, accused of having failed to act in a matter relating to Marbella Town Hall and being a judge in a town of fewer than 100,000 inhabitants in which her father had important businesses. In fact, her father, Juan Ramírez, was a civil servant in the Marbella courts. Ramírez left Marbella shortly afterwards. However, she appealed and was reinstated in office. She is now a Judge in the town of Torremolinos (Malaga).

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In fact, prior to this scandal, Estevill had been removed from office. The disciplinary commission of the General Council of the Judiciary banned him from the judiciary for a six-year period on the grounds of illegal arrest. However, he appealed and gained his post back. See, the case at: <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/spanish/1004-2001.html>

References:

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July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

35. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

29

35a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

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YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

35b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:

It is the same regulation for any civil servant.

References:

Organic Law 30/1992, of 26 November, of Legal provisions of the public administrations and common administrative procedure (regulates access to registries, any public information and mechanisms of appeal):

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN (BOE No. 285, 27 Noviembre 1992)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

35c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:

National level judges are not obliged to disclose their assets.

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)

<http://www.boe.es>

AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING ORGANIC LAWS: 4/1987 (BOE nº 171, 18-07-1987), 7/1988 (BOE nº 313, 30-12-1988), 4/1992 (BOE nº 140, 11-06-1992), 7/1992 (BOE nº 280, 21-11-1992), 16/1994 (BOE Nº 268, 9-11-1994), 5/1995 (BOE nº 122, 23-05-1995), 5/1997 (BOE nº 291, 5-12-1997), 6/1998 (BOE nº 167, 14-07-1998), 11/1999 (BOE nº 104, 1-05-1999), 13/1999 (BOE nº 116, 15-05-1999), 7/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 9/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 2/2001 (BOE nº 155, 29-06-2001), 2/2002 (BOE nº 109, 7-05-2002), 6/2002 (BOE nº 154, 28-06-2002), 8/2002 (BOE nº 258, 28-10-2002), 9/2002 (BOE nº 296, 11-12-2002), 2/2003 (BOE nº 65, 17-03-2003), 4/2003 (BOE nº 122, 22-05-2003), 5/2003 (BOE nº 127, 28-05-2003), 7/2003 (BOE nº 156, 1-07-2003), 8/2003, (BOE nº 164, 10-07-2003), 13/2003 (BOE nº 257, 27-10-2003), 19/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 20/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 1/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2004), 2/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2003), 3/2005 (BOE Nº 163, 9-07-2005), 5/2006 (BOE Nº 134, 6-06-2006), 3/2007 (BOE Nº 71, 23-03-2007), 6/2007 (BOE Nº 125, 25-05-2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

35d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING ORGANIC LAWS: 4/1987 (BOE nº 171, 18-07-1987), 7/1988 (BOE nº 313, 30-12-1988), 4/1992 (BOE nº 140, 11-06-1992), 7/1992 (BOE nº 280, 21-11-1992), 16/1994 (BOE Nº 268, 9-11-1994), 5/1995 (BOE nº 122, 23-05-1995), 5/1997 (BOE nº 291, 5-12-1997), 6/1998 (BOE nº 167, 14-07-1998), 11/1999 (BOE nº 104, 1-05-1999), 13/1999 (BOE nº 116, 15-05-1999), 7/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 9/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 2/2001 (BOE nº 155, 29-06-2001), 2/2002 (BOE nº 109, 7-05-2002), 6/2002 (BOE nº 154, 28-06-2002), 8/2002 (BOE nº 258, 28-10-2002), 9/2002 (BOE nº 296, 11-12-2002), 2/2003 (BOE nº 65, 17-03-2003), 4/2003 (BOE nº 122, 22-05-2003), 5/2003 (BOE nº 127, 28-05-2003), 7/2003 (BOE nº 156, 1-07-2003), 8/2003, (BOE nº 164, 10-07-2003), 13/2003 (BOE nº 257, 27-10-2003), 19/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 20/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 1/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2004), 2/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2003), 3/2005 (BOE Nº 163, 9-07-2005), 5/2006 (BOE Nº 134, 6-06-2006), 3/2007 (BOE Nº 71, 23-03-2007), 6/2007 (BOE Nº 125, 25-05-2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

35e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

35f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to judges. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

35g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

36. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

0

36a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:

Judges are not obliged to disclose their assets.

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

36b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Judges are not obliged to disclose their assets.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

36c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Judges are not obliged to disclose their assets.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

III-4. Budget Processes

37. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

100

37a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

Comments:

Article 37. Submission to Parliament.

1. The bill for the General State Budget, composed of articles, annexes and statements on revenues and expenditure, with the degree of detail on credits required by articles 40 and 41 of this law, shall be submitted to the Parliament before 1 October of the prior year covered by the Budget.

2. The bill for the General State Budget shall be accompanied by the following additional documentation:

- a) Descriptive reports on spending programs and their annual objectives.
- b) Explicative reports on the contents of each budget allocation, with specifications of the main modifications compared to the present budgets in force.
- c) An annex with an itemized financial breakdown by spending management centers.
- d) An annex of a multi-year nature for projects of public investment with a territorial classification.
- e) Liquidation of the previous years budgets and a forecast of the liquidation of the current year.
- f) Accounts and balances of the Social Security system of the previous year.
- g) Consolidated financial statement of the budget.
- i) Economic and financial report.
- j) Report on fiscal revenue.

Article 38. Extension of the General State Budget

1. In the event the law for the General State Budget is not approved prior to the first day of the relevant fiscal year, an automatic renewal shall occur of the initial budget of the previous year until the approval and publication of the new budget in the Official State Gazette.

2. The renewal shall not affect credits for spending on programs or policies that end in the year, with renewed budgets or for obligations that expire in the same.

3. The organic structure of the budget shall be adjusted, with no alteration in its total amount, to the administrative organization in force in the year in which the allocation was to be executed.

References:

Ley 47/2003, de 26 de noviembre, General Presupuestaria
General Budgetary Law 47/2003 of 26 November
(Official Buletting of the State (BOE) published on Nov. 27, 2003)
<http://www.boe.es>

See, the Web site of the World Bank for a full version in English:
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/pe/BudgetLaws/Spain.doc>

YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

37b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

25:

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

37c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

75:

50: Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

38. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

67

38a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

38b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Only through their Representatives at the Congress

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75:

50: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

25:

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

38c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The approved budget is published on the State's Official Gazette, Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) and is available.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

75:

50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

25:

0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

39. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

Comments:

See, the Budgetary Commission of the Congress:
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Organos/Comision?_piref73_1339263_73_1339256_1339256.next_page=wc/composicionOrgano&idOrgano=307&idLegislatura=8

References:

Ley 47/2003, de 26 de noviembre, General Presupuestaria
General Budgetary Law 47/2003 of 26 November
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) published on Nov. 27, 2003)
<http://www.boe.es>

See, the Web site of the World Bank for a full version in English:
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/pe/BudgetLaws/Spain.doc>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

40. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

88

40a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:

50: Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

25:

0: There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

40b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

75:

50: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

25:

0: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

40c. In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The committee is composed of members of Parliament belonging to different political parties.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government.

25:

0: This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee's behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

40d. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

75:

50: The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. ⁶⁹Civil Service Regulations

41. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

41a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

References:

See the Web site of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:
http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

41b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

References:

See the Web site of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:
http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

41c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

References:

See the Web site of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:
http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

41d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

Comments:

Yes, certain types of corruption would be considered very serious offenses so as to prohibit a civil servant from future government employment. However, in practice it is very rare to find convictions for corruption and permanent suspension from employment.

References:

See the Web site of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:
http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

42. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

83

42a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Politics plays an important part in the Spanish administration. Although civil servants enter their position through public competition, regardless of the political party in the government, the shift of high-ranking officials can affect your life in a positive or negative way.

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

75:

50: Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:

0: Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

42b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Professional qualifications are not always as important as the public competition exams.

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

42c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Patronage and nepotism are common, especially in the universities, where publicly advertised posts are usually filled with partisans close to professors and heads of departments.

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

75:

50: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

25:

0: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

42d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable means to map positions to both human capital requirements (including the position's authority and responsibilities) and base pay.

75:

50: Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

25:

0: Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

42e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

75:

50: Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

25:

0: Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

42f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

75:

50: The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

25:

0: The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

42g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

75:

50: The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

42h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The country would come to a standstill if they were not paid on time.

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

75:

50: In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

25:

0: In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

42i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Convictions for corruption are extremely rare. In an extraordinary case of someone sentenced for corruption, the appeals mechanism would contribute to drop the charges before reaching a conviction. When politicians are charged with corruption it is because they have either surpassed the limits of what is considered allowed" or due to a political sacrifice.

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

43. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

25

43a. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

Comments:

Rather than abstaining from decisions, civil servants would be forced to recuse themselves by other civil servants.

References:

See the Website of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:

http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

43b. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

Comments:

There are limitations and strict regulations on employment while in the public position, but not after leaving office.

References:

See the Web site of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:

http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

43c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES | NO

Comments:

The law prevents civil servants from accepting gifts, services or favors incurring beyond the usual range of customs and courtesy" although "regular customs and courtesy" remains ambiguous.

References:

See the Web site of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:
http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

43d. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

There are no restrictions on post-government, private sector employment of civil servants.

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
 Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
 Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
 July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

43e. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
 July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Ramón Deza,, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
 Aug. 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
 Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
 Aug 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced and sufficiently restrict the amounts of gifts and hospitality that can be given to civil servants. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality

above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

43f. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Civil servants recuse themselves but only because they may be forced to by other civil servants.

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

75:

50: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

25:

0: Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

44. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

44a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | NO

Comments:

Only the declarations of the Members of Government and Secretaries of State shall be published on the Official Gazzette (BOE).

References:

Good governance code

http://www.map.es/iniciativas/mejora_de_la_administracion_general_del_estado/funcion_publica/codigo_buen_gobierno/codigo_pdf/document_es/Codig

YES: A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

44b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Only the declarations of the Members of Government and Secretaries of State shall be published on the Official Gazzette (BOE).

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

44c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Only the declarations of the Members of Government and Secretaries of State shall be published on the Official Gazzette (BOE).

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal interview University of Malaga

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

45. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

25

45a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Article 427

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

45b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Article 427 of the Spanish Criminal Code allows whistle-blowing as an extenuating condition if it is reported within a time period. However, this legal provision has never been enforced in Spain.

See: Garcia España, Elisa (2006). El premio a la colaboración con la justicia: Especial consideración a la corrupción administrativa. Albolote: Ed. Comares. ISBN10 8498360188; ISBN13 9788498360189

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga

Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Garcia España, Elisa (2006). El premio a la colaboración con la justicia: Especial consideración a la corrupción administrativa. Albolote: Ed. Comares. ISBN10 8498360188; ISBN13 9788498360189

100: Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

45c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | **NO**

References:

Private sector corruption is not illegal in Spain.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

45d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

Comments:

Private sector corruption is not illegal in Spain. However, a reform to the criminal code is being considered.

References:

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

0

46. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | **NO**

Comments:

If one wants to report corruption, then one must report it to the police or to the anti-corruption prosecutor.

References:

There are no internal mechanisms through which civil servants can report corruption.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

47. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

0

47a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

No such agency exists in Spain.

References:

José Ortigosa , Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug .15, 007 Personal interview University of Malaga

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Ramón Deza, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

100: The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

47b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

No such agency exists in Spain.

References:

JJosé Ortigosa , Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug .15, 007 Personal interview University of Malaga

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Ramón Deza, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

100: The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

47c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

No such agency exists in Spain,

References:

José Ortigosa , Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug .15, 007 Personal interview University of Malaga

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Ramón Deza, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

100: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

47d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

No such agency exists in Spain.

References:

José Ortigosa , Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Rogelio Bueno, Civil servant from the University of Malaga
Aug .15, 007 Personal interview University of Malaga

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Ramón Deza, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

8
IV-3. Procurement

48. Is the public procurement process effective?

70

48a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:

Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común.

(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) published on Nov. 27, 1992)

<http://www.boe.es>

See the Web site of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:

http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

48b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:

The legislation calls for regular training of civil servants in general but not of public procurement officials in particular. Nevertheless, such training is voluntary.

References:

Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común.

(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) published on Nov. 27, 1992)

<http://www.boe.es>

See the Web site of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es), which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:

http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

48c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

They are typically enforced when public officials have an active post in the government, not after leaving it.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 – Personal Interview

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

48d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:

The law does not establish a mechanism to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

48e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

References:

Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2000, de 16 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (BOE 21/06/2000)

Real Decreto 1098/2001, de 12 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento General de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (BOE 26/10/2001)

ORDEN EHA/4110/2005, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se hacen públicos los límites de los distintos tipos de contratos a efectos de la contratación administrativa a partir de 1 de enero de 2006 (BOE 31/12/2005)

Real Decreto 161/1997, de 7 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Caja General de Depósitos (BOE 25/02/1997)

ORDEN de 7 de enero de 2000 por la que se desarrolla el Real Decreto 161/1997, de 7 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Caja General de Depósitos (BOE 25/01/2000)

YES: A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

NO: A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).

48f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

References:

Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2000, de 16 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) 21/06/2000)

Real Decreto 1098/2001, de 12 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento General de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (BOE 26/10/2001)

ORDEN EHA/4110/2005, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se hacen públicos los límites de los distintos tipos de contratos a efectos de la contratación administrativa a partir de 1 de enero de 2006 (BOE 31/12/2005)

Real Decreto 161/1997, de 7 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Caja General de Depósitos (BOE 25/02/1997)

ORDEN de 7 de enero de 2000 por la que se desarrolla el Real Decreto 161/1997, de 7 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Caja General de Depósitos (BOE 25/01/2000)

YES: A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

48g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

References:

Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2000, de 16 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) 21/06/2000)

Real Decreto 1098/2001, de 12 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento General de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (BOE 26/10/2001)

ORDEN EHA/4110/2005, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se hacen públicos los límites de los distintos tipos de contratos a efectos de la contratación administrativa a partir de 1 de enero de 2006 (BOE 31/12/2005)

Real Decreto 161/1997, de 7 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Caja General de Depósitos (BOE 25/02/1997)

ORDEN de 7 de enero de 2000 por la que se desarrolla el Real Decreto 161/1997, de 7 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Caja General de Depósitos (BOE 25/01/2000)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

References:

Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2000, de 16 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE)21/06/2000)

Real Decreto 1098/2001, de 12 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento General de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (BOE 26/10/2001)

ORDEN EHA/4110/2005, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se hacen públicos los límites de los distintos tipos de contratos a efectos de la contratación administrativa a partir de 1 de enero de 2006 (BOE 31/12/2005)

Real Decreto 161/1997, de 7 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Caja General de Depósitos (BOE 25/02/1997)

ORDEN de 7 de enero de 2000 por la que se desarrolla el Real Decreto 161/1997, de 7 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Caja General de Depósitos (BOE 25/01/2000)

YES: A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO

Comments:

The legislation says that companies can even be suspended from their activity.

References:

Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2000, de 16 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE)21/06/2000)

Real Decreto 1098/2001, de 12 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento General de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (BOE 26/10/2001)

ORDEN EHA/4110/2005, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se hacen públicos los límites de los distintos tipos de contratos a efectos de la contratación administrativa a partir de 1 de enero de 2006 (BOE 31/12/2005)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, preventing convicted companies from doing business with the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

48j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto , Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

49. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

100

49a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

Comments:

Information is available online at the Web site of the Ministry of Economics and the Treasury:
<http://www.meh.es/portal/Normativa+y+doctrina/Normativa/NormativaResultados?normativa=Contratacion>

References:

Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2000, de 16 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) 21/06/2000)

Real Decreto 1098/2001, de 12 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento General de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (BOE 26/10/2001)

ORDEN EHA/4110/2005, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se hacen públicos los límites de los distintos tipos de contratos a efectos de la contratación administrativa a partir de 1 de enero de 2006 (BOE 31/12/2005)

YES: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

NO: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

49b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

References:

Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2000, de 16 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) 21/06/2000)

Real Decreto 1098/2001, de 12 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento General de la Ley de Contratos de las Administraciones Públicas (BOE 26/10/2001)

ORDEN EHA/4110/2005, de 29 de diciembre, por la que se hacen públicos los límites de los distintos tipos de contratos a efectos de la contratación administrativa a partir de 1 de enero de 2006 (BOE 31/12/2005)

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

49c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Regulations are available online.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

49d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Regulations are available online and for free.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

49e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

This does not prevent some insider trading from taking place.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

49f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75:

50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

25:

0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.

IV-4. Privatization

50. Is the privatization process effective?

92

50a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO

Comments:

They are now, before they were subjected to public authorization.

References:

Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, de régimen jurídico de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 72, published on March 25, 1995)
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/25/pdfs/A09366-09369.pdf>

LEY 13/2006, de 26 de mayo, por la que se deroga el régimen de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas establecido por la Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, y sus disposiciones de desarrollo y ejecución. (BOE No. 126, Published on May 27, 2006)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

50b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

Comments:

Incompatibilities of civil servants

References:

See the website of the Ministry of the Public Administration (www.map.es) which publishes a comprehensive compilation of the most important legislation regarding the Spanish Public Administration:
http://www.map.es/documentacion/funcion_publica/legislacion/legislacion_completa.html

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

50c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Privatization in Spain ended towards the end of 1990s. Conflict of interest regulations were flawed then. Today, regulations are enforced as long as civil servants are employed by the government. Once they leave their public positions, no follow up is ever done.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict of interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

100

51a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

References:

Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, de régimen jurídico de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 72, published on March 25, 1995)
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/25/pdfs/A09366-09369.pdf>

LEY 13/2006, de 26 de mayo, por la que se deroga el régimen de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas establecido por la Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, y sus disposiciones de desarrollo y ejecución.
(BOE No. 126, Published on May 27, 2006)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the

basis for scoring this indicator.

NO: A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

51b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Although there was a lot of insider trading prior to the formal process of advertisement. Privatization in Spain ended towards the end of 1990s.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

51c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

References:

Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, de régimen jurídico de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 72, published on March 25, 1995)
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/25/pdfs/A09366-09369.pdf>

LEY 13/2006, de 26 de mayo, por la que se deroga el régimen de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas establecido por la Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, y sus disposiciones de desarrollo y ejecución. (BOE No. 126, Published on 27 May 2006)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

51d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

Comments:

All legislation is available online:

Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, de régimen jurídico de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 72, published on 25 March 1995)
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/25/pdfs/A09366-09369.pdf>

LEY 13/2006, de 26 de mayo, por la que se deroga el régimen de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas establecido por la Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, y sus disposiciones de desarrollo y ejecución. (BOE No. 126, Published on 27 May 2006)
<http://www.boe.es>

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
 Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
 July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

51e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

Comments:

Regulations are available online:

Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, de régimen jurídico de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 72, published on 25 March 1995)
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/25/pdfs/A09366-09369.pdf>

LEY 13/2006, de 26 de mayo, por la que se deroga el régimen de enajenación de participaciones públicas en determinadas empresas establecido por la Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo, y sus disposiciones de desarrollo y ejecución. (BOE No. 126, Published on 27 May 2006)
<http://www.boe.es>

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
 Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
 July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. ⁸⁹ National Ombudsman

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

52. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

Comments:

According to the Spanish Constitution: An organic act shall regulate the institution of the Defender of the People (Defensor del Pueblo) as high commissioner of the Cortes Generales, appointed by them to defend the rights contained in this Part; for this purpose he or she may supervise the activity of the Administration and report thereon to the Cortes Generales (Senate Standing Orders, section 183).

References:

Spanish Constitution — Chapter 2, Section 4, Article 54

Organic Law 3/1981, of 6 April, on the Defender of the People (Defensor del Pueblo)
Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 109, published on 7 May 1981
http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/leyes_espa/lo_003_1981.pdf

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

53. Is the national ombudsman effective?

80

53a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 3/1981, of 6 April, on the Defender of the People (Defensor del Pueblo)
Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 109, published on May 7, 1981
http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/leyes_espa/lo_003_1981.pdf

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

53b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In theory, the agency operates without any interference from the government. In fact, the national ombudsman is elected by the Parliament and not by the government. However, one questions to what extent the current national ombudsman and his closest collaborators are politically biased as they have been full-time politicians in the past (i.e., prior to their current positions, the national ombudsman was minister of justice from 1988 to 1991, his first aide was deputy major in Ibiza (Balearic Islands) and his second aide was town councilor of Albacete (an important town in Castilla-La Mancha).

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

75:

50: This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

53c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

53d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

53e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In theory, the agency operates without any interference from the government. In fact the national ombudsman is elected by the Parliament and not by the government. However, one questions to what extent the current national ombudsman and his closest collaborators are politically biased as they have been full-time politicians in the past. Prior to their current positions, the national ombudsman was minister of justice from 1988 to 1991, his first aide was deputy mayor in Ibiza (Balearic Islands) and his second aide was town councillor of Albacete (an important town in Castilla-La Mancha).

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

53f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

53g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Available online at:
<http://www.defensordelpueblo.es/index.asp>

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

53h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The national ombudsman does not initiate investigations on its own. The agency can forward allegations to the public prosecutor, the police or any court. Annual reports do not carry any binding effects.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

53i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The agency does not have the power to penalize offenders. However, it may forward reports to the competent authorities. Reports, however, may not end up in civil or criminal investigations.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

53j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Ombudsman reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman reports do not lead to policy changes.

53k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

54. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

100

54a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | NO

References:

See, Annual Reports at the Spanish Ombudsman Web site:
<http://www.defensordelpueblo.es/index.asp>

YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

54b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Reports (1983 – 2006) are available online at:
<http://www.defensordelpueblo.es/>

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Reports (1983 – 2006) are available online at:
<http://www.defensordelpueblo.es/>

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

Comments:

Reproduction of section 136 of the Spanish Constitution.

(1) The Court of Audit is the supreme body charged with auditing the State's accounts and financial management, as well as those of the public sector.

It shall be directly accountable to the Cortes Generales (Parliament) and shall discharge its duties by delegation of the same when examining and verifying the General State Accounts.

(2) The State Accounts and those of the State's public sector shall be submitted to the Auditing Court and shall be audited by the latter. The Auditing Court, without prejudice to its own jurisdiction, shall send an annual report to the Cortes Generales informing them, where applicable, of any infringements that may, in its opinion, have been committed, or any liabilities that may have been incurred.

(3) Members of the Auditing Court shall enjoy the same independence and fixity of tenure and shall be subject to the same incompatibilities as judges.

(4) An organic act shall make provision for membership, organization and duties of the Auditing Court.

References:

Spanish Constitution:

<http://www.constitucion.es>

Section 136 of the Spanish Constitution.

Law 7/1988, of 5 April, on the Court of Audit functioning Act
(Official Buletting of the State (BOE) No. 84, published on April 7, 1988)
Online (in English) at the website of the Court of Audit

Spanish Court of Audit Web site: <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

56. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

94

56a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:

Law 7/1988, of 5 April, on the Court of Audit functioning Act
(BOE No. 84, published on 7 April 1988)
Online (in English) at the website of the Court of Audit

Spanish Court of Audit Web site: <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 – Personal Interview

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The number of professional staff is 588, temporary staff is 31, and administrative/Secretarial staff is 138.

References:

Web site of the Court of Audit – <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Appointments to the agency are made through public competition.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The 2007 budget of the Spanish Court of Audit amounts to around US\$77.8 million (54.4 million euros).

References:

Court of Audit Web site: <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

56f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

One can access Reports, Memorandum, Motions and Notes online at: <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>.

References:

Spanish Court of Audit Web site: <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

100: The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Through its annual report, the Court of Audit may report any act of political corruption. From then on, it is the public prosecutor's task to initiate any proceedings within the criminal jurisdiction.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

56h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In the exercise of its auditing function, as laid down in the Spanish Constitution, the Court of Audit shall send an annual report to the Cortes Generales (the Parliament) informing of any infringements that may have been committed. It may also propose steps to improve public-sector economic-financial management. The court prevents the accounting jurisdiction from including judgment of matters remitted for consideration to other pertinent courts. In addition, the decision made by the Court of Audit cannot have any effect outside the scope of the accounting jurisdiction. Because corruption or corruption-related crimes acts are included in the Criminal Code, the Court of Audit has no jurisdiction upon them. But, the accounting jurisdiction of the court is compatible with the proceedings in the criminal jurisdiction.

In short, the Court of Audit has no effective power to pursue public corruption, but nevertheless, in the exercise of its double role, it may help in its fight. Through its annual report, the Court of Audit may report any act of political corruption. From then on, it is the public prosecutor's task to initiate any proceedings within the criminal jurisdiction.

References:

Anti-corruption strategies within the Competences of the Supreme Audit Institutions in the European Union: Spain. By Luis Ortega Alvarez
http://www.eplc.gr/session_state/files/events/upload/Spain.pdf

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

57. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

100

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

Comments:

One can access audit reports online under the heading Reports, memorandum, motions and notes. See the Court of Audit Web site at: <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

References:

<http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

57b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

One can access audit reports online under the heading Reports, memorandum, motions and notes. See the Court of Audit Web site at: <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

One can access audit reports online under the heading Reports, memorandum, motions and notes. See the Court of Audit Web site at: <http://www.tcu.es/default.htm>

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

98
V-3. Taxes and Customs

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

100

58. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

References:

The current Spanish Taxation Agency was created by Law 31/1990:
Ley 31/1990, de 27 de diciembre, de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para 1991
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) Dec. 28, 1990 and fe. 14, 1991)
<http://derfintrib.rediris.es/biblioteca/leyes/AEAT.pdf>

The Taxation Agency (Agency Tributaria) at:
<http://www.agencia tributaria.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

59. Is the tax collection agency effective?

88

59a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In 2006, the Spanish Taxation Agency's total staff was 27,247. See, Annual Report 2006.

References:

Jesus Montero Mesa, Member of the General Council of GESTHA (Union of Technical Experts from the Ministry of Economics and the Treasury)
July 2006 — Telephone interview

Spanish Taxation Agency Annual Report — 2006

http://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT/Contenidos_Comunes/La_Agencia_Tributaria/Informacion_institucional/Memorias/MEMORIAS_DE_LA_AGENCIA

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The total budget for the Spanish Taxation Agency in 2006 was US\$1,8 million (1.3 million euros) See, Annual Report 2006.

References:

Jesus Montero Mesa, Member of the General Council of GESTHA (Union of Technical Experts from the Ministry of Economics and the Treasury)
July 2006 — Telephone interview

Spanish Taxation Agency Annual Report — 2006

http://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT/Contenidos_Comunes/La_Agencia_Tributaria/Informacion_institucional/Memorias/MEMORIAS_DE_LA_AGENCIA

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100

60. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Yes, although tax fraud is quite common.

References:

Ramón Deza, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

Fernando Vivas, Head of National Police Union in Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:

50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

25:

0: Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

References:

Ley 31/1990, de 27 de diciembre, de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para 1991
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) Dec. 28, 1990 and Feb. 14, 1991)
<http://derfintrib.rediris.es/biblioteca/leyes/AEAT.pdf>

Law 12/1995, of 12 December on the Repression of smuggling
Ley Orgánica 12/1995, de 12 de diciembre, de Represión del Contrabando
BOE 297 published on Dec. 13, 1995
<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/12/13/pdfs/A35701-35705.pdf>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

62. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

62a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ramón Deza, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Non-official website of the Spanish Customs and Excise
<http://www.telecable.es/personales/sva/alfa.html>

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The agency has regular funding, although one could not argue it is not sufficient.

References:

Ramón Deza, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
Aug 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

Jesus Montero Mesa, Member of the General Council of GESTHA (Union of Technical Experts from the Ministry of Economics and the Treasury)
July 2006 — Telephone interview

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

63. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ramón Deza, Head of Customs and Excise in Malaga
Aug. 15, 2007 Personal Interview Institute of Criminology, University of Malaga

Fernando Vivas, Head of National Police Union in Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

75:

50: Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

25:

0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

64. In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

Comments:

Each government (local or regional) oversees the performance of their state-owned companies.

References:

Law 7/1985, of 2 April, on the regulations of the local regime (municipalities)
Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, reguladora de las bases de régimen local
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 80, published on April 3, 1985)
http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1985/05392

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if this function does not exist.

65. Is the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

65a. In law, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

References:

The agency/equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of the government

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

65b. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

Comments:

It is the same staff of the city council or equivalent local government.

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: The agency or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65c. In practice, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: The the agency or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The the agency or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

65d. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Investigations will only be started when reported to the local court or prosecution service.

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

65e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:

50: The agency or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to

enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

66. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

70

66a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | NO

References:

Law 7/1985, of 2 April, on the regulations of the local regime (municipalities)
Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, reguladora de las bases de régimen local
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 80, published on April 3, 1985)
http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1985/05392

YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

66b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

It is updated annually.

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: State-owned companies always disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

75:

50: State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, or file the information behind schedule.

25:

0: Financial data is not available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

66c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

They are subjected to the same regulations imposed by the Treasury.

References:

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

75:

50: Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

25:

0: State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

66d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

66e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

70
V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

67. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

81

67a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

References:

CODE OF COMMERCE (1885)
CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO de 1885
(Gazette numbers 289-328, from Oct. 16, 1885 to Nov. 24, 1885)

Amended by the following legislation:

19/1989 (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) nº 178, 27-07-1989), 24/2001 (BOE nº 313, 31-12-2001) , 34/2002 (BOE nº 166, 12-07-2002) , 22/2003 (BOE Nº 164, 10-07-2003), 62/2003 (BOE nº 313, 31-12-2003), 2/2007 (BOE nº 65, 16-03-2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required

67b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

References:

LEY 30/1992, DE 26 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS Y DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO COMÚN
JEFATURA DEL ESTADO (BOE No. 285 DE 27 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1992
http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1992/26318# analisis

Ley 26/1984, de 19 de julio, General para la defensa de los consumidores y usuarios (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) núms. 175 y 176, de 24-07-1984)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

67c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

Patricia Benavides, Professor of Commercial Law
University of Malaga
Aug. 10, 2007 — Personal interview — University of Malaga

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

25:

0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

67d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

Patricia Benavides, Professor of Commercial Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 10, 2007 — Personal interview — University of Malaga

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

68. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

68a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:

Every Autonomous Community has its own regulation in terms of environmental protection. In Andalusia, for example, the legislation is available online at:

http://www.ruidos.org/Normas/Ley_Andal_7_1994.htm

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:

Every Autonomous Community has its own regulation in terms of environmental protection. In Andalusia, for example, the legislation is available online at:

http://www.ruidos.org/Normas/Ley_Andal_7_1994.htm

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

68c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:

Every Autonomous Community has its own regulation in terms of public safety. In Andalusia, for example, information is online at:

http://www.proteccioncivil-andalucia.org/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=166&Itemid=183

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

69. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

69a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

José Ramón Mendiguren, Social Activist
Aug. 7, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

69c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

86
VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law

70. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

100

70a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Other types of corruption are also illegal when attempted" because article 62 (in relation to article 16) allows for the punishment of "any attempted crime" if some kind of danger is envisioned.

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Articles 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424 (for bribery).

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

It is necessary to define exactly what is meant by the term extortion". In Spain, extortion has a very concrete meaning, which entails violence. If you refer to extortion as the act of obtaining money from a person by intimidation, then the Spanish legislation would consider it something called "illegal extraction" which is typified in article 437 of the Spanish Criminal Code. Also, Articles 439 and 440 of the Spanish Criminal Code punishes public servants who, taking advantage of their positions, extract some kind of personal gain.

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Article 437. See, also Articles 439 and 440.

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Articles 423 and 424

YES: A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Articles 419, 420, 421, 422 and 426

YES: A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Article 445

YES: A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Articles 432, 433 and 434

YES: A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Article 442

YES: A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Law 19/1993 specifies the obligations of financial (and other) relevant organizations, i.e., actions to be taken and procedures to be followed in order to prevent the abuse of the financial system and other areas of the economic sector for the purposes of money laundering.

The law establishes new requirements concerning cooperation with the competent authorities dealing with AML issues and applies to private persons or entities involved in professional or business activities that are especially vulnerable to money laundering.

Law 19/1993 has also broadened the range of bodies/professionals obliged to report suspicious transactions and now includes auditors, accountants, tax consultants, notaries and lawyers.

Law 12/2003, of 21 May on the Prevention and Freezing of Terrorist Funding, established the possibility to freeze any kind of financial flow or account in order to prevent the funds being used to carry out of terrorist acts, while being able, at the same time, to identify and block the terrorist financial channels. It also allows for the verification of the true nature of these funds, of their origin, location, disposition and movements, and of the identity of the person responsible for these transactions.

References:

Spanish Criminal Code (Art. 301)

Law 19/1993, of 28 December, on specific measures to prevent money laundering online (in Spanish)
at: <http://www.sepblac.es/espanol/legislacion/prevbcap/pdf/ley19-93.pdf>

YES: A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

70i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

In a more general fashion, article 515 of the Spanish Criminal Code penalizes criminal organizations." Also within the the Criminal Code one finds numerous crimes that are aggravated if committed by a criminal organization.

References:

Spanish Criminal Code, Article 515

YES: A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

71. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 10/1995, of 24 April On the creation of the Special Prosecutor's Office for the Repression of Economic Offenses related to Corruption (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 98 published on April 25, 1995)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

72. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

44

72a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:

The anti-corruption agency is a subordinate of the nation's special prosecutor who, in turn, is appointed by the executive.

References:

Organic Law 10/1995, of 24 April On the creation of the Special Prosecutor's Office for the Repression of Economic Offences related to Corruption
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 98 published on 25 April 1995)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

72b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

75:

50: This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

72c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The head of the anti-corruption agency is accountable to the nation's special prosecutor who, in turn, is appointed by the executive. The chief prosecutor of the agency is selected by the government on a proposal submitted by the State Prosecution Service, after having consulted the Prosecution Council (Consejo Fiscal).

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

72d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

72e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The staff is very qualified (some prosecutors have more than 10 years' experience). However, nine prosecutors are not enough for a country of 42 million people.

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

Juan Carlos Lopez Caballero, Anti-mafia Prosecutor in Malaga
January 2007 — Personal interview

100: The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

72f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

It receives funding but it is always in short supply.

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

72g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Online one can only find reports from 2005 & 2006 at :<http://www.fiscal.es>. Prior to that, one should get them from university libraries or from libraries within the Prosecutor's Office.

References:

Memoria de la Fiscalía General del Estado
(Nation's Prosecutor General's Office Annual Report)

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

72h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The Anti-corruption Office is a subordinate of the state's prosecutor general who, in turn, is appointed by the executive. The office is understaffed and, in practice, prosecutors concentrate largely on big cases which ironically, are political cases.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

72i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Although it has the mandate to initiate investigations, it rarely does so.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

73. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

73a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The agency acts on complaints relatively quickly, although the Agency acknowledges no jurisdiction over minor cases.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

73b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

74. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

67

74a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

Comments:

AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING ORGANIC LAWS:

14/1983 (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) nº 310, 28-12-1983), 10/1984 (BOE nº 3, 3-01-1984), 2/1987 (BOE nº 120, 20-05-1987), 7/1988 (BOE nº 313, 30-12-1988), 4/1988 (BOE nº 126, 26-05-1988), 12/1991 (BOE nº 165, 11-07-1991), 8/1992 (BOE nº 308, 24-12-1992), 16/1994 (BOE nº 268, 9-11-1994), 5/1995 (BOE nº 122, 23-05-1995), 10/1995 (BOE nº 281, 24-11-1995), 2/1998 (BOE nº 143, 16-06-1998), 5/1999 (BOE nº 12, 14-01-1999), 14/1999 (BOE nº 138, 10-06-1999), 7/2002 (BOE nº 161, 6-06-2002), 8/2002 (BOE nº 258, 28-10-2002), 1/2003 (BOE nº 60, 11-03-2003), 5/2003 (BOE nº 127, 28-05-2003), 7/2003 (BOE nº 156, 1-07-2003), 13/2003 (BOE nº 257, 27-10-2003), 15/2003 (BOE nº 283, 26-11-2003), 19/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 1/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2004), 8/2006 (BOE nº 290, 5-12-2006) ; AND LAWS: 24/04/1958 (BOE nº 99,25-05-1958), 28/1978 (BOE nº 128, 30-05-1978), 33/1978 (BOE nº 172, 20-07-1978), 53/1978 (BOE nº 293, 8-12-1978), 16/1980 (BOE nº 101, 26-04-1980), 4/1984 (BOE nº 62, 13-03-1984),6/1984 (BOE nº 80, 3-04-1984), 6/1985 (BOE nº 77, 30-03-1985), 21/1988 (BOE nº 173, 20-07-1988), 10/1992 (BOE nº 108, 5-05-1992), 21/1994 (BOE nº 161, 7-07-1994), 22/1995 (BOE nº 170, 18-07-1995), 1/1996 (BOE nº 11, 12-01-1996), 36/1998 (BOE nº 270, 11-11-1998), 1/2000 (BOE nº 7, 8-01-2000), 38/2002 (BOE nº 258, 28-10-2002), 27/2003 (BOE nº 183, 1-08-2003), 18/2006 (BOE nº 134, 6-06-2006)

References:

Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure

LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL.

(From Gaceta nº 260, 17 September 1882 to Gaceta nº 283, 10 October 1882)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

74b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Spain is characterized by very slow legal procedures. Sometimes a criminal procedure may take up to eight years before a sentence is reached. Civil procedures may take longer. There are some which have gone beyond 10 years. Thus, the appeal mechanism is only a result of the legal backlog.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:

0: Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

74c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments.

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100

75. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 – Personal Interview at the University

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

75:

50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

50

76. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In the area of illegal planning and development it is common to find sentences that are never enforced.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

77. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

94

77a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

Comments:

AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING ORGANIC LAWS:

4/1987 (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) n° 171, 18-07-1987), 7/1988 (BOE n° 313, 30-12-1988), 4/1992 (BOE n° 140, 11-06-1992), 7/1992 (BOE n° 280, 21-11-1992), 16/1994 (BOE N° 268, 9-11-1994), 5/1995 (BOE n° 122, 23-05-1995), 5/1997 (BOE n° 291, 5-12-1997), 6/1998 (BOE n° 167, 14-07-1998), 11/1999 (BOE n° 104, 1-05-1999), 13/1999 (BOE n° 116, 15-05-1999), 7/2000 (BOE n° 307, 23-12-2000), 9/2000 (BOE n° 307, 23-12-2000), 2/2001 (BOE n° 155, 29-06-2001), 2/2002 (BOE n° 109, 7-05-2002), 6/2002 (BOE n° 154, 28-06-2002), 8/2002 (BOE n° 258, 28-10-2002), 9/2002 (BOE n° 296, 11-12-2002), 2/2003 (BOE n° 65, 17-03-2003), 4/2003 (BOE n° 122, 22-05-2003), 5/2003 (BOE n° 127, 28-05-2003), 7/2003 (BOE n° 156, 1-07-2003), 8/2003 (BOE n° 164, 10-07-2003), 13/2003 (BOE n° 257, 27-10-2003), 19/2003 (BOE n° 309, 26-12-2003), 20/2003 (BOE n° 309, 26-12-2003), 1/2004 (BOE n° 313, 29-12-2004), 2/2004 (BOE n° 313, 29-12-2003), 3/2005 (BOE N° 163, 9-07-2005), 5/2006 (BOE N° 134, 6-06-2006), 3/2007 (BOE N° 71, 23-03-2007), 6/2007 (BOE N° 125, 25-05-2007)

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

77b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

Comments:

National judges are typically independent yet sometimes their judgments are influenced by politics. In Spain, although judges and magistrates are largely independent, there are two national associations which include, on the one hand, judges and magistrates who sympathize with the political right (Asociación de Jueces y Magistrados Francisco de Vitoria, <http://www.ajfv.es>) and those who sympathize with the political left (Jueces para la Democracia, <http://www.juecesparalademocracia.es>)

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview – University

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:

0: National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

77c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

Comments:

AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING ORGANIC LAWS:

4/1987 (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) nº 171, 18-07-1987), 7/1988 (BOE nº 313, 30-12-1988), 4/1992 (BOE nº 140, 11-06-1992), 7/1992 (BOE nº 280, 21-11-1992), 16/1994 (BOE nº 268, 9-11-1994), 5/1995 (BOE nº 122, 23-05-1995), 5/1997 (BOE nº 291, 5-12-1997), 6/1998 (BOE nº 167, 14-07-1998), 11/1999 (BOE nº 104, 1-05-1999), 13/1999 (BOE nº 116, 15-05-1999), 7/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 9/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 2/2001 (BOE nº 155, 29-06-2001), 2/2002 (BOE nº 109, 7-05-2002), 6/2002 (BOE nº 154, 28-06-2002), 8/2002 (BOE nº 258, 28-10-2002), 9/2002 (BOE nº 296, 11-12-2002), 2/2003 (BOE nº 65, 17-03-2003), 4/2003 (BOE nº 122, 22-05-2003), 5/2003 (BOE nº 127, 28-05-2003), 7/2003 (BOE nº 156, 1-07-2003), 8/2003 (BOE nº 164, 10-07-2003), 13/2003 (BOE nº 257, 27-10-2003), 19/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 20/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 1/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2004), 2/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2003), 3/2005 (BOE nº 163, 9-07-2005), 5/2006 (BOE nº 134, 6-06-2006), 3/2007 (BOE nº 71, 23-03-2007), 6/2007 (BOE nº 125, 25-05-2007)

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

77d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

Comments:

AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING ORGANIC LAWS:

4/1987 (Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) nº 171, 18-07-1987), 7/1988 (BOE nº 313, 30-12-1988), 4/1992 (BOE nº 140, 11-06-1992), 7/1992 (BOE nº 280, 21-11-1992), 16/1994 (BOE Nº 268, 9-11-1994), 5/1995 (BOE nº 122, 23-05-1995), 5/1997 (BOE nº 291, 5-12-1997), 6/1998 (BOE nº 167, 14-07-1998), 11/1999 (BOE nº 104, 1-05-1999), 13/1999 (BOE nº 116, 15-05-1999), 7/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 9/2000 (BOE nº 307, 23-12-2000), 2/2001 (BOE nº 155, 29-06-2001), 2/2002 (BOE nº 109, 7-05-2002), 6/2002 (BOE nº 154, 28-06-2002), 8/2002 (BOE nº 258, 28-10-2002), 9/2002 (BOE nº 296, 11-12-2002), 2/2003 (BOE nº 65, 17-03-2003), 4/2003 (BOE nº 122, 22-05-2003), 5/2003 (BOE nº 127, 28-05-2003), 7/2003 (BOE nº 156, 1-07-2003), 8/2003 (BOE nº 164, 10-07-2003), 13/2003 (BOE nº 257, 27-10-2003), 19/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 20/2003 (BOE nº 309, 26-12-2003), 1/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2004), 2/2004 (BOE nº 313, 29-12-2003), 3/2005 (BOE Nº 163, 9-07-2005), 5/2006 (BOE Nº 134, 6-06-2006), 3/2007 (BOE Nº 71, 23-03-2007), 6/2007 (BOE Nº 125, 25-05-2007)

References:

Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, on the Judicial Power
(Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 157, published on July 2, 1985)
<http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

78. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

78a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

References:

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

78b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

79. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

93

79a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Although one could say Spanish judges are typically professionals whose decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias, there have been some cases of Roma people who claimed to have been treated unfairly.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

79b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

This is in fact a constitutional right: (Spanish Constitution — Rights and freedoms — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 14). Citizens are equal before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

José Ortigosa, Civil servant from the Ministry of Justice
Aug. 14, 2007 Personal interview Civil Court Malaga

100: Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

75:

50: Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

25:

0: Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

79c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

Comments:

Spanish Constitution — Rights and freedoms — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 24

1. All persons have the right to obtain effective protection from the judges and the courts in the exercise of their rights and legitimate interests, and in no case may there be a lack of defense.
2. Likewise, all have the right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law; to defense and assistance by a lawyer; to be informed of the charges brought against them; to a public trial without undue delays and with full guarantees; to the use of evidence appropriate to their defense; not to make self-incriminating statements; not to plead themselves guilty; and to be presumed innocent.
3. The law shall specify the cases in which, for reasons of family relationship or professional secrecy, it shall not be compulsory to make statements regarding allegedly criminal offences.

References:

Spanish Constitution — Rights and freedoms — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 24

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

79d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In fact, this is a constitutional right:

Spanish Constitution — Rights and freedoms — Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 24

1. All persons have the right to obtain effective protection from the judges and the courts in the exercise of their rights and legitimate interests, and in no case may there be a lack of defense.
2. Likewise, all have the right to the ordinary judge predetermined by law; to defense and assistance by a lawyer; to be informed of the charges brought against them; to a public trial without undue delays and with full guarantees; to the use of evidence appropriate to their defense; not to make self-incriminating statements; not to plead themselves guilty; and to be presumed innocent.
3. The law shall specify the cases in which, for reasons of family relationship or professional secrecy, it shall not be compulsory to make statements regarding allegedly criminal offences.

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview University

100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

75:

50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

25:

0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

79e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In some cases , however, the amount of the secured bond may restrict citizens from pursuing legal proceedings further.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits.

79f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In some cases , however, the amount of the secured bond may restrict small retail businesses from pursuing legal proceedings further.

References:

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

Inmaculada Rosas, Attorney and member of the anti-corruption group, Association for Analysis and Reflection (AYRE)
July 19, 2007 Personal interview at the AYRE headquarters (Malaga)

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits.

79g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Ana Maria Prieto, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, University of Malaga
Aug. 3, 2007 Personal interview — University

Inmaculada Gálvez, Attorney and Former Representative (Green Party) of the Parliament of Andalusia
July 19, 2007 — Personal Interview

100: Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

75:

50: Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

25:

0: Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

VI-4. Law Enforcement

80. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

100

80a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Along with professional qualifications, appointments are made through public competition

References:

Fernando Vivas, Head of National Police Union in Malaga
July, 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

Carlos Vazquez, Deputy Chief Commissioner, National Police Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

80b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

It does carry out its mandate, although there are always economic restrictions.

References:

Fernando Vivas, Head of National Police Union in Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

Carlos Vazquez, Deputy Chief Commissioner, National Police Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

80c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The agency is typically independent although high-ranking positions are shifted according to the government. Also, both national police forces (Civil Guard and National Police) are subordinate of the Ministry of the Interior

References:

Fernando Vivas, Head of National Police Union in Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

Dr. José Luis Díez Ripollés, Professor of Criminal Law, School of Law, University of Malaga
July 10, 2007 — Personal Interview at the University

100: The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

81. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

67

81a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

Another way of filing complaints is one called Hoja de reclamación "(complaints form) issued by the Autonomous Communities. One can use this form to complain about any service or purchase in Spain. By law, every business or public agency must keep a book and they must provide it if asked by a customer or service user. The responsible person of the business or service (or the government of the Autonomous Community) will respond to every complaint in writing.

Every Autonomous Community has its own legislation:

COMUNIDAD AUTONOMA DE ANDALUCIA

Decreto 171/89, de 11 de julio. Regula las hojas de queja y reclamaciones de los consumidores (BOJA 03-08-89)

DIPUTACIÓN GENERAL DE ARAGÓN

Decreto 311/2001 de 4 de diciembre. Regula las hojas de reclamaciones en materia de consumo (BOAR 19-12-01)

Orden de 18 de septiembre de 2003. Actualiza el Anexo I del Decreto 311/2001 (BOAR 3-10-2003)

Orden de 2 de julio de 2002. Amplía la relación de sectores, empresas y establecimientos obligados a cumplir el Decreto 311/2001. (BOAR 17-07-2002)

PRINCIPADO DE ASTURIAS

Decreto 6/2005, de 19 de enero, por el que se regulan las hojas de reclamaciones a disposición de los consumidores y usuarios.

COMUNIDAD AUTONOMA DE LAS ISLAS BALEARES

Ley 1/98, de 10 de marzo, del Estatuto de los Consumidores y Usuarios (BOIB 17-03-98) Art.11

COMUNIDAD AUTONOMA DE CANARIAS

Decreto 225/94, de 11 de noviembre, por el que se regulan las hojas de reclamaciones de los consumidores y usuarios (BOC 05-12-94)

COMUNIDAD AUTONOMA DE CANTABRIA

Decreto 12/96, de 26 de abril. Regula las hojas de reclamaciones de consumidores y usuarios (BOCT 02-05-96)

Orden de 26 de julio de 1996. Desarrolla el Decreto 12/96, que regula las hojas de reclamaciones de consumidores y usuarios (BOC 01-08-96)

JUNTA DE COMUNIDADES DE CASTILLA-LA MANCHA

Decreto 72/97 de 24 de junio. Regulación de las hojas de reclamaciones (BOCM 27-06-97)

Orden de 28 de julio de 1997. Aprueba las hojas de reclamaciones de los consumidores y usuarios y su cartel anunciador (BOCM 08-08-97)

Orden de 22 de octubre de 2003. Modifica la Orden de 28 de julio de 1997. (BOCM 12-11-2003)

COMUNIDAD AUTONOMA DE CASTILLA Y LEON

Decreto 109/2004, de 14 de octubre, por el que se regulan las Hojas de Reclamaciones de los Consumidores y Usuarios.

Corrección de errores del Decreto 109/2004, de 14 de octubre, por el que se regulan las Hojas de Reclamaciones de los Consumidores y Usuarios.

GENERALIDAD DE CATALUÑA

Decreto 70/2003 de 4 de marzo. Regula las hojas de reclamación/denuncia en los establecimientos comerciales y en la actividad de prestación de servicios. (DOGC 28-03-2003)

JUNTA DE EXTREMADURA

Decreto 32/95 de 4 de abril. Regula el modelo de hojas de reclamaciones de los consumidores y usuarios y su utilización (DOE 08-04-95)

COMUNIDAD AUTONOMA DE GALICIA

Decreto 375/98 de 23 de diciembre. Regula las hojas de reclamaciones de los consumidores y usuarios. (BOGA 12-01-99)

COMUNIDAD DE MADRID

Decreto 152/2001 de 13 de septiembre. Reglamento de la Ley 11/98, de 9 de julio, de protección de los consumidores (BOMA 03-10-01)

Orden 2844/2002 de 7 de junio. Modifica la hoja de reclamaciones del Anexo del Decreto 152/2001 (BOMA 14-06-02)

REGION DE MURCIA

Decreto 31/99 de 20 de mayo. Regulación de las hojas de reclamaciones (BORM 26-05-99)

COMUNIDAD FORAL DE NAVARRA

Decreto Foral 69/98 de 2 de marzo. Regula las hojas de reclamaciones de consumidores y usuarios (BONA 23-03-98)

References:

Such a mechanism does not exist. If citizens want to complain about a police action they should take complaints to the local court or prosecution service.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

81b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Such mechanism does not exist in Spain.

References:

Fernando Vivas, Head of National Police Union in Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

Carlos Vazquez, Deputy Chief Commissioner, National Police Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

100: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

81c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:

The entity is recognized as the Internal Affairs Unit, which is accountable to the director general of the National Police and the Civil Guard.

References:

The agency is internal to the law enforcement bodies regulated by the following legislation:

Organic Law 2/1986, of 13 March, on Law enforcement bodies

[Ley Orgánica 2/1986, de 13 de marzo, de Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad](Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 63, published on 14 March 1986)

http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1986/06859

Royal Decree 884/1989, of 14 July, on the approval of the regulations of the disciplinary regime of the National Police [Real Decreto 884/1989, de 14 de Julio, por el que se aprueba el reglamento de régimen disciplinario del Cuerpo Nacional de Policía](BOE No. 171, Publisher on 19 July 1989) http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1989/17118&codmap=

Organic Law 11/1991, of 17 June, on the Disciplinary regime of the Civil Guard [Ley Orgánica 11/1991, de 17 de junio, del Régimen Disciplinario de la Guardia Civil](BOE No. 145, Publisher on 18 June 1991) <http://www.boe.es>

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

81d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

The agency may transfer the case to the administrative or criminal court.

References:

Fernando Vivas, Head of National Police Union in Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

Carlos Vazquez, Deputy Chief Commissioner, National Police Malaga
July 15, 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

81e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES | NO

References:

Organic Law 2/1986, of 13 March, on Law enforcement bodies [Ley Orgánica 2/1986, de 13 de marzo, de Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad](Official Bulletin of the State (BOE) No. 63, published on March 14, 1986) http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1986/06859

Royal Decree 884/1989, of 14 July, on the approval of the regulations of the disciplinary regime of the National Police [Real Decreto 884/1989, de 14 de Julio, por el que se aprueba el reglamento de régimen disciplinario del Cuerpo Nacional de Policía](BOE No. 171, Publisher on 19 July 1989) http://www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1989/17118&codmap=

Organic Law 11/1991, of 17 June, on the Disciplinary regime of the Civil Guard [Ley Orgánica 11/1991, de 17 de junio, del Régimen Disciplinario de la Guardia Civil](BOE No. 145, Publisher on June 18, 1991)

YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

81f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Fernando Vivas
Head of National Police Union in Malaga
15 July 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

Carlos Vazquez
Deputy Chief Commissioner — National Police Malaga
15 July 2007 — Telephone interview (Although I know him personally)

100: Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

75:

50: Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

25:

0: Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.