

Overall Score:

**41 - Very Weak**

Legal Framework Score:

**56 - Very Weak**

Actual Implementation Score:

**26 - Very Weak**

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

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## I-1. <sup>53</sup>Civil Society Organizations

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1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

33

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The law of associations prohibits associations with political" objectives to "influence national policies of the government and national parliament." This article is sufficiently ambivalent to be used to prohibit certain groups from actively promoting good governance and anti-corruption.

**References:**

Lei das Associações (Law of Associations) from May 11, 1991, Art. 8, 2. e).

**YES:** A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Within the limitations described above, the law guarantees that Angolan associations have juridical, administrative and financial autonomy and associations are free to enter partnerships with international organizations.

**References:**

Lei das Associações (Law of Associations) from May 11, 1991, Art. 8, 2. e), art. 9 and 24

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

No such requirements are outlined in the law.

**References:**

Lei das Associações (Law of Associations) from May 11, 1991, Art. 8, 2. e).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

## 2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

50

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Human Rights and Church organizations are the most active in terms of promoting good governance and anti-corruption in Angola. In line with the ambiguity of the legislation described above, these organizations operate in an environment with a lack of recognition and occasional harassment. For example, the Association for Justice, Peace and Democratization is currently being tried on article 8 of the law of associations quoted above. Open Society Institute for Southern Africa (OSISA) has not been able to obtain a legal status but also has not been effectively closed down, leaving it to operate at the will of the authorities.

**References:**

1. Voice of America (quoted on AngoNoticias news portal), August 13, 2007, Aumenta clima de tensão entre governo e ONGs, revela VOA, [http://www.angonoticias.com/full\\_headlines.php?id=16023](http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=16023)[http://www.inforpress.cv/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=7823&Itemid=65](http://www.inforpress.cv/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7823&Itemid=65)
3. Katila Pinto de Andrade, Deputy Director, Open Society Institute for Southern Africa, November 13, 2008.

**100:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

**75:**

**50:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

As a result of the context described in the previous answer, a few CSOs are somewhat active but are not relevant to the policy process. Others tend to conduct a great deal of self-censorship to avoid problems. Finally, most CSOs working in these areas need training and discipline to distinguish between partisan and non-partisan approaches to advocacy.

**References:**

1. Voice of America (quoted on AngoNoticias news portal), Aug. 13, 2007, Aumenta clima de tensão entre governo e ONGs, revela VOA, [http://www.angonoticias.com/full\\_headlines.php?id=16023](http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=16023)[http://www.inforpress.cv/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=7823&Itemid=65](http://www.inforpress.cv/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7823&Itemid=65)
3. Katila Pinto de Andrade, Deputy Director, Open Society Institute for Southern Africa, November 13, 2008.

**100:** Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

**75:**

**50:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

**25:**

**0:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Neither the Association for Justice, Peace and Democratization (AJPD) nor the Open Society Institute for Southern Africa (OSISA) has yet been closed down.

**References:**

1. Voice of America (quoted on AngoNoticias news portal), Aug. 13, 2007, Aumenta clima de tensão entre governo e ONGs, revela VOA, [http://www.angonoticias.com/full\\_headlines.php?id=16023](http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=16023)[http://www.inforpress.cv/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=7823&Itemid=65](http://www.inforpress.cv/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7823&Itemid=65).
3. Katila Pinto de Andrade, Deputy Director, Open Society Institute for Southern Africa, Nov. 13, 2008.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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### 3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Father Jacinto Wacussanga, Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
2. Katila Pinto de Andrade, Deputy Director, Open Society Institute for Southern Africa, Nov. 13, 2008.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Father Jacinto Wacussanga, Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
2. Katila Pinto de Andrade, Deputy Director, Open Society Institute for Southern Africa, Nov. 13, 2008.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist's work. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

**References:**

1. Father Jacinto Wacussanga, Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
2. Katila Pinto de Andrade, Deputy Director, Open Society Institute for Southern Africa, Nov. 13, 2008.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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#### 4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

**References:**

Constitutional law, Sept. 16, 1992, Art. 33, in line with the Law of Associations.

**YES:** A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The constitutional revision of 1992 made trade unions independent of the state although they remained weak as a result of a mix of structural limitations (vast majority of population informally employed) and government intervention (fear, intimidation, non-coverage of strikes in state-controlled media). Recently, representatives of the teachers union SINPROF have reportedly been imprisoned and subsequently released in the province of Bengo.

**References:**

1. Tony Hodges (2001): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, African Issues, Indiana University Press, p. 94.
2. Father Jacinto Wacussanga, Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
3. Voice of America (quoted on Angola24horas), Oct. 31, 2008, Tribunal do Bengo liberta professores grevistas, <http://angola24horas.com/?pg=noticia&id=2301>.
3. Frente para a Democracia, <http://www.fpdangolaimprensa.blogspot.com/>.

**100:** Trade unions are common and are an important part of the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

**75:**

**50:** Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

**25:**

**0:** Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

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## I-2. Media

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### 5. Are media and free speech protected?

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Constitution of Angola Art. 35.

The Media Law, No. 7/06 of May 15, 2006, Art. 1 ([http://www.cne.ao/pdf/lei07\\_05.pdf](http://www.cne.ao/pdf/lei07_05.pdf)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Constitution of Angola Art. 32.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

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## 6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

50

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Luanda has a number of private print media entities in the shape of weeklies and, recently, two new weeklies have been launched. All print media must be registered and licensed through a somewhat bureaucratic process involving a lot of documentation. It is not clear whether registration can be refused, but there are concerns that the provisions of article 21 of the law may limit who may become a journalist or set up a media outlet (see report of Article 19, p. 13).

**References:**

1. Article 19, Aug. 2007, Freedom of Expression and the Angolan Elections, <http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/angola-foe-elections.pdf>.

2. Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, Nov. 10, Luanda.

**100:** Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

The Media Law, No. 7/06 of May 15, 2006 ([http://www.cne.ao/pdf/lei07\\_05.pdf](http://www.cne.ao/pdf/lei07_05.pdf)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

1. Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, Nov. 10, 2008, Luanda.

2. José Paulo, Media Program Officer, Open Society Institute Angola, Email exchange, Dec. 12, 2008.

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Licenses are only issued in the capital, Luanda, but at no or low cost (especially if the journal or magazine is non-profit).

**References:**

1. Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, Nov. 10, 2008, Luanda.
2. José Paulo, Media Program Officer, Open Society Institute Angola, Email exchange, Dec.12, 2008

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

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## 7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

6

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Private radio stations are permitted to broadcast only on a regional basis whereas the state-owned radio and TV stations are allowed to broadcast on a national scale. Radio Ecclesia, the independent Catholic radio, has tried to get permission to widen its broadcast reach for several years without success. Before the elections, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)-owned Radio Despertar was threatened with closure as the stations broadcasting range exceeded its 50 km limit. The government's geographic limitation of private radio stations broadcasts is widely viewed as a political tool. Some commentators speculate that the government applies a co-optation" strategy by offering journalists better working conditions by moving to the state-owned media. Proof for this would require further investigation.

**References:**

1. BBC World Service Trust, Cândido Mendes and Barnaby Smith, 2006, African Media Development Initiative Angola Research findings and conclusions, [http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/AMD/angola/amdi\\_angola\\_full\\_report.pdf](http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/AMD/angola/amdi_angola_full_report.pdf).
2. Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

**25:**

**0:** Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Media Law, No. 7/06 of May 15, 2006 ([http://www.cne.ac/pdf/lei07\\_05.pdf](http://www.cne.ac/pdf/lei07_05.pdf)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is not possible to get a license to broadcast nationally.

**References:**

1. Father Jacinto Wacussanga, Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, November 5, 2008, Luanda
2. Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, Luanda

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

1. Father Jacinto Wacussanga, Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
2. Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

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## 8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

100

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published on-line.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### References:

1. Father Jacinto Wacussanga, Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
2. Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

#### 75:

**50:** Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

#### 25:

**0:** Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content on-line.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### References:

1. Father Jacinto Wacussanga, Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
2. Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, Nov. 10, Luanda.

**100:** The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

#### 75:

**50:** In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

#### 25:

**0:** The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

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## 9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The law is ambiguous as it highlights the importance of protecting the reputation (good name) of individuals and does not make reference to whether this is not a violation of the law if it is based on accurate information.

**References:**

The Media Law, No. 7/06 of May 15, 2006, ([http://www.cne.ao/pdf/lei07\\_05.pdf](http://www.cne.ao/pdf/lei07_05.pdf)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Given the ambiguity of the media law, it becomes both risky and very costly to report on corruption. Media entities in Angola face extraordinarily high operational costs and this, coupled with the government's active use of the defamation article, means that some editors think twice before letting their journalists engage in a corruption-related story. The case of the imprisoning of the director-general (DG) of the weekly Angolan newspaper Semanário Angolense has been referred to as an example of government intimidation of the press. The DG was sentenced to eight months in prison and the payment of damages amounting to US\$250,000 to former Angolan Minister of Justice and current Government Ombudsman Paulo Tchিপilica.

**References:**

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

João da Silva Candembo (Acting Director General): Communique by Semanario Angolense, Oct. 3, 2007, [http://docs.google.com/View?docid=dgkm3zmv\\_274qs84xr](http://docs.google.com/View?docid=dgkm3zmv_274qs84xr).

**100:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

**75:**

**50:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

**25:**

**0:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

**Comments:**

There is no specific pre-publication censoring mechanism of private media outlets. The interviewee and key institutions such as Article 19 and the Media Institute of Southern Africa, which monitors Angolan press, make no mention of such a practice.

**References:**

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008 Luanda.

Media Institute of Southern Africa (2008), Angola, <http://www.misa.org/chapters/angola/misaangola.html>.

Article 19 (August 2007): Freedom of Expression and the Angolan Elections, <http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/angola-foe-elections.pdf>.

**100:** The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

**75:**

**50:** The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

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## 10. Are the media credible sources of information?

60

10a. In law, print media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Lei de Imprensa 7/06 (Press law of July 2006), article 26.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Lei de Imprensa 7/06 (Press law of July 2006), article 26.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Investigative journalism in Angola suffers from lack of skills, the direct and indirect pressure on critical media and the impossibility to access to official information. Moreover, an interviewee noted that there have been some violations of the code of conduct by journalists that were often due to a lack of training but with no bad intentions; this sometimes happened as a result of the competition with other private newspapers.

**References:**

Media Institute of Southern Africa (2008): Angola, <http://www.misa.org/chapters/angola/mediaenvironment.html>.

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

**75:**

**50:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

**25:**

**0:** Editors and journalists are widely known to sell" favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is important here to distinguish between private and public media. Public media (which is the only one with national coverage) had a clear bias towards the incumbent party (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola — MPLA), whereas the coverage by private media outlets was overall balanced. The European Union (EU) observer mission found that despite allocating equal free airtime on a daily basis to all parties contesting the elections during the entire campaign period TPA [Televisao Publica De Angola], RNA [Radio Nacional de Angola] and state-owned Jornal de Angola provided coverage of the electoral campaign that was generally biased in favour of the ruling party."

**References:**

EU Election Observation Mission Angola, Legislative Election, 8 September 2008 – PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, p. 3, [http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM\\_ANGOLA\\_2008\\_PS\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM_ANGOLA_2008_PS_EN.pdf)

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, Luanda

**100:** All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

**75:**

**50:** Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

**25:**

**0:** The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting

political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Political parties do not have equitable access to state-owned media outlets. This was exemplified during the most recent elections where there was failure to avoid bias in coverage despite the allocation of equal free airtime on a daily basis to all parties contesting the elections during the entire campaign period.

**References:**

EU Election Observation Mission Angola, Legislative Election, Sept. 8, 2008 – PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, p. 3, [http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM\\_ANGOLA\\_2008\\_PS\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM_ANGOLA_2008_PS_EN.pdf).

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

**75:**

**50:** The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

**25:**

**0:** The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

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## 11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

67

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The case of the imprisoning of the director-general of the weekly Angolan newspaper Semanário Angolense, Mr. Graca Campos, is an example of a journalist being jailed because of his work covering corruption. It seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to the nature of his work on former Angolan Minister of Justice and current Government Ombudsman Paulo Tchিপilica's alleged benefits he received from alleged traffic of influences underlying a process of de-confiscation of real estate.

**References:**

João da Silva Candembo (Acting Director General), Oct. 3, 2007, Communiqué by Semanario Angolense, [http://docs.google.com/View?docid=djkm3zmv\\_274gs84xr](http://docs.google.com/View?docid=djkm3zmv_274gs84xr).

CPJ (2007): Proeminente jornalista é mandado para a prisão por ação de difamação (<http://www.englishpen.org/writersinprison/bulletins/angolanewspaperdirectorandjournalistfelisbertodegracampossentencedtoeightmonthsimprisonment/>).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a

NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There are no reports of such incidents.

**References:**

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No such incidents have been reported.

**References:**

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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61  
I-3. Public Access to Information

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12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

67

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This law has to be read in conjunction with the State Secrets Law (12/02) of August 16, 2002 that limits the extension of the law. Another limit on the extension of the law is that the right to information is not constitutionally guaranteed.

**References:**

Lei do Acesso aos Documentos Administrativos, 11/02 de 16 de agosto (Law on Access to Documents held by Public Authorities, <http://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/angola/foi-law02.doc>).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is a Monitoring Commission (see article 17-19) that can evaluate" complaints from individuals, but it is not an actual formal process for appeal.

**References:**

Lei do Acesso aos Documentos Administrativos, 11/02 de 16 de agosto (Law on Access to Documents held by Public Authorities, <http://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/angola/foi-law02.doc>).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

A request must be made in writing and contain sufficient information to enable the official dealing with it to identify the document required (art. 13).

All state institutions must appoint an entity responsible for implementing the law (art. 14).

A reply must be given within 10 days (art. 15).

The government also has an Internet portal with a center of contacts" where requests can be made: <http://www.angola-portal.ao/PortaldoServico/FaleConosco.aspx>.

**References:**

Lei do Acesso aos Documentos Administrativos, 11/02 de 16 de agosto (Law on Access to Documents held by Public Authorities, <http://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/angola/foi-law02.doc>).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

### 13. Is the right of access to information effective?

10

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is significant that in the four and a half years since the Law was enacted, it has barely been used and does not register among journalists as a tool they can rely upon to gather information." Given the lack of application, it is difficult to say how long a time it takes to obtain government documentation. A key problem is also the lack of uniformity in the application of this law. It differs from case to case and depends on whether you have contacts within the government. Finally, the State Secrets Law is so broad that it can be abused to prevent access to information.

**References:**

Article 19 (August 2007): Freedom of Expression and the Angolan Elections: <http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/angola-foe-elections.pdf> .

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In light of the limitations of access, the documents that are available can be obtained at the cost of photocopying but it requires going to the ministry or public entity in question. Most often, however, the requests of citizens or journalists will not be attended to.

**References:**

Article 19 (August 2007): Freedom of Expression and the Angolan Elections, <http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/angola-foe-elections.pdf>.

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

No such process exists in practice.

**References:**

Article 19 (August 2007): Freedom of Expression and the Angolan Elections, <http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/angola-foe-elections.pdf>.

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

No such process exists in practice.

**References:**

Article 19 (August 2007): Freedom of Expression and the Angolan Elections, <http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/angola-foe-elections.pdf>.

Antonio Freitas, Chief Editor, Novo Jornal, November 10, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

**Comments:**

The law does not seem to have been implemented. In line with the answer to question13a, the key problem with regard to access to information in Angola is the lack of uniformity or that access to information is driven by supply rather than by demand. The government will not give information about sensitive issues and can use the state secret law at will to legalize” this denial.

**References:**

Article 19: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, Overview and Conclusions on the Angolan Situation Regarding the Upcoming Elections (Late 2006/Early 2007), <http://magic.wordpress-158395-729720.cloudwaysapps.com/socialScientist/surveyQuestions.cfm?questionID=42&subCategoryID=15&answerID=&status=notsubmitted>.

**100:** The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

**75:**

**50:** The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

**25:**

**0:** The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

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 Category II. Elections
 

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 40  
 II-1. Voting & Citizen Participation
 

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## 14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (The Constitution of Angola) Art.º 28.º e 57.º

Portuguese: <http://www.rjcplp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-constituicao/downloadFile/file/ANGOLA.Constituicao.pdf?nocache=1202120482.47>.

English: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN002502.pdf>

Lei Eleitoral (elections law) Art.º 11.º

<http://www.angola-portal.ao/PortaldoGoverno/LegislacaoD.aspx?Codigo=132>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (The Constitution of Angola) Art.ºs 59.º e 79.º

Portuguese: <http://www.rjcplp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-constituicao/downloadFile/file/ANGOLA.Constituicao.pdf?nocache=1202120482.47>.

English: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN002502.pdf>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

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15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

75

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The only problem reported in the recent elections related to some problems with voter registration lists.

**References:**

European Union (2008): Elections Mark Crucial Step Towards Democracy Despite Organizational Weaknesses," [http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/PR\\_08\\_09\\_08\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/PR_08_09_08_EN.pdf).

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

**75:**

**50:** Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

European Union (2008): Elections Mark Crucial Step Towards Democracy Despite Organizational Weaknesses," [http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/PR\\_08\\_09\\_08\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/PR_08_09_08_EN.pdf).

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

**75:**

**50:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

**25:**

**0:** Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Whereas it is hoped that the recent resumption of the electoral process will mark the beginning of regular elections (with the holding of Presidential elections in 2009 being the first test), the fact cannot be ignored that elections had not been held since 1992 and have been postponed since 1997 when the current parliament lost its mandate. After the end of the war in 2002, elections were again postponed in a fairly arbitrary manner.

**References:**

Amudsen & Weimar (2008): Opposition Parties and the Upcoming 2008 Parliamentary Elections in Angola, <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?3103=opposition-parties-and-the-upcoming-2008>.

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

**75:**

**50:** Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

**25:**

**0:** Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

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16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

65

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (The Constitution of Angola) Art.º 4.º e 28.º

Portuguese: <http://www.rjcplp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-constituicao/downloadFile/file/ANGOLA.Constituicao.pdf?nocache=1202120482.47>.

English: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN002502.pdf>  
Lei dos partidos politicos (law on Political Parties) Art.º 4.º e 12.º <http://www.angola-portal.ao/PortaldoSistema/legislacaoD.aspx?Codigo=135>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (The Constitution of Angola) Art.º 28.º

Portuguese: <http://www.rjcplp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-constituicao/downloadFile/file/ANGOLA.Constituicao.pdf?nocache=1202120482.47>.

English: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN002502.pdf>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Relatively liberal registration procedure accompanied the 2005 law reform. All 7,500 endorsers of a new party must have ID, so the procedure may be quite burdensome.

**References:**

Amudsen & Weimar (2008): Opposition Parties and the Upcoming 2008 Parliamentary Elections in Angola (<http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/23103=opposition-parties-and-the-upcoming-2008>).

EISA (2006): Angola Party registration (<http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/angparties1.htm>).

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

**25:**

**0:** Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Voting is for parties, so the parties nominate their candidates, and the party must present the documentation to the the National Electoral Commission (CNE — Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) presenting their eligibility. The applications of 20 parties were rejected from participating in the election on legal grounds. Costs of campaigning are high. Parties receive government funding for their campaign.

**References:**

Amudsen & Weimar (2008): Opposition Parties and the Upcoming 2008 Parliamentary Elections in Angola (<http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/23103=opposition-parties-and-the-upcoming-2008>).

EUOM (2008): Preliminary report ([http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM\\_ANGOLA\\_2008\\_PS\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM_ANGOLA_2008_PS_EN.pdf)).

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office. A system of party lists may discourage or prevent independent candidates from running for office.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA — Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) won 191 out of 220 seats in the National Assembly (81.64 percent of the vote), which provides it with a crucial two-thirds majority and leaves the opposition with only token participation.

**References:**

National Electoral Commission (CNE): Eleções legislativas, 2008, <http://www.cne.ao/>.

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

**75:**

**50:** The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

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## II-2. Election Integrity

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### 18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

15

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Appointments have been made by political parties themselves as well as the president. As Human Rights Watch writes, Human Rights Watch found that the elections oversight body, the National Electoral Commission (CNE), chaired by the deputy Supreme Court president, is not independent. Of 11 members, six are appointed by political parties according to their representation in parliament, three from the ruling MPLA and three from opposition parties, while the other members are appointed by the president, the Supreme Court and several government ministries. Given the dominance of the ruling MPLA in the government and civil service, the majority of the CNE members are effectively appointed by the ruling party."

**References:**

Angola: Doubts Over Free and Fair Elections." Human Rights Watch, Aug. 12, 2008.

"SADC Team Says Government Grip on Electoral Process Too Tight" (<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=71030>).

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

Appointments have been made by political parties themselves as well as the president. As Human Rights Watch writes, Human Rights Watch found that the elections oversight body, the National Electoral Commission (CNE), chaired by the deputy Supreme Court president, is not independent. Of 11 members, six are appointed by political parties according to their representation in parliament – three from the ruling MPLA and three from opposition parties – while the other members are appointed by the president, the Supreme Court and several government ministries. Given the dominance of the ruling MPLA in the government and civil service, the majority of the CNE members are effectively appointed by the ruling party."

**References:**

Angola: Doubts Over Free and Fair Elections." Human Rights Watch, Aug. 12, 2008.

"SADC Team Says Government Grip on Electoral Process Too Tight" (<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=71030>).

**100:** Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed

usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), The electoral commission [CNE — Comissão Nacional Eleitoral] has depended for logistical support on the government's Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Electoral Process (CIPE), which should come under its supervision. Offices of the two commissions have shared staff at the local level, which has undermined transparency concerning electoral oversight. Representing several government ministries, the CIPE is dominated by the ruling MPLA [Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola] and chaired by the Minister of Territorial Administration, Virgílio Fontes Pereira, who is also a senior MPLA candidate in the election. The CIPE carried out Angola's voter registration from November 2006 to May 2008 and was critical in determining the location of polling centers and stations until the end of July 2008."

**References:**

Angola: Doubts Over Free and Fair Elections." Human Rights Watch, Aug. 12, 2008.

"SADC Team Says Government Grip on Electoral Process Too Tight" (<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=71030>).

**100:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

As Human Rights Watch argues, The government of Angola repeatedly delayed the establishment of a constitutional court to deal fairly and speedily with complaints, as required by the SADC [Southern African Development Community] Guidelines. The task of legal oversight of the process was left far too long with the Supreme Court, which had a record of procedural delays that have disadvantaged the opposition parties. For example, the Supreme Court took three years to respond to constitutional complaints lodged by UNITA [Union for the Total Independence of Angola] in 2005 regarding several electoral laws. In addition, the court failed to respond to repeated requests from opposition parties to clarify criteria on how to document their application to stand in the elections. This has contributed to delays in approving which political parties are eligible to stand and in distributing state funds for campaigning. A constitutional court was finally established on June 25, 2008. It has so far developed a positive professional record in dealing with electoral concerns."

**References:**

Angola: Doubts Over Free and Fair Elections." Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2008.

"SADC Team Says Government Grip on Electoral Process Too Tight" (<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=71030>).

For a useful summary of CNE's election results and international assessments of the 2008 Angolan elections process, see "Angola Election: Free and Fair, Sort of." AfricaFocus Bulletin, September 27, 2008 (<http://www.africafocus.org/docs08/ang0809.php>).

**100:** Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

**75:**

**50:** Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

As Human Rights Watch argues, The government of Angola repeatedly delayed the establishment of a constitutional court to deal fairly and speedily with complaints, as required by the SADC [Southern African Development Community] Guidelines. The task of legal oversight of the process was left far too long with the Supreme Court, which had a record of procedural delays that have disadvantaged the opposition parties. For example, the Supreme Court took three years to respond to constitutional complaints lodged by UNITA [Union for the Total Independence of Angola ] in 2005 regarding several electoral laws. In addition, the court failed to respond to repeated requests from opposition parties to clarify criteria on how to document their application to stand in the elections. This has contributed to delays in approving which political parties are eligible to stand and in distributing state funds for campaigning. A constitutional court was finally established on June 25, 2008. It has so far developed a positive professional record in dealing with electoral concerns."

**References:**

Angola: Doubts Over Free and Fair Elections." Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2008.

"SADC Team Says Government Grip on Electoral Process Too Tight" (<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=71030>).

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

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## 19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

88

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

For the 2008 legislative elections, 8,397,173 people in total were registered, with 30 percent of them in the capital, Luanda. The registration process is generally viewed as timely and transparent, although a delay in passing the voter register from the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Election Process to the National Electoral Commission caused some problems on election day.

**References:**

EUOM (2008): Preliminary report ([http://www.eucom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM\\_ANGOLA\\_2008\\_PS\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eucom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM_ANGOLA_2008_PS_EN.pdf)).

**100:** There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

**75:**

**50:** There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

**25:**

**0:** The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost" voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Constitutional Court was established in mid-2008 and thus far has established a solid reputation in dealing with electoral disputes.

**References:**

Lei Eleitoral (Election law) Art.º 7.º.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, there is a procedure in place. In the September 2008 elections, there were very few complaints, except for one by Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) regarding the process in Luanda, but which was withdrawn.

The Constitutional Court was established in mid-2008 and thus far has established a solid reputation in dealing with electoral disputes.

**References:**

EUOM (2008): Preliminary report ([http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM\\_ANGOLA\\_2008\\_PS\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM_ANGOLA_2008_PS_EN.pdf)).

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

**75:**

**50:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

**25:**

**0:** The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

**75:**

**50:** The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei de Observação Eleitoral (Election observation law) Art.º 1.º and following.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

International observers had generally full access but the European Union (EU0 observation mission was almost canceled as it was accredited only shortly before the elections. The SADC (Southern African Development Community ) mission was unable to meet with the National Electoral Commission (CNE — Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) before the elections despite many attempts. National observers did not have as much free access as international observers.

**References:**

SADC (2008): The Observation Statement Submitted to the National Electoral Commission of Angola (<http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/ang2008ecf.pdf>).

Jacinto Wacussanga (Pe. Pio), Researcher, Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

Isabel Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Nov. 6, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers' activities.

**75:**

**50:** Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

**25:**

**0:** Election observers' movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

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## 17. Is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

0

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | **NO**

### Comments:

The domestic agency assigned to regulate the elections is the national electoral commission (CNE — Comissão Nacional Eleitora) but its mandate is much broader than monitoring. According to the the European Union Observer Mission (EUOM), CNE governs the conduct of all election-related activities and operations, as well as supervising the voter registration process."

The law on electoral observations states that the organization of election observers is up to the individual organizations, institutions or governments invited. The Commission's mandate does not refer to observation (see <http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/Legal.html>), thereby triggering the NO score.

### References:

Lei Eleitoral (Electoral law) Art.º 154 e seguintes.

Lei de Observação eleitoral (Electoral Observation law) Art.º 32.º

EUOM (2008): Preliminary report ([http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM\\_ANGOLA\\_2008\\_PS\\_EN.pdf](http://www.eueom-ao.org/EN/PDF/EUEOM_ANGOLA_2008_PS_EN.pdf)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities exists that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

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## 34 II-3. Political Financing

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### 20. Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties?

57

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The law of political parties establishes that the rules for financing is defined in law. However, the only specific regulation identified deals with campaigning. In this survey, we therefore refer only to financing related to the campaigning of political parties, but it should be stressed that it is not clear if this legislation extends to other party activities than campaigning.

**References:**

Lei dos Partidos Políticos (Political Parties Law) Art.º 40.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/zz%20Law%20No%202%2005%201%20of%20July.pdf>.

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei dos Partidos Políticos (Political Parties Law) Art.º 40.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/zz%20Law%20No%202%2005%201%20of%20July.pdf>.

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political parties. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei dos Partidos Políticos (Political Parties Law) Art.º 40.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/zz%20Law%20No%202%2005%201%20of%20July.pdf>.

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to political parties. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei dos Partidos Políticos (Political Parties Law) Art.º 40.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/zz%20Law%20No%202%2005%201%20of%20July.pdf>.

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Donations from abroad must be declared to the National Assembly before being submitted to the beneficiary. The law states, "The monetary and material contributions and the donations from abroad for the electoral process must be declared by the donor to the National Assembly before being given to the recipients for the purpose of approval and subsequent registration in the General Budget of the State."

**References:**

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 99.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances and expenditures of political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Parties must submit their campaigning accounts to the National Electoral Commission (CNE — Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) no more than 60 days after the announcement of the results of the elections. If the accounts are not submitted or if the CNE finds irregularities, it can include the supreme audit institution (Tribunal de Contas).

**References:**

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 98.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of party finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties' finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The National Electoral Commission (CNE — Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) plays this role in Angola.

**References:**

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94.º – 99.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of political parties. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

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## 21. Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates?

67

21a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to individual political candidates.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The law of political parties establishes that the rules for financing is defined in law. However, the only specific regulation identified deals with campaigning. In this survey, we therefore refer only to financing related to campaigning, not non-campaign-related costs or fundraising.

**References:**

Lei dos Partidos Políticos (Political Parties Law) Art.º 40.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/zz%20Law%20No%202%2005%201%20of%20July.pdf>.

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to individual political candidates, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to individual political candidates.

21b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political candidates.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei dos Partidos Políticos (Political Parties Law) Art.º 40.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/zz%20Law%20No%202%2005%201%20of%20July.pdf>.

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political candidates. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to individual political candidates.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Lei dos Partidos Políticos (Political Parties Law) Art.º 40.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/zz%20Law%20No%202%2005%201%20of%20July.pdf>.

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21d. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political candidates.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Donations from abroad must be declared to the National Assembly before being submitted to the beneficiary. The law states, "The monetary and material contributions and the donations from abroad for the electoral process must be declared by the donor to the National Assembly before being given to the recipients for the purpose of approval and subsequent registration in the General Budget of the State."

**References:**

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 99.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to individual political candidates.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to individual political candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

21e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the campaign finances of individual political candidates.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Parties must submit their campaigning accounts to the National Electoral Commission (CNE — Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) no more than 60 days after the announcement of the results of the elections. If the accounts are not submitted, or if the CNE finds irregularities, it can include the supreme audit institution (Tribunal de Contas). Because of the system of party lists, this effectively applies to candidates, as well.

**References:**

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 99.º <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates to self-audit.

21f. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The National Electoral Commission (CNE — Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) performs this function.

**References:**

Lei eleitoral (Electoral law) Art. 94° – 99.° <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Law%20No%207%2004%2017%20of%20June.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

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## 22. Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective?

25

22a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There are no such limits in Angola in law or in practice.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

22b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There are no such limits in Angola in law or in practice.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to political parties are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

22c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There are no such limits in Angola in law or in practice.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

22d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is too early to say as the elections were only held in September 2008 and the National Electoral Commission (CNE – Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) will, at the time of submitting this questionnaire, be revising the accounts received (if they follow the time limits stipulated in law).

**References:**  
Not applicable.

**100:** The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of political parties. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

22e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is too early to say as the elections were only held in September 2008 and the National Electoral Commission (CNE – Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) will, at the time of submitting this questionnaire, be revising the accounts received (if they follow the time limits stipulated in law).

**References:**  
Not applicable.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

22f. In practice, contributions to political parties are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is too early to say as the elections were only held in September 2008 and the National Electoral Commission (CNE – Comissão Nacional Eleitoral) will, at the time of submitting this questionnaire, be revising the accounts received (if they follow the time limits stipulated in law).

**References:**  
Not applicable.

**100:** Political party finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

**75:**

**50:** Political party finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party may be sufficiently

audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

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### 23. Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates effective?

30

23a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political candidates are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a particular candidate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

#### References:

There are no such limits in Angola in law or in practice.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a particular candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support particular political candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a particular political candidate are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

#### References:

There are no such limits in Angola in law or in practice.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support individual candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to individual candidates are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23c. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is too early to say as the presidential elections have not yet been held. In the legislative elections, only parties were running.

**References:**

Not applicable.

**100:** The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

23d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is too early to say as the presidential elections have not yet been held. In the legislative elections only parties were running.

**References:**

Not applicable.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

23e. In practice, the finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is too early to say as the presidential elections have not yet been held. In the legislative elections only parties were running.

**References:**

Not applicable.

**100:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions.

**25:**

**0:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

## 24. Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties?

0

24a. In practice, political parties disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is only a requirement for the political parties to disclose their campaign accounts, which has to be done up to 60 days after the announcement of the results of the elections. This did not happen after the September 2008 elections.

**References:**

Lei Eleitoral (Electoral law) Art.º 98.

Jornal de Angola.

**100:** Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

**75:**

**50:** Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

**25:**

**0:** Political parties never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

24b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is only a requirement for the political parties to disclose their campaign accounts, which has to be done up to 60 days after the announcement of the results of the elections. This did not happen after the September 2008 elections.

**References:**

Lei Eleitoral (Electoral law) Art.º 98.

Jornal de Angola.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

24c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is only a requirement for the political parties to disclose their campaign accounts, which has to be done up to 60 days after the announcement of the results of the elections. This did not happen after the September 2008 elections.

**References:**

Lei Eleitoral (Electoral law) Art.º 98.

Jornal de Angola.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## 25. Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns?

25

25a. In practice, individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is too early to say as the presidential elections have not yet been held. In the legislative elections only parties were running.

**References:**

Not applicable.

**100:** Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

**75:**

**50:** Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

**25:**

**0:** Individual candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

25b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**  
This is too early to say as the presidential elections have not yet been held. In the legislative elections only parties were running.

**References:**  
Not applicable.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

25c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**  
This is too early to say as the presidential elections have not yet been held. In the legislative elections only parties were running.

**References:**  
Not applicable.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

### III-1. Executive Accountability

#### 27. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

25

27a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Dos Santos seldom appears in public. When he addresses the nation, it is usually in speeches and there is no exposure to critical questions.

**References:**

Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

27b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

**References:**

N.º 1 do Art.º 121.º da Lei Constitucional.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

27c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The judiciary does not act as an effective check on executive power, and the President retains, appoints and dismisses many members of the judiciary, including the power to appoint Supreme Court justices without National Assembly approval. Hence, there are often overlaps between membership of the politburo of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA — Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) and high-level positions in the judiciary.

**References:**

Freedomhouse 2007 – Countries at the Crossroads (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7123-8.pdf>).

Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to rely upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

27d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Political power is concentrated in the president and the Council of Ministers through which the president exercises executive power. The council can enact laws, decrees and resolutions, assuming most of the functions that are normally associated with the legislative branch. The legislature is extremely weak and never opposes the executive. It cannot remove the President or any government minister (except in exceptional cases). Angola is therefore practically governed by executive orders.

**References:**

Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola\\_-\\_country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices\\_-\\_2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola_-_country_report_on_human_rights_practices_-_2007.html)).

Amundsen, Cesaltina Abreu and Laurinda Hoygaard, Accountability on the Move: The Parliament of Angola (Bergen: Christian Michelson Institute) <http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2021=accountability-on-the-move>.

**100:** The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

28. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

0

28a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The President can only be prosecuted in cases of bribing and treason." The prosecution is the responsibility of the national assembly (where the ruling party makes up an 82 percent majority).

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Art.º 65.º and al. m) do 88.º .

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

28b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There is no specific reference to the prosecution of government.

**References:**

Lei Constitucional Chapter IV, art.º 105 and following.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

---

29. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

0

29a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The U.S. Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

Not possible to find such legislation.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

29b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The U.S. Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

Not possible to find such legislation.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

29c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The U.S. Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

Not possible to find such legislation.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

29d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

**Comments:**

US Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

Not possible to find such legislation.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

29e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The U.S. Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

Not possible to find such legislation.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

29f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The business climate favored those connected to the government; government ministers and other high-level officials commonly and openly owned interests in companies regulated by their respective ministries."

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving

government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

29g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The business climate favored those connected to the government; government ministers and other high-level officials commonly and openly owned interests in companies regulated by their respective ministries."

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

29h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The business climate favored those connected to the government; government ministers and other high-level officials commonly and openly owned interests in companies regulated by their respective ministries."

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**100:** Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

### 30. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

0

30a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

No such asset disclosures exist.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

30b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such asset disclosures exist.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

30c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such asset disclosures exist.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## 26. Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

0

26. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | **NO**

### Comments:

This article stipulates that all citizens have the right to contest and take legal action against any acts that violate their rights as set out in the present Constitutional Law and other legislation. It does not, however, specify that citizens can sue the government.

### References:

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) art. 43.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

---

## 31. Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

0

31. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

### References:

Bertelsmann foundation 2008 Angola Country report (<http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html>).

Freedomhouse 2007 – Countries at the Crossroads (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7123-8.pdf>).

Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

**50:** The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:

0: The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

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## III-2. Legislative Accountability

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32. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

33

32a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

### References:

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Art.º 121.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

32b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The judiciary does not act as an effective check on legislative power and the President retains, appoints and dismisses many members of the judiciary. This includes the power to appoint Supreme Court justices without National Assembly approval. Hence, there are often overlaps between membership of the politburo of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA — Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) and high-level positions in the judiciary.

### References:

Freedom house – Countries at the crossroads 2007 (<http://1156/www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=148&ion=89&ccrpage=37>).

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

32c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

However, only if they caught committing crimes where the punishment is than 2 years in prison. If not, the lifting of immunity depends on National Assembly approval.

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Art.º 84.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings. A NO score is also earned if the legislative branch itself controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on members of the legislature.

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33. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

0

33a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Specific legislation related to asset disclosure was not found, but Freedom House reports that some legal provisions exist to prevent such conflicts of interest – for instance, 'National Assembly members cannot be employed by foreign or international businesses' but these are insufficient and ineffective."

The U.S. Department of State says that there is no legislation preventing conflicts of interest in place.

Estatuto dos Deputados No. 6/93 would seemingly regulate asset disclosures on the part of legislators, but no MPs have ever complied with the requirement and local experts have failed to locate or obtain the ostensible disclosure forms.

**References:**

Freedom house – Countries at the Crossroads 2007 (<http://1156/www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=148&section=89&ccrpage=37>).

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

33b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Specific legislation related to post-government employment was not found, but Freedom House reports that some legal provisions exist to prevent such conflicts of interest — for instance, 'National Assembly members cannot be employed by foreign or international businesses' but these are insufficient and ineffective."

The U.S. Department of State says that there is no legislation preventing conflicts of interest in place.

**References:**

Freedom house – Countries at the crossroads 2007 (<http://1156/www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrccountry=148&ion=89&ccrpage=37>).

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola\\_-\\_country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices\\_-\\_2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola_-_country_report_on_human_rights_practices_-_2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

33c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No such regulations exist.

**References:**

Freedom house – Countries at the crossroads 2007 (<http://1156/www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrccountry=148&ion=89&ccrpage=37>).

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola\\_-\\_country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices\\_-\\_2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola_-_country_report_on_human_rights_practices_-_2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

33d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

**References:**

No such disclosure requirements exist.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

33e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such restrictions exist in law or in practice.

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off<sup>10</sup> period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

33f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such regulations exist.

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

33g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such disclosure requirements exist.

**100:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

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### 34. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

0

34a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

34b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

34c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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### 35. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

0

35a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

This perhaps derives from the general lack of acknowledgment of the right of access to information (see 12a).

**References:**

There are no clearly defined formal rules identified in the resolution 4/93 on the internal regulation of the National Assembly or other laws.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

35b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

In some cases, documents can be achieved through Ministers of Parliament, but this is highly unreliable mechanism and there is no guarantee of avoiding persistent delays in obtaining the documents. Otherwise, there is no formal mechanism through which citizens can monitor the legislature's activities.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

35c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

In some cases, documents can be achieved through Ministers of Parliament but this is highly unreliable mechanism and there is no guarantee of avoiding persistent delays in obtaining the documents. Otherwise, there is no formal mechanism through which citizens can monitor the legislature's activities.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## 8 III-3. Judicial Accountability

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### 36. Are judges appointed fairly?

17

36a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Line. b), n.º 1, of Art.º 132.º and line h), of Art.º 66.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

**NO:** A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

---

36b. In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting national-level judges.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Despite being highly politicized (politically appointed), most national judges actually have relevant professional qualifications. Capacity constraints in the judiciary is more pronounced at provincial and municipal levels.

**References:**

Freedom house – Countries at the Crossroads 2007 (<http://1156/www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=148&section=89&ccrpage=37>).

Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

**75:**

**50:** Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

36c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Supreme court judges are appointed by the President.

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Al. b), n.º 1, do Art.º 132.º e Al. h), do Art.º 66.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

---

37. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

33

37a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | NO

**References:**

Chapter V of the Constitution does not mention such a requirement.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

37b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

One of the only cases known of being explained was the Supreme Court case about whether the president was eligible to run for office after having been in power since 1978.

**100:** Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

**25:**

**0:** Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

37c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

**References:**

Conselho Superior da Magistratura Judicial (High Council of the Judicial Bench), Art.º 132.º da Lei Constitucional.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

37d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The agency consists of three legal experts who are nominated by the President of the Republic.

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Art.º 132.º, nº 2, al. 3.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference by the executive and legislative branches.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry or legislative committee.

37e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Angonoticias reported in June 2008 that the High Council of the Judicial Bench has followed up on complaints about corrupt judges and taken disciplinary action. The lead researcher would have liked to interview the President of the Bar Association of Lawyers, Ingles Pinto, on this issue but this was, unfortunately, not possible.

**References:**

Angonoticias, (June 10, 2008) Conselho superior da magistraduria judicial demite juizes acusados de corrupcao ([http://www.angonoticias.com/full\\_headlines.php?id=19895](http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=19895)).

**100:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

37f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Angonoticias reported in June 2008 that the High Council of the Judicial Bench has followed up on complaints about corrupt judges and taken disciplinary action. The lead researcher would have liked to interview the President of the Bar Association of Lawyers, Ingles Pinto, on this issue but this was, unfortunately, not possible.

**References:**

Angonoticias, (June 10, 2008) Conselho superior da magistraduria judicial demite juizes acusados de corrupcao ([http://www.angonoticias.com/full\\_headlines.php?id=19895](http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=19895)).

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in

enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

### 38. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

0

38a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The U.S. Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

No such requirements found in Angolan legislation.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

38b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The U.S. Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

No such requirements found in Angolan legislation.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

38c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The U.S. Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

No such requirements found in Angolan legislation.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

38d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The U.S. Department of State finds that there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation.

**References:**

No such requirements found in Angolan legislation.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

38e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such regulations exist.

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

38f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such regulations exist.

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

38g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**100:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

39. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

0

39a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

39b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

39c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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### III-4. Budget Processes

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40. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

40a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The legislative can only amend the budget in line with the national plan.

**References:**

Lei Quadro do Orçamento Geral do Estado (General Framework law for the national budget) Art.º 21.º da Lei n.º 9/97, de 17 de Outubro.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

40b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The budget is largely prepared shrouded in secrecy in the Ministry of Finance. A massive US\$9.7 billion line of credit with the People's Republic of China, for example, is managed by the Office for National Reconstruction (GRN — Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional).

**References:**

Isaaksen, Arnudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, state and people – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola ([http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp\\_forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cg=&id=4930e9096](http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp_forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cg=&id=4930e9096)).

World Bank (2007) Angola Public Expenditure Review, Vol 1, p.

6 [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTANGOLA/Resources/AO\\_PER\\_VOL\\_1.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTANGOLA/Resources/AO_PER_VOL_1.pdf)

**100:** All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

**75:**

**50:** Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

**25:**

**0:** The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

40c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Formally legislators have access and a library, but it is not enough. Also, most of the budget preparation process takes place in the Ministry of Finance, and no pre-budget is prepared for debate or study.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, state and people – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola (<http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>).

**100:** Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

**75:**

**50:** Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

**25:**

**0:** Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

#### 41. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

50

41a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The budget process is very closed and controlled by the executive. There is no pre-budget report to promote debate and Parliament has only a limited time to discuss the budget. Some progress has been made as the Ministry of Finance started publishing the budget proposal on its website. This happened for the first time in 2008 — before it was not available to the public.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, state and people – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola (<http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>).

International Budget Project (2005): Open Budget

Questionnaire, <http://www.openbudgetindex.org/Questionnaire05AngolaFinal.pdf>.

Ministry of Finance: <http://www.minfin.gv.ao/docs/dspPropostaOrcam.htm>.

**100:** Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

**25:**

**0:** Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

41b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is, on the one hand, limited capacity from NGOs and CSOs, and, on the other hand, there is limited access into an already non-transparent budget process. Some CSOs are reportedly heard, although infrequently, and often only government friendly organizations are invited. This process is irrelevant to budget decisions.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, state and people – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola ([http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp\\_forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cg=&id=4930e9096](http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp_forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cg=&id=4930e9096)).

International Budget Project (2005): Open Budget Questionnaire, <http://www.openbudgetindex.org/Questionnaire05AngolaFinal.pdf>.

**100:** Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

41c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Itemized access is possible both for current budget and budget proposal through the Ministry of Finance's website.

**References:**

Ministry of Finance: <http://www.minfin.gv.ao/docs/dspOrcaCorren.htm> and <http://www.minfin.gv.ao/docs/dspPropostaOrcam.htm>.

**100:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

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43. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

0

43a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Finance Committee is supposed to receive quarterly budget execution reports from the Ministry of Finance, but the government does not comply with this legal requirement.

**References:**

IPU 2007 – Angola – Assembleia Nacional ([http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2007\\_F.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2007_F.htm)).

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola (<http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>).

**100:** Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

**75:**

**50:** Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

**25:**

**0:** There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

43b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Prior to the September 2008 elections, the Finance Committee's composition reflected the composition of the National Assembly but it has not been possible to obtain information about the new composition. In any case, the Finance Committee is technically weak. In the post election period, the opposition has been reduced to a token influence and has no way of influencing the work of the committee.

**References:**

Website of the National Assembly of Angola: <http://www.parlamento.ao/comissao.php?ID=5>.

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola (<http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>).

**100:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

**75:**

**50:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

**25:**

**0:** The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

43c. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Finance Committee does not play this role due to a lack of technical skills and lack of relevant information from the ministry (see 43a and 43b).

**References:**

Website of the National Assembly of Angola: <http://www.parlamento.ao/comissao.php?ID=5>.

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola (<http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>).

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

**75:**

**50:** The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

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42. Is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

0

42. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Only the Finance Committee may do some oversight, but this is limited and has no direct investigative purpose.

**References:**

The Resolution n.º 4/93, of March 12 (Regimento Interno da Assembleia Nacional) was reviewed and no such committee exists.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

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Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

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IV-1. <sup>25</sup>Civil Service Regulations

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44. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

25

44a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) Art.º 6.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de Dezembro, <http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-procedimento/downloadFile/file/Angola.ProcedimentoAdministrativo.pdf?nocache=1201882099.49>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

44b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

These articles speak in general terms about observing the law, but they do not specify rules for carrying out competitive recruitment and promotion.

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) Art.º 6.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de Dezembro, <http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-procedimento/downloadFile/file/Angola.ProcedimentoAdministrativo.pdf?nocache=1201882099.49>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

44c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

All administrative acts are subject to complaint by superiors to superiors within the institution and to the judicial system. However, this system is dependent on superiors and, hence, it is not independent.

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) Art.º 108.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de Dezembro, <http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-procedimento/downloadFile/file/Angola.ProcedimentoAdministrativo.pdf?nocache=1201882099.49>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. The mechanism should be independent of their supervisors but can still be located within the government agency or entity (such as a special commission or board). Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

44d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There are no specific rules in this regard.

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) do Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de Dezembro, <http://www.rjcplp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-procedimento/downloadFile/file/Angola.ProcedimentoAdministrativo.pdf?nocache=1201882099.49>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist or if the ban is not a lifetime ban.

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#### 45. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

31

45a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The civil service was highly affected by the protracted civil war and lack of enforcement of legislation. A professional civil service based on principles of public service, transparency and promotion through merit was never established.

The sub-national government has three tiers corresponding to three geographical levels (provinces, municipalities and communes) that are entirely based on nomination of officials by those above them. Because of this, the process is highly politicized.

Within ministries there is a culture of avoiding taking the initiative for fear of being perceived challenging the authority of superiors. There are, of course, exceptions to this general description, but the few individuals who try to make a difference would normally be trapped in an unproductive system.

**References:**

Tony Hodges (2004): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, African Issues, James Currey, p. 67-72 and 75-79.

Freedom house – Countries at the Crossroads 2007, <http://1156/www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=148&ion=89&ccpage=37>

Business Anti-corruption (<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>)

**100:** Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the

government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:

0: Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

45b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The civil service was highly affected by the protracted civil war and lack of enforcement of legislation. A professional civil service based on principles of public service, transparency and promotion through merit was never established.

The sub-national government has three tiers that correspond to three geographical levels (provinces, municipalities and communes). Entirely based on nomination of officials from above. Because of this, it is highly politicized. Though it is almost impossible to find hard evidence for this, the nomination approach, the low level of education (especially outside Luanda) and lack of control mechanisms mean that issues surrounding personal and party loyalty, plus other loyalties, can be a problem.

**References:**

Tony Hodges (2004): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, African Issues, James Currey, p. 67-72 and 75-79.

Freedom house – Countries at the Crossroads 2007, <http://1156/www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=148&ion=89&ccrpage=37>

Business Anti-corruption (<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>).

100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

45c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Civil service was highly affected by the protracted civil war and lack of enforcement of legislation. A professional civil service based on principles of public service, transparency and promotion through merit was never established.

The sub-national government has three tiers corresponding to three geographical levels (provinces, municipalities and communes) entirely based on nomination of officials from above. Because of this, it is highly politicized. Though it is almost impossible to find hard evidence for this, the nomination approach, the low level of education (especially outside Luanda) and lack of control mechanisms mean that issues such as personal and party loyalty, plus other loyalties, can be a problem.

**References:**

Tony Hodges (2004): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, African Issues, James Currey, p. 67-72 and 75-79.

Freedom house – Countries at the Crossroads 2007, <http://1156/www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=148&ion=89&ccrpage=37>

Business Anti-corruption (<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>).

**100:** Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

**75:**

**50:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

45d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Given the limited geographic range of the public administration, the low level of education and the large degree of absenteeism as a result of low wages, it may be deduced that many civil servants either have no job description or that the description has limited relevance to the work they carry out. The government has improved salaries and training over the past few years but not published a coherent reform program or policy on civil service and the impact has been limited (in particular for the poor and marginalized).

**References:**

Tony Hodges (2004): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, African Issues, James Currey, p. 67-72 and 75-79.

**100:** Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable representation of positions in terms of a person's authority, responsibility and base pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

45e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Non-salary benefits add little to the gross value of civil servants' earnings, except at the very highest levels (directors and chiefs), where salaries are dwarfed by the value of such benefits as official cars, Christmas bonuses and per diems during official missions."

**References:**

Tony Hodges (2004): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, African Issues, James Currey, p. 67-72 and 75-79.

**100:** Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

45f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

No such list identified on relevant government websites, and it would be highly surprising if this was done due to the limited nature of government information sharing.

**References:**

[www.mapess.gv.ao](http://www.mapess.gv.ao), [www.minfin.gv.ao](http://www.minfin.gv.ao).

Tony Hodges (2004): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, African Issues, James Currey, p. 67-72 and 75-79.

**100:** The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

**75:**

**50:** The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

**25:**

**0:** The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

45g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such mechanism exists.

**100:** The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

**75:**

**50:** The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

45h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There seems to have been a general improvement in the payment of civil servants in line with the general improvement of the state finances (and in light of the importance of civil servants in the 2008 legislative elections). Whether this extends to all levels of administration is unclear.

**References:**

[http://www.angonoticias.com/full\\_headlines.php?id=21406](http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=21406).

**100:** In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

**75:**

**50:** In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

**25:**

**0:** In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

45i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such blacklisting system exists.

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective. Some bans are only temporary.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

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#### 46. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

14

46a. In law, senior members of the civil service are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Although there is some legislation about conflict of interest, there is no specific requirement for asset disclosure.

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) do Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de

Dezembro, <http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-procedimento/downloadFile/file/Angola.ProcedimentoAdministrativo.pdf?nocache=1201882099.49>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if senior members of the civil service are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any senior member of the civil service is not required to disclose assets.

46b. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) Art. 16 and following of the Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de Dezembro, <http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-procedimento/downloadFile/file/Angola.ProcedimentoAdministrativo.pdf?nocache=1201882099.49>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

**NO:** A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

46c. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Although there is some legislation about conflict of interest, there is no specific restrictions for entering the private sector after leaving the government.

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) do Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de Dezembro, <http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-procedimento/downloadFile/file/Angola.ProcedimentoAdministrativo.pdf?nocache=1201882099.49>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

46d. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Although there is some legislation about conflict of interest, there is no specific regulations governing gifts and hospitality.

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) do Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

46e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of senior members of the civil service.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

No such disclosures (or their auditing) exist.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

46f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such restrictions exist in law or in practice.

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

46g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such regulations or safeguards exist.

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

46h. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Given that government ministers and other high-level officials commonly and openly own interests in companies regulated by their respective ministries suggest that these civil servants would not recuse themselves from policy decisions that would benefit their businesses.

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

**100:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

**75:**

**50:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

46i. In practice, civil service asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**100:** Civil service asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Civil service asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Civil service asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

47. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

47a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

47b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

47c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such disclosures exist.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

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48. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

0

48a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

No such whistle-blower protection legislation exists.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

48b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

No such whistle-blower protection legislation exists.

**100:** Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

48c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

**References:**

No such whistle-blower protection legislation exists.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

48d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such whistle-blower protection legislation exists.

**100:** Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

---

50. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

0

50a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such mechanism exists.

**100:** The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

50b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such mechanism exists.

**100:** The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

50c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such mechanism exists.

**100:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

50d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such mechanism exists.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

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49. Is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

0

49. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Angola is listed here as having no such agency. The envisioned High Authority Against Corruption does not yet exist in practice.

**References:**

Information Portal on Corruption in Africa, African Anti-Corruption Hotlines. <http://www.ipocafrika.org/content/view/45/86/>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

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0  
IV-3. Procurement

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51. Is the public procurement process effective?

20

51a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

According to the World Bank, Control mechanisms are missing at all levels."

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens (Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.)

World Bank (2005): Country Procurement Assessment Report, Annex II in Angola: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability,

[http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

[pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341\\_2005](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

51b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

No such requirements exist.

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens (Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.)

World Bank (2005): Country Procurement Assessment Report, Annex II in Angola: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability

<http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?>

[pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341\\_2005](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process. A YES score is earned if such training is mandated for portions of the broader civil service, to include procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

51c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

No such recusal requirements exist.

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens (Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.)

World Bank (2005): Country Procurement Assessment Report, Annex II in Angola: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability,

<http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?>

[pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341\\_2005](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

**25:**

0: Conflict-of-interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No such mechanism exists.

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens (Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.)

World Bank (2005): Country Procurement Assessment Report, Annex II in Angola: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability,

[http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

[pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341\\_2005](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

51e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei Organica do Tribunal de Contas (Supreme Audit Institution organic law): Art.º 8, nº 3 al. a).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).

51f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No such requirement exists in law.

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens (Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

51g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

No such right is specified in the decree.

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens (Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

In line with the law on administrative procedures, all administrative actions can be appealed to hierarchical superiors and the courts.

**References:**

Procedimento Administrativa (Administrative Procedure) Art.º 108.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 16-A/95, de 15 de Dezembro, <http://www.rjcplp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-procedimento/downloadFile/file/Angola.ProcedimentoAdministrativo.pdf?nocache=1201882099.49Art.>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

No legislation for such a blacklisting process exists.

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens (Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, designed to prevent convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such blacklisting system exists.

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

---

## 52. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

17

52a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Such regulations are to be published in the government Gazette.

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens (Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

52b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The World Bank finds that there is a need for the establishment of a transparent procurement system in relation to upfront setting up of evaluation criteria, bid publication and publication of contract award. Since the publication of the report, the procurement system has been overhauled with World Bank technical support but progress in reforming the approach has been erratic at best.

**References:**

Decree 7/96 de 16 of February, Regime de realização das Despesas Publicas, Prestação de Serviços e Aquisição de Bens

(Regulation for realization of public expenditure etc.).

World Bank (2005): Angola, Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

52c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the World Bank, the government Gazette does not seem to contribute to transparency as well as to the dissemination of regulations, as it is relatively expensive and apparently not [even] widely distributed within the government itself."

**References:**

World Bank (2005): Country Procurement Assessment Report, Annex II in Angola: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability,

[http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

[pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341\\_2005](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

52d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the World Bank, the government Gazette does not seem to contribute to transparency as well as to the dissemination of regulations, as it is relatively expensive and apparently not [even] widely distributed within the government itself."

**References:**

World Bank (2005): Country Procurement Assessment Report, Annex II in Angola: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability,

[http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

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**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

52e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the World Bank, the government Gazette does not seem to contribute to transparency as well as to the dissemination of regulations, as it is relatively expensive and apparently not [even] widely distributed within the government itself." The World Bank Report also recommends that the Ministry of Finance issue a circular or newsletter intended for the private sector.

**References:**

World Bank (2005): Country Procurement Assessment Report, Annex II in Angola: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability,

[http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?](http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=51187349&piPK=51189435&theSitePK=322490&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=322519&theSitePK=322490&entityID=000090341_2005)

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**100:** There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

52f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The World Bank finds that there is a need for the establishment of a transparent procurement system in relation to upfront setting up of evaluation criteria, bid publication and publication of the contract award. Since the publication of the report, the procurement system has been overhauled with World Bank technical support, but progress in reforming the approach has been erratic at best.

**References:**

World Bank (2005): Angola, Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability.

**100:** Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

**75:**

**50:** Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

**25:**

**0:** This information is not available to the public through an official process.

## IV-4. Privatization

53. Is the privatization process effective?

67

53a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei das Privatizações, (Privatization law) Art.º 8.º da Lei n.º 10/94, de 31 de Agosto.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

53b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei das Privatizações (Privatization law) Art.º 11.º.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

53c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

During the most successful phase of the privatization process, conflict-of-interest regulation seems to have been seriously flawed as insiders with links to the government, the army or the party acquired enterprises on favorable terms.

**References:**

Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2008: Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007. <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html>.

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

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#### 54. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

65

54a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The law states that the modalities, limitations and restrictions of specific cases undergoing the privatization process must be adequately publicized.

**References:**

Lei das Privatizações (Privatization law) Art.º 7, N.º 3 da Lei n.º 10/94, de 31 de Agosto.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

54b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The privatization process has stalled and needs to be revamped. Since 2002, only a few companies have been privatized. The privatizations carried out were advertised in the national newspaper, Jornal de Angola.

**References:**

World Bank

IMF (2005) Angola: 2004 Article IV Consultation p. 11, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05228.pdf>.

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

54c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

**References:**

There is no such requirement in the privatization law and its alteration law, N° 8/03 of April 18, 2003.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

54d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is very little information available about the privatizations that took place years ago, but they were most likely published in Jornal de Angola; this would be available at least to citizens in Luanda and in some provincial capitals.

**References:**

IMF (2005) Angola: 2004 Article IV Consultation p. 11, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05228.pdf>.

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Jornal de Angola newspaper is available at a reasonable cost.

**References:**

IMF (2005) Angola: 2004 Article IV Consultation p. 11, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05228.pdf>.

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

## Category V. Oversight and Regulation

### V-1. National Ombudsman

56. Is the national ombudsman effective?

39

56a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

#### References:

Art.º 142.º e 143.º da Lei Constitucional e Art.º 8.º e 10.º da Lei n.º 4/06, de 28 de Abril (Lei do Estatuto do Provedor de Justiça).

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

#### Comments:

The ombudsman's office has only existed in practice since 2005. When it was founded and the current director (former Angolan Minister of Justice Paulo Tchipilica) was appointed there was great criticism of the lack of civil society consultation. (Paulo Tchipilica was accused of benefiting from alleged influence peddling related to reports of the de-confiscation of real estate that led to the imprisonment of the chief editor of Semanario Angolense – see section on the Media).

The current director was the only candidate for the job and he is seen by some as politically charged. There is however, no evidence of direct or indirect political interference.

#### References:

Amnesty International (March 2005): Angola: The Establishment of the Justice Ombudsman should comply with international standards <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR12/002/2005/en/dom-AFR120022005en.html>.

Kamia Cristina Victor de Carvalho, Poverty Specialist, UNDP Angola, Nov. 7, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with

some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

56c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The director of the ombudsman's office is appointed by a majority of two-thirds of the national parliament for a four-year term that can be extended with an additional four-year term. The current director was appointed in 2005. It has not yet been tested whether the ombudsman can be removed without relevant justification, but at the moment the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA — Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) has a two-thirds majority in parliament (86 percent of the seats) and, so, could potentially remove the director if it finds the grounds to do so.

**References:**

Ana Celeste Januario, Independent consultant, Dec. 9, 2008.

**100:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The ombudsman has about 45 employees and is based only in Luanda.

**References:**

Ana Celeste Januario, independent consultant, Dec. 9, 2008.

**100:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

At the higher levels, ombudsman officials may be politically influenced, but at the lower levels seem, at least, to incorporate a fairly broad range of officials with varying outlooks.

**References:**

Ana Celeste Januario, independent consultant, Dec. 9, 2008.

Kamia Cristina Victor de Carvalho, poverty specialist, UNDP Angola, Nov. 7, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The ombudsman is financed through the allocation to the National Assembly. The exact amounts are not specified.

**References:**

Ana Celeste Januario, independent consultant, Dec. 9, 2008.

Kamia Cristina Victor de Carvalho, poverty specialist, UNDP Angola, Nov. 7, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

56g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Apparently, the ombudsman reports to the Commission of the National Assembly on a biannual basis but these reports are not publicly available, which is in line with the general low level of access to politically sensitive information in Angola.

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

Ana Celeste Januario, independent consultant, December 9, 2008.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Up until now, investigations have been limited except for some prison visits, which have led to no reports. Citizen complaints have been received, but there is little information on the follow-up.

**References:**

Freedom house – Countries at the Crossroads 2007 (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=148&section=89&ccrpage=37>).

Bureau on Democracy, Human rights and Labour (2008): Country Report on Human rights practices 2007 ([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html)).

DIOGO PAIXÃO: Provedoria recebe vinte reclamações por dia (<http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=95359&Seccao=politica>).

**100:** The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

56i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

The ombudsman can only make recommendations, and there is little evidence of any serious investigations.

**References:**

Freedom house – Countries at the Crossroads 2007, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=148&section=89&ccrpage=37>.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

56j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Sometimes the government acts, sometimes it does not, but it is extremely difficult to find hard evidence either way for this.

**References:**

US State Department, Bureau on Democracy, Human rights and Labour (2008): Country Report on Human rights practices 2007

([http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola\\_-\\_country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices\\_-\\_2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola_-_country_report_on_human_rights_practices_-_2007.html)).

DIOGO PAIXÃO: Provedoria recebe vinte reclamações por dia

(<http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=95359&Seccao=politica>).

Ana Celeste Januario, independent consultant, Dec. 9, 2008.

**100:** Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Ombudsman's reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman's reports do not lead to policy changes.

56k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The ombudsman's effectiveness is limited by its presence only in Luanda, limited staff, and a politically charged Director.

**References:**

DIOGO PAIXÃO: Provedoria recebe vinte reclamações por dia (<http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=95359&Seccao=politica>).

Ana Celeste Januario, independent consultant, Dec. 9, 2008.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

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## 57. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

0

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | **NO**

### Comments:

The ombudsman is supposed to submit reports quarterly to National Assembly (Art.º 21.º da Lei do Estatuto do Provedor de Justiça) but these are not publicly accessible.

### References:

Art.º 21.º da Lei do Estatuto do Provedor de Justiça.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

57b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

### References:

The ostensible quarterly reports are not publicly available.

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

The ostensible quarterly reports are not publicly available.

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

55. Is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

**References:**

Provedor de Justiça Art.º 142.º e seguintes da Lei Constitucional and Lei n.º 4/06, de 28 de Abril (Lei do Estatuto do Provedor de Justiça).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

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## V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

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59. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

47

59a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

Art.º 3.º da Lei Orgânica do Tribunal de Contas.

---

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

59b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The director is appointed by the president of the republic for a three-year term. The law does not stipulate the terms for the directors' removal from office. The independence of the tribunal has yet to be tested.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>.

International Budget Project (2005): Open Budget Questionnaire, <http://www.openbudgetindex.org/Questionnaire05AngolaFinal.pdf>.

Ministry of Finance, <http://www.minfin.gv.ao/docs/dspPropostaOrcam.htm>.

**100:** The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

59c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

As a relatively new institution, the Tribunal is still building its competence and skills. The institution is in the process of increasing its staff from 75 to 125.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>.

Ketil Hansen-Shino, Sr Public Sector Management Specialist, World Bank, Nov. 11, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cg=&id=4930e9096>.

Ketil Hansen-Shino, Sr Public Sector Management Specialist, World Bank, Nov. 11, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

59e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Tribunal de Contas is financed through the National Budget.

2008 budget: AOA 2,477,125,951 (approximately US\$33 million).

2009 budget: AOA 1,745,112,969 (approximately US\$23 million).

**References:**

Ministry of Finance: National Budget 2008: <http://www.minfin.gv.ao/docs/dspOrcaCorren.htm>.

Ministry of Finance: National Budget 2009: <http://www.minfin.gv.ao/docs/dspPropostaOrcam.htm>

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

59f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The findings and recommendations of the tribunal are unknown to the public, not discussed in parliamentary debates and often not implemented by the executive. It is hard to obtain basic information about activities, even for the World Bank.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/taxis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cg=&id=4930e9096>.

Ketil Hansen-Shino, Sr Public Sector Management Specialist, World Bank, Nov. 11, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

59g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Basically, the tribunal sends its audit reports to the court's judges who make the decision on whether to approve, investigate further, or prosecute. No recommendations are made by the tribunal to the parliament on bottlenecks in the system, on serious under- or over-spending by government ministries, or other systemic change recommendations.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/taxis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cg=&id=4930e9096>.

**100:** Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

59h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency has extensive powers and can initiate investigations. It has, nevertheless, been established only recently and still has only limited capacities. In regard to political interference, the agency has not been tested.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>.

Business Anti-corruption, <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

**100:** The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

**75:**

**50:** The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

---

60. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

33

60a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

These reports are to be published in the government gazette.

**References:**

Art.º 42.º da Lei Orgânica do Tribunal de Contas.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

60b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The findings and recommendations of the tribunal are unknown to the public, not discussed in parliamentary debates, and often not implemented by the executive. Even for the World Bank it is hard to obtain basic information about activities.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/texis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>.

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

60c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The findings and recommendations of the tribunal are unknown to the public, not discussed in parliamentary debates and often not implemented by the executive. Even the World Bank find it is hard to obtain basic information about activities.

**References:**

Isaaksen, Amudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/tehis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>.

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

58. Is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

58. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

**References:**

Tribunal de Contas (Tribunal of accounts or Supreme Audit Institution), Lei n.º 5/96, de 12 de Abril (Lei Orgânica do Tribunal de Contas).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

---

60  
V-3. Taxes and Customs

---

62. Is the tax collection agency effective?

50

62a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

... the ineffective tax administration leaves ample scope for tax evasion through bribery and fraud." In line with the general weakness of the civil service, this suggests that the staff of the agency is somewhat unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

**References:**

Tony Hodges (2004): Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, African Issues, James Currey, p. 67-72 and 75-79.

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency receives regular funding as part of the Ministry of Finance.

**References:**

Direcção Nacional de impostos, Art.º 22.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 4/98, de 30 de Janeiro (Estatuto Orgânico do Ministério das Finanças).

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

## 65. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

75

65a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Customs Administration has a total of 783 working officials. The government has worked on implementing the Customs Expansion and Modernization Program (CEMP) in collaboration with the independent firm Crown Agents.

**References:**

Jenicek & Matingou (2008): Trade Facilitation, [http://www.agriculturaitis.czu.cz/pdf\\_files/vol\\_41\\_2\\_pdf/matingou-jenicek.pdf](http://www.agriculturaitis.czu.cz/pdf_files/vol_41_2_pdf/matingou-jenicek.pdf).

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency receives regular funding as part of the Ministry of Finance.

**References:**

Direcção Nacional das Alfândegas, Art.º 23.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 4/98, de 30 de Janeiro (Estatuto Orgânico do Ministério das Finanças).

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

## 61. Is there a national tax collection agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The agency is part of the Ministry of Finance.

**References:**

Direcção Nacional de impostos, Art.º 22.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 4/98, de 30 de Janeiro (Estatuto Orgânico do Ministério das Finanças).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

---

63. Are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

0

63. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Serious problems of corruption by tax officials are reported by business. In addition, payment is received from some business but not from others. A problem in the management of revenue is that the National Tax Directorate (DNI), for lack of capacity, relies heavily on self-assessment and checks only the big taxpayers."

**References:**

Isaaksen, Arnudsen & Wiig (2007): Budget, State and People – Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/txis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&nwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cg=&id=4930e9096>.

Business Anti-corruption, <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

**100:** Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

**75:**

**50:** Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

**25:**

**0:** Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

---

64. Is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

64. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The agency is part of the Ministry of Finance.

**References:**

Direcção Nacional das Alfândegas, Art.º 23.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 4/98, de 30 de Janeiro (Estatuto Orgânico do Ministério das Finanças).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

---

66. Are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

75

66. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Previously, the system was highly non-transparent, some improvements have been made in the administration of Angola's customs service in the last few years. Still, it remains a barrier to economic growth.

**References:**

The U.S. Trade Department (2007): Angola Trade Barriers, [http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document\\_Library/Reports\\_Publications/2007/2007\\_NTE\\_Report/asset\\_upload\\_file224\\_10923.pdf](http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file224_10923.pdf).

Jenicek & Matingou (2008): Trade Facilitation, [http://www.agriculturaitz.czu.cz/pdf\\_files/vol\\_41\\_2\\_pdf/matingou-jenicek.pdf](http://www.agriculturaitz.czu.cz/pdf_files/vol_41_2_pdf/matingou-jenicek.pdf).

**100:** Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

**75:**

**50:** Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

**25:**

**0:** Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

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#### V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

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68. Is the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

0

68a. In law, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Secretariat part of government and the Secretary reports directly to the Head of Government.

**References:**

N.º 2 do Art.º 1.º do Estatuto Orgânico da Secretaria de Estado do Sector Empresarial Público.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency.

68b. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Secretariat has been abolished after its secretary was moved to the Ministry of Transportation.

**References:**

Angola Xyami.com, Wilson Dadá (Nov. 11, 2008): Angola/Novo Governo: Existem ministérios que se sobrepõem e sumiu uma Secretaria de Estado <http://www.angolaxyami.com/Politica-angolana/Angola/Novo-Governo-Existem-ministerios-que-se-sobrepoem-e-sumiu-uma-Secretaria-de-Estado.html>.

**100:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

68c. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Contrary to other state secretaries, the State Secretary for the Sector of Public Enterprises does not have a budget for 2009.

**References:**

Ministry of Finance, National Budget 2009, Resume of expenditures of Entities by Program (p. 21-22), [http://www.minfin.gv.a0/fsys/RESUMO\\_DA\\_DESPESA\\_DO\\_ORGAO\\_POR\\_PROGRAMA2009.pdf](http://www.minfin.gv.a0/fsys/RESUMO_DA_DESPESA_DO_ORGAO_POR_PROGRAMA2009.pdf).

**100:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

68d. In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Secretariat is not functional.

**References:**

Angola Xyami.com, Wilson Dadá (Nov. 11, 2008): Angola/Novo Governo: Existem ministérios que se sobrepõem e sumiu uma Secretaria de Estado <http://www.angolaxyami.com/Politica-angolana/Angola/Novo-Governo-Existem-ministerios-que-se-sobrepoem-e-sumiu-uma-Secretaria-de-Estado.html>.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

68e. In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Secretariat is not functional.

**References:**

Angola Xyami.com, Wilson Dadá (Nov. 11, 2008): Angola/Novo Governo: Existem ministérios que se sobrepõem e sumiu uma Secretaria de Estado <http://www.angolaxyami.com/Politica-angolana/Angola/Novo-Governo-Existem-ministerios-que-se-sobrepoem-e-sumiu-uma-Secretaria-de-Estado.html>.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be partisan in its application of power.

---

## 69. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

5

69a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Public companies are expected to send a report on their accounts to the relevant authorities once a year but these are not publicly available.

**References:**

No such financial transparency is mandated in law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

69b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

SONANGOL and Endiama (Empresa de Diamantes de Angola) are the overarching state-owned oil companies (SOCs). SONANGOL is in charge of the sector that brings in more than 80 percent of the state revenue.

Both SONANGOL and Endiama have been criticized for carrying out quasi-fiscal expenditures. Reportedly, SONANGOL's accounts have been audited, but these are not available to the public. Public companies are expected to send a report on their accounts to the relevant authorities once a year but these are not publicly available.

**References:**

World Bank (2005): Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability  
<http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?>

**100:** State-owned companies always publicly disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, file the information behind schedule, or not publicly disclose certain data.

**25:**

**0:** Financial data is not publicly available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

69c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

SONANGOL and Endiama (Empresa de Diamantes de Angola) are the overarching state-owned oil companies (SOCs). SONANGOL is in charge of the sector that brings in more than 80 percent of the state revenue.

Both SONANGOL and Endiama have been criticized for carrying out quasi-fiscal expenditures. Reportedly, SONANGOL's accounts have been audited, but these are not available to the public. Public companies are expected to send a report on their accounts to the relevant authorities once a year but these are not publicly available.

**References:**

World Bank (2005): Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability, <http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?>

**100:** Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

**75:**

**50:** Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

**25:**

**0:** State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

69d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Public companies are expected to send a report on their accounts to the relevant authorities once a year but these are not publicly available.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

69e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Public companies are expected to send a report on their accounts to the relevant authorities once a year but these are not publicly available.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

67. Is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

67. In law, is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Secretary is supposed to watch and direct the state-owned enterprises and promote efficiency, synergy, openness, competence, ethics and responsibility in the sector.

**References:**

State Secretary for the Sector of Public Enterprises (Secretaria de Estado do Sector Empresarial Público), Decreto-Lei n.º 7/07, de 2 de Maio (Estatuto Orgânico da Secretaria de Estado do Sector Empresarial Público) e Art.º 24.º do Estatuto Orgânico do Ministério das Finanças.

<http://www.angolaxyami.com/Politica-angolana/Angola/Novo-Governo-Existem-ministerios-que-se-sobrepoem-e-sumiu-uma-Secretaria-de-Estado.html>

<http://www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=17034>

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. A YES score can be earned if several government agencies or ministries oversee different state-owned enterprises. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this function does not exist, or if some state-owned companies are free from government oversight.

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35  
V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

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70. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

38

70a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Art.º 10.º .

Lei das Actividades Comerciais (law on comercial activities) Art.º 15.º da Lei n.º 1/07, de 14 de Maio.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required

70b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

No such mechanism has been established in law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

70c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

It takes 68 days to start a business.

**References:**

World Bank: Doing Business 2009 (<http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=7>).

Business Anti-corruption, <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

70d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Costs exceed US\$1,000.

**References:**

World Bank 2009: Starting a Business in Angola, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/StartingBusiness/Details.aspx?economyid=7>.

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

---

**71. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?**

100

71a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The legislation requiring them exists but the requirements are not easily accessible.

**References:**

Lei Geral do Trabalho (Labor law) Art.º 85.º e seguintes da Lei n.º 2/00, de 11 de Fevereiro.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The legislation requiring them exists, but the requirements not easily accessible.

**References:**

Lei de Bases do Ambiente (Law on the Environment) Art.ºs 4.º al. g) da Lei n.º 5/98, de 19 de Junho.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The legislation requiring them exists, but the requirements are not easily accessible.

**References:**

Lei Geral do Trabalho (Labor law) Art.º 85.º e seguintes da Lei n.º 2/00, de 11 de Fevereiro.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

---

72. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

33

72a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The government has set occupational health and safety standards; however, the Ministry of Labor's Office of the Inspector General does not enforce these standards effectively.

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, [http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html).

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In line with the difficulties in enforcing health and safety standards, it can be assumed that the enforcement of environmental

standards would suffer similar problems. An exception, however, might be in the oil sector where there is generally a prompt reaction to oil spills.

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, [http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html).

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The government has set occupational health and safety standards; however, the Ministry of Labor's Office of the Inspector General did not enforce these standards effectively.

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, [http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html).

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

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Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

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VI-1. <sup>57</sup>Anti-Corruption Law

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73. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

73a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

But this legislation is highly inadequate. There is no coherent anti-corruption legislation. It is, instead, spread out in different supporting pieces of legislation, among them the penal code from 1886.

**References:**

Lei da Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupção (Law of the High Authority Against Corruption) Art.º 8.º da Lei n.º 3/96, de 05 de Abril.

Código Penal (Penal Code): Art.º 324.º e Seguintes (1886).

Lei das Infracções Contra a Economia (Law of crimes against the economy) Art.º 48.º e Seguintes da Lei n.º 6/99, de 3 de Setembro.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei das Infracções Contra a Economia ((Law of crimes against the economy) Art.º 48.º and following.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei das Infracções Contra a Economia ((Law of crimes against the economy) Art.º 48.º and following.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei das Infrações Contra a Economia ((Law of crimes against the economy) Art.º 49.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

The legal framework omits this issue.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei das Infrações Contra a Economia ((Law of crimes against the economy) Art.º 17.º .

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei das Infrações Contra a Economia ((Law of crimes against the economy) Art.º 35.º .

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

According to the U.S. State Department, Angola currently has no comprehensive laws, regulations, or other procedures to detect money laundering and financial crimes." Anti money-laundering legislation is however in the making.

**References:**

There is no legislation against money laundering.

U.S. State Department Money Laundering Report (25/11/08) page 4, [knowyourcountry.info/files/angola.doc](http://knowyourcountry.info/files/angola.doc).

**YES:** A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Código Penal (Penal code) Art.º 21.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

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## VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

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75. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

11

75a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupção,(High Authority against Corruption) Art.º 7.º da Lei da Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupção, <http://www.inacom.og.ao/legislacao/relacionada/1996/04/default.htm>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

75b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law.

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008, Angola Country Report, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23 <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

**100:** This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

75c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008 Angola Country Report, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23, <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>

**100:** The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

0: The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

75d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law.

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008, Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23 [http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70\\_0.html?&L=1](http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70_0.html?&L=1).

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

75e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law.

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008, Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23 [http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70\\_0.html?&L=1](http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70_0.html?&L=1).

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

75f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law.

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008 Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23 <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

75g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law.

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008 Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23, <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

75h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008, Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23 <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

75i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law.

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008, Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23 <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

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## 76. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

0

76a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law.

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008 Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23 <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

76b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency exists only in law.

**References:**

Business Anti-Corruption portal, Angola Country Profile,  
<http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008 Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 23 <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

**100:** Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

74. Is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

74. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to Isaksen and Wiig, the government is opposing the establishment of the High Authority against Corruption and the

law establishing it has been ignored even as it has actually already been ratified by the President of the Republic.

**References:**

Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupção, (High Authority against Corruption) Art.º 8.º da Lei da Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupção. [http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola/downloadFile/file/Angola.AltAutoridadeCorrupcao.pdf?nocache=1201273977\\_01](http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola/downloadFile/file/Angola.AltAutoridadeCorrupcao.pdf?nocache=1201273977_01).

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/Angola.pdf#xml=http://ibp.forumone.com/cgi-bin/txis/webinator/search4/xml.txt?query=Angola&pr=IBP1&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=500&rlead=500&sufs=0&order=r&cq=&id=4930e9096>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

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37  
VI-3. Rule of Law

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77. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

50

77a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (The Constitution of Angola) Art.º 41.º

Portuguese: [http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-constituicao/downloadFile/file/ANGOLA.Constituicao.pdf?nocache=1202120482\\_47](http://www.rjcpjp.org/RJCPLP/sections/informacao/legislacao-nacional/anexos/angola-constituicao/downloadFile/file/ANGOLA.Constituicao.pdf?nocache=1202120482_47).

English: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN002502.pdf>.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

77b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The judicial system in Angola suffers from lack of capacity (few judges and many cases) and the citizenry also generally lack knowledge of their rights. Only 23 of 168 municipal courts are operational. This means that a large part of the population has no access to the legal system, which has a significant backlog of cases. The vast majority of disputes are resolved outside the formal court system.

**References:**

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008, Angola Country Report, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 10-11 <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

Skaar & Serra Van Dunem (2006): Courts under Construction in Angola: What can They do for the poor? (<http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2457=courts-under-construction-in-angola>).

João Damião, practicing lawyer, Luanda, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

77c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Despite the constitutional guarantee that costs should not be a barrier to justice and the fact that free legal aid is available (within the limitations set by geography and the limited numbers of lawyers), it costs money to bring a case to court in Angola (Skaar & Serra Van Dunem state that divorce can cost up to US\$5,000, making it unaffordable to the vast majority of even middle class citizens).

Appeals are particularly costly as many cases end up in the supreme court (as a consequence of the limited number of courts and the people's distrust of them). A judicial tax" of 10 percent applies in those cases that are appealed to the supreme court, a cost that severely restricts access to justice for middle class and poor citizens.

**References:**

Skaar & Serra Van Dunem (2006): Courts Under Construction in Angola: What Can They Do for the Poor? (<http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2457=courts-under-construction-in-angola>).

João Damião, practicing lawyer, Luanda, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees are not a barrier to appeals.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees present somewhat of a barrier to pursuing appeal.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments. Attorneys fees greatly discourage the use of the appeals process.

---

## 78. Do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

50

78. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In addition to the flaws related to lack of capacity and poorly trained judges, there are also reports of widespread corruption in the judiciary, combined with tight political control. Some judges (perhaps especially in low-level, non-politicized cases) make some

efforts to follow protocol. In a particular case that was investigated as part of this research, a municipal court judge ruled against the police in a case of illegal detention that was related to a land dispute.

**References:**

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008 Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

Skaar & Serra Van Dunem (2006): Courts Under Construction in Angola: What Can They Do for the Poor? (<http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2457=courts-under-construction-in-angola>).

Andre Quitari, student, Agostino Neto University, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

**75:**

**50:** Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

**25:**

**0:** Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

---

## 79. Are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

25

79. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Judiciary is strongly influenced by the executive. The interviewee estimated that only 70 percent of all rulings are enforced by the state.

**References:**

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008, Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, page 10-11 <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html?&L=1>.

Skaar & Serra Van Dunem (2006): Courts under Construction in Angola: What Can They Do for the Poor? (<http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2457=courts-under-construction-in-angola>).

João Damião, practicing lawyer, Luanda, Nov.12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

**25:**

**0:** Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

---

## 80. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

81

80a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) N.º 3 do Art.º 120.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts ).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

80b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The judiciary is weak and highly politicized.

**References:**

World Bank: Doing Business 2009 (<http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=7>).

Bertelsmann foundation 2008 Angola Country report (<http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/70.0.html>).

**100:** National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

**75:**

**50:** National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

**25:**

**0:** National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

80c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The distribution is done by lottery where numerated cases are put in one bowl and while another bowl is filled with the names of individual judges. The process is overseen by the president judge of the province in question and performed two times per week.

**References:**

Código de Processo Civil (Civil code) Art.º 209.º and º 216.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

80d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

**References:**  
Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Art.º 128.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

---

### 81. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

81a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

**References:**  
No documented cases reported.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

81b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

**References:**  
No documented cases reported.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work

on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

## 82. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

50

82a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

Ethnicity is not perceived as a significant problem in Angola — and particularly not in Luanda where large groups from different ethnic groups live together as a result of their displacement during the war. However, it cannot be denied that there are cases of discrimination in the provinces.

### References:

João Damião, Practicing Lawyer, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

82b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

Outside the issues associated with the huge socio-economic gender biases in Angola and focusing exclusively on how they are treated at the courts, women are not treated differently.

### References:

João Damião, practicing lawyer, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**75:**

**50:** Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**25:**

**0:** Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

82c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The state-appointed legal service in Angola is handled by the Bar Association of Lawyers (Ordem dos Advogados). When the Bar Association receives a request by an interested party, including a statement from the municipal authorities that confirms that the individual cannot afford to pay for legal services (atestado de pobreza), the Bar association assigns a lawyer to join the process. The lawyer is subsequently paid a fee (through the Bar Association) by the State upon submitting documentation that he has indeed worked on the case.

**References:**

Lei Constitucional (Constitutional law) Art.º 36.º

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

82d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Only in Luanda and with exceptions. Applicants need to show that they lack sufficient resources to pay for legal aid.

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, [http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html).

João Damião, practicing lawyer, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

**75:**

**50:** State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

**25:**

**0:** State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

82e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The legal fees of a lawyer varies from case to case based on the level of complexity of the case and other issues. The fees can easily exceed US\$500. Sometimes, lawyers lower their fees or work pro bono. There are also legal fees to be paid to the court. This means that, in most cases, the costs will be prohibitive.

**References:**

Skaar & Serra Van Dunem (2006): Courts Under Construction in Angola: What Can They Do for the Poor? (<http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2457=courts-under-construction-in-angola>).

João Damião, practicing lawyer, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to citizens.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most citizens from bringing a case.

82f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The legal fees of a lawyer varies from case to case based on the level of complexity of the case and other issues. The fees can easily exceed US\$500. Sometimes, lawyers lower their fees or work pro bono. There are also legal fees to be paid to the court. This means that, in most cases, the costs will be prohibitive.

**References:**

João Damião, practicing lawyer, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to small businesses.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most small businesses from bringing a case.

82g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Courts are unavailable in most of the country. In the provinces there is often only one judge for the entire province.

**References:**

João Damião, practicing lawyer, Nov. 12, 2008, Luanda.

Skaar & Serra Van Dunem (2006): Courts under Construction in Angola: What Can They Do for the Poor? <http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2457=courts-under-construction-in-angola>.

**100:** Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

**75:**

**50:** Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

**25:**

**0:** Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

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## VI-4. Law Enforcement

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83. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

50

83a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Recruitment is from the armed forces, but it seems that professional criteria are now applied after a 2006 reform where the requirements for new police recruits were strengthened.

**References:**

Amnesty (2007): Above the Law – Police Accountability in Angola, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR12/005/2007/en/dom-AFR120052007en.html>.

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

83b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The budget component for security and public order (that includes the police) has been growing from 6.61 percent of the total budget in 2006 to 7.46 percent in the 2008 budget. In the same period, the total value of the budget has more than doubled.

**References:**

Comissão Episcopal de Justiça e Paz, Sector de Justiça Económica (2008): Análise do Orçamento Geral do Estado 2008, p. 18.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

83c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The above reports describe cases where the police have acted against political parties and been used in politically sensitive repression in Cabinda.

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, [http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html).

Amnesty (2007): Above the Law – Police Accountability in Angola, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR12/005/2007/en/dom-AFR120052007en.html>.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

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84. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

54

84a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

**References:**

Provedor da Justiça (Ombudsman), N.º 2 do Art.º 142.º da Lei Constitucional.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

84b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The ombudsman can only issue recommendations and according to the U.S. Department of State, Most complaints were handled within the National Police by internal disciplinary procedures, which sometimes led to formal punishment including dismissal. However, the government did not have a mechanism to investigate transparently and punish alleged offenders, and in most cases failed to provide any additional information on investigations or legal proceedings.”

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, [http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html).

**100:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

84c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupção (High Authority Against Corruption) Art.º 4.º da Lei da Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupção and N.º 1 do Art.º 142.º da Lei Constitucional.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

84d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The High Authority exists only in law.

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights

Practices 2007, [http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html).

Business Anti-corruption, <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=386>.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

84e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES | NO

**References:**

Regulamento de Disciplina da Policia Nacional (Regulations for the Discipline of the National Police) Art.º 14 do Decreto n.º 41/96 de 27 de Dezembro.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

84f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the U.S. State Department, Most complaints were handled within the National Police by internal disciplinary procedures, which sometimes led to formal punishment including dismissal. However, the government did not have a mechanism to investigate transparently and punish alleged offenders, and in most cases failed to provide any additional information on investigations or legal proceedings.”

**References:**

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, [http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country\\_report\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_practices - 2007.html](http://angola.usembassy.gov/angola - country_report_on_human_rights_practices - 2007.html).

Amnesty (2007): Above the Law – Police Accountability in Angola, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR12/005/2007/en/dom-AFR120052007en.html>.

**100:** Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

**75:**

**50:** Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

**25:**

**0:** Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.

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