

Overall Score:

**61 - Weak**

Legal Framework Score:

**87 - Strong**

Actual Implementation Score:

**36 - Very Weak**

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

---

## I-1. <sup>63</sup>Civil Society Organizations

---

### 1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

100

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

No legal restrictions are applied to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) focusing on anti-corruption and good governance issues. Overall, there are no limitations on citizens forming CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance. But how and in what ways CSOs can focus on those issues are not very-well defined in the law.

**References:**

The Law on Non-Governmental Organizations, and interview with Alimmamad Nuriyev, president of the Constitution Fund.

**YES:** A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

---

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the legislation that regulates NGO activities, CSOs are free to accept funding and grants from foreign and domestic sources. NGOs are free to accept funding from both domestic and foreign financial sources (Article 24).

**References:**

The Law on Non-Governmental Organizations and the Law on Mass Media.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Non-Governmental Organizations, CSOs are responsible for disclosing their annual financial reports (Article 29.3). The Law on Mass Media also requires disclosure of financial activities (Article 21).

**References:**

The Law on Non-Governmental Organizations and the Law on Mass Media.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

---

## 2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

25

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

**Comments:**

Such barriers are established by using taxes and police enforcement. Sometimes CSOs that do such activities are characterized as anti-government, and they feel government pressure. Sometimes, such NGOs are not able to set up events such as workshops or seminars in certain regions, and this negatively affects those NGOs' activities.

**References:**

Rovshen Agayev, the deputy of the Center for Economic Initiative, and the newspaper Yeni Musavat.

**100:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

**75:**

**50:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

**Comments:**

Almost no independent CSOs take part in the decision-making processes. In spite of the fact that national legislation requires such participation, this does not happen in practice. For example, according to the law there should be one representative from CSOs in the Observation Council of State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan. Yet, only state officials are engaged in the Observation Council. In addition, according to the chapter of the Anti-Corruption Commission approved by the president on May 03, 2005, this commission should cooperate with CSOs and engage them in anti-corruption initiatives. However, CSOs are not engaged in the commission's activities or programs.

**References:**

Reports by CESD, [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az), Oil and Gas Report by Himayedar and President's Chapter signed on May 03, 2005.

**100:** Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

**75:**

**50:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

25:

0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Election Monitoring Center was closed in 2008. The CSO was closed due to independently monitor elections in Azerbaijan. The center has also monitored corruption in the electoral process, especially for parliamentary elections.

**References:**

Media and NGO reports.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

---

### 3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

100

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No CSO activists are imprisoned. However, some journalists focusing on anti-corruption or procurement issues are imprisoned.

**References:**

Interview with CESD experts, interview with M. Talibli, the chairman of the Innovation Center, and different media reports.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

**References:**

Reports by different media institutes and reports by the National Ombudsman Institute.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist's work. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

**References:**

Interviews with different human rights defenders in Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

---

#### 4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Trade Unions, approved on February, 24 1994, citizens are free to set up trade unions.

**References:**

The Law on Trade Unions, February 24, 1994.

**YES:** A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Almost all trade unions are dependent on the government. Trade unions can not be set up without agreeing with the government.

**References:**

Interviews with different experts, including G.Ibadoglu and R. Agayev.

**100:** Trade unions are common and are an important part of the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

**75:**

**50:** Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

**25:**

**0:** Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

---

## I-2. Media

---

### 5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan is the main guarantor of free speech. The constitution states that all mass media organizations are free, no state censure can be established for mass media, and the state supports freedom of speech (Article 50.2). In addition, according to the Law on Mass Media, all media organizations including paper and electronic media are free (Article 1). The Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting states that television and radio channels are free and not subject to censure.

**References:**

Azerbaijan Law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The constitution (Article 50.2) indicates that all citizens are free to get information and distribute it through legal means, and the state guarantees freedom of speech.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

## 6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

88

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

According to Azerbaijan law, everybody is free to form a newspaper or print media outlet. The Law on Mass Media requires that those forming a print outlet must notify the Ministry of Justice seven days in advance.

### References:

Interview with Rovshen Hachiyev, deputy editor of the Azadlig newspaper, and media and NGO reports.

**100:** Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

### Comments:

No license is needed to form a print media outlet.

### References:

The Law on Mass Media.



**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

No license is needed to form a print media outlet, but one must apply to receive approval, and this could be characterized as a licensing. This process takes about one month.

**References:**

Interview with Anar Babali, a media expert, and interview with Azer Akhmedov, director of the Azadlig newspaper.

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The cost is very small and is determined based on minimum wage, which is 70 manat (US\$86). Usually it is not prohibitive.

**References:**

Interview with senior officials of the Ministry of Justice, and interview with different media representatives, including Dunya Sakit, the editor-in-chief of Expert magazine.

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

---

## 7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

38

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The government creates barriers to forming a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity, making it nearly impossible. There are almost no independent TV channels in Azerbaijan, in spite of the fact that some channels are called independent. The government has a monopoly position in forming broadcast channels.

### References:

Interview with Azer Akhmedov, interview with Rovshen Hachiyev, leading journalists, and reports by different international organizations as well as national institutes.

**100:** Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

**25:**

**0:** Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

### Comments:

In law, where a broadcast (radio and television) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked. However, since the court system is totally under government control, the appeal procedure is a formality. There is no legal precedent supporting citizens' rights to form broadcast stations.

**References:**

The Law on Mass Media.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting, (Article 14.23) it takes 75 days to get a license to form a TV or radio channel. But this does not happen in reality.

**References:**

Interview with Babek Baker, leading journalist, and reports from the Free Speech" journalists' union.

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the Presidential Act on License for specific sectors approved on December 29, 2005 and amendments to this act on June 29, 2006, 11,000 manat (US\$13605) is needed for a TV or radio license. This amount is 180 higher than minimum wage and 60 times higher than the average salary in Azerbaijan. In reality, it costs more.

**References:**

Interview with Babek Bekir and reports from the Free Speech" journalists' union.

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

---

## 8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

75

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published on-line.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Usually no problems are observed.

**References:**

Interview with expert Rafiq Mammadli, and reports from Ministry of Technology and Telecommunication.

**100:** The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

**75:**

**50:** Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

**25:**

**0:** Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content on-line.

**Comments:**

Usually no problems occur, but there are some cases that sites have been destroyed, for example, the site of Musavat newspaper, [www.musavat.com](http://www.musavat.com), has been destroyed several times.

**References:**

Interview with different NGOs, interview with R.Mammadli, and reports from different governmental bodies including the Ministry of Technology and Telecommunication.

**100:** The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

---

## 9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

67

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

If the information is accurate and can be confirmed, the law does not prohibit reporting it, even if it can damage the reputations of public figures.

**References:**

The Law on Mass Media.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Usually, editors of newspapers determine such rules. For instance, there are some top senior officials newspapers have almost never reported on critically.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Hacıyev, deputy editor of the Azadlıg newspaper, and reports from the Yeni Musavat newspaper.

**100:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

**75:**

**50:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

**25:**

**0:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no practice to apply open censorship in Azerbaijan, however, the pressure of the government can be characterized as informal censorship.

**References:**

Interview with leading newspaper editors and reports from different NGOs.

**100:** The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

**75:**

**50:** The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

---

## 10. Are the media credible sources of information?

10

10a. In law, print media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There is no such requirement in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

The Law on Mass Media.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There is no such requirement in the Law for TV and Radio Broadcasting.

**References:**

Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Professionalism is the one of main problems in the Azerbaijan media. Many government and opposition journalists are not trying to report accurate information. They try to criticize opponents. There is no almost independent media in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, NGO activist, and Rovshen Hachiyev, leading journalist.

**100:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

**75:**

**50:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

**25:**

**0:** Editors and journalists are widely known to sell" favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

TV and radio was under government control during the recent elections. Therefore, political parties and independent candidates did not receive fair media coverage. But print media covers political parties and independent candidates.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, NGO activist, media reports and reports of the Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

**75:**



**50:** Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

**25:**

**0:** The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Starting in 2008, candidates can only use public TV in limited situations, and no state-owned channels can be used. Last time main opposition parties leaders were interviewed by Public TV was at least 4 years ago, therefore it is hard to say Public TV even is relatively open.

**References:**

Reports from Council of Europe, Election Monitoring Center, and reports from different mass-media institutes.

**100:** The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

**75:**

**50:** The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

**25:**

**0:** The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

---

## 11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

33

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Genimet Zahidov, editor of Azadlig newspaper, one of leading newspapers, was jailed.

**References:**

Reports of Azadlig newspaper (www.azadliq.az), reports from Human Rights Watch, reports from different NGOs, and human rights defenders.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Agil Khalil, a correspondent of the Azadlig newspaper, was physically harmed last year. He was investigating government corruption.

**References:**

Reports of Azadlig newspaper (www.azadliq.az), reports from Human Rights Watch, reports from different NGOs, and human rights defenders.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

No journalists was killed last year.

**References:**

Reports from different media institutes, such as Azadlig, Yeni Musavat, and Baku Xeber, and interview with different media organizations.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

---

## 59 I-3. Public Access to Information

---

### 12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

100

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Freedom of information is ensured by Article 50 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, which was adopted in November 1995. According to Article 50, everyone is free to seek, obtain, transfer, prepare and distribute information. A new law of the Azerbaijan Republic on obtaining information was adopted in 2005. The new law defines mechanisms of obtaining information from the state and municipality institutions, deadlines for appeals, rules of appeals, types of information, and more.

**References:**

Constitution of Azerbaijan, 1995, and the Law on Obtaining Information, 2005.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Obtaining Information, if the information keeper rejects or ignores the timeframe for execution of the

information inquiry, the citizen has a right of appeal to the courts or the national ombudsman on information.

**References:**

The Law on Obtaining Information, 2005.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Access to Information (Article 30), government bodies have to disclose necessary information by printing, posting it online, and by other means. Citizens can request information through the court, excluding records on army and security.

**References:**

Law on Access to Information.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

---

### 13. Is the right of access to information effective?

15

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, citizens requests are not responded to for several months.

**References:**

Interview with Rovhsen Agayev, interview with Mehemmed Talibli, NGO activities, and reports from different media institutes.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, citizens can not use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost. Personal contacts are needed, which is costly.

**References:**

Interview with Rovhsen Agayev, interview with Mehemmed Talibli, NGO activities, and reports from different media institutes.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, citizens can not resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period. Sometimes it takes one year and usually citizens are unable to get the information that they request.

**References:**

Interview with Rovhsen Agayev, interview with Mehemmed Talibli, NGO activities, reports from different media institutes, and interview with human rights defenders.

**100:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, citizens can not resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost, because illegal payment is needed, which is extremely high.

**References:**

Interview with Rovhsen Agayev, interview with Mehemmed Talibli, NGO activities, reports from different media institutes, and interview with human rights defenders.

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

**Comments:**

In many cases, the government is reluctant to give reasons for denying an information request.

**References:**

Interview with Rovhsen Agayev, interview with Mehemed Talibli, NGO activities, reports from different media institutes, and interview with human rights defenders.

**100:** The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

**75:**

**50:** The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

**25:**

**0:** The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

---

## Category II. Elections

---

### II-1. <sup>61</sup>Voting & Citizen Participation

---

#### 14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the constitution, citizens of Azerbaijan have the right to elect and be elected to government bodies, and to participate in referendums. Article 12 of the election code implies that every citizen who has reached the age of 18 by the day of parliamentary, presidential and municipal elections and referendum (including the same day) has the right to elect, to vote in referendum, to observe elections (referendum process), to participate in pre-election and pre-referendum campaigns and to participate in actions related to the election and referendum.

**References:**

Article 56 of the constitution, 1995, and Article 12 of the election code, 2003.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the election code (Article 7.1.), elections for parliament, president, and municipalities are mandatory and are held every five years (Article 84). Parliamentary elections are held in November every five years, according to the constitution. Presidential elections are held in October every five years according to the the election code (article number 178.1) and municipality elections are held in December every five years according to the code (Article 211).

**References:**

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

---

## 15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

50

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In both the presidential elections in 2003 and parliamentary elections in 2005 the name of voters, especially those who were supposed to support opposition candidates, were not included in the voting list. The names of all voters including inactive voters should be included in the list, but in fact, name of pro-opposition voters are not considered. As a result, they were refused a voter ID and not able to vote.

**References:**

Reports of Election Monitoring Center, and interview with different media and human rights defenders.



**100:** Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

**75:**

**50:** Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The last elections confirm that ballots are not secret and not protected. During elections, additional voting bulletins are put to the ballot, which change the results of elections.

**References:**

Election Monitoring Center's reports, interview with different NGOs activities, mass-media reports, and articles of Yeni Musavat ([www.musavat.com](http://www.musavat.com)).

**100:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

**75:**

**50:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

**25:**

**0:** Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

All elections have been held according to regular schedules in the last decade.

**References:**

Election Monitoring Center's reports, interview with different NGOs activities, mass-media reports, and articles of Yeni Musavat

**100:** Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

**75:**

**50:** Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

**25:**

**0:** Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

---

## 16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

60

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

**YES** | NO

### Comments:

According to The Law on Political Parties (Articles 1 and 2) more than 1,000 supporters are required to form political parties.

### References:

Law on Political Parties.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

**YES** | NO

### Comments:

According to the election code (Article 3) without any discrimination as to ethnicity, religion, language, social condition, position, thinking, political, trade unions and other public union membership ,everybody who is above 18 years old can run for municipality office, those above 25 years old can run for parliamentary office, and those above 35 years old can run for presidential office.

**References:**

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties. However, there are still some problems registering political parties, mainly for political reasons.

**References:**

Interview with different political parties including Musavat, ADP, reports from mass-media including Azadlig newspaper, and Liberty Radio.

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

**25:**

**0:** Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In general, all citizens can run for political office. In practice, this depends on the type of election and the political circumstances. Citizens can be rejected when registering as candidates, or a candidate may be offered money or intimidated to withdraw his or her candidacy.

**References:**

Elections Monitoring Center's Reports, Human Rights Watch's Reports, reports from different mass-media institutes.

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office. A system of party lists may discourage or prevent independent candidates from running for office.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The parliament has 125 seats. The opposition has more than 10 seats in the Parliament. However it is doubtful whether some of them are real opposition or just puppets of the government.

**References:**

Parliament's New, interviews with journalists, and reports from Parliament Monitoring Institutes.

**100:** The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

**75:**

**50:** The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

**25:**

**0:** The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

---

## II-2. Election Integrity

---

## 18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

55

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

### Comments:

By law the Central Election Commission is protected from political interference and is an independent body.

### References:

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

In practice the Central Election Commission has no independence.

### References:

Interview with different human rights defenders, for instance, Mehriban Gehremanli, chairman of Committee for Human Rights and Lawyers.

**100:** Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Central Election Commission has a full-time staff, but there is doubt as to whether all of them are professional or not.

**References:**

Interview with different human rights defenders and lawyers, reports from Election Monitoring Center, reports from different mass-media institutes, and interview with Anar Mammadli, independent expert.

**100:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This is not always true.

**References:**

Interview with different human rights defenders and lawyers, reports from Election Monitoring Center, reports from different mass-media institutes, and interview with Razi Hacıyev, Civil Society Association.

**100:** Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

**75:**

**50:** Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the election code, if the infringement described in the complaint can be considered a criminal action according to the criminal code of Azerbaijan, the Central Election Commission can refer it to the relevant public prosecutors. Usually the commission does implement it.

**References:**

Interview with different human rights defenders and lawyers, reports from Election Monitoring Center, reports from different mass-media institutes, and interview with Mirvari Gehramanli, independent expert.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

---

## 19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

54

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Election commissions in Azerbaijan are under monopoly of the government, and there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration. Usually it is done based on political purposes.

**References:**

Interview with different human rights defenders and lawyers, Reports from Election Monitoring Center, reports from different

mass-media institutes, interview with Anar Mammadli, Election Monitoring Center, and interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert.

**100:** There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

**75:**

**50:** There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

**25:**

**0:** The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost<sup>7</sup> voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Voters, candidates, political parties and political party blocs can appeal to the courts against the decisions adopted by election commissions. According to legislation, such contests can be settled through the judicial system.

**References:**

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

Election results have never been effectively appealed through the judicial system.

**References:**

Interview with different human rights defenders and lawyers, reports from Election Monitoring Center, reports from different mass-



media institutes, interview with Anar Mammadli, Election Monitoring Center, and interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert.

**100:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

**75:**

**50:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

**25:**

**0:** The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Military and security forces remain neutral during the elections, but the police carry the responsibility for ensuring security outside of the precinct. In practice, the military precincts are totally under the control of the executive branch. But especially in parliamentary elections, in some cases, police do not remain neutral, however, the situation is improving.

**References:**

Interview with different human rights defenders and lawyers, reports from Election Monitoring Center, reports from different mass-media institutes, interview with Anar Mammadli, Election Monitoring Center, and interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert.

**100:** The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

**75:**

**50:** The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overtly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Election Code (Articles 40.7, 41, 42 and 44) domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

**References:**

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Election observers are able to effectively monitor elections, but there are huge problems for observation in the election especially when the votes are counted. The problem is that observers usually observe voting process, not the votes counting process. In addition usually many observers are pro-government.

**References:**

Interview with different human rights defenders and lawyers, reports from Election Monitoring Center, reports from different mass-media institutes, interview with Anar Mammadli, Election Monitoring Center, and interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert.

**100:** Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers' activities.

**75:**

**50:** Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

**25:**

**0:** Election observers' movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

---

17. Is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Central Election Commission (CEC) is the election monitoring agency which has following structure: Central Election Commission, Constituency Election Commission and Precinct Election Commission. The Central Election Commission consists of 18 members. The members of the CEC are approved by the the parliament. Six members of the CEC are representatives from different political parties which have the majority in the parliament. Six members are independents. The Constituency Election Commissions consists of nine members.

**References:**

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities exists that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

---

70  
II-3. Political Financing

---

20. Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties?

71

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Political Parties regulates the financial and property matters of the parties. The following cannot donate to political parties: state agencies, charities, religious organizations and trade unions. Political parties may not receive donations given with the purpose of gaining economic or political benefits. The amount of donations given to political parties must be included in the financial accounts, along with the name of the donor, his or her address and the amount of the donation. Any financial aid from foreign sources are prohibited in law. According to the Article 18 of that code, incomes of political parties can be from the following: memberships, income from estate renting/sales, incomes from events, publications, articles, and more.

**References:**

Law on Political Parties.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political parties.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Political Parties (Article 19) political parties can not get any private contributions to maximize their political and economic efficiency. Political parties have to insert name of private contributions names as well as addresses to the financial reports. Political parties can not receive contributions from individuals without limitations.

**References:**

Law on Political Parties.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political parties. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to political parties.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the election code (Article 156.2) individual donations to candidates in the parliamentary elections and to political parties can not exceed 509 manat (US\$630).

**References:**

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to political parties. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

In law, there are no limits on total political party expenditures, there are only limits for political parties to finance the election process.

**References:**

Law on Political Parties.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the election code, individuals must disclose donations to political candidates and parties.

**References:**

Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances and expenditures of political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

During the election campaign period, election commissions monitor the finances of the candidates. According to the Law on Political Parties, tax authorities annually audit parties' financial reports.

**References:**  
The Tax Code.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of party finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties' finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**  
The Tax Department monitors the political financing process.

**References:**  
Tax Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of political parties. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

---

## 21. Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates?

83

21a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to individual political candidates.

YES | NO

**Comments:**  
According to the Law on Political Parties (Article 19) political parties can not get any private contributions to maximize their political and economic efficiency. There is , however, no law which specifically addresses political candidates.

**References:**  
Law on Political Parties.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to individual political candidates, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to individual political candidates.

21b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political candidates.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the election code (Article 156.2) individual donations to candidates in the parliamentary elections and to political parties can not exceed 509 manat (US\$630).

**References:**

Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political candidates. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to individual political candidates.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to Article 156.2.4 and 156.4.3 of the election code, there are financial limits on corporate donations to candidates which cannot exceed 10,228 manat (US\$12650).

**References:**

Election Code of Azerbaijan Republic

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21d. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political candidates.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the election code (Articles 95.1 and 95.3) registered candidates, political parties and political parties groups should publish their financial reports.

**References:**

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to individual political candidates.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to individual political candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

21e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the campaign finances of individual political candidates.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

During the election campaign period, election commissions monitor the finances of the candidates. According to the Law on Political Parties, tax authorities annually audit parties' financial reports.

**References:**

The Election Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates to self-audit.

21f. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Tax Department is responsible for monitoring.



**References:**  
The Tax Code.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

---

## 22. Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective?

25

22a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

The limits on individual donations to political parties are not effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a political party due to the regulations governing political financing based on narrow indicators. There are still no regulations for political parties to disclose their financial activities, and regulations governing political financing are not effective.

**References:**

Interview with M.Talibli, chairman of Innovation Center, reports of different media institutes and interview with different political parties representatives.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

22b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a political party.

**Comments:**

In practice, there are problems with individual donations to pro-government candidates and political parties. The government harasses the individuals who finance opposition parties. The government uses different obstacles to prevent them from political party financing.

In practice, corporations unable to donate to political parties, even they are willing to do it, because of government pressure.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, deputy to chairman of Economic Initiatives Center, reports from Musavat newspaper, [www.musavat.com](http://www.musavat.com), and reports of Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to political parties are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

22c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

**Comments:**

Except for the election campaigns, there is no limit on total party expenditures. However, during the election period the major problem is ignorance and a lack of enforcement of the law by the ruling party.

**References:**

Interview with R.Haciye, deputy to editor of Azadlig newspaper, interview with different politicians, and reports of the Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

22d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Investigation on political financing must be agreed upon by the government.

**References:**

Interview with R.Haciyev, deputy to editor of Azadlig newspaper, interview with different politicians, and reports of Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of political parties. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

22e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

This depends on the government's political interest. Such action can be implemented only by certain state agencies.

**References:**

Interview with R.Haciyev, deputy to editor of Azadlig newspaper, interview with different politicians, and reports of Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

22f. In practice, contributions to political parties are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Almost no major political parties have been audited.

**References:**

Interview with R.Haciyev, deputy to editor of Azadlig newspaper, interview with different politicians, and reports of Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** Political party finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

**75:**

**50:** Political party finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

**25:**

**0:** Party finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

## 23. Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates effective?

25

23a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political candidates are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a particular candidate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is the pressure to discourage support of opposition parties.

**References:**

Interview with R.Haciyev, deputy to editor of Azadlig newspaper, interview with different politicians, reports of Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a particular candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support particular political candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a particular political candidate are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are not effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate due to high pressure from the government side.

**References:**

Interview with R.Haciyev, deputy to editor of Azadlig newspaper, interview with different politicians, and reports of Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support individual candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations);

or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to individual candidates are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23c. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

This completely depends on the government's political interest. Such action can be implemented only by certain state agencies. For instance, in last elections, many independent candidates were unable to take part in the whole election, they were stopped in the middle of the process.

**References:**

Interview with R.Haciyev, deputy to editor of Azadlig newspaper, interview with different politicians, reports of Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

23d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

This completely depends on the government's political interest. Such action can be implemented only by certain state agencies. Usually, penalties are imposed based on political reasons.

**References:**

Interview with R.Haciyev, deputy to editor of Azadlig newspaper, interview with different politicians, reports of Election Monitoring Center.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

23e. In practice, the finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

During an election period, the election commissions monitor candidates' financial expenditures and donations. Beside such monitoring, no auditing is applied.

**References:**

Interview with Anar Babayev, expert, reports of different NGOs and mass media.

**100:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions.

**25:**

**0:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

## 24. Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties?

25

24a. In practice, political parties disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Only in election periods is there reasonable time, but in practice, political parties do not disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period, usually, they do not even disclose such data.

**References:**

Interview with different journalists and politicians.

**100:** Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

**75:**

**50:** Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

**25:**

**0:** Political parties never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

24b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a reasonable time period only in election period, but in general, there is no access the financial records of political parties.

**References:**

Reports of Election Monitoring Center, different articles of leading newspapers.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

24c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable cost.



100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable cost only in election period, but in general it is very expensive.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, reports of Election Monitoring Center, different articles in national newspapers.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## 25. Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns?

25

25a. In practice, individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In election period individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period, but not all information is disclosed.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, reports of Election Monitoring Center, different articles in national newspapers.

**100:** Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

**75:**

**50:** Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

**25:**

**0:** Individual candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

25b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

In election period citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period, but not all records are disclosed, usually, there is no access to the financial records.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, reports of Election Monitoring Center, different articles in national newspapers.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

25c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Not all records are disclosed, only contributions from the government institute are disclosed.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, reports of Election Monitoring Center, different articles in national newspapers.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## Category III. Government Accountability

---

### III-1. ~~47~~ Executive Accountability

---

27. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

44

27a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, the chief executive gives no reasons for his or her policy decisions. They are made for political reasons.

**References:**

Interview with different NGO representatives, reports from the mass media, and interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert.

**100:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

27b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the constitution (Article 7), the judiciary can review the actions of the executive, everyone is equal under judiciary rules and no discrimination can occur.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

27c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, the judiciary cannot review the actions of the executive, it depends on instructions that come from the government.

**References:**

Interview with journalists and politicians, and Rovshen Hacıyev, deputy to the editor-in-chief of the Azadlig newspaper.

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to rely upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

27d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

**Comments:**

In practice, it is hardly possible that the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies or government practices.

**References:**

Interview with journalists and politicians, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, Mehemed Talibli, chairman of Center for Innovations, and Rovshen Hacıyev, independent journalist.

**100:** The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

---

## 28. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

100

28a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the constitution (Article 107), if the president is involved in criminal activities, he or she can be prosecuted for crimes he or she commits. In order to do it, with initiative of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court can make the request to the parliament within 30 days. At least 95 of 125 parliamentary votes are needed to approve the Supreme Court's request.

After that the Constitutional Court has to approve parliament's decision to arrest the president and oust him or her from office. The Constitutional Court has 1 week to approve the parliament's decision, if the court does not approve the decision, then he president can not be prosecuted. Meanwhile, according to the constitution (Article 123) if the prime minister is involved in criminal activities, he/she can be arrested after the president's approval.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

28b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the constitution (Article 107) ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. In order to do so, the prosecutor-general addresses requests to the president to obtain approval to make arrests.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

---

## 29. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

56

29a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Approval of Procedures for Submission of Financial Information by Public Officials requires the list of officials, including president, prime minister and chairman of the parliament, who must submit the financial information to the Commission on Combating Corruption under the State Council on Management of Civil Service. Although this law has been approved, it has not yet been implemented.

**References:**

The Law on Approval of Procedures for Submission of Financial Information.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

29b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Anti-Corruption Law approved on May 03, 2005 (Articles 3 and 5) and Law on Reporting of Financial Data by Senior Figures approved on June 24, 2005 (Article 3 and 5), the ministers are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. Although they have been approved, both laws have not yet been implemented.

**References:**

Law on Reporting of Financial Data by Senior Figures.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

29c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Anti-Corruption Law, the value of gifts can not exceed 53 manat (US\$65). If the value of the gifts is more than indicated amount then the executive branch member either cannot accept it, otherwise it can be characterized as bribe.

**References:**

The Anti-Corruption Law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

29d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Combating Corruption requires independent auditing.

**References:**

Law on Combating Corruption.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

29e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

In law there are no such restrictions.

**References:**

Azerbaijan law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

29f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice this is not effective because in spite of the fact it is prohibited by law, almost all senior officials have companies. Some of them are even in monopoly positions, and they keep their businesses after being in the government.



**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of mass-media institutes, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, Mehmed Talibli, chairman of Center for Innovations, and Rovshen Hacıyev, independent journalist.

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

29g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no control mechanism to regulate gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch, and therefore it is not effective.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and independent journalists.

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

29h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

**Comments:**

In practice, executive branch asset disclosures are not audited.

**References:**

Interview with Dr. Azer Mehtiyev, independent researcher, interview with journalists and NGOs representatives.

**100:** Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

### 30. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

0

30a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Reporting of Financial Data by Senior Figures approved on June 24, 2005 (Article 9), their declarations are personal information and cannot be submitted to another person.

**References:**

The Law on Obtaining Information.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

30b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens cannot access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. In practice, citizens almost have no chance to get access.

**References:**

Interview with well-known journalists and NGO representatives.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

30c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens cannot access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost, at least because they don't have the opportunity to have such access in practice.

**References:**

Interview with well-known journalists and NGO representatives, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, Mehmed Talibli, chairman of Center for Innovations, and Rovshen Hacıyev, independent journalist.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

26. Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

26. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Civil rights are protected by the constitution and any violations can be challenged through the courts.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

---

31. Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

0

31. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, the ruling party is not distinct from the state.

**References:**

Interview with independent researchers and R.Agayev, NGO representative.

**100:** Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

**75:**

**50:** The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

**25:**

**0:** The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

---

## III-2. Legislative Accountability

---

### 32. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

83

32a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Constitutional Court can review laws passed by the legislature.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

32b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In some cases, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature, for instance Tax Code was reviewed.

**References:**

Interview with R. Agayev, independent researcher, articles of mass-media institutes, reports from different NGOs.

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

32c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the constitution (Article 90) members of the national legislature can be subject to criminal proceedings.

**References:**

Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings. A NO score is also earned if the legislative branch itself controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on members of the legislature.

---

33. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

32

33a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Combating Corruption, MPs shall submit their relevant financial information to the authority identified by the parliament.

**References:**

The Law on Combating Corruption.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

33b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There is no restriction on entering the private sector after leaving the government.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

33c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Anti-Corruption Law of Azerbaijan, the value of gifts can not exceed 52.55 manat (US\$65).

**References:**

Anti-Corruption Law of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

33d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There are not any requirements in the Law on Reporting of Financial Data by senior figures.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

33e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are not effective in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Interview with Alimammed Nuriyev, Coordinator of the National NGOs Anti-Corruption Network, Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of different NGOs

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

33f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.



100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective in Azerbaijan, there is no control mechanism to do it.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center ([www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org)), reports of different NGOs and mass-media institutes.

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

33g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are not any mechanisms to audit national legislative branch asset disclosures.

**References:**

Interview with different experts, parliament members and journalists.

**100:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

### 34. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

0

34a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | **NO**

#### Comments:

No legislation can allow citizens to access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

#### References:

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

34b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

#### Comments:

It is almost impossible to have access to legislative asset disclosure records, not only within a reasonable time period, but also even in long period.

#### References:

Interview with Mehemmed Talibli, the chairman of Economic Initiatives Center, reports of different NGOs and mass-media institutes.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

34c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, the chairman of Economic Initiatives Center, reports of different NGOs and mass-media institutes.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

### 35. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

33

35a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Articles 50 and 57 of the constitution regulate citizens' rights to request and access information.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

35b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Usually citizens cannot access records of legislative processes and documents, therefore, it is difficult to determine time.

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, the chairman of Economic Initiatives Center, interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of different mass-media institutes.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

35c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Usually citizens cannot access records of legislative processes and documents, therefore, it is difficult to calculate cost.

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, the chairman of Economic Initiatives Center, interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of different mass-media institutes.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

### 37 III-3. Judicial Accountability

---

#### 36. Are judges appointed fairly?

83

36a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Courts and Judges (Article 93) provides transparent procedures for selecting national-level judges. According to the law, election process should be conducted in transparent ways.

**References:**

The Law on Courts and Judges.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

**NO:** A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

36b. In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting national-level judges.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the constitution (Article 126) professional criteria are required in selecting national-level judges, but in many cases those requirements are not considered.

**References:**

Interview with different lawyers and journalists.

**100:** National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

**75:**

**50:** Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

36c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The judges of courts of first instance are appointed by presidential decree, the judges of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal are appointed by parliament, by recommendation by the President.

**References:**

Law on Courts and Judges.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

---

## 37. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

29

37a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No legislative act requires members of the national-level judiciary to give reasons for their decisions.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

37b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Members of the national-level judiciary rarely give reasons for their decisions

**References:**

Interview with lawyers and journalists.

**100:** Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

**25:**

**0:** Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

37c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

There is the Judicial Legal Council which is close to the president's office.

**References:**

The legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

37d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The Judicial Legal Council is under total control of the ministry of justice, which is controlled by the president's office.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference by the executive and legislative branches.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry or legislative committee.

37e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

As long as Judicial-Legal Council are not independent, the council has never had initiates for investigations.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and reports of different mass-media institutes.

**100:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.



37f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Without political decision, the council does not impose penalties on offenders.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert and reports of different mass-media institutes.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

---

38. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

32

38a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Anti-Corruption Law (Article 2) and Law on Submitting Financial Records by Public Figures (Article 2 and 3) requires members of the national-level judiciary to file an asset disclosure form.

**References:**

The Law of Anti-Corruption.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

38b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Anti-Corruption Law governing, gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are regulated.

**References:**

Anti-Corruption Law of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

38c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

No legislative act requires the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

38d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There are not any restrictions.

**References:**

The legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

38e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges is not working in practice.

**References:**

Interview with Mehmed Talibli, independent expert, interview with H.Hasanov, independent lawyer and reports of different mass-media institutes.

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

38f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are not any control mechanism to regulate governing gifts and hospitality.

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, independent expert, interview with H.Hasanov, independent lawyer and reports of different mass-media institutes.

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

38g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Interview with Dr. Azer Mehtiyev, independent researcher, reports of different mass-media institutes.

**100:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

39. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

0

39a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Reporting of Financial Records by Senior Figures approved on June 24, 2005 (Article 9) their declarations are personal information and cannot be submitted to another person.

**References:**

Law on Reporting of Financial Records by Senior Figures.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

39b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of different mass-media institutes, reports of NGOs, including [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org), [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az).

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

39c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of different mass-media institutes, reports of NGOs, including [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org), [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az).

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## III-4. Budget Processes

---

40. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

83

40a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to Article 95 of the constitution, the parliament can amend the budget when it is necessary.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

40b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

All significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and Mehmed Talibli, the chairman of Economic Initiatives Center.

**100:** All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

**75:**

**50:** Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

**25:**

**0:** The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

40c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The legislature does not have sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and Mehmed Talibli, the chairman of Economic Initiatives Center

**100:** Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

**75:**

**50:** Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

---

## 41. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

50

41a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

There are some positive changes in recent years in terms of conducting transparent debates. However, there are still many obstacles to enhancing transparency in this stage. Parliament has never amended the state budget project, and no CSOs are invited to take part in discussions.

### References:

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of mass-media institutes and NGOs, [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org).

**100:** Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

**25:**

**0:** Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

41b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

In spite of the fact that no budget hearing is required by law, some NGOs and sometimes even local governments hold such hearings, especially in recent years.



**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of mass-media institutes and NGOs, [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org).

**100:** Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

41c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens do not have access all itemized budget allocations, but many of them are available.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of mass-media institutes and NGOs, [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org) and [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az).

**100:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

---

### 43. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

25

43a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Department heads do not regularly submit reports to this committee.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of Mass-media institutes and NGOs, [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org) and [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az).

**100:** Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

**75:**

**50:** Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

**25:**

**0:** There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

43b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The committee has never acted in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion in Azerbaijan. Almost all members of opposition parties serving on the committee are not real opposition party members.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of mass-media institutes and NGOs, [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org) and [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az).

**100:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

**75:**

**50:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

**25:**

**0:** The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

43c. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Since there is high political dependency, the committee can not hold independent investigations into financial irregularities.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of Mass-media institutes and NGOs, [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org) and [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az).

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

**75:**

**50:** The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

---

## 42. Is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

42. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Budget System, there is a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds, called the budget committee.

**References:**

Law on Budget System.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

---

## Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

---

### IV-1. <sup>57</sup>Civil Service Regulations

---

44. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

75

44a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Civil Service and the Law on Combating Corruption require an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

**References:**

The Law on Civil Service and the Law on Combating Corruption.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

44b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Combating Corruption (Article 7.1.) regulate to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

**References:**

The Law on Combating Corruption.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

44c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is no independent body that can ensure fairness in the selection of civil servants, and there is no independent body that can review complaints by civil servants about their jobs.

**References:**

Civil Procedure Code, 2000.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. The mechanism should be independent of their supervisors but can still be located within the government agency or entity (such as a special commission or board). Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

44d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Criminal Code, 2000, and the Law on Combating Corruption, 2004, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

**References:**

Criminal Code, 2000, the Law on Combating Corruption, 2004.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist or if the ban is not a lifetime ban.

---

## 45. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

47

45a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

It is hard to imagine that civil servants are protected from political interference in Azerbaijan.

### References:

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and civil servants.

**100:** Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

45b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

Many ministries and committees are applying test system to appoint civil servants, however, personal relationships, networks, regional factors, and political interests are still main factors for appointment of senior civil servants.

### References:

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, civil servants and reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

45c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Civil service management actions are mainly based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and civil servants and reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

**75:**

**50:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

45d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Civil servants usually have clear job descriptions, but the quality of their job descriptions is another issue.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and civil servants, and reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable representation of positions in terms of a person's authority, responsibility and base pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

45e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Since civil servants get non-registered and illegal payment, their bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

**References:**

Interview with Mehmed Talibli, Chairman of Center for Innovation, civil servants and reports of mass-media institutes.,

**100:** Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

45f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no civil service lists from which appointments are made.



**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, Chairman of Center for Innovation and civil servants and reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

**75:**

**50:** The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

**25:**

**0:** The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

45g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Since there is no independent redress mechanism for the civil service its effectiveness can not determined.

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, Chairman of Center for Innovation, and civil servants and reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

**75:**

**50:** The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

45h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

All payments are made on time.

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, Chairman of Center for Innovation, and civil servants, and reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

**75:**

**50:** In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

**25:**

**0:** In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

45i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In some cases civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center for Innovation, and civil servants, and reports of government institutes and mass-media institutes.

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective. Some bans are only temporary.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

---

## 46. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

39

46a. In law, senior members of the civil service are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is this law, but it is almost not applied.

**References:**

Law on Reporting of Financial Data by Senior Figures.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if senior members of the civil service are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any senior member of the civil service is not required to disclose assets.

46b. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Law on Combating Corruption and civil servant regulations.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

**NO:** A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

46c. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There are not any restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

46d. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Combating Corruption, 2004, regulates governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants. Values of gifts received by an official should be less than 40 manat (US\$50).

**References:**

The Law on Combating Corruption, 2004.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

46e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of senior members of the civil service.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is no requirement in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

46f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Regulation of restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants is not effective in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers and economists, reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

46g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no almost control mechanism to regulate governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

**References:**

Interview with civil servants, lawyers, economists and different reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

46h. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, Mehemed Talibli, economist, lawyers, journalists, reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

**75:**

**50:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

46i. In practice, civil service asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Civil service asset disclosures have been never audited.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, Mehemed Talibli, economist, lawyers, journalists, reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** Civil service asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Civil service asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Civil service asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

## 47. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

47a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | **NO**

### Comments:

No legislation acts allow citizens to have access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants, although the Law on Procedures of Declaration of Financial Information by Public Officials demands asset disclosure records by senior civil servants. But this law is not implemented.

### References:

The legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

47b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

### References:

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, Mehemed Talibli, economist, lawyers, journalists, reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

47c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, Mehemed Talibli, economist, lawyers, journalists, reports of mass-media institutes.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

---

48. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

31

48a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There are no laws on whistle-blower protections for individuals who lodge complaints about corruption in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.



**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

48b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The government does not have whistle-blower protection measures.

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, the chairman of Economic Innovation Center, reports of mass-media institutes, NGOs.

**100:** Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

48c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is no law specifically covering the private sector but still some laws are still applicable.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

48d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are not protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives, interview with Mehemed Talibli, independent expert.

**100:** Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

---

50. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

31

50a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Many government bodies have online forums, and hot-lines where people can report corruption.

**References:**

Interview with Alimammad Nuriyev, independent lawyer, reports from government, mass-media institutes, NGOS.

**100:** The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

50b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In cases of some government bodies, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding both from the budget and other resources.

**References:**

Interview with lawyer, civil servants, NGOs, interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org), Rovshen Agayev, the deputy to chairman of Economic Initiatives Center.

**100:** The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

50c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

Interview with lawyer, civil servants, NGOs and mass-media reports.

**100:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues

can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

50d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with lawyer, civil servants, NGOs and mass-media reports, interview with Rvoshen Agayev, independent expert, and H.Hasanov, the independent lawyer.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

---

49. Is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

100

49. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Soma legislation covers internal mechanism, for example, phone hotlines and forums are applied by many executive agencies.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

---

54  
IV-3. Procurement

---

---

51. Is the public procurement process effective?

83

51a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Procurement Law (Article 13) indicates regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials. Public procurement officials and their relatives do not have the right to participate in the procurement.

**References:**

Law on Procurement.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

51b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Procurement does require mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

**References:**

Law on Procurement of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process. A YES score is earned if such training is mandated for portions of the broader civil service, to include procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

51c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The conflict-of-interest regulations for public procurement officials are very seldom enforced.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of ERC, CESD reports, [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az), reports from mass-media.

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict-of-interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Combating Corruption and Procedures on Declaration of Financial-Related Information by Public Officials requires monitoring the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials. The Chamber of Taarif is responsible for this monitoring.

**References:**

The Law on Combating Corruption and Procedures on Declaration of Financial-Related Information by Public Officials.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

51e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Law on Procurement (Article 11) requires holding competitive bidding.

**References:**

The Law on Procurement of Azerbaijan Republic.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).

51f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Procurement (Article 45) requires strict formal requirements limiting the extent of sole sourcing.

**References:**

The Law on Procurement of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

51g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Procurement of Azerbaijan Republic (Articles 55; 56; 57; 58 and 59) unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

**References:**

Law on Procurement of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to Law on Procurement of Azerbaijan Republic (Article 60) unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

**References:**

Law on Procurement of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

**YES** | NO



**Comments:**

The State Agency on Public Procurement has the right to prohibit companies that have violated procurement regulations to participate in future procurement bids.

**References:**

Law on Procurement of Azerbaijan Republic.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, designed to prevent convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no evidence that companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations have been prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

**References:**

Interview with Azer Mehtiyev, independent economist, lawyers and NGOs representatives.

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

---

## 52. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

83

52a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Public Procurement citizens can access public procurement regulations.

**References:**

The Law on Public Procurement.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

52b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Public Procurement requires publicly announcement of the results of procurement decisions.

**References:**

The Law on Public Procurement.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

52c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Almost all results are published in state newspaper within five banking days, however, some results are kept secret.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of ERC, reports of mass-media, government institutes and NGOs.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

52d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Since results are posted online, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of ERC, reports of mass-media, government institutes and NGOs.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

52e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Almost all procurements are advertised in the mass media.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of ERC, reports of mass-media, government institutes and NGOs.

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

52f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens can access the results of almost all major public procurement bids.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of ERC, reports of mass-media, government institutes and NGOs, CESD reports, [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az).

**100:** Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

**75:**

**50:** Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

**25:**

**0:** This information is not available to the public through an official process.

---

## IV-4. Privatization

---

### 53. Is the privatization process effective?

33

53a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Privatization of State Companies approved and Second State Program on Privatization, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

**References:**

The Law on Privatization of State Companies approved and Second State Program on Privatization

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

53b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

No legislation regulates conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

53c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no evidence that conflict-of-interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, reports of mass-media institutes, NGOs.

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

---

#### 54. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

70

54a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to Article 25 of the Law on Privatization of State Property, an announcement of the privatization of state-owned property must be placed in the official media at least 30 days before the announced day of selling the property.

**References:**

The Law on Privatization of State Property.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

54b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Privatizations are advertised in the "Mulkiyyet" newspaper controlled by the Azerbaijan Estate Committee, but in some cases, issues of "Mulkiyyet" newspaper are distributed among citizens. For instance, voucher privatization was held in March 2008, but newspapers where the privatization was advertised were not distributed among citizens.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, reports of mass-media institutes, NGOs.

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

54c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Privatization of State Property (the Article 25.3), information on privatization of the state-owned enterprises should be published in the media within 15 days.

**References:**

Law on Privatization of State Property.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

54d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Since the privatization is advertised in newspapers, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period in general. In some cases they do not have access to these newspapers. The reason is that although the newspapers are printed they are not distributed.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, reports of mass-media institutes, NGOs.

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Information about privatization bids and other information is published in official newspaper, *Mulkiyyet*.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, reports of mass-media institutes, NGOs.

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## Category V. Oversight and Regulation

---

### V-1. <sup>72</sup>National Ombudsman

---

56. Is the national ombudsman effective?



56a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on the Ombudsman (Article 5), the commissioner shall be independent and obey only the constitution and laws of Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Law on the Ombudsman.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is hard to mention that the ombudsman is protected from political interference. In fact, there is tremendous political interference.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists, reports of mass-media and NGOs.

**100:** This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

56c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In general, the head of the ombudsman agency is protected from removal without justification.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists, reports of mass-media and NGOs.

**100:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists, reports of mass-media and NGOs, Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, CESD reports, [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az).

**100:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The Ombudsman Institute is under pressure from the president's office.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of mass-media and NGOs.

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding, mostly from the state budget.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of mass-media and NGOs.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

56g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

All reports can be downloaded from the Ombudsman s site; <http://www.ombudsman.gov.az> .

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of mass-media and NGOs.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Compared with other institutes, the national ombudsman have more initiatives for holding investigations.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists, reports of mass-media and NGOs.

**100:** The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

56i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are very few cases.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and reports of human rights defending institutes, and M.Talibli, independent expert.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

56j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is hard to say that the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Interviews with lawyers, journalists and reports of human rights defend institutes, Mehemed Talibli, the chairman of Center for Innovations, and Rovshen Agayev, independent expert.

**100:** Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Ombudsman's reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman's reports do not lead to policy changes.

56k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It depends on the nature of complaints.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and reports of human rights defend institutes, interview with H.Hasanov, independent lawyer, and M.Talibli, independent expert.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

---

## 57. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

100

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

All reports should be published in the official newspapers.

**References:**

Constitutional Law on the Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsman) of Azerbaijan, 2001.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

57b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Reports can be downloaded from the site and found in newspapers.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers and journalists, reports of media, Alimemmed Nuriyev, the president of Constitution Fund, ERC reports, [www.erc-az.org](http://www.erc-az.org)

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with lawyers and journalists, reports of media.

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

55. Is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Ombudsman approved on December 28, 2001, established the Ombudsman Institute in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Law on Ombudsman of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

---

## V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

---

59. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

59

59a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO



**Comments:**

The Chamber of Auditors is an independent institute.

**References:**

The Law on Audit Service, 1994.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

59b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In general, the head of the chamber is not protected from removal without relevant justification, it depends on political decisions.

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, independent expert, interview with journalists, lawyers, reports of media and NGOs

**100:** The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

59c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Mehemed Talibli, independent expert, interview with journalists, lawyers, reports of media and NGOs.

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In spite of the fact that the Chamber of Auditors depends on executive power, the independence of the agency is somewhat supported.

**References:**

Interview with Mehmed Talibli, independent expert, interview with journalists, lawyers, reports of media and NGOs.

**100:** Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

59e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

**100** | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The chamber regularly receives funding from the state budget, and fees according to the contracts.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, interview with auditors, journalists, lawyers, government representatives, reports of the media and NGOs.

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

59f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Since 2007, access to reports is getting easier.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, interview with auditors, journalists, lawyers, government representatives, reports of the media and NGOs.

**100:** The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

59g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

This seldom occurs.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, interview with auditors, journalists, lawyers,

government representatives, reports of mass-media and NGOs.

**100:** Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

59h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

In very few cases, the audit agency has had initiatives to start its own investigations.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, interview with auditors, journalists, lawyers, reports of media and NGOs.

**100:** The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

**75:**

**50:** The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

---

## 60. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

50

60a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The Law on Audit Service requires public disclosure of reports.

**References:**

Law on Audit Service.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

60b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is very limited access to reports.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, interview with auditors, journalists, lawyers, reports of media and NGOs.

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

60c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is very limited access to reports.

**References:**

Interview with Gubad Ibadoglu, the chairman of Economic Research Center, interview with auditors, journalists, lawyers, reports of mass-media and NGOs.

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

### 58. Is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

58. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES

NO

**Comments:**

The Chamber of Auditors covers the entire public sector.

**References:**

The Law on Audit Service, 1994.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

---

## 62. Is the tax collection agency effective?

100

62a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### References:

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, reports of media, NGOs and government studies.

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The Ministry of Taxes receives regular revenues from the state budget, and two percent of the collected tax is reserved.

### References:

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az), reports of media, NGOs and government studies.

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

## 65. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

100

65a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### References:

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az), reports of media, NGOs and government studies.

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The committee receives regular funding from the state budget.

### References:

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, [www.cesd.az](http://www.cesd.az), reports of media, NGOs and government studies.

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**



0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

## 61. Is there a national tax collection agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

### Comments:

The Act on Ministry of Taxes was approved on March 29, 2001.

### References:

Act on Ministry of Taxes.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

---

## 63. Are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

50

63. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

The situation is improving in recent years. However, there are some problems in terms of discrimination, especially in small business. In some cases, small business subjects are required to pay extra fees.

### References:

Interview with Mehemmad Talibli, the chairman of Center for Economic Innovations, reports of mass-media, NGOs and government studies, interview with businessmen.

**100:** Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

**75:**

**50:** Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

**25:**

**0:** Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

---

## 64. Is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

64. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

**YES** | NO

### Comments:

There is a Customs Committee.

### References:

Act on Customs Committee.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

---

## 66. Are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

25

66. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

### Comments:

There is huge discrimination in customs.

### References:

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, independent expert, reports of media, NGOs, interview with businessmen.

**100:** Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

**75:**

**50:** Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

**25:**

**0:** Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

---

## V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

---

68. Is the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

60

68a. In law, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

There are no notes that those agencies are protected from political interference.

**References:**

Acts on The State Estate Committee and the State Securities Committee of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency.

68b. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Azer Mehtiyev, independent expert, reports of media, NGOs and government studies.

**100:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

68c. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency receives regular funding from the state budget.

**References:**

Interview with Azer Mehtiyev, independent expert, reports of mass-media, NGOs and government studies.

**100:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

68d. In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There almost no facts.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of media, NGOs.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

68e. In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The commission applies penalties and fees.

**References:**

Interview with Azer Mehtiyev, independent expert, reports of media.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be partisan in its application of power.

## 69. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

40

69a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | NO

### Comments:

According to the law, citizens can access the financial reports.

### References:

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

69b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

Financial records of state-owned companies are very seldom updated.

### References:

Interview with Gadir Ibrahimli, independent expert, reports of Azadlig newspaper, reports of NGOs.

**100:** State-owned companies always publicly disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, file the information behind schedule, or not publicly disclose certain data.

**25:**

**0:** Financial data is not publicly available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

69c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

From 2008 onward, the financial records of many state-owned companies will be audited according to international accounting standards.

**References:**

Interview with Gadir Ibrahimli, independent expert, reports of Azadlig newspaper, reports of NGOs.

**100:** Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

**75:**

**50:** Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

**25:**

**0:** State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

69d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Gadir Ibrahimli, independent expert, reports of Azadlig newspaper, reports of NGOs.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

69e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Gadir Ibrahimli, independent expert, reports of Azadlig newspaper, reports of NGOs.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

67. Is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

67. In law, is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The State Estate Committee and the State Securities Committee of Azerbaijan are responsible for overseeing state-owned companies.

**References:**

Acts on the State Estate Committee and the State Securities Committee of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. A YES score can be earned if several government agencies or ministries oversee different state-owned enterprises. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this function does not exist, or if some state-owned companies are free from government oversight.



---

67  
V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

---

70. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

63

70a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Law on Entrepreneurship Activities.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required

70b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

If a business license request is denied, the complaint mechanism is the court: An applicant can apply to the court.

**References:**

The Law on Entrepreneurship Activities.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

70c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the law, the relevant executive agency should make a decision on issuing or rejecting a license within 15 days. Decision usually depends on political influence, bribery and other negative factors.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, interview with journalists, lawyers and media reports.

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

70d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

If we consider bribery as well, then citizens cannot obtain any necessary business license at a reasonable cost.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, interview with journalists, lawyers and media reports.

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

---

71. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

100

71a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the legislation, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to legislation, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

---

72. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

8

72a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

This seldom occurs.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, interview with journalists, lawyers and media reports.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Usually inspectors and businessmen negotiate monthly or quarterly bribes for favorable treatment.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, interview with journalists, lawyers and media reports.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The main factors are bribe and political protection.

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, interview with journalists, lawyers and media reports.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

---

Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

---

VI-1. <sup>68</sup>Anti-Corruption Law

---

73. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

100

73a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The criminal code criminalized corruption, and according to legislation corruption is illegal.

**References:**

The Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the criminal code, extortion is illegal.

**References:**

The Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the criminal code (Article 312), offering a bribe is illegal.

**References:**

The Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the criminal code (Article 311.1) receiving a bribe is illegal.

**References:**

Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the criminal code, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

**References:**

The Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the criminal code, using public resources for private gain is illegal. Using public resources for private gain is the definition of corruption in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

The Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the criminal code of Azerbaijan (Article 284), using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

**References:**

The Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.



**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the criminal code, money laundering is illegal.

**References:**

The Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the criminal code, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e., organized crime) is illegal.

**References:**

The Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

---

## VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

---

75. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

75a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the law, anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

**References:**

Anti-Corruption Act of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

75b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The anti-corruption agency is not protected from political interference.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives, selected reports from media.

**100:** This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

75c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists, and media reports.

**100:** The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

75d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In general, appointments to the anti-corruption agency are not based on professional criteria. Political relations and position is very important for those appointments.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives, selected reports from media.

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

75e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, the anti-corruption agency has a professional, full-time staff.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and government studies, Alimammad Nuriyev, the president of the Constitution Fund.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

75f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency receives regular funding from the state budget.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and government studies.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

75g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

All reports are posted on the Website of the commission.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and government studies.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

75h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The commission has enough powers to carry out its mandate.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert and government studies, media reports.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

75i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It is very hard to say that the anti-corruption commission independently initiates investigations since there is high political dependency.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert and media reports.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

---

## 76. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

38

76a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In some cases the anti-corruption commission acts on complaints within a reasonable time period, but usually, it is not easy to evaluate the process since the commission is not a very open institute.

**References:**

Interview with Vugar Bayramov, the chairman of CESD, Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, and media reports.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

76b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

There is no public confidence that citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency without fear of recrimination.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and media reports.

**100:** Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

---

74. Is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

74. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Anti-Corruption Act, the Commission on Combating Corruption under the State Council on Management of the Civil Service was established in 2004. The Commission is composed of and operated by 15 members who are appointed as follows: five members by the president; five members by parliament; and five members by the court of Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Anti-Corruption Act of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

---

64  
VI-3. Rule of Law

---

77. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

100

77a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Constitution (Articles 57, 60 and 65), there is general right of appeal in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

77b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

**100** | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the last year, appeals were usually resolved within a reasonable time period.



**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and court representatives.

**100:** Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

77c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Citizens can use the appeals mechanism free of charge.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and court representatives.

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees are not a barrier to appeals.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees present somewhat of a barrier to pursuing appeal.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments. Attorneys fees greatly discourage the use of the appeals process.

---

78. Do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

0

78. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law, such as bribery, political position and regionalism.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and media reports.

**100:** Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

**75:**

**50:** Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

**25:**

**0:** Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

---

## 79. Are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

50

79. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Judicial decisions are usually enforced by the state.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGO representatives.

**100:** Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

**25:**

0: Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

## 80. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

50

80a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

### Comments:

In law, there are formal rules establishing the independence of the judiciary from the executive and legislative branches.

### References:

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts ).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

80b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

In practice, national-level judges are not protected from political interference, decisions are made based on political reasons.

### References:

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, interview with journalists and lawyers.

**100:** National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

**75:**

**50:** National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

**25:**

**0:** National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

80c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

No legislative act mentions a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

80d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Law on Courts and Judges, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

**References:**

The Law on Courts and Judges

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

---

## 81. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

81a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

In the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

81b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

In the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

---

## 82. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

79

82a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias in Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Interview with Almammas Nuriyev, the chairman of Constitution Foundation, interview with journalists and lawyers.

**100:** Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

82b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no gender imbalance in this issue.

**References:**

Interview with Almammas Nuriyev, the chairman of Constitution Foundation, interview with journalists and lawyers.

**100:** Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**75:**

**50:** Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**25:**

**0:** Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

82c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the constitution, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

82d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it, however, there are not sufficient criminal defense resources available to the citizens of Azerbaijan.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives.

**100:** State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

**75:**

**50:** State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

**25:**

**0:** State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

82e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Not all citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a lawsuit.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives.

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to citizens.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most citizens from bringing a case.

82f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Small businesses consider bribe an additional cost, therefore it is hard to say that a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives.

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to small businesses.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most small businesses from bringing a case.

82g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.



100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

All citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives, and Alimmamad Nuriyev, the president of Constitution Fund.

**100:** Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

**75:**

**50:** Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

**25:**

**0:** Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

---

## VI-4. Law Enforcement

---

83. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

42

83a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no professional criteria for police officers and prosecutors.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGO representatives, reports of media.

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have

clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

83b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency receives sufficient funding from the state budget.

**References:**

Interview with Rovhsen Agayev, independent expert, interview with lawyers, government representatives.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

83c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Rovhsen Agayev, independent expert, interview with lawyers, journalists, media reports.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

---

## 84. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

50

84a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action; citizens can apply to the court.

**References:**

The Legislation of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

84b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Rovshen Agayev, independent expert, reports of media and NGOs.

**100:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

84c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Criminal Procedural Code (Article 215), there are different agencies to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

**References:**

The Criminal Procedural Code.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

84d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

This does not work in practice.

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

84e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

According to the Article 25 of the constitution, officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

**References:**

The Constitution of Azerbaijan.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

84f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

Interview with lawyers, journalists and NGOs representatives.

**100:** Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

**75:**

**50:** Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

**25:**

**0:** Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.

