Overall Score:

77 - Moderate

Legal Framework Score:

85 - Strong

Actual Implementation Score:

67 - Weak

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

100

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES | NO

References:
Article 1 of Act II of 1989 on the Right to Association

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.
YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

NO: A NO score is earned if any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

YES

92

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

Comments:
K-Monitor is a Hungarian anti-corruption NGO that publishes a website collecting on-line anti-corruption articles. They have been working for two years without any problems to date. The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union focuses on access to information issues. They have filed legal suits against the government and have been in existence for 12 years now.
### References:

Own experience as Executive Director of Transparency International Hungary

| 100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration. |
| 75: |
| 50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. |
| 25: |
| 0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. |

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

| 100 |
| 75 |
| 50 |
| 25 |
| 0 |

### Comments:

The study describes general problems of civil participation, selection of social service partners is not transparent, nor is there any guarantee that public opinion will be taken into account in policy formulation.

### References:

Farkas-Gerencsér-Kalas-Oprics: Standard procedures for civil consultation

| 100: Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters. |
| 75: |
| 50: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures. |
| 25: |
| 0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion. |

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.
3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:
There are no reports of imprisonment of CSO activists because of their work covering corruption.
Interview with Balázs Dénes, Chair of Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, August 2008

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

References:
There are no reports of media or CSOs shut down by government because of their corruption-related work during the study period.
Interview with Balázs Dénes, Chair of Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, August 2008
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist’s work. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual’s history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

100

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO
YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
http://www.mszosz.hu -Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions has 38 member trade unions.
Central Statistical Office: 1059 trade unions were registered in 2006, out of which 911 were active.

100: Trade unions are common and are an important part of the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

I-2. Media

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.
YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 61 (1) of the Constitution

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

100

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

100: Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:
Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

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Comments:
If the license is denied, the decision can be challenged in court. If the license is provided, the court can still revise it and if there was any administrative error, it must be corrected – this is an administrative procedure and does not seem to hinder the granting of licenses in practice.

References:
Art. 15 of Act II of 1986

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
It takes 15 days on average

References:
Ministerial Council Decree 12/1986 (IV. 22.)

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.
0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
A print media license costs US$70.

References:
http://www.koh.hu

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

63

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

Comments:
Licenses can be obtained only if there is an open tender to sell the use of electromagnetic frequencies, which are in the public domain.

References:
100: Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:
Broadcast media licenses can be obtained through a tender procedure. Bids are evaluated by the National Television and Radio Board. Decisions of the Board can be appealed at Court.

References:
Art. 99 (5) Act I. of 1996

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Licenses can be obtained only if there is an open tender to sell the use of air frequencies which are in the public domain.

References:

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.
Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
Licenses can be obtained only if there is an open tender to sell the use of air frequencies which are in the public domain. Public confidence about the procurement process in general, however, is low, and corruption is often suspected.

References:
Act I of 1996

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

100

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published on-line.

References:
Reporters without Borders – List of Internet Enemies
The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

Are the media able to report on corruption?

In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.
Comments:
Practice is not in line with the Constitutional Court Decision. Press freedom is limited by the courts, which have held media organizations liable for accurately quoting individuals whose allegations are later proven to be false. Suing media figures for damages is becoming more and more popular among politicians and other public figures, which has a chilling effect on media independence.

References:
Constitutional Court Decision 36/1994 (VI 24)

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Of the respondents who were regular staff members, 65% mentioned that their superiors censored their work while 86% of freelance journalists had had similar experiences, although two thirds of them reported only occasional incidents.

References:
Borbála Tóth: Labor Relations and Media. Analyzing the patterns of labor relations in the media organizations of members of The South East European Network For Professionalization of Media (SEENPM). Independent Journalism Centre, 2008

100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75:

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

25:

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.
9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The government itself does not require journalists to send their articles for checking the content and does not directly forbid the publication of articles. Top editors, however, normally know what can and cannot be included in a paper, so a kind of self-censorship exists. However my personal experience is that when I was invited to talk about a corruption scandal on TV, by the time I arrived at the studio the journalist literally told me that we got a phone call and we should not have so much emphasis on this issue."

In cases of major scandals there is political influence on the media, but not by checking the text of articles.

References:

10. Are the media credible sources of information?

80

10a. In law, print media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

Comments:
The publishing company’s name has to be published together with the name of the person responsible for publishing.

References:
Decree of the Ministerial Council 12/1986 (IV 22)
**YES:** A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

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<tr>
<th>10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.</th>
<th>YES</th>
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**Comments:**
Disclosure is indirect. Licenses can be obtained through open tenders in which bidders have to include their owners. The winner's owners are published by the National Radio and Television Board.

**References:**
Act I of 1996

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<tr>
<th><strong>YES:</strong> A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.</th>
<th><strong>NO:</strong> A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.</th>
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| 10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting. | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
Chief editors and/or owners are influenced by advertisers. After a major corruption scandal of Hungarian Telecom was reported by chief editor journalists of Manager Magazine (a monthly journal) they were fired by the journal's owners. Many local level papers depend highly on their local advertisers, so revealing a corruption issue involving a local company could literally endanger the paper. Some journalists are taken to free car-rides so that they are able to write about cars, but the event takes place in Brasil. Very few papers and journals have code of conduct. the number of good investigative journalists is not more than 50.

**References:**
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2008

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<th><strong>100:</strong> Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.</th>
<th>75:</th>
</tr>
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</table>

| **50:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct. | 25 | 0 |
Editors and journalists are widely known to sell favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates.
and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

67

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

Comments:
Even though it was not about corruption, the arrest of two journalists covering an unauthorized demonstration and its dispersal by police received criticism in November 2007.

References:
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2008
Interview with Zsolt Bogar, investigative journalist, Magyar Narancs, September 1, 2008.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist’s work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned” is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

Comments:
Irén Kármán, an investigative journalist was beaten and found tied up in June 2007. She had published a book on oil dealings of the 1990s. Experts say that she did not follow the professional criteria of investigative journalism.

References:
June 24, 2007
Interview with Zsolt Bogar, investigative journalist, Magyar Narancs, September 1, 2008.
YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

References:
no such reports have been published.
Interview with Zsolt Bogar, investigative journalist, Magyar Narancs, September 1, 2008

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

YES | NO

References:
Art. 19 of Act LXIII of 1992
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 21 of Act LXIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

Comments:
Each public institution must have an internal regulation on how to provide information when requested. This regulation has to be available on the website of the institution. Normally they have to register the request and give an answer (either electronically or via mail) within 15 days. If this does not happen the requesting person or organization can turn to the courts. Case law has generally held in favor of public access to information legislation and the courts have required government institutions to make requested data public.

References:
Act LXIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

13. Is the right of access to information effective?
13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

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**Comments:**
The cited study shows that mainly in case of local governments (but also some national institutions) the data requested is delivered with considerable delay or is incomplete, or never delivered at all.

**References:**

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100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

**75:**

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

**25:**

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

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**References:**
Act XC of 2005 on eFOI.

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100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.
13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Ádám Földes, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, August 2008.

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Ádám Földes, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, August 2008.

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.
References:

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

Category II. Elections

II-1. Voting & Citizen Participation

14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people
are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

Comments:
Members of Parliament stand for reelection every 4 years.

References:
Art. 20 of Act XX of 1949, Constitution.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.
NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

100

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14468.html

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.
15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

75:

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

25:

0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

90
16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

References:
Article 70 of the Constitution

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There are around 170 registered parties, most of which are not active.
While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office. A system of party lists may discourage or prevent independent candidates from running for office.

Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.
References:

100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

75:

50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition’s ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature’s proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

II-2. Election Integrity

18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

85

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
Article 21 of Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedures

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.
18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

Comments:
The National Election Committee (NEC) has elected and commissioned members. Commissioned members are assigned by parties, while Elected members are elected by a simple majority of the Parliament on the basis of the recommendation of the minister of the interior. This voting system favors governing parties’ candidates.

References:
Act C of 1997 on Election Procedures

100: Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

50: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
http://www.valasztas.hu

100: The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75: The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.
18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Reports of the National Election Committee to the Parliament about parliamentary and local elections, 2002 and 2006.

100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

75:

50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Election agencies do not investigate; the burden of proof is on citizens reporting the breach of law. However election agencies have strong rights of injunctions. If they sustain the complaint, they establish the fact of violation, bar the violator from further breach of the rules, and annul the election procedure or the part thereof affected by the violation, and provide for that part of the election to be repeated. According to the parliamentary reports of the NEC, the latter power of injunction is not exercised in practice. This suggests that other types of sanctions may be necessary.

References:

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments
against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

96

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

References:
Section X of Act C of 1997 on electoral procedures.

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.
19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

Comments:
Election agencies do not have a right to investigate. Although they make decisions quickly, the variety of sanctions they can impose is inadequate. Results of the elections can be challenged at the election agencies. Since they do not have a right to investigate, it is hard for them to prove abuse during the elections. No further appeal mechanisms exist. If we take into account that the government was changed in three of the last four elections, 3 times out of the 4 elections, however, it seems that the system functions adequately.

References:

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

References:

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

75:
50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:

0: The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

References:
Act C of 1997 on election procedures

YES: A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
OSCE Report on elections in Hungary, 2002

100: Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers’ activities.

75:

50: Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

25:

0: Election observers’ movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.
17. Is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES  |  NO

References:
Chapter 2 of Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedures

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities exists that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

II-3. Political Financing

20. Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties?

YES  |  NO

Comments:
Parties can receive donations from the state, individuals, corporations and foundations. Parties cannot receive donations from a foreign state.

References:
Article 4 of the Act XXXIII of 1989 on the Operation and Financial Functioning of Political Parties.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
Donations above HUF 500,000 (US$2478) have to be enlisted in the annual report of parties. Foreign donations above HUF 100,000 (cc. EUR 450) have to be enlisted in the annual report of parties.

References:
Article 4 of Act XXXIII of 1989 on the Operation and Financial Functioning of Political Parties.

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political parties. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
Donations above HUF 500 000 (US$2478) have to be enlisted in the annual report of parties. Foreign donations above HUF 100,000 (US$496) have to be listed in the annual report of parties.

References:
Article 4 of Act XXXIII of 1989 on the Operation and Financial Functioning of Political Parties

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to political parties. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.
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**Comments:**
There are no limits on party expenditures however there are strict limits on campaign expenditures which are impossible to keep to. See Article 91-93 of Act C of 1997 on Election Procedures.

**References:**

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<th>YES:</th>
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**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties.

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**Comments:**
Donations above HUF 500,000 (cc. US$2478) have to be published in the annual report of parties. Foreign donations above HUF 100,000 (cc. US$496) have to be published in the annual report of parties. Regulations are circumvented in practice by receiving donations from foundations to which no strict disclosure rules apply regarding their donors. Party spending in campaign periods is much higher than the reported expenditures (according to independent estimates up to 10 times higher), which leads to the common supposition that not all income of political parties is actually disclosed.

**References:**
Art. 9 of Act XXXIII of 1989 on the Operation and Financial Functioning of Political Parties.

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**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties, existing regulations do not require a donor’s name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances and expenditures of political parties.

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**Comments:**
Annual financial reports are prepared by the bookkeepers of parties and are not audited by independent organizations. Formatting of financial reporting is rather basic does not allow for detailed tracking.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of party finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties’ finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:
According to the law the State Audit Office (SAO) oversees the financial management of parties. This regulation is interpreted rather narrowly by the SAO, which limits itself to examine whether the reports are submitted according to the law. On the other hand, the SAO argues that it lacks the authority and financial resources to conduct investigations into parties’ finances.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of political parties. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

21. Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates?

YES | NO

21a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to individual political candidates.

Comments:
The law regulates state funding only.

References:
Article 91. of Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedures
YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to individual political candidates, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to individual political candidates.

21b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:
The law regulates state funding only.

References:
Article 91 of Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedures

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political candidates. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to individual political candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:
The law regulates state funding only.

References:
Article 91 of Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedures

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21d. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political candidates.
Comments:
Independent candidates have to publish campaign spending and sources 60 days after elections. Reports are rather formal and do not allow for real monitoring. Political candidates of a certain party do not have to make their individual expenditures and donations. They are only required to report the party's expenditures as a whole.

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to individual political candidates.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to individual political candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

21e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the campaign finances of individual political candidates.

References:
Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedures

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates to self-audit.

21f. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns.

References:
Art. 92 of Act C on Electoral Procedures

Comments:
The Supreme Audit Office is the monitoring agency.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of individual political candidates’ campaigns. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

22. Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective?

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22a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political parties are effective in regulating an individual’s ability to financially support a political party.

Comments:
Reform recommendations provided by an independent research institute and supported by all parties do not include limiting the amount of donations, but on making parties’ finances fully transparent. They would ban corporate donations and define government support, depending on the amount of individual donations.

References:
http://ekint.org/ekint_files/File/tanulmanyok/apartfinanszirozasalapelvei.pdf

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100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

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22b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to political parties are effective in regulating a company’s ability to financially support a political party.
Comments:
All of Hungary’s active political parties, an independent research institute and a substantial segment of the Hungarian business community (e.g. the American Chamber of Commerce, which represents 85% of foreign investment into Hungary) support a ban on political donations by corporations. Their reasoning is that parties are elected by citizens who themselves should support candidates and parties financially – not corporations, where economic and lobby interests could prevail over the views of citizenry. A bill banning corporate donations was submitted to Parliament a year ago, however, and it has not been discussed, nor has any date been set for deliberations.

References:
Presentation of Laszlo Majtenyi (Eötvös Károly Institute) at the conference of the Anti-corruption Coordination Board on Party Financing, and comments of Peter Fath (CEO of American Chamber of Commerce), December, 2007, Budapest.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.</td>
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| 50: | Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign. |

| 25: | Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to political parties are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign. |

| 0: | Existing campaign limits are so low that they are impossible to enforce. According to independent estimates the two major parties use 10 times more funds for campaigns than the law technically allows. |

References:
Data provided by Transparency International Hungary, Freedom House Europe and the Perspective Institute on http://www.kampanyfinanszirozas.hu
50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

22d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties independently initiates investigations.

Comments:
The Supreme Audit Office is supposed to oversee parties' finances, but limits its authority to mere pro forma check of the financial reports. At the same time, the SAO states that it has no authority and financial resources to conduct investigations. The SAO has not initiated an investigation of its own since 1989.

References:
Eötvös Károly Institute: Poor parties, rich campaign, 2006
http://ekint.org/ekint/ekint.news.page?nodeid=124
Data provided by Transparency International Hungary, Freedom House Europe and the perspective Institute on www.kampanyfinanszirozas.hu

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of political parties. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

22e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties imposes penalties on offenders.

Comments:
In case of financial irregularities (e.g. violating the spending limit, the SAO) may require the party in question to pay a fine of twice
the amount by which it exceeded the legal limit. This happened to Centrum Party in 2002. This was a case of obvious violations of campaign spending limits to show that they are impossible to enforce. Parties normally use the right figures (within the limits) and as the SAO does not investigate there is no penalty imposed.

References:

---

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

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22f. In practice, contributions to political parties are audited.

---

Comments:
Parties never use independent auditors. It is a common supposition that most of parties' finances originate from off-the-book contributions.

References:

---

100: Political party finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

75:

50: Political party finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

23. Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates effective?
23a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political candidates are effective in regulating an individual’s ability to financially support a particular candidate.

References:

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a particular candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support particular political candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a particular political candidate are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are effective in regulating a company’s ability to financially support a candidate.

References:

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support individual candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.
25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to individual candidates are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23c. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns independently initiates investigations.

---

Comments:
The Supreme Audit Office is supposed to oversee individual candidates’ campaign expenditures and funding sources. The SAO limits its authority to a mere pro forma check of the financial reports. At the same time the SAO states that it has no authority and financial resources to conduct investigations. The SAO has not initiated an investigation of its own since 1989.

References:

---

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of individual candidates’ campaigns. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

---

23d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates’ campaigns imposes penalties on offenders.

---

References:

---

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

75:
The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

In practice, the finances of individual candidates’ campaigns are audited.

The finances of individual candidates’ campaigns are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

The finances of individual candidates’ campaigns are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions.

The finances of individual candidates’ campaigns are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties?

In practice, political parties disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

Comments:
Parties have to publish financial reports by April 30th of each year in the Official Gazette of Hungary. Normally they comply with the law, e.g. in 2008 only the Centrum Party was a bit late, their financial report appeared on May 6th.

References:

100: Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Political parties never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regularly withheld from public disclosure.

24b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a reasonable time period.

References:

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

24c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable cost.

References:
Official Gazette is available on-line free of charge. http://www.magyarkozlony.hu

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.
Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.</td>
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</table>

25. Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates’ campaigns?

83

25a. In practice, individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>50</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Only national-level candidates have to publish their campaign spending after the campaign period.</td>
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</table>

References:
The Official Gazette

100: Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Individual candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

25b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period.

<table>
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<th>100</th>
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<th>50</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidates financial records are published after elections in the Official Gazette, which is available online.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

25c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Official gazette is available on-line free of charge.

References:
The Official Gazette

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category III. Government Accountability

III-1. Executive Accountability
27. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

81

27a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
If it comes for legislation, there is always an explanation. If it is about a new policy there are press conferences and explanations, which might not be satisfactory, but there is the chance for journalists to ask questions in a regulated manner.

References:
http://www.kormanyszovivo.hu

100: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

75:

50: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

25:

0: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely sensor such sessions.

27b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions.
that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

27c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

Comments:
Legislation may be initiated by the executive but has to be passed by the parliament

The Constitutional Court decides on whether a law is constitutional. Any legislation initiated by the executive has to be passed by the Parliament and the President may seek the opinion of the Constitutional Court. However the judiciary and the Constitutional Court does not revise the policies and actions of the executive. The judiciary does not always act quickly, however, when there are complaints about the executive branch.

References:
Activities of the Constitutional Court at http://www.mkab.hu

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to rely upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

27d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

Comments:
All laws should be countersigned by the President of the Republic who normally submits legislation to the Constitutional Court for review.

There is no data about the ratio of law-substituting executive orders. The executive does apply this method, but the public perception might even be worse than the frequency of their actual application.

References:
The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

28. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

YES  NO

Comments:
Only Members of Parliament enjoy immunity; state secretaries can be prosecuted. Members of Parliament can also be prosecuted after their immunity is withdrawn by a parliamentary committee.

References:
Act LVII of 2006 on the Rights of State Leaders.

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

28b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES  NO

Comments:
Ministerial level officials enjoy immunity which can be lifted by a superior organ (parliamentary committee, judicial council, the parliament, etc.) depending on what kind of office the person fills. Eg. a minister’s right to immunity can be lifted by 2/3rd majority of the Parliament, while the immunity of judges may be lifted by the Judicial Council.
YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

29. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

29a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 10 of Act LVII of 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

29b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
Act XXXIII of 1992 on Civil Service
Act LVII of 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.
NO: A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

29c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO

References:
Act XXXIII of 1992
Act LVII of 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

29d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

References:
Act LVII of 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

29e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO
YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

29f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.</td>
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</table>

References:

29g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

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<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>100</td>
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</table>

References:
The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

Comments:
The Court of Auditors audits asset declarations of state leaders only every 5 years. The burden of proof lies with the auditors.

References:
Act LVII of 2006

Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.
YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

30b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Asset declarations can be downloaded from the Internet.

References:
Act LVII of 2006

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

30c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Asset declarations can be downloaded free of charge.

References:
http://www.meh.hu/kormany/allamivezetok/avjuttatasok20080508.html
100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

### 26. Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

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26. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

**YES** | **NO**

### References:
Article 57 of the Constitution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

### 31. Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

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31. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.
Comments:
Selection of civil servants is transparent and fair in theory and at lower levels. The majority of state secretaries are people closely related to political parties. There are very few state secretaries who work in public administration during different governments. Some heads of departments are also strongly linked to political parties.

References:

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

50: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:

0: The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

III-2. Legislative Accountability

32. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

67

32a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

References:
Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).
32b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
See list of activities of the Constitutional Court

References:
http://www.mkab.hu

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

32c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | NO

Comments:
The Parliament may lift the immunity of MPs with a 2/3rds majority.

References:
Articles 4-7 of Act LV of 1990

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings. A NO score is also earned if the legislative branch itself controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on members of the legislature.

33. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?
33a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
Article 19 of Act LV of 1990

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

33b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

References:
Act LV of 1990

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

33c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 16 of Act LV of 1990
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

33d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

Comments:
Declarations of assets are examined by the Immunity Committee of the Parliament only if someone requests to do so. The request must contain the information on the basis of which examination can start.

References:
Article 22 of Act LV of 1990

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

33e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent.
33f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Limitations are too high and often ill-defined. Members of Parliament have to include gifts in the asset declarations, but asset declarations are not audited on a regular basis.

References:

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

33g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Immunity Committee of the Parliament examines declarations of assets if requested.

References:
Act LV of 1990
website of the Parliamentary Committee on Immunity

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:
Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

34. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

100

34a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:
Act LV of 1990

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

34b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Asset declarations are available on line.

References:
Website of the Parliament

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.
25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

34c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

| 100  | 75  | 50  | 25  | 0  |

Comments:
Asset declarations are available on line, free of charge.

References:
Website of the Parliament

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

35. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

92

35a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

| YES | NO |

References:
Article 11 of Act XC of 2005 on eFoI

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).
NO: A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

35b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
All bills are available on-line, however working documents are normally not published.

References:
http://www.parlament.hu

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

35c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
All bills are available on-line, free of charge.

References:
https://www.parlament.hu

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:
Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

III-3. Judicial Accountability

36. Are judges appointed fairly?

YES | NO

Comments:
There is an obligatory exam but there is no obligation to take results into account when appointing judges.

References:
Art. 14 of Act LXVIII of 1997
5/2007 Regulation of the National Judicial Council.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

NO: A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

36b. In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting national-level judges.

Comments:
In many cases selection is based on personal networks that favor the existing hierarchy of judicial leadership.

References:
100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigating attorney.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

36c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | NO

Comments:
Only those who have passed the detailed exam can become judges. This special exam is taken after candidates have three years of experience working in any field of legal profession. Future judges normally fulfill this three-year internship period in a court. Once they have passed this central exam (which is the same for all ex-law students) they can continue working on the court assisting judges at least for another year. If there is a place open for a judge’s position then they have to pass a special exam administered by the Judicial Academy and the chair of the court selects the judge who would fulfill the open position. The chair of the court presents the nominee to the Judicial Council which has the right to appoint or not appoint the judge. Normally the Judicial Council goes along with the nomination provided by the chair of the court.

References:
Act LXIII of 1997

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

37. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

75

37a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | NO
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

37b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:

100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

75:

50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

25:

0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

37c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

References:
Act LXVI of 1997 established the National Judicial Council.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.
37d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 34 of Act LXVI of 1997

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference by the executive and legislative branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry or legislative committee.

37e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The case was about a head of a county court. She mismanaged the court over a period of years. Cases were delayed, files disappeared, and the selection of judges was not transparent. The Judicial Council requested explanation only when serious financial problems occurred, but ultimately the Council concluded that no major failure had been proven. Even though documents show evidence of serious mismanagement and the gross incompetence and/or negligence, nothing happened. The judge in question was nominated for and received an award from the President of Hungary. This scandal came out six months ago after thorough analysis of the documents of the Judicial Council. The judge still retains her position.

References:
Interview with Zoltan Fleck, 19th December 2007
http://www.jogiforum.hu/interju/45
Endre Babus: Court Scandals, 10th January 2008, HVG

100: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.
37f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Endre Babus: Court Scandals, 10th January 2008, HVG

100: When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

38. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

18

38a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

References:
Art 11 of Act LXVII of 1997

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

38b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.
38c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

References:
Act LXVII of 1997

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

38d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

References:
Act LXVII of 1997

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

YES | NO

Comments:
The National Judicial Council may initiate investigations, but there is no rule to perform regular checks of asset declarations. Furthermore most of the members of the Council are heads of county courts so their impartiality might be questioned.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges’ ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

38e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:

38f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:
Act LXVII of 1997
50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

38g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

100: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

39. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

0

39a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:
asset declarations are not public.

References:
Act LVII of 1997
YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

39b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
No such regulation exists; asset declarations are not public.

References:

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

39c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Asset declarations are not public.

References:

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:
50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

III-4. Budget Processes

40. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

92

40a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

References:
Act XXXVIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

40b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The threshold for significant government expenditure changes starts at 2.5% of the national budget.

References:
Act XXXVIII of 1992
100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive’s personal budget, or other expenses.

25:

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

40c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

References:
Interview with Mihály Varga, Chair of the Budget Committee, 8th April 2008.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

75:

50: Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

41. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

50

41a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

Comments:
The budget as a whole is debated in the Parliament, changes in individual chapters cannot be enacted without prior approval. Neither can the public see requests coming from ministries.
100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

41b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Sessions of the Budget Committee are open but there is no way for outside organizations to take part in the discussion unless they are especially invited to do so. This is not a common practice.

References:
Reports about the sessions of the Budget Committee
www.parliament.hu

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75:

50: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

25:

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

41c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
Comments:
The Budget Act contains the budget allocated to different institutions and programmes. Spending of different agencies is difficult to follow because only lump sums (e.g., expenses of all ministries together) are available.

References:

100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

75:

50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

25:

0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

43. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

67

43a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Ministers do not submit reports but the government submits annual reports about the implementation of the budget.

References:
http://www.parlament.hu – list of documents discussed by the committee

100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:

50: Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

25:

0: There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.
43b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

References:
See composition of the committee at http://www.parlament.hu

100: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

75:

50: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

25:

0: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

43c. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

References:
46/1994 (IX. 30) Parl. Decree

100: When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

75:

50: The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.
42. Is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

42. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

Comments:
Parliamentary Committee on Budget, Finances and Audits.

References:
46/1994 (IX. 30). Parl. Decree

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. Civil Service Regulations

44. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

75

44a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO
References:
Preamble of Act XXIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

44b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

References:
Article 9 of Act XXIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

44c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is no special mechanism for civil service. There is a redress mechanism for any citizen at the prosecutor’s office. Civil servants are in a difficult situation. They can go to the prosecutor’s office, however at the same time according to the Civil Service Act they should not reveal any information which could harm the reputation of their colleagues. Therefore, meaningful whistleblower protection does not exist.

References:
Law XXIX of 2004

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. The mechanism should be independent of their supervisors but can still be located within the government agency or entity (such as a special commission or board). Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism’s decisions to the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

44d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.
Any person convicted of any crime is prohibited from being a civil servant.

**References:**
Art 7 of Act XXIII of 1992

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist or if the ban is not a lifetime ban.

45. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

72

45a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

**Comments:**
The highest level of civil service is politically influenced. Political influence is less visible at lower levels, however, which form the bulk of public administration.

**References:**
Atpolitizált a közszféra, Magyar Nemzet Online, 10th June 2008.  
http://www.mno.hu/portal/565700


**100:** Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

**25:**
Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

45b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

Comments:
A reform of the selection and evaluation of civil servants came into force in January 2008. The new regulation introduced a unified exam for applicants, even though the employer is not obliged to employ the person with the best performance. Up to now the program has not been evaluated.

References:
Act LXIII of 2007
Startol a köztszvitivelQi reform, Hirportál, 8th January 2008
http://www.hrportal.hu/index.phtml?page=article&id=66065

Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

45c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

References:

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.
Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable representation of positions in terms of a person’s authority, responsibility and base pay.

Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position’s responsibilities, authority, or pay.

In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

Bonus paid cannot exceed the amount of the basic fee multiplied by 10. The basis fee is the monthly basis and all civil servant earn more than that. As an average civil servants gets a maximum of 1.5 times his or her monthly salary as bonus each year. This is 12.5% of the salary on a yearly basis, but normally they get less as a bonus. According to the law civil servants are entitled to get a 13-month salary.

References:

Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

References:
Art. 49/N of Act XXXIII of 1992
Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

References:
http://www.kozigallas.gov.hu
No special mechanisms for civil service exist.
The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

45h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:
No media negative media report has been published.

100: In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

75:

50: In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

25:

0: In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

45i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
Anybody who has ever been convicted for any crime cannot be employed as a civil servant. The law is applied in practice since a negative moral certificate has to be enclosed to all applications.

References:

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective. Some bans are only temporary.

25:
There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

46. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

46a. In law, senior members of the civil service are required to file an asset disclosure form.

| YES | NO |

References:
- Art 22 of Act XXIII of 1992
- Act CLII of 2007
- Art 10. of Act LVII of 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if senior members of the civil service are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any senior member of the civil service is not required to disclose assets.

46b. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

| YES | NO |

References:
- Art. 38 of Act XXIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

46c. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

YES  |  NO

References:

46d. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES  |  NO

References:
Act XXIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

YES  |  NO

References:
Article 21 of Act XXIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

YES  |  NO
46f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
There is no such regulation.

---

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

---

46g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**References:**
There are no such regulations.

---

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.
46h. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:

| 100: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants. |
| 75: |
| 50: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected. |
| 25: |
| 0: Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected. |

46i. In practice, civil service asset disclosures are audited.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
too many asset declarations are stored and there is no staff to audit them

References:
Peterfalvi Media Review, 2005

| 100: Civil service asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. |
| 75: |
| 50: Civil service asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets. |
| 25: |
| 0: Civil service asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices. |
47. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

100

47a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | NO

Comments:
Senior civil servants are defined as ministers and state secretaries.

References:
Act CLII of 2007
Art 10 of LVII of 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

47b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Asset declarations of state leaders are available online.

References:
http://www.meh.hu

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.
47c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

**Comments:**
Asset declarations of state leaders are available online, free of charge.

**References:**
http://www.meh.hu

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- **100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or online.

- **75:**

- **50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

- **25:**

- **0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

### IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

48. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

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- **44a:** In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

**Comments:**
Legislation is contradictory. The Criminal Code sanctions the person who takes a disadvantageous measure against the another because of his or her announcement of public concern. At the same time, the Civil Service Act and the Labor Law states that a civil servant cannot give out any information which would damage the reputation of his/her colleagues.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

48b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Comments:
A Culture of whistleblowing does not exist, media reports about whistleblowing cases occur only very rarely.

References:
Index, 17 August 2007
http://index.hu/politika/belfold/orozred07081/

100: Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

48c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

Comments:
There is no special regulation for private sector employees. They are covered under the criminal and labor code.

References:
Criminal Code, Art. 109 of Labor Law, 1992,
Art 143 of Act XXIX of 2004 on public announcements

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

48d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
Even though there is no special legislation for private sector employees some companies do set up whistleblowing protection systems. 17% of white collar crime cases were revealed thanks to anonymous hotlines.

**References:**
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwpublications.nsf/docid/EE3A2B7A07DF1085802570F50039C266/$file/Crime_Survey_HUN_FINAL.pdf

**100:** Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

50. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**50a:** In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.
100: The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

50b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100  75  50  25  0

100: The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

50c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100  75  50  25  0
100: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

50d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Presentation of Ádám Földes (Civil Liberties Union) at the Forum organised by the Anticorruption Coordination Board, 23 September 2007.

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

49. Is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

0

49. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?
Comments:
There is a website where citizens can report abuses related to EU funds.

References:
No such service exists

**YES**: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

### 15
**IV-3. Procurement**

51. Is the public procurement process effective?

65

51a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

**YES** | **NO**

References:
Art. 10 of Act of CXXIX of 2003 on Public Procurements.

**YES**: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

51b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.
Comments:
The Public Procurements Council organizes the training of public procurement officials, but training is not obligatory for those dealing with procurements. In certain procedures an official public procurement adviser has to be involved.

References:
Art. 379 (m) of Act CXXIX of 2003 on Public procurements.

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process. A YES score is earned if such training is mandated for portions of the broader civil service, to include procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

51c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

Comments:
Stakeholders have to sign conflict of interests declarations which are not well controlled.

References:

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

25:

0: Conflict-of-interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO
Comments:
The regulation refers to all civil servants, there is no special legislation for public procurement officials.

References:
Act XXIII of 1992

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

51e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES  |  NO

References:
Act CXIX of 2003 on Public Procurements.

YES: A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

NO: A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% of GDP).

51f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES  |  NO

References:
Act CXIX of 2003 on public procurements.

YES: A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

51g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.
YES | NO

**References:**
Chapter VII of Act CXXIX of 2003 on Public procurements.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

**References:**
Chapter VII of Act CXXIX of 2003 on public procurements.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO

**Comments:**
Companies might be prohibited, but prohibition is not automatic or compulsory.

**References:**

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, designed to prevent convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.
51j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
None of the companies were prohibited in 2007.

References:

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

52. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

92

52a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

References:
Act XC of 2005 on eFoI.

YES: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

NO: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

52b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.
YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

52c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
The entire legislation is available online.

References:
www.magyarorszag.hu

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75: 

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25: 

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

52d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

Comments:
All laws and regulations are available on line, free of charge.

References:
Art. 47 of Act CXXIX of 2003 on Public procurements
References:
www.magyarorszag.hu

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

52e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

Comments:
Tenders are published in the Procurement Gazette, but audit records of the Supreme Audit Office and reports from the Procurement Committee shows that in many cases there was no tender procedure initiated even though the value of procurement reached the limit defined in the law.

References:
Act CXXIX of 2003 on Public procurements

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

52f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.
Comments: Results are published in the Procurement Gazette which is available online, free of charge. The Gazette can only be downloaded in a PDF format which makes following procurement results very difficult. There is a new search engine being implemented, but it is not yet fully functional.

References:
www.kozbeszerzes.hu

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.
75:
50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.
25:
0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.

IV-4. Privatization

53. Is the privatization process effective?

83

53a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO

References:
Act CVI of 2007 on state assets

YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.
NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

53b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

References:
Act CVI of 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

53c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The internal audit office is responsible for supervising the execution of contracts. At the same time it is responsible for ensuring that the contracts are eventually fulfilled, therefore the independence of the control mechanism is not guaranteed.

References:

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

54. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

100
54a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

**YES | NO**

**References:**
Act CVI of 2007

**YES:** A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

54b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

**100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0**

**Comments:**
All advertisements on privatization have to be published on the website of the National State Asset company.

**References:**
http://www.mnvrt.hu

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

54c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.
**YES**: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO**: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**54d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.**

**Comments:**
Records are available on line

**References:**
Act CVI of 2007

---

**100**: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50**: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0**: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

**54e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.**

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
Records are available on line

**References:**
http://www.mnvrt.hu
100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. National Ombudsman

56. Is the national ombudsman effective?

84

56a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
Act LIX of 1993 on Ombudsmen

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
References:
Interview with Maté Szabó In, De iure, 7/2008

100: This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

75:

50: This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

56c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

Comments:
Ombudsmen are selected for 6 years and can only be removed by a 2/3rds majority of Parliament

References:
Act LIX of 1993

100: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.
### 56e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**
See list of staff at [http://www.obh.hu/ktk/index.htm](http://www.obh.hu/ktk/index.htm)

### 56f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**
Act LIX of 1993  
Comments:
Ombudsman office budgets are calculated by the ombudsmen themselves and approved by the Parliament. The Government might have influence on cutting ombudsman office budgets.

References:
Act LIX of 1993

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

56g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

References:
See annual reports submitted to the Parliament at http://www.obh.hu

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.
Comments:
On the basis of individual complaints the ombudsman analyzes the a practices of an institution or a system. For example, it was not clear to which extent the operation of courts should be public, whether the trial is public and all documents are public. The ombudsman issued a position paper on the issue which is a taken as a guiding statement of best practices in the future. So the ombudsman only analyzes existing documents and practices but does not investigate in the sense of developing new evidence and prosecuting criminals. But all ombudsmen are very highly regarded and they do make thorough, independent analysis of cases.

References:

100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies’ investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies’ investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

56i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

Comments:
Among the four ombudsmen only the Data Protection Commissioner can have legally binding decisions. They have no way of imposing sanctions on the government.

References:

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:
0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

56j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
Ombudsmen’s decisions are not legally binding, but according to their reports most of their recommendations are followed.

References:
http://www.obh.hu – see reports submitted to the Parliament

100: Ombudsman’s reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, ombudsman’s reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Ombudsman’s reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman’s reports do not lead to policy changes.

56k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
See annual reports of the ombudsmen at http://www.obh.hu

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:
The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

57. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

| YES | NO |

Comments:
The law does not require the publication of recommendations of ombudsmen.

References:
Act LIX of 1993

YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

57b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The general ombudsman publishes all his reports while specialized ombudsmen publish only more important recommendations.

References:

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:
0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**
Published reports and recommendations are available on line.

**References:**
http://www.obh.hu

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

55. Is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

**YES** | **NO**

**Comments:**
There are four ombudsmen: Ombudsman of civil rights, Ombudsman of data protection and the freedom of information Ombudsman and the Ombudsman of minorities. The ombudsman of civil rights and the one minorities are mentioned in the Constitution. There is a law on the Ombudsman of Civil rights which also makes reference to the newer and more specialized ombudsman offices. The ombudsman of data protection and the ombudsman of freedom of information are included in the law on data protection and freedom of information.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

59. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

97

59a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 1. of Act XXXVIII of 1989

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

59b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
Head of the SAO is assigned for 12 years.
Art. 8 of Act XXXVIII of 1989

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

59c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

The Supreme Audit Institution employs 610 persons.

References:
Telephone interview with Béla Nagy, Human resources Department of the Supreme Audit Institution, 2nd September 2008.

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

References:
Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The budget is planned by the Supreme Audit Office but may be cut by the Parliament.

**References:**
Chapter V of the State Budget

In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

**Comments:**
The Supreme Audit Office submits annual reports to the Parliament and makes public all reports about its activity.

**References:**
www.asz.hu, www.parliament.hu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.</td>
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</table>

Comments:
According to feedback from institutions gathered by the SAO, 80% of their recommendations are acted upon.

References:
Annual reports of the SAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
The Supreme Audit Office is not entitled to carry out investigations. It can decide its own audit and control plan and activities, but never carries out individual investigations. In cases where there is a suspicion of a crime the SAO must report it to the prosecutor’s office so that the issue is investigated.
100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

60. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

100

60a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

Comments:
The law states that the yearly report of the SAO to the Parliament has to be published.

References:
Act XXVIII of 1989 on SAO
Glass Pocket Act, XXIV. of 2003

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

60b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

60c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

58. Is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

58. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

V-3. Taxes and Customs

62. Is the tax collection agency effective?

100

62a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
15,635 employees. There have been requests to raise the number of employees because a new service of investigating the rise of assets has been introduced. The Ministry of Finance approved some staff increase but has not fulfilled the full request.

References:
Telephone interview with Czinkiné Dudás Mária, Human Resources Department, Tax Authority, 2nd September 2008.

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.
62b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

References:
Chapter XXII. of the State Budget

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

65. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

100

65a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

References:
E-mail interview with Jaskó Réka, Human Resources Department, Customs and Finance Guard

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

Comments:
The Customs and Finance Guard employs 7,131 persons.
65b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

|   | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:
Chapter XXII. of State Budget

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

61. Is there a national tax collection agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES       | NO

Comments:
Tax and Finance Control Administration

References:

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

63. Are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?
63. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

**Comments:**
According to businesspeople it happens that the employees of the tax authority have to perform certain figures, i.e., reach a certain level of income from taxes. So tax officers call companies and tell them that if they are willing to pay a certain amount of fine they won’t check all the books of the company. Interviews confirmed this process but there is no hard evidence or data that reflects this trend.

**References:**

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:

50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

25:

0: Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

64. Is there a national customs and excise agency?

**YES**

**NO**

**References:**
Act XIX of 2004

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.
66. Are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

75

66. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Norbert Puskás, Customs and Finance Guard, March 2008. Location: Customs and Finance Guard Office

100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

75:

50: Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

25:

0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

68. Is the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

75

68a. In law, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | NO
YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency.

68b. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
397 persons are employed at the central agency. The agency was set up in January 2008, there are no reports available about its functioning.

References:
http://mnvzrt.hu

100: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

68c. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Section XLIII of the State Budget in 2008
The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

Investigations are initiated by the police mostly due to media pressure, but not directly after a negative report of the SAO appears.

References:
www.asz.hu – reports of the Supreme Audit Office

When irregularities are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

Government agencies do not have the right to impose sanctions. They can only initiate internal controls and investigations and fire the employees involved in corruption scandals.
### References:
Act VI of 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>100:</strong></td>
<td>When rules violations are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>75:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>50:</strong></td>
<td>The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>25:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0:</strong></td>
<td>The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be partisan in its application of power.</td>
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</table>

### 69. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
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</table>

### References:
Act CXI of 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES:</strong></td>
<td>A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO:</strong></td>
<td>A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

### Comments:
Only annual reports are available, which are not detailed enough to be able to follow the real flow of funds.
## References:

**Websites of main state-owned companies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>State-owned companies always publicly disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, file the information behind schedule, or not publicly disclose certain data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Financial data is not publicly available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

### Comments:

All state-owned enterprises have an audited report of 2007 uploaded. Audits are normally carried out by one of the Big 4 agencies.

## References:

**Websites of main state-owned enterprises.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.</td>
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69d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

### Comments:

All state-owned enterprises have an audited report of 2007 uploaded.
References:
Web sites of state-owned companies

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

69e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
All state-owned enterprises have an audited report of 2007 on their web sites.

References:
Web sites of state-owned enterprises

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

67. Is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

67. In law, is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?
Comments:
Most of state-owned enterprises are supervised by the respective ministers and not by the central organ. However, there is a central organ which deals with the state assets and some companies fall under its supervision.

References:
Act CVI of 2007
Act VI of 1977

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. A YES score can be earned if several government agencies or ministries oversee different state-owned enterprises. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if this function does not exist, or if some state-owned companies are free from government oversight.

87
V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

70. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

94

70a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 9 of the Constitution

YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required.

70b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.
YES | NO

Comments:
If the license is denied an appeal can be submitted to the court which makes the final decision.

References:
Section V of Act V of 2006

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

#### 70c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

Comments:
The median wait time for a business license in Hungary is 211 days compared to 251 days average in the region and 153 days average in OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) member countries.

References:

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

25:

0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

70d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |
Comments:
10% (income per capita) compared to 628% average in the region and 62% average in OECD.

References:

| 100 | Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line. |
| 75: |
| 50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital. |
| 25: |
| 0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization. |

71. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

100

71a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:
Act CLIV of 1997
Act XI of 1991
Act CXL of 2004
Act XCIII of 1990
Dec. 44/2000. (XI.27.) of the Minister of Health
Dec. 16/2000. (VI.8) of the Minister of Health
Dec. 21/2007. (V. 8.) of the Minister of Health

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.
Comments:
Legislation is in place however the system is quite complex, fragmented into numerous regulations and laws.

References:
There are a number of laws and regulations available at: http://www.orszagoszoldhatosag.gov.hu/index.php?akt_menu=110

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:
3/2002 (II. 8.) joint decree of the minister of health and the minister of social affairs

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

72. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

50

72a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.
100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

---

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0
100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law

73. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

89

73a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:
Corruption is not defined as such in the Criminal Code.

References:
Criminal Code

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.
73b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 323 of Criminal Code

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:
Active and passive bribery are regulated under the same articles of the law.

References:
Art. 250-255. of Criminal Code

YES: A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:
Active and passive bribery are regulated under the same articles of the law.

References:
Art. 250-255 of the Criminal Code
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<tr>
<td><strong>YES:</strong> A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.</td>
<td><strong>NO:</strong> A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.</td>
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73e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

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**References:**
Act XXXVII of 2000, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
Art. 258 of the Criminal Code

| YES: A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal. | **NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal. |

73f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

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<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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**References:**
Art. 319 of Criminal Code
Section IV of Act XXIII of 1992 on civil servants

| YES: A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal. | **NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal. |

73g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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**References:**
Section III of Criminal Code
YES: A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Act. XV of 2003 on money laundering

YES: A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

YES | NO

References:
Act CI of 2006 UN Convention against Organized Crime

YES: A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

---

VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

75. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?
75a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

**YES** | **NO**

**Comments:**
The Police has to carry out its activities without being influenced by any political parties.
The Police is directed by the Government through the Minister of Justice and Law Enforcement Employees of the Police cannot carry out political activities.

The Anti-Corruption Coordination Board has 18 members: 6 represent ministries, 6 no-governmental independent state agencies and 6 independent NGOs

**References:**
Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, 2.§ (3)
Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, 4.§ (2)
Constitution 40/B§ (4)
Art 4 of Gov. Dec. 1037/2007 (VI. 18)

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

75b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**
It is a general complaint that sentences imposed in corruption cases are light because investigations take a long time and a lot of evidence is lost during the investigation. Political influence might not be excluded in major corruption cases which are substantiated by media reports revealing close connection between companies and public contracts.

**References:**

**100:** This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

**75:**
This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

The head of the National Investigating Office is nominated by the head of the Police. In case of major failures (not necessarily in corruption cases) the head of the Police can be removed. Also he or she can be transposed to a similar-level of workplace. However, in an interview with István Szikinger, he was convinced that there is no anti-corruption agency in Hungary and that the police are not independent at all.

The Chair of the Board is the Minister of Justice. If he is removed because of any political and/or personal reason, the chair of the board is changed automatically.

References:
Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police
Interview with Mr. István Szikinger, lawyer and professor at Central European University.

The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

For the Anti-Corruption Board, among 18 members 12 do not have to fulfill any professional criteria just be representative of certain government or state institutions. The 6 independent civil members have to have professional experience about corruption research and analysis.
References:


100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

75e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

Comments:
The police agency does have a full-time staff, but most of their time is dedicated to organized crime cases, rather than corruption.

Members of the Board are not paid and get together to revise the anti-corruption strategy and action plan. 3 staff members of the Ministry of Justice form the secretariat of the Board but they have other commitments as civil servants beside this Board

References:
http://www.police.hu

100: The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

75f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.
Comments:
Budget of the Agency is within the budget of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement

References:
State budget

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

75g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

Comments:
Even though the Police does not make public reports, the Prosecutor does report to the Parliament on a yearly basis and all memos of the meetings of the Anti-Corruption board are available online.

References:
Documents discussed by the Parliamentary Committee of Military and Police – no report about the Police's activities

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

75h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.
Comments:
In practice, the police unit has a wider reach as the coordination board only has advisory powers.

References:

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<tr>
<td><strong>100</strong>: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).</td>
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<td><strong>75</strong>:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>50</strong>: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>0</strong>: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.</td>
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75i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

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<td><strong>100</strong>: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.</td>
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<td><strong>75</strong>:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>50</strong>: The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.</td>
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<td><strong>25</strong>:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>0</strong>: The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.</td>
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Comments:
Media often reports about corruption cases, but investigation only starts if there is a criminal charge filed by a citizen. These investigations are conducted by the anti-corruption police unit as the board has no investigative powers.

References:
76. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

38

76a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The Anticorruption Coordination Board is not entitled to deal with complaints. Only the anti-corruption police unit deals with complaints.

References:

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

76b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
No whistleblowing protection law or system exists in Hungary, therefore whistleblowing is not common.

References:
Situation Analysis of the Anticorruption Strategy, Ministry of Justice

100: Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.
Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

74. Is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

Comments:
The situation is the following: there is no independent agency that would have the exclusive mandate to investigate corruption cases. There are several departments that because of the internal division of labor of certain institutions deal with different types of corruption cases. The main organizations are:

There is a department at the Police called the National Investigating Office which focuses on organized crime, money laundering and corruption related crimes. They investigate these crimes. As the Police is structured under the Ministry of Justice and Law enforcement it is not independent.

The National Prosecutor is independent of the Government, reports only to the Parliament. They also have a sub-department to investigate corruption cases when public servants are involved.

There is a body called the Defense Service of Law Enforcement Agencies. This institution is under the Ministry of Justice and Law enforcement. If a member of a law enforcement agency is involved in a corruption case, they investigate. Citizens can also turn to them.

Also there is the Customs and Finance Guard. They are not independent, it is structured under the Ministry of Finance. They also have investigative power on customs-related cases and organized crimes.

And there is the Anticorruption Coordination Board set up by the Government, with 18 members among them 6 ngos, it only has consultative power and role.

As you can see the picture is quite complex.

References:
The National Investigating Office within the Police

Art. 2. of Gov. Decision 1037/2007 (VI. 18.)

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.
VI-3. Rule of Law

77. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

67

77a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

References:
Art. 57 of the Constitution

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

77b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:
Interview with Zoltán Fleck, 20th December 2007, http://www.jogiforum.hu

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:
Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

Comments:
Between 1-6% of the value of the case depending on the type of the case. The amount might be prohibitive in case of constructions works affecting citizens.

References:
Act XCIII of 1990.

In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees are not a barrier to appeals.

In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees present somewhat of a barrier to pursuing appeal.

The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments. Attorneys fees greatly discourage the use of the appeals process.

Do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

Even the judgements follow written law the interpretation of the legislation might be very different, depending on the judges. It is not necessarily because of political influence, but mostly because there is no special organ supervising the uniform application of its laws.

References:
Judicial independence, Accountibilty and Judicial Reforms, Eötvös Károly Institute, 2007
Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

79. Are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

References:
Judicial independence, accountability and Judicial reforms, Eötvös Károly Institute, 2007

80. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.
YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

80b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References: Interview with Peter Hack, professor at ELTE University, Faculty of Law, September 2008.

100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:

0: National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

80c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | NO

Comments: Rules for case distribution are defined by heads of different courts. Rules are approved by the Judicial Council and are normally made public.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

80d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

81. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

81a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.
NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

81b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

References:
Interview with Peter Hack, ELTE University, September 2008.

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge’s involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

82. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

64

82a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
There is a general discrimination against the Roma population in Hungary which is reflected in the courts too. According to the study of the Helsinki Committee the ratio of discrimination is the same at the courts as in the general population. There was a recent case when a Roma musician was convicted even though when the crime was committed he was playing in front of 40 people in another town. The judge refused to listen to the witnesses. The judge’s decision was later overturned on an appeal.

References:
Interview with András Kádár, Director, Hungarian Helsinki Committee

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.
Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

82b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

| 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0 |

References:

100: Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

75:

50: Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

25:

0: Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

82c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

References:
Art 47 of Act XIX of 1998 on criminal proceedings.

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.
82d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

References:
Nem sok vizet zavarnak a kirendelt védők, July 18th 2007, http://origo.hu
Kádár-Tóth-Vavró: Védettlenül, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2007


table

100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

75:

50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

25:

0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

Comments:
Fees of lawyers are very high. Furthermore forensic expert opinion costs are also high. An average family will not risk (or can't even afford) paying for a lawyer plus court costs if they are not sure that they would win a case.

References:

82e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

Comments:
Fees of lawyers are very high. Furthermore forensic expert opinion costs are also high. An average family will not risk (or can't even afford) paying for a lawyer plus court costs if they are not sure that they would win a case.

References:
82f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100  75  50  25  0

References:

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to small businesses.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most small businesses from bringing a case.

82g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

100  75  50  25  0

References:
There are courts in each county and in bigger cities http://www.birosag.hu

100: Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

75:

50: Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

25:

0: Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.
### VI-4. Law Enforcement

#### 83. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

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<tr>
<td>83a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.</td>
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**References:**

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<tr>
<td>100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.</td>
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<td>0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.</td>
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<tr>
<td>83b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.</td>
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**References:**
Interview with Jozsef Petretei, Minister of Justice, 29th January 2007, Népszabadság [http://nol.hu/cikk/433389/](http://nol.hu/cikk/433389/)
Laws on the implementation of the state budget

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<tr>
<td>100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.</td>
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The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

83c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

Comments:
The police are independent. However in major corruption cases investigations take a very long time and it is believed that during this time a lot of evidence can get lost.

References:

The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

84. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

YES | NO

Comments:
The Independent Police Complaints Board was set up in 2007. Citizens can submit complaints about the Police. The Board investigates the case and suggests sanctions.
YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

84b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen’s complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:
The agency was set up in January 2008. There is no statistical data available yet on its work. There have been 48 cases closed up to now.

References:
http://www.panasztestulet.hu

100: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

84c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

Comments:
Independent Police Complaints Board

References:
Act XXXIV of 1994
YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

84d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100  |  75  |  50  |  25  |  0

References:

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

84e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES  |  NO

References:
Act XLIII of 1994

YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.
84f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

Comments:
Since the police are among the most corrupt institutions in Hungary, criminal cases of police officers might be hidden by his/her colleagues.

References:

100: Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

75:

50: Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

25:

0: Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.