

Overall Score:

76 - Moderate

Legal Framework Score:

80 - Moderate

Actual Implementation Score:

69 - Weak

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

I-1. ⁶⁹Civil Society Organizations

1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

100

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

YES

NO

Comments:

Kazakhstani legislation doesn't set any limitations on the creation or activities of civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or governance.

Non-profit organizations can be created to help achieve social, cultural, scientific, educational, charitable, and administrative goals; protect the legal rights and interests of citizens and organizations; resolve disputes and conflicts; enhance the cultural wealth of citizens; protect citizens' health; protect the environment; develop physical culture and sports; render legal assistance; and assist with other goals directed toward public wealth and the wealth of their members (participants). From Law of Kazakhstan

Citizens of Republic Kazakhstan have the right of freedom of association. From Constitution

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on non-profit organizations, January, 16, 2001, N 142-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 21, 2007), Article 4

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on referendum in August, 30, 1995) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007), Article 23

YES: A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

YES | NO

Comments:

Funding of non-profit organizations in monetary and other forms may come from

- 1) receipts from founders (participants, members).
- 2) voluntary property payments and donations.
- 3) receipts (income) from goods, works, or services, in cases established by the legislation.
- 4) dividends (income), compensation (interest) received from stocks, bonds, other floaters and deposits.
- 5) other income not forbidden by the law.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on non-profit organizations, January, 16, 2001, N 142-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 21, 2007), Article 35

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

NO: A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | NO

Comments:

- 1) The non-profit organization conducts bookkeeping and statistical reporting in the order stipulated by legislation of Kazakhstan.
- 2) The non-profit organization gives information of its activities to state statistics and tax bodies, to founders and to other persons according to the legislation and constituent documents of non-profit organization.

According to the legislation, the non-profit organization that carries out activities thanks to means offered gratis by foreign states, international and foreign organizations, foreigners, and/or persons without citizenship gives to tax bodies a report of how such funding is used.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on non-profit organizations, January, 16, 2001, N 142-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 21, 2007), Article 41

YES: A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

33

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

75:

50: CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

75:

50: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

25:

0: Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

YES | **NO**

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist's work. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

88

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

Comments:

Public association that doesn't contradict legislation is allowed within political parties, trade unions and other citizens associations created on a voluntary basis so they can for achieve their overall aims.

Participants (members) of public associations have no rights conferred upon them by these associations. Citizens are not responsible for obligations incurred by public associations in which they participate as members, and the specified associations do not answer for obligations of its members.

References:

Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions as of July 8, 2007), Article 106

YES: A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

NO: A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Trade unions are common and are an important part of the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

75:

50: Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

I-2. Media

5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

YES

NO

Comments:

Freedom of speech, reception and distribution of creative works, expressions of art and persuasion in printed and other form is in no way forbidden by law. Censorship is forbidden. From Article 2

Everyone has the right to receive and distribute the information in any way not forbidden by law. Information regarded as state secrets of Kazakhstan is determined by law. From Constitution

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on mass media, July, 25,1999, #451-1 (with alterations and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007)

According to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of Aug. 7, 2005, #67-III, article 2, introduced amendments (see old wording)

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on referendum in August,30,1995) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007), Article 20

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

YES | NO

Comments:

Freedom of speech and creativity are guaranteed. Censorship is forbidden.

Everyone has the right to receive and distribute the information in any way not forbidden by law. Information regarded as state secrets of Kazakhstan is determined by law.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on referendum in August 30,1995) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007), Article 20

YES: A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

NO: A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

81

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Becoming registered requires a lot of materials and attached documents from an organization that would like to form a print medium. The registering body has the right to ask any number of questions, and a request may be denied, sometimes on the basis of political motivation.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

100: Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

25:

0: Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:

Appeals of unreasonable refusal in licensing or infringement of the rights of a licensee are carried out in an established order.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on licensing (with changes of July 27, 2007), Articles 11, 50

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

69

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Becoming registered requires a lot of materials and attached documents from an organization that would like to form a broadcast station (radio and TV). The registering body has the right to ask any number of questions, and a request may be denied, sometimes on the basis of political motivation.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

75:

50: Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

25:

0: Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

Comments:

A license is required for any organization that broadcasts via television and/or radio.

Appeals of unreasonable refusal in licensing or infringement of the rights of a licensee are carried out in an established order.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on licensing (with changes of July 27, 2007), Articles 24, 50

YES: A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

25:

0: Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

50

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published on-line.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

75:

50: Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

25:

0: Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content on-line.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

75:

50: In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

25:

0: The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

75

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | NO

Comments:

Journalists shall have the right

- 1) to undertake research and to request, receive and disseminate information.
- 2) to visit government agencies and organizations with all forms of ownership and to be received by their officials when undertaking their business responsibilities; to be present at all events held by agency, excluding private events.
- 3) to make recordings, including the use of audiovisual equipment and/or cinema and photo shooting, except events prohibited by legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
- 4) to be allowed, upon presentation of the journalist s credentials, into regions where natural disasters have occurred, at meetings and demonstrations, and at other events that express public, group and personal interests and protest.
- 5) to have access to documents and materials, except portions containing data that is a state secret.
- 6) to check the trustworthiness of received information.
- 7) to address specialists when checking received information.
- 8) to disseminate his/her messages and materials under his/her signature and conditional name (pseudonym).
- 9) to refuse to publish material under his/her name if its contents, after editing, contradicts his/her personal beliefs.
- 10) to keep the secret of copyright and information sources, except for events when these secrets are published at the demand of a court.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, July, 23, 1999, 451-I (with changes and additions as of June 19, 2007), Chapter 5, Article 20

YES: A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

75:

50: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

25:

0: The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

75:

50: The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

25:

0: The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

10. Are the media credible sources of information?

55

10a. In law, print media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

Comments:

Each release of a periodical's printed edition should contain the following data:

- 1) Name of the mass medium.
- 2) Owner of the mass medium.
- 3) A surname and the initials of the editor-in-chief.
- 4) Number and date of the certificate of statement on register and the name of body providing it.
- 5) Frequency of the medium.
- 6) Serial number and date of issue.
- 7) Circulation.
- 8) Name and address of the printing house and the editorial office.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on mass media, July,23,1999, N 451-1 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

YES | NO

Comments:

Each mass medium outlet is obligated to announce its name every time it goes on the air, or at least four times a day if it broadcasts continuously.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, from July, 23, 1999 451-I, (with changes and additions as of June 19, 2007), Article 15

YES: A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

25:

0: Editors and journalists are widely known to sell" favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75:

50: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25:

0: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

75:

50: The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

100

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

The Constitution does not contain articles regulating the right of citizen to access to governmental information and basic governmental records.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on referendum, Aug. 30,1995) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on 21.05.2007)

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, December, 18, 1995, #2688 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

The Constitution contains does not contain articles regulating the right of citizens to access to governmental information and basic governmental records. This mean that citizens have no right of access to basic government records. There is no appeal procedure if access to a basic government record is denied.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, December, 18, 1995, #2688 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007)

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan n government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 18, 1995, #2688 (with alterations and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007) have not contain articles, regulating the right of citizen of access to governmental information and basic governmental records. That mean that as far as citizen has no right of access to a basic government record, in Kazakhstan there is no a procedure of access to a basic government record is denied.

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

Comments:

Governmental bodies, public associations, government officials and mass media are obligated to provide an opportunity for each citizen to become familiar with documents, decisions and information sources affecting his/her rights and interests.

At the same time, there is an electronic request system called Lawyer, which contains all Kazakhstani legislation and legal practices. Access to this electronic system can be possible through the Internet, but this service is not free of charge.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, July, 23, 1999, 451-I (with changes and additions as of June 19, 2007), Article 2

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

13. Is the right of access to information effective?

70

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

75:

50: Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

25:

0: Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

75:

50: The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

25:

0: The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

Category II. Elections

II-1. ⁷⁵Voting & Citizen Participation

14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

Comments:

Universal active suffrage: the right of citizens of Kazakhstan to vote in elections after each person reaches 18 years of age, regardless of origin; social, official or property status; sex; race; nationality; language; religion, beliefs; residence; or any other circumstance.

Passive universal suffrage: the right of citizens to be elected president, deputy of Parliament, or maslihat (deputy) or member of other institutions of local government.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept., 28, 1999, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 4

YES: A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

NO: A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

Comments:

The next presidential election is carried out on the first Sunday of December and cannot coincide with elections of new members

of Parliament.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on referendum in August,30,1995) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007), Article 41

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

67

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

75:

50: Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

25:

0: Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

75:

50: Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

25:

0: Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

75:

50: Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

25:

0: Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

75

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

1. Citizens shall have the right to freely associate with political parties.
2. A citizens may be a member of only one political party.
3. Membership in a political party may not serve as the ground for limiting the rights or freedoms of the citizen.
4. Everyone has the right to specify or to not specify which party he/she belongs to.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions as of May 15, 2007), Article 3

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

Comments:

Public service is based on principles, among them the equal right of citizens to access public service and promotions based on his/her abilities and vocational training.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999 , 453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 3

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

75:

50: Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

25:

0: Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

75:

50: Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office. A system of party lists may discourage or prevent independent candidates from running for office.

25:

0: Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Parliament s leading party is Nur-Otan.”

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

75:

50: The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition’s ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

25:

0: The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature’s proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.

II-2. Election Integrity

18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

65

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES

NO

Comments:

The structure of the Central Electoral Commission includes chairman, vice-president, secretary and four members. Their election to a post and leaving of a post is made by Mazhilis (deputies) of Parliament after presentation to the President of Kazakhstan.

References:

Presidential decree of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nov. 11, 1996, as registered in the Ministry of Justice on Jan., 19, 1998, N 427

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

75:

50: Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments

against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

92

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

75:

50: There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

25:

0: The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost" voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:

Courts and bodies of the Public Prosecutor are obligated to accept appeals from members of electoral commissions, citizens and representatives registered with public associations established by law that carry out voting, including questions on election legislation infringement, both in the preparation for and in elections. They must consider appeals within five days, or immediately if it is less than five days before the election or the day of the election.

Decisions made by and actions taken by local government bodies, self-government enterprises and organizations, and their officials, that violate elections legislation will be appealed in court.

Courts, bodies of Public Prosecutor and the election commissions organize their work during the election process, including days off and on the day of elections, so that they can receive and consider complaints, as established by current constitutional law.

If current constitutional law makes no other provision, citizens and organizations appeals about violations of election legislation are considered by the electoral commissions within five days from the day the appeal is made.

If current constitutional law makes no other provision, appeals on decisions and actions (or inaction) of the electoral commission and its members are considered by a higher commission within three days from the day of appeal.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 49

YES: A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

According to the election legislation, the applications of members of the election commissions, citizens, representatives of the non- governmental organizations registered in set order, regarding elections issues , including about infringements of elections legislation, received on the day of voting shall be considered by courts and offices prosecutor' immediately.

With a view of realization of constitutional rights of citizens such work has been carried out not only pursuant to complaints and applications, but also according to mass-media and by means of analysis of other accessible materials.

For example, on a site www.osdp.kz on the day of voting materials about fixing more than the eighty infringements ostensibly revealed by observers on polling districts appeared. The majority of these messages is already checked and as the analysis as has shown, basically has not found the acknowledgement.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

75:

50: The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

25:

0: The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

75:

50: The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

25:

0: The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overtly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

Comments:

On election day, voters have the right from the moment a polling district opens for voting up to establishment of the results of voting in a polling district to appeal simultaneously to one authorized representative of each candidate; one representative of each mass medium who presents his/her service card; and one observer from each political party, other public association, other non-profit organizations and observers from foreign states and international organizations.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 20

YES: A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers' activities.

75:

50: Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

25:

0: Election observers' movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

17. Is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

Comments:

The Central Electoral Commission carries out execution of election legislation; provides its uniform application; and makes decisions within the limits of its competence.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, # 2464, (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 12

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

NO: A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities exists that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by

international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

86
II-3. Political Financing

20. Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties?

100

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

Sources of financing for political parties may include

- 1) introductory fees and membership dues.
- 2) donations from citizens and non-governmental organizations of Kazakhstan that are made as established by the central executive agency that collects tax obligations due to the state on the condition that these donations are confirmed and their source is documented.
- 3) income of enterprise activity.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on political parties, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 15, 2007), Article 18

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

The election funds of political parties may include voluntary donations from citizens and Kazakhstani organizations that should not exceed by more than 10,000 times the minimal salary established by legislation.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on political parties, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 15, 2007), Article 92

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political parties. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

The election funds of political parties may include voluntary donations from citizens and Kazakhstani organizations that should not exceed by more than 10,000 times the minimal salary established by legislation.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on political parties, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 15, 2007), Article 92

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to political parties. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

Comments:

After a candidate has registered, election funds are deposited into a special temporary account opened in bank establishments by the corresponding electoral commission. Income to the specified account are not charged and are not paid off. The election fund can be used exclusively by the candidate and political parties that have put forward party lists for the purposes named by the current Constitutional law. Banks must report weekly on receipts to and expenditures from the special accounts to the corresponding electoral commission. Questions from the corresponding electoral commission about those data must be made within 24 hours. Expenditures from election funds in a special bank account are determined by the Central Electoral Commission.

Expenditures from electoral funds are carried out by the corresponding electoral commissions and bank establishments.

Representatives of corresponding electoral commissions can name control experts to state bodies according to their competence.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Articles 34 and 36

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

Candidates standing in structured party lists put forward by political parties, have no right to create their own election funds.

Political parties election funds should not exceed by more than 5000 times the minimal salary established by the legislation.

The election funds of political parties may include voluntary donations from citizens and Kazakhstani organizations that should not exceed by more than 10,000 times the minimal salary established by legislation.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 92

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances and expenditures of political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

The constitutional law has requirements only for the independent auditing of political parties' finances and expenditures.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions as of May 15, 2007)

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of party finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties' finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of political parties.

YES | NO

Comments:

Electoral commissions are the state electoral bodies that organize, preparation for and run elections. From Article 10

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on political parties, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 15, 2007), Chapter 2

Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, April 14, 2004, #545-II, Article 10 introduced amendments (see old wording)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of political parties. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

21. Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates?

83

21a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to individual political candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:

Non-state financing of elections:

Presidential and deputy-of-Parliament candidates pre-election campaigns can be financed by election funds established by the current constitutional law.

Election funds are subject to state registration as established by the legislation.

Election funds may come from the personal means of candidates or constituencies, or funds from political parties. The funds are allocated to the candidate by the Kazakhstani public association that nominates him.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 34

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to individual political candidates, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to individual political candidates.

21b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:

Election funds of a candidate

1) can come from his/her own means. The total sum should not exceed by more than 100 times the minimal salary established by the legislation.

2) are allocated to him/her by the public association that had put him/her forward. The total sum should not exceed by more than in two hundred times the minimal salary established by the legislation.

can come from voluntary donations from citizens and Kazakhstani organizations. The total sum should not exceed established by more than 300 times the minimal salary established by the legislation.

Donations from state bodies and organizations, institutions of local government, charitable organizations, religious associations, legal persons having foreign participation in Kazakhstan, and anonymous donations are forbidden.

Sources of financing and using of means by political party

2. Donations to political parties and to their structural divisions (branches and representatives) are not allowed from

1) foreign states, foreign legal persons and international organizations.

2) foreigners and persons without citizenship.

3) legal persons with foreign participation.

4) state bodies and organizations.

5) religious associations and charitable organizations.

6) anonymous donors.

A court may decide that donations received from people and organizations specified above are added to the income of the state

Political parties financial reports are published annually in printed editions. From Article 18

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 106

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions as of May 15, 2007), Article 18

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political candidates. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to individual political candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:

Election funds of a candidate

1) can come from his/her own means. The total sum should not exceed by more than 100 times the minimal salary established by the legislation.

2) are allocated to him/her by the public association that had put him/her forward. The total sum should not exceed by more than in two hundred times the minimal salary established by the legislation.

3) can come from voluntary donations from citizens and Kazakhstani organizations. The total sum should not exceed established by more than 300 times the minimal salary established by the legislation.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464(with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 106

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21d. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:

Election funds can be received or directed only by legal means. Information about the total sum in the fund and its sources are published in mass media within 10 days after publication of election results.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464(with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 34

YES: A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to individual political candidates.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to individual political candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

21e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the campaign finances of individual political candidates.

YES | NO

Comments:

Constitution law does not contain articles regulating requirements for independent auditing of individual political candidates' campaign finances.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions as of May 15, 2007)

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 28, 1995, #2464 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates to self-audit.

21f. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns.

YES | NO

Comments:

The agency is the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan.

Electoral commissions are the state electoral bodies that organize, preparation for and run elections. From Article 10

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on political parties, July 15, 2002, 344-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 15, 2007), Chapter 2

Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, April 14, 2004, #545-II, Article 10 introduced amendments (see old wording)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

22. Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective?

75

22a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a political party.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

22b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a political party.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to political parties are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

22c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

22d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of political parties. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

22e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

22f. In practice, contributions to political parties are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Political party finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

75:

50: Political party finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

23. Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates effective?

75

23a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political candidates are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a particular candidate.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a particular candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support particular political candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a particular political candidate are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

75:

50: Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support individual candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

25:

0: Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to individual candidates are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23c. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

23d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

23e. In practice, the finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions.

25:

0: The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

24. Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties?

24a. In practice, political parties disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Political parties never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

24b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Kazakhstani citizens cannot access the financial records of political parties within a reasonable time period.

All information concerning political parties' financial records is held by the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

24c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

Comments:

Since the time of the Soviet Union time, in practice, citizens cannot access political parties' financial records at a reasonable cost. This information is available only from the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

25. Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns?

0

25a. In practice, individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

Comments:

Individual political candidates disclose information about their financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period only to the Central Election Commission, but this information is not available to Kazakhstani citizens.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

100: Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

75:

50: Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

25:

0: Individual candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

25b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In practice, citizens have no access to information about individual political candidates' financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period. This information is available only from the Central Election Commission.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

25c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In practice, citizens have no access the financial records (campaign revenues and expenditures) of individual candidates at a

reasonable cost. This information is available only to the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category III. Government Accountability

III-1. ⁵⁶Executive Accountability

27. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

88

27a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

75:

50: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

25:

0: The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

27b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

Comments:

The state power in the Republic of Kazakhstan is unified and executed on the basis of the Constitution and laws in accordance with the principle of its division into the legislative, executive and judicial branches, and a system of checks and balances that governs their interaction.

The Constitutional Council shall consider appeals of courts of law in cases stipulated by Article 78 of the Constitution. From Article 72

The courts shall have no right to apply laws and other regulatory legal acts that infringe on the rights and liberties of an individual and a citizen established as by the Constitution. If a court finds that a law or other regulatory legal act subject to application infringes on the rights and liberties of an individual and a citizen, it shall suspend legal proceedings and address the Constitutional Council with a proposal to declare that law unconstitutional. From Article 78

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan (it is accepted on a referendum on Aug. 30, 1995) (with changes and additions as of May 21, 2007), Articles 3, 72,78

Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions as of July 8, 2007), Article 283

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

27c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to rely upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

75:

50: The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

27d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

75:

50: The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

25:

0: The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

28. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

100

28a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

Comments:

The President of the Republic is responsible for actions performed while exercising his duties. Only in the case of high treason may he be discharged from office by Parliament.

The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan does not contain articles regulating when head of the government can be prosecuted for a crime he commits.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on referendum in August 30, 1995) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007), Article 47

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, #2688

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

28b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

Comments:

Persons authorized to perform state functions all officials, deputies of Parliament, judges and the persons equal to them bear responsibility for offenses connected to corruption on the basis of the current law.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan

On Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan" (with changes and additions of 19.06.2007) does not contain articles on ministerial-level officials' immunity

Law of the Republic Kazakhstan, July 2, 1998, #267-1 (as of July 27, 2007), Article 3.

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

29. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

44

29a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

Neither the constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan nor the law about the struggle against corruption have any details or specifications regarding the of filing of asset-disclosure forms from the heads of state.

1. Civil servants include political and administrative posts.
2. Posts occupied by political civil servants are appointed by the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan. From Article 7

References:

Law of the Republic Kazakhstan, July 2, 1998, #267-I (as of July 27, 2007), Article 9

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Law About struggle against corruption” has no any details and specification regarding file asset disclosure form for the heads of state.

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

29b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

Comments:

On the basis of the current law, persons authorized to perform state functions all officials, deputies of Parliament, judges and persons equal to them bear the responsibility for corruption offenses.

Candidates for a state post or a post connected with performing the functions of the state or equal to them file a disclosure form to a tax body. From Article 9

References:

Law of the Republic Kazakhstan, July 2, 1998, #267-I (as of July 27, 2007), Articles 3, 9

YES: A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

NO: A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

29c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic Kazakhstan, July 2, 1998, #267-I (as of July 27, 2007), Article 13

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

29d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic Kazakhstan, July 2, 1998, #267-I (as of July 27, 2007), Article 10

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

29e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

Comments:

The law does not contain articles restricting heads of state and government ministers from being engaged in the private sector

after leaving government.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 18, 1995, #2688 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state of June 19, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

29f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

29g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

29h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

30. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

0

30a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, July 2, 1998, 267-I (with changes and additions as of July 27, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

30b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

30c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

26. Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

26. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

YES

NO

Comments:

Participants of constitutional procedure are the following, on whose request a constitutional procedure may be initiated:

- 1) President of the Republic.
- 2) Senate Chairman.
- 3) Mazhilis Chairman.
- 4) not less than one-fifth of the total number of Parliament Deputies.
- 5) Prime Minister.
- 6) Republic Courts of Law.
- 7) state structures and officials whose acts constitutionality shall be checked.

When necessary, procedure participants may empower representatives in the Constitutional Council in the manner prescribed by civil remedial legislation.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 29, 1995, #2737: On the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes from Nov. 24, 2004), Chapter IV

Constitutional Procedure, Article 20

YES: A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

31. Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

75

31. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

75:

50: The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

25:

0: The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

III-2. Legislative Accountability

32. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

67

32a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the status of its deputies, Oct. 16, 1995, #2529 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 13

Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 7, 2008), Article 283

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 11, 2006, #200-III (see old wording), point 1, introduced amendments

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

32b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

32c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | NO

Comments:

Deputies of Parliament, during the term of their authority, cannot be arrested, detained or liable to the measures of administrative

penalty imposed by judicial order. Nor can criminal proceedings be instituted against them without consent of the corresponding chamber, except in cases of grave crimes.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the status of its deputies, Oct. 16, 1995, #2529 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 32

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings. A NO score is also earned if the legislative branch itself controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on members of the legislature.

33. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

43

33a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

Comments:

On the basis of the current law, persons authorized to perform state functions all officials, deputies of Parliament, judges and persons equal to them bear the responsibility for corruption offenses.

Candidates for a state post or a post connected with performing the functions of the state or equal to them file a disclosure form to a tax body. From Article 9

References:

Law of the Republic Kazakhstan, July 2, 1998, #267-I (as of July 27, 2007), Articles 3, 9

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

33b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

Comments:

Neither document contains any articles restricting members of Parliament from engaging in private-sector activities after they leave state service.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

33c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 13

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

33d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 9

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

33e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

33f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

33g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

34. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

0

34a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 9

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

34b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

34c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

35. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

92

35a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

Comments:

Neither the Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the status of its deputies, Oct. 16, 1995, #2529 (with alterations and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007) nor the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on referendum on Aug. 30, 1995) (with alterations and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007) do not contain articles regulating citizens' access to records or documents relating to the legislative processes.

References:

Normative decision of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, April 18, 2007, 4, on official interpretation of point 2 of article 12; points 2 and 8 of article 62; point 1 of article 76; and sub-items 3 and 5 of point 3 of article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Special law regulating the order of development, representation, discussion, introduction into action and publication of legislative and other normative legal acts, March, 24, 1998, #213-1

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there are exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

35b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

35c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

50
III-3. Judicial Accountability

36. Are judges appointed fairly?

67

36a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

Comments:

Nobody has the right to interfere with the realization of justice or to render any influence on a judge or jury. Such actions are pursued by law.

The judge is not obliged to give any explanations of the essence of cases being considered or taking place. A consultation room where secret conversations can take place should be provided in all cases.

Selection of a candidate for a vacant post of judge of a regional court is carried out by the Qualifying Board of Justice (QBJ) on a competitive basis from among the persons who meet the requirements of point 1 of article 29 of the present Constitutional law, and also from among acting judges who have submitted an application for employment. The nominee for a vacant post of Chairman of the Regional Court is examined by the QBJ after presentation to the Chairman of the Supreme Court. The OBJ recommends a candidate for a vacant post of chairman or judge of a regional court to the Minister of Justice, who, as established by law, represents the candidate to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan for appointment to the post.

Selection of a candidate for a vacant post of judge of a district court is carried out by the Supreme Judicial Council on a competitive basis from among the persons who submitted an application for employment and who meet the requirements of point 2 of article 29 of current constitutional law.

The Supreme Judicial Council recommends a candidate based on competitive analysis for a vacant post as judge of the district court to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan for appointment on the post.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II

(with changes and additions in accordance with the state on Dec. 11, 2006), Article 25, 30

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec.11, 2006, #1997-III, point 2, introduced amendments (commissioned on Jan. 1, 2007) (see old wording)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

NO: A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

36b. In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting national-level judges.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

75:

50: Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

25:

0: National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

36c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

YES | **NO**

Comments:

Nobody has the right to interfere with the realization of justice or to render any influence on a judge or jury. Such actions are pursued by law.

The judge is not obliged to give any explanations of the essence of cases being considered or taking place. A consultation room where secret conversations can take place should be provided in all cases.

Equal rights to employment are given to candidates for the post of judge are provided, independent of origin, social and property status, racial and national belonging, sex, political views, religious beliefs and other circumstances.

Selection of a candidate for a vacant post of judge of a regional court is carried out by the Qualifying Board of Justice (QBJ) on a competitive basis from among the persons who meet the requirements of point 1 of article 29 of the present Constitutional law, and also from among acting judges who have submitted an application for employment. The nominee for a vacant post of Chairman of the Regional Court is examined by the QBJ after presentation to the Chairman of the Supreme Court. The OBJ recommends a candidate for a vacant post of chairman or judge of a regional court to the Minister of Justice, who, as established by law, represents the candidate to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan for appointment to the post.

Selection of a candidate for a vacant post of judge of a district court is carried out by the Supreme Judicial Council on a competitive basis from among the persons who submitted an application for employment and who meet the requirements of point 2 of article 29 of current constitutional law.

The Supreme Judicial Council recommends a candidate based on competitive analysis for a vacant post as judge of the district court to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan for appointment on the post.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on Dec. 11, 2006), Articles 25, 30

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 11, 2006, #1997-III, point 2, introduced amendments (commissioned on Jan. 1, 2007) (see old wording)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

37. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

54

37a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

Neither law contains articles obligating national-level judges to give reasons for their decisions.

References:

The constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan On judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan December, 25, 2000 132-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on 11.12.2006) and

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on republican referendum in August,30,1995) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on 21.05.2007) are not

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on referendum on Aug. 30, 1995) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

37b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

75:

50: Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

25:

0: Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

37c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

Comments:

The right of instituting disciplinary proceedings belongs to

- 1) the Republican Disciplinary Qualifying Commission when cases concern any national-level judge.
- 2) the District Disciplinary Qualifying Commission when cases concern the judge of a district court, or the chairman or a judge of regional court.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on Dec. 11, 2006), Article 41

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

37d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:

In cases stipulated by constitutional law, the Republican and Oblast Disciplinary and Qualification Collegia shall be created to award qualification classes to judges and to resolve issues of discipline or liability of judges or terminating the powers of a judge.

Creating and organizing the work of the Disciplinary and Qualification Collegia, and the procedure for considering disciplinary cases, shall be determined by regulations to be approved by the president.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II (with changes and additions as of Dec. 11, 2006) Article 38

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference by the executive and legislative branches.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry or legislative committee.

37e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

37f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

38. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

46

38a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

Comments:

On the basis of the current law, persons authorized to perform state functions — all officials, deputies of Parliament, judges — and persons equal to them bear the responsibility for corruption offenses.

Members of the national-level judiciary are related to state employees. They are obligated to file an asset-disclosure form.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 3

YES: A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

38b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:

On the basis of the current law, persons authorized to perform state functions — all officials, deputies of Parliament, judges — and persons equal to them bear the responsibility for corruption offenses.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 3

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

38c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

There is no such requirement in law, so the score is no. The law relating to the struggle against corruption has no provision requiring an independent audit of members of the national-level judiciary s asset-disclosure forms.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 9

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

38d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

Neither contain articles restricting national-level judges from being engaged by the private sector after they leave the government.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

38e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

38f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

38g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

In practice, national-level judges' asset-disclosures are audited because national-level judges are state employees. This is regulated by the law on the struggle against corruption.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

39. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

0

39a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

Comments:

All disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary are secret, so they are not available to citizens.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in

accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 9

YES: A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

39b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

39c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

III-4. Budget Processes

40. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

75

40a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the status of its deputies, Oct. 16, 1995, #2529 (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on June 19, 2007), Article 16

YES: A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

NO: A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

40b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

75:

50: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

25:

0: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

40c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

75:

50: Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

25:

0: Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

41. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

25

41a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

75:

50: There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

25:

0: Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

41b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

75:

50: Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

25:

0: Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

41c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

75:

50: Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

25:

0: Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

43. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

58

43a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

75:

50: Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

25:

0: There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

43b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

75:

50: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

25:

0: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

43c. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

Comments:

Parliamentary law does not contain any articles or provisions requiring the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds or initiating independent investigations into financial irregularities to be competent.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

75:

50: The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

42. Is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

42. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

References:

Decision of the Bureau of Mazhilis, Parliament of Republic Kazakhstan, Nov. 20, 2007, Appendix 1, 72-IV

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

IV-1. ⁸¹ Civil Service Regulations

44. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

44a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

Comments:

State service in the Republic of Kazakhstan is based on principles of

- 1) legality.
- 2) Kazakhstani patriotism.
- 3) uniting state service despite the division of the government into legislative, executive and judicial branches.
- 4) priority of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens before the interests of the state.

- 5) equal right of citizens to access state services and promotion to state service based on abilities and vocational training.
- 6) citizens voluntarily entering state service.
- 7) professionalism and competence of civil servants.
- 8) equal payment for performing equivalent work.
- 9) subordinate civil servants and those serving subordinate state bodies executing the decisions made by higher state bodies and officials within their powers.
- 10) accountability of civil servants.
- 11) responding to public opinion and publicity, except of when the activity is a state secret or other secret protected by law.
- 12) legal and social security of civil servants.
- 13) civil servants being diligent and taking initiative when executing their official duties, especially when the task is of special importance and complexity.
- 14) taking personal responsibility for default or inadequate execution of official duties or exercising more power than the civil servant has.
- 15) continually improving civil servants professional skills.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 3

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

44b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

Comments:

Officials and other persons authorized to conduction state functions, and the persons equal to them (except for the persons specified in sub-item 4 of item 3 of article 3 of the present law), cannot occupy positions that are directly subordinate to posts occupied with their close relatives (parents, children, adoptive children, both full and not full siblings, grandparents, grandchildren or spouse) except for the cases stipulated by legislation.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 11

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

44c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

Comments:

In cases of illegal discharge, administrative civil servants have the right to appeal to the authorized body and to the courts for judicial protection his/her rights and freedoms. The authorized body” in the context of civil service means the administrative civil servant’s direct boss or supervisor, the head of the body, or a higher level body that controls the activities of the body in question.

Change of political civil servants cannot be the basis for terminating an administrative civil servant.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 27

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. The mechanism should be independent of their supervisors but can still be located within the government agency or entity (such as a special commission or board). Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism’s decisions to the judiciary.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

44d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

Comments:

Political civil servants retire on the bases and in the order established by the Constitution, current law and other legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Infringement of official powers or committing offenses not compatible with working for a state service cannot be the basis for a political civil servant’s resignation. These are grounds for dismissal. The bases for and the order of dismissal of political civil servants are determined by the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 26

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist or if the ban is not a lifetime ban.

45. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

45a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

75:

50: Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

25:

0: Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

45b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

45c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

75:

50: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

25:

0: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

45d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable representation of positions in terms of a person's authority, responsibility and base pay.

75:

50: Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

25:

0: Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

45e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

75:

50: Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

25:

0: Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

45f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

75:

50: The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

25:

0: The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

45g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

Comments:

Although there is no independent redress mechanism in the civil service, civil servants can appeal to the general court system.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

75:

50: The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

45h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

75:

50: In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

25:

0: In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

45i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective. Some bans are only temporary.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

46. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

64

46a. In law, senior members of the civil service are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

Comments:

Candidates for state-service posts or for a post connected with performing an equal function, submit an income declaration to a tax body.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 9

YES: A YES score is earned if senior members of the civil service are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

NO: A NO score is earned if any senior member of the civil service is not required to disclose assets.

46b. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

Comments:

Civil servants have no right to represent third parties' affairs in the state body in which they are in service or that is directly subordinate to them or under their inspection. Nor can they use their connections or official powers in the personal service of citizens or organizations.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 10

YES: A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

NO: A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

46c. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

No law restricts civil servants from entering the private sector after leaving the government.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

46d. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 13

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

46e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of senior members of the civil service.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 10

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

46f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off” period.

75:

50: The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

25:

0: The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

46g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

75:

50: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

25:

0: The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

46h. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

75:

50: The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

25:

0: Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

46i. In practice, civil service asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Civil service asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

75:

50: Civil service asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

25:

0: Civil service asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

47. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

47a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | **NO**

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 9

YES: A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

NO: A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

47b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

47c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

48. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

75

48a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

Comments:

The person informed about a corruption offense or otherwise helping in the struggle against corruption is under protection of the state.

Information about people helping in the struggle against corruption is a state secret. Such information can be released only to the bodies specified in points 2 and 4a of article 6 of the current law or by a court as established by the law. Disclosure of this information is the responsibility of the body or person who releases it, as established by the law.

If necessary, the personal safety of people helping in the struggle against corruption is provided by the bodies conducting the fight against corruption.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 7

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

48b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

48c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

Comments:

The person informed about a corruption offense or otherwise helping in the struggle against corruption is under protection of the state.

Information about people helping in the struggle against corruption is a state secret. Such information can be released only to the bodies specified in points 2 and 4a of article 6 of the current law or by a court as established by the law. Disclosure of this information is the responsibility of the body or person who releases it, as established by the law.

If necessary, the personal safety of people helping in the struggle against corruption is provided by the bodies conducting the fight against corruption.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 7

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

48d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

50. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

100

50a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

50b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

50c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues

can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

50d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

49. Is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

100

49. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | NO

Comments:

The authorized body carries out its mandate with an eye toward economic safety and management, and also within the limits stipulated by the legislation. Inter-governmental-branch coordination helps prevent revealing, suppression, disclosing and investigation of economic, financial and corruption crimes and offenses.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the bodies of financial police of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions as of May 22, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

92
IV-3. Procurement

51. Is the public procurement process effective?

70

51a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government purchases (with additions of July 5, .2008), Article 6

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

51b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:

The Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (the Special Part) (as of June 19, 2007) has no articles mandating professional training for public procurement officials.

YES: A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process. A YES score is earned if such training is mandated for portions of the broader civil service, to include procurement officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

51c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

25:

0: Conflict-of-interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government purchases (with additions of July 5, 2008), Article 15

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

51e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

References:

The Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (the Special Part) (as of June 19, 2007), Article 910

YES: A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

NO: A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).

51f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

YES | **NO**

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government purchases (with additions of July 5, 2008), Article 12

YES: A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

51g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government purchases (with additions of July 5, 2008), Article 45

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on mortgage of real estate, Dec. 23, 1995, #2723 (with changes and additions of July 26, 2007), Article 33

YES: A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO

Comments:

Malicious violation of the established procedure for conducting public tenders and auctions that cause considerable damage to a given proprietor; organizer of tenders or auctions; buyer; or other economic entity shall be punished by a fine between 500 and 2000 monthly assessment indices or by restriction of freedom for up to three years.

References:

Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions of July 21, 2007), Article 197

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, designed to prevent convicted companies from doing business with the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

75:

50: A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

25:

0: There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

52. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

100

52a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

Comments:

The data contained in registers about state purchases are placed on a public website and should be accessible to interested persons without a payment, except for data that are state secrets or are otherwise protected by law.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government purchases (with additions of July 5, 2008), Article 11

YES: A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

NO: A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

52b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on government purchases (with additions of July 5, 2008), Article 18

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

52c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

52d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

52e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

52f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

100: Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

75:

50: Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

25:

0: This information is not available to the public through an official process.

IV-4. Privatization

53. Is the privatization process effective?

83

53a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

YES | NO

Comments:

Privatization means sale of state property to physical, nongovernmental and foreign organizations within the framework established by the present law and in the order it determines.

Objects of privatization include

- 1) a property complex.
- 2) industrial units, both non-productive divisions and structural units, of a property complex where privatization does not break the closed technological cycle.
- 3) property.
- 4) shares.
- 5) shares or authorized capital in business organizations.
- 6) derivative securities certifying the rights on shares belonging to the state.
- 7) other state property fixed behind official bodies, in the order established by the government.

Objects of privatization cannot include state property that, according to acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, can be only in a state ownership, as well as state property that is not subject to privatization according to decisions made by the president and/or government of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

State property becomes the object of privatization from the date of the decision on its privatization by the state body authorized to dispose of the property.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on privatization, Dec. 23, 1995, # 2721, Chapter 1, Article 5

YES: A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

53b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state service, July 23, 1999, #453-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 10

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

53c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

75:

50: Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

25:

0: Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

54. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

54a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on privatization, Dec. 23, 1995, # 2721 (with changes and additions as of Jan. 9, 2007)
Article 3

YES: A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

NO: A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

54b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

75:

50: There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

25:

0: There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

54c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

Comments:

The main principles of carrying out privatization are publicity, competition, the responsibility of officials to legality carry out privatization and the reliability of the data submitted about the objects for sale.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on privatization, Dec. 23, 1995, # 2721, Article 4

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

54d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

Category V. Oversight and Regulation

V-1. ⁸⁴National Ombudsman

56. Is the national ombudsman effective?

66

56a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

References:

Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on establishment of a post of the Ombudsman, Sept. 19, 2002, #94 7(with alterations in accordance with the state on Aug. 29, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Appointment to and removal from this post are made by the president.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

75:

50: This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

56c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

56g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

Comments:

The chairman of the Human Rights Commission is not independent in his activity.

There is almost no evidence showing that the chairman of the Human Rights Commission has initiated an investigation.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

56i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

75:

50: The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

56j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Ombudsman's reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman's reports do not lead to policy changes.

56k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

57. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

50

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | **NO**

References:

Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on establishment of the post of Representative of Human Rights, Sept. 19, 2002, #947 (with alterations in accordance with the state on Aug. 29, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

NO: A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

57b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

55. Is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

Comments:

The Commission for Human Rights is independent in carrying out its activity.

The Representative on Human Rights has no branches in other cities of Kazakhstan.

The Ombudsmen Act has not yet been adopted in Kazakhstan.

References:

Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 19, 2002, #947, on approval of the post of Commissioner for Human Rights (as amended as of Aug. 29, 2006)

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

59. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

84

59a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

Comments:

The main principals of auditor activity are
independence.
objectivity.
professional competence.
confidentiality.
honesty.
observance of standards of organizations and their code of ethics.

Other principles of auditor activity are determined according to international auditor practice, unless laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan contradict the principals

References:

Law of Republic Kazakhstan on auditor activity, Nov. 20, 1998, #304-I (with changes and additions as of Feb. 19, 2007), Article 4

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

59b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

59c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

59e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

59f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

59g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

75:

50: In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

25:

0: Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

59h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

75:

50: The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

25:

0: The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

60. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

33

60a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

References:

Law of Republic Kazakhstan on auditor activity, Nov. 20, 1998, #304-I (with changes and additions as of Feb. 19, 2007), Article 5

YES: A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

NO: A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

60b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Kazakhstani citizens do not have access to audit reports within a reasonable time period. There is a range of limitations to access, according to the laws on state secrets and auditing activity.

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

60c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

Comments:

Kazakhstani citizens do not have access to audit reports within a reasonable time period. There is a range of limitations to access, according to the laws on state secrets and auditing activity.

References:

Alibekov Saylau- professor of Kazakh University of the international Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Kazakh University of international Relations and World Languages, Almaty, 2008

Kozyreva Evgeniya- President of Feminist League”, August, 4-2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

58. Is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

58. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

Comments:

The government determines which authorized state body regulates auditor activity and also determines for which organizations an audit is obligatory, if it is not otherwise stipulated by acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

References:

Law of Republic Kazakhstan on auditor activity, Nov. 20, 1998, #304-I (with changes and additions as of Feb. 19, 2007), Article 6

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

73
V-3. Taxes and Customs

62. Is the tax collection agency effective?

100

62a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

65. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

100

65a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

61. Is there a national tax collection agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

Comments:

The task is assigned to tax bodies to maintain the completeness of tax receipts and other obligatory payments to the budget, the completeness and timeliness of the transfer of obligatory pension payments and social deductions to the state fund for social insurance, and to assure payment by taxpayers of their tax obligations.

References:

Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan on taxes and other obligatory payments in the budget (Tax code) (with changes and additions in accordance with the state of Jan. 1, 2008), Article 15

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

63. Are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

75

63. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:

50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

25:

0: Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

64. Is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

64. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

Comments:

The government formed a committee of customs control within the Ministry of Finance with the assignment to reorganize the agency of customs control.

References:

Act of the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Oct. 29, 2004, #1133: Questions from the Committee of Customs Control to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions as of Nov. 30, 2005)

Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan about measures on the further perfection of the system of government of the Republic of Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

NO: A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

66. Are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100

66. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

75:

50: Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

25:

0: Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

V-4. State-Owned Enterprises

68. Is the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

70

68a. In law, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

According to the constitutional law on the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "the government itself oversees state-owned companies.

The Government of the Republic shall

5) develop and implement measures to strengthen the financial system; provide state control over the establishment and utilization of state currency and financial and material resources.

8) organize management of state property, work out and implement measures on its use and protect state property.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 18, 1995, #2688, About the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions as of June 19, 2007), Article 9

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency.

68b. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau- professor of Kazakh University of the international Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Kazakh University of international Relations and World Languages, Almaty, 2008

Kozyreva Evgeniya- President of Feminist League”, August, 4-2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

68c. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau- professor of Kazakh University of the international Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Kazakh University of international Relations and World Languages, Almaty, 2008

Kozyreva Evgeniya- President of Feminist League”, August, 4-2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

68d. In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

75:

50: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

68e. In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

75:

50: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be partisan in its application of power.

69. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

80

69a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | NO

Comments:

The law contains no articles that allow citizens access to the financial records of state-owned companies.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 18, 1995, #2688, (with changes and additions as of June 19, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

69b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: State-owned companies always publicly disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

75:

50: State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, file the information behind schedule, or not publicly disclose certain data.

25:

0: Financial data is not publicly available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

69c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

75:

50: Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

25:

0: State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

69d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

75:

50: Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

69e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

67. Is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

100

67. In law, is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | NO

Comments:

The Government of the Republic shall

5) develop and implement measures to strengthen the financial system; provide state control over the establishment and utilization of state currency and financial and material resources.

6) develop structural and investment policy.

8) organize management of state property, work out and implement measures on its use and protect state property.

References:

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 18, 1995, #2688, About the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions as of June 19, 2007), Article 9

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. A YES score can be earned if several government agencies or ministries oversee different state-owned enterprises. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

NO: A NO score is earned if this function does not exist, or if some state-owned companies are free from government oversight.

83
V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

70. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

100

70a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

YES | NO

Comments:

Licensing is carried out with equally for all persons who meet the requirements established for the given kind of activity.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, About licensing (with changes from July 27, 2007), Article 4

YES: A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

NO: A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required

70b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

Comments:

If a business license is denied, a written explanation of the terms established for licensing and/or attachments to the license.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, About licensing (with changes from July 27, 2007), Article 45

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

70c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

75:

50: Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

25:

0: Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

70d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

71. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?

100

71a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on licensing (with changes of July 27, 2007), Chapter 5, Article 42

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on licensing (with changes of July 27, 2007), Chapter 5, Article 42

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on licensing (with changes of July 27, 2007), Chapter 5, Article 42

YES: A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

NO: A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

72. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?

92

72a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

88
VI-1. Anti-Corruption Law

73. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

89

73a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Provocation of commercial payoff is an attempt to transfer to a person carrying out administrative functions in commercial or other organizations, without his consent, money, property or advantages for the purpose of providing false evidence of a crime or blackmail. This is punishable by a fine of 100 300 monthly settlement parameters or of a rate of salary or other income for a period of one to three months, or imprisonment for 5 years with or without confiscation of property.

References:

Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions of July 21, 2007), Article 349

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 25, 2003, #484-11 (see old wording)

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73b. In law, extortion is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Extortion is the required transfer of another's property or to right property, or performance of other actions of property under the threat of violence, or destruction or damage of another's property. Equally it is the threat to distribute information defaming the victim or his/her relatives, or other information that can cause essential harm to the interests of the victim or his /her relatives. It is punished by restriction of freedom for 3 years, or arrest for 6 months, or imprisonment for 4 years and a financial penalty.

References:

Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions of July 21, 2007), Article 181

YES: A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Giving a bribe to a person authorized to perform state functions, or to the person equal to him personally, or through an intermediary. It is punished by a fine or imprisonment for up to 3 years.

References:

Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions of July 21, 2007), Article 312.

YES: A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

A bribe is offering money, other property, the right to property or benefits of property to someone authorized to perform state functions, or a person equal to him, personally or through an intermediary, to induce action or inaction that benefits the briber or persons represented by him is illegal. It is punished by a fine or restriction of freedom for up to 5 years, or by imprisonment for 5 years and being deprived of the right to occupy certain posts or to engage in certain activity for up to 5 years, with or without confiscation of property.

References:

Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions of July 21, 2007), Article 311

YES: A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Neither document contains articles regulating cases of bribery of foreign officials.

References:

Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions of July 21, 2007)

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Neither document contains articles regulating cases of using public resources for private gain.

References:

Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with changes and additions of July 21, 2007)

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Corruption includes persons authorized to perform public functions or those having equivalent status using their official powers to

settle issues to obtain material interests for said person or his/her close relatives. It also includes unreasonably withholding, delaying, or transferring incomplete or inaccurate information from individuals and legal entities that law requires be provided.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 12

YES: A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Committing financial operations and other transactions with money, resources or other property gained by obviously means, and using above-mentioned means or property for the owner s or others economic gain are punished by a fine or arrest for up to 6 months, or a fine and imprisonment for 3 years.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 193

YES: A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

YES | NO

Comments:

Law contains no articles regulating conspiracy to commit illegalities (i.e., organized crime).

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007)

YES: A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

NO: A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

75. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

75

75a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

Finance Police Bodies are special state bodies carrying out law-enforcement activity aimed at the prevention, revelation, suppression, disclosure and investigation of criminal and other illegal encroachments on human rights and other interests of society and the state in the sphere of economic and financial activity, the struggle against corruption by carrying out operations, including searches, preliminary investigation and inquiry, and administrative deals outlined by established law.

References:

Act on Finance Police Bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan (as subsequently amended as of May 22, 2007, Chapter 1

Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Jan. 23, 2006, #29: On assignment of chairman of the Agency Struggling Against Economic and Corruption Criminality (finance police)

YES: A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

NO: A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

75b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

100: This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

75:

50: This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

75c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

75:

50: The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

25:

0: The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

75d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

75e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

75f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

75g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

75h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

75i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

76. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

88

76a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

76b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

75:

50: Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

25:

0: Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

74. Is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

74. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES

NO

Comments:

The Agency on the Struggle Against Economic and Corruption Criminality (financial police) is the state body that maintains the economic safety of the administration. It is directly subordinate and accountable to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It works within the limits stipulated by legislation.

References:

Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, April, 21, 2005, #1557

YES: A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

NO: A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

88
VI-3. Rule of Law

77. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

75

77a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES

NO

Comments:

The purposes of judicial authority are to protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens and organizations; and to ensure execution of the Constitution, laws, other normative legal acts and international agreements.

Judicial protection is guaranteed to everyone against wrongful decisions and actions of state bodies, organizations, and official and other persons restraining or limiting the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests stipulated by the Constitution and laws.

By law, no one can be deprived of the right to consideration of his/her affair by a valid, competent, independent and impartial court.

Judicial authority is carried out by means of civil, criminal and other forms of legal proceedings established by law.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II

(with changes and additions in accordance with the state on Dec. 11, 2006), Section 1, Article 1

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

77b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

75:

50: Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

25:

0: Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

77c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees are not a barrier to appeals.

75:

50: In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees present somewhat of a barrier to pursuing appeal.

25:

0: The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments. Attorneys fees greatly discourage the use of the appeals process.

78. Do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100

78. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

75:

50: Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

25:

0: Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

79. Are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100

79. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

100: Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

80. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

63

80a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

Comments:

Judges are independent and enforce only the Constitution and law.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II

(with changes and additions in accordance with the state on Dec. 11, 2006), Article 1

YES: A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts).

NO: A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

80b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

100: National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

75:

50: National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

25:

0: National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

80c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

YES | **NO**

Comments:

Law contains no articles providing a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national -level judges.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II

(with changes and additions in accordance with the state on Dec. 11, 2006)

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted by referendum on Aug. 30,1995 (with alterations and additions in accordance with the state on May 21, 2007

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

NO: A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

80d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

YES | NO

Comments:

Grounds for termination of a judge s powers are

- 1) the judge s resignation or discharge from office pursuant to his own wish.
- 2) a state of health impeding further performance of professional duties, in accordance with a medical opinion.

- 3) recognizing the judge as legally incapable or restrictedly incapable, or applying compulsory measures of a medical nature to him.
 - 4) conviction of a judge.
 - 5) loss of citizenship in the Republic of Kazakhstan.
 - 6) death of the judge or a court decision recognizing him as deceased.
 - 7) appointment or election of the judge to another position or his transfer to another job.
- abolishment of the court or expiration of powers, if the judge does not agree to take up a vacant position as judge in another court.

The powers of a judge may be terminated due to a decision of a disciplinary and qualification collegium of judges on the need of discharge the judge from office for disciplinary misconduct or failure to meet the requirements stipulated in Article 28 of this law.

The powers of the chairman of a court or the chairman of a collegium may be terminated early if they fail to meet the requirements stipulated in Articles 9, 14, 15, 20, 21 and 28 of this law.

The decision to discharge a judge from office shall be made by

- 1) a resolution of the Senate, after input from the chairmen of the judicial collegia and judges of the Supreme Court, pursuant to a proposal by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
- 2) a decree by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, after input from the chairmen of the collegia and a judge of oblast courts, and the chairman and a judge of a district court.

References:

Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the judicial system and the status of judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 25, 2000, #132-II (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on Dec. 11, 2006), Article 34

YES: A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

NO: A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

81. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

81a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

81b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

NO: A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

82. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

93

82a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

75:

50: Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

25:

0: Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

82b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

75:

50: Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

25:

0: Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

82c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

Comments:

Citizens can be exempted from payment for legal assistance due to their financial situation.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on advocacy, Dec. 5, 1997, #195-I (with alterations and additions in accordance with the state on May 22, 2007), Article 6

YES: A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

82d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

75:

50: State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

25:

0: State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

82e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to citizens.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most citizens from bringing a case.

82f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to small businesses.

75:

50: In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

25:

0: The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most small businesses from bringing a case.

82g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

75:

50: Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

25:

0: Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

VI-4. Law Enforcement

83. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

75

83a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

75:

50: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

25:

0: Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

83b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

25:

0: The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

83c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

75:

50: The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

25:

0: The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

84. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

96

84a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

Comments:

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan (MIAK) has created a public council to control police activity. The council's work will be directed toward increasing bodies of internal affairs' effectiveness.

References:

Astana, May 4, 2007, Kazakhstan Today

YES: A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

NO: A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

84b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

75:

50: The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

25:

0: The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

84c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on fighting against corruption, July, 2, 1998, #267-I (with changes and additions in accordance with the state on July 27, 2007), Article 6. Bodies, carrying out the struggle with corruption

Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, April 21, 2005 #1557: Questions of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Struggle with Economic and Corruption Criminality (of the financial police)

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 26, 1995, Article 17-1, Item 2, Sub-item 1: About the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

YES: A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

NO: A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

84d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

75:

50: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

84e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES | NO

Comments:

Law regulates the possibility of making law-enforcement officials immune from criminal proceedings.

References:

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on law-enforcement bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 21, 1995, #2707 (with alterations and additions in accordance with the state on July 7, 2007) r

YES: A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

NO: A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

84f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

References:

Alibekov Saylau, professor, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, July, 20, 2008, Almaty

Kozyreva Evgeniya, president of the Feminist League, Aug. 4, 2008, Almaty, Kazakhstan

100: Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

75:

50: Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

25:

0: Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.
