

Overall Score:

**56 - Very Weak**

Legal Framework Score:

**77 - Moderate**

Actual Implementation Score:

**36 - Very Weak**

Category I. Civil Society, Public Information and Media

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## I-1. <sup>66</sup>Civil Society Organizations

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### 1. Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?

67

1a. In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

**YES** | NO

#### References:

Law on Non Governmental Organizations, Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 27/99, 09/02, 30/02, 11/07

Local version of the law is available at [http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&ct=res&cd=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gom.cg.yu%2Ffiles%2F1201611154.pdf&ei=sR6BSNHrMISs8ATb0qjZCw&usg=AFQjCNEvi3B7JFRIY8yQ&sig2=vyi\\_DH8n97vgaVmU0Cz2rQ](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&ct=res&cd=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gom.cg.yu%2Ffiles%2F1201611154.pdf&ei=sR6BSNHrMISs8ATb0qjZCw&usg=AFQjCNEvi3B7JFRIY8yQ&sig2=vyi_DH8n97vgaVmU0Cz2rQ)

**YES:** A YES score is earned when freedom to assemble into groups promoting good governance or anti-corruption is protected by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent group is legally prohibited from organizing to promote good governance or anti-corruption. These groups may include non-violent separatist groups, political parties or religious groups.

1b. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.

**YES** | NO

#### Comments:

The law on NGOs says that NGOs can obtain donations from local and international donors. There are no restrictions in any legislation regarding donations to NGOs.

**References:**

Law on Non Governmental Organizations, Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 27/99, 09/02, 30/02, 11/07

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs face no legal or regulatory restrictions to raise or accept funds from any foreign or domestic sources. A YES score may still be earned if funds from groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there any formal legal or regulatory bans on foreign or domestic funding sources for CSOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance.

1c. In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to disclose their sources of funding.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

NGOs are required, like all other legal entities, to submit their financial statements to the government, but financial statements do not include information on sources of income, including donor information.

**References:**

There is no such requirement by any law.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are required to publicly disclose their sources of funding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such public disclosure requirement exists.

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## 2. Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?

67

2a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Quote from the Freedom House report: Some NGOs have complained that the success of their efforts have led to harassment and threats from the police and government bodies."

**References:**

Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2008, Lisa McLean, [http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh\\_galleries/NIT2008/NT-Montenegro-final.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2008/NT-Montenegro-final.pdf)

Dailz Vijesti, Aug. 3, 2007, VIJESTI", POTPREDSJEDNICA VLADE U PISMU ME UNARODNIM INSTITUCIJAMA TE' KO

OPTUJILA DIREKTORKU MANSA: urovi: alovi radi protiv interesa

dr-ave" <http://www.mans.cg.yu/MANS/press/2007/Avgust2007/03.htm>

Mina News Agency, March 13, 2007, "Nepoznata lica fizi ki napala aktiviste"

Daily Novine, Oct. 27, 2006, Broj prislukavanih nije dr-avna tajna, [www.novine.ca/arhiva/2006/1076/region.asp](http://www.novine.ca/arhiva/2006/1076/region.asp)

Voice of America, April 22, 2007, "Istra-iva u ljudskih prava u Crnoj Gori Aleksandru Zekovi u ~ivot ugro-en"

**100:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government, other than voluntary registration.

**75:**

**50:** CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption must go through formal steps to form, requiring interaction with the state such as licenses or registration. Formation is possible, though there is some burden on the CSO. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Other than pro-government groups, CSOs focused on promoting good governance or anti-corruption are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

2b. In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.

100 | **75** | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Although only a few NGOs are actively engaged in the fight against corruption, they do succeed in shaping public opinion. In particular, the NGO MANS is succeeding in keeping the issue of fighting corruption high on politicians' agendas. It is also doing this through media releases.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview over Main Problems and Status of Reforms, Marijana Trivunovic, Vera Devine, Harald Mathisen, Chr. Michelsen Institute

Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2008, Lisa McLean, [http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh\\_galleries/NIT2008/NT-Montenegro-final.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2008/NT-Montenegro-final.pdf)

**100:** Civil society organizations focused on anti-corruption or good governance are an essential component of the political process. CSOs provide widely valued insights and have political power. Those CSOs play a leading role in shaping public opinion on political matters.

**75:**

**50:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are active, but may not be relevant to political decisions or the policymaking process. Those CSOs are willing to articulate opinions on political matters, but have little access to decision makers. They have some influence over public opinion, but considerably less than political figures.

**25:**

**0:** Anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are effectively prohibited from engaging in the political process. Those CSOs are unwilling to take positions on political issues. They are not relevant to changes in public opinion.

2c. In practice, no anti-corruption/good governance CSOs have been shut down by the government for their work on corruption-related issues during the study period.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

There are no such cases recorded in any Montenegrin media or by any NGOs.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSOs shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of their work on corruption-related issues during the study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any CSO has been effectively shut down by the government or forced to cease operations because of its work on corruption-related issues during the study period. The causal relationship between the cessation of operations and the CSO's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the CSO was forced to cease operations due to its work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

### 3. Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?

33

3a. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Veselin Bajceta was arrested during one of MANS campaigns and imprisoned for several hours.

**References:**

Daily Vijesti , May 13, 2008, Dr~ava u slu~bi mo nika”

Daily Dan, May 27, 2008, Baj eta odbacio optu~be

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no CSO activists imprisoned because of their work covering corruption. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any activist was jailed in relation to work covering corruption. The causal relationship between the official charges and the person’s work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the person was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned” is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

3b. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

MANS activists were assaulted while collecting citizens signatures for one of MANS actions. The police have never found those who committed that crime, although it happened in front of numerous witnesses.

**References:**

One World, March 13, 2007, Nepoznati lica gi napadnale aktiviste na MANS”

Mina News Agency, March 13, 2007, “Nepoznata lica fizi ki napala aktiviste”

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists covering corruption being assaulted in the specific study period. A YES score can be earned if there was an attack but it was clearly unrelated to the activist’s work. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period of assault to an activist who covers corruption. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

3c. In practice, in the past year, no civil society activists working on corruption issues have been killed.

YES | NO

**References:**

There were no such cases documented in the media.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of CSO activists being killed because of their work covering corruption in the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases during the study period where a person was killed related to a corruption trial, scandal or investigation. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's history may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is reasonable that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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#### 4. Can citizens organize into trade unions?

63

4a. In law, citizens have a right to organize into trade unions.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Article 53 of the Montenegrin Constitution guarantees the right to every citizen to form and join to trade unions.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, article 53

**YES:** A YES score is earned when trade unions are allowed by law, regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives. Groups with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) may be banned. Groups sympathetic to or related to banned groups must be allowed if they have no history of violence.

**NO:** A NO score is earned when any single non-violent trade union is legally prohibited by the government from organizing.

4b. In practice, citizens are able to organize into trade unions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In 2007 there was a split in the trade union confederation, but the government continues to consider the Confederation of Trade Unions of Montenegro its only social partner, although throughout the transition process it was not able to achieve any significant improvement of workers rights. In fact, the deterioration of existing social rights (eg. social benefits, people with disabilities, minimum wages, etc.) seems to be silently accepted.

**References:**

Trade Union of Teachers, 2007, exact date not known, Reform of Trade Union cannot be stopped", <http://www.prosvjetasind.cg.yu/mala%20sindikalna%20retrospektiva.pdf>

Daily Pobjeda, June 2, 2007. "Panika u redovima vje itog predsjednika i njegovih sljedbenika"

**100:** Trade unions are common and are an important part of the political process and political discourse. Trade union organizers have widely understood rights. Trade unions are free from intimidation or violence.

**75:**

**50:** Trade unions exist, but are not always relevant to politics or policy debates. Barriers to organizing trade unions exist, such as intimidation at work, or retribution firings. Trade union organizers have some rights, but these may not be commonly

known, or are difficult to defend.

25:

0: Trade unions are rare. Significant barriers to organization exist, including direct violence. Rights of union organizers are not widely known, or are ineffective in protecting organizers.

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## I-2. Media

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### 5. Are media and free speech protected?

100

5a. In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The constitution guarantees the freedom of the press.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, article 49

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of the press is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any specific publication relating to government affairs is legally banned, or any general topic is prohibited from publication. Specific restrictions on media regarding privacy or slander are allowed, but not if these amount to legal censorship of a general topic, such as corruption or defense. A NO score is earned if non-government media is prohibited or restricted.

5b. In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The constitution gives everyone the right to free speech.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, article 47

**YES:** A YES score is earned if freedom of individual speech is guaranteed in law, including to all political parties, religions, and ideologies.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any individual speech is legally prohibited, regardless of topic. Specific exceptions for speech linked with a criminal act, such as a prohibition on death threats, are allowed. However, any non-specific prohibition earns a NO score.

## 6. Are citizens able to form print media entities?

100

6a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

There were no reported cases of prohibition of printed media.

### References:

Daily Vijesti", "Dan", "Pobjeda"

**100:** Print media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. This score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of print media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur.

**25:**

**0:** Print media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear.

6b. In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

YES | NO

### References:

Law on Media, Law on Radio Diffusion

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied print media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no print license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for print media licenses.

6c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### References:

Interview with Boris Darmanovic, Association of Young Journalists

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

6d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Boris Darmanovic, Association of Young Journalists

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

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## 7. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?

38

7a. In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency responsible for providing channels to broadcast media did not provide them to one of independent TV station, TV Vijesti. The agency claimed there were not enough channels.

However other broadcasters, such as TV Fox, have obtained channels that were outside of its contract. The owner of one of the BBM cable television company, Vesko Barovic, who is famous Montenegrin tycoon, has refused to let TV Vijesti broadcast over his cable network.

**References:**

<http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/index.php?id=278868>, <http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/index.php?id=275314>

<http://www.cafemontenegro.cg.yu/index.php?group=25&news=25148>, <http://www.bizniscg.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13829>

**100:** Broadcast media entities can freely organize with little to no interaction with the government. Media groups have equal access to broadcast bandwidth through a reasonably fair distribution system. This score may still be earned if groups or



individuals with a history of political violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming media entities.

**75:**

**50:** Formation of broadcast media groups is possible, though there is some burden on the media group including overly complicated registration or licensing requirements. Some unofficial barriers, such as harassment of minority groups, may occur. Division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be somewhat unfair.

**25:**

**0:** Broadcast media groups are effectively prohibited, either by official requirements or by unofficial means, such as intimidation or fear. This score is appropriate if the division of broadcast bandwidth is widely viewed to be used as a political tool.

7b. In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on Radio Diffusion, article 40

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is, in law or in accompanying regulations, a formal process to appeal a denied broadcast media license, including through the courts. A YES score is also earned if no broadcast license is necessary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no appeal process for broadcast media licenses.

7c. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

The agency responsible for providing channels to broadcast media did not provide them to one of independent TV station, TV Vijesti. The agency claimed there were not enough channels..

However other broadcasters, such as TV Fox, have obtained channels that were outside of its contract. The owner of one of the BBM cable television company, Vesko Barovic, who is famous Montenegrin tycoon, has refused to let TV Vijesti broadcast over his cable network.

**References:**

<http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/index.php?id=278868>

<http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/index.php?id=275314>

<http://www.cafemontenegro.cg.yu/index.php?group=25&news=25148>

<http://www.biznis.cg.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13829>

**100:** Licenses are not required or licenses can be obtained within two months.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes more than two months. Some groups may be delayed up to six months.

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes close to or more than one year for most groups.

7d. In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency responsible for providing channels to broadcast media did not provide them to one of independent TV station, TV Vijesti. The agency claimed there were not enough channels.

However other broadcasters, such as TV Fox, have obtained channels that were outside of its contract. The owner of one of the BBM cable television company, Vesko Barovic, who is famous Montenegrin tycoon, has refused to let TV Vijesti broadcast over his cable network.

**References:**

<http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/index.php?id=278868>  
<http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/index.php?id=275314>  
<http://www.cafemontenegro.cg.yu/index.php?group=25&news=25148>  
<http://www.bizniscg.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13829>

**100:** Licenses are not required or can be obtained at minimal cost to the organization. Licenses can be obtained on-line or through the mail.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

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## 8. Can citizens freely use the Internet?

100

8a. In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published on-line.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such cases were reported.

**100:** The government does not prevent Internet users from accessing online content. While some forms of content may be illegal to download or own (such as child pornography), the government does not manipulate networks to prevent access to this information. This indicator addresses direct government intervention in the transfer of information, not indirect deterrents such as intimidation, surveillance or technical difficulties in countries with poor infrastructure.

**75:**

**50:** Internet users are prevented by the government from reaching online content in some cases. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

**25:**

**0:** Internet users are routinely prevented from accessing online content. Government restrictions are in place at all times for certain topics. Government tactics may include firewalls preventing access to networks in other countries, or manipulating

search engine results to exclude politically sensitive topics.

8b. In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content on-line.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such cases were reported.

**100:** The government never removes online information or disables servers due to their political content. All political speech is protected with limited exceptions, such as legitimate intellectual property restrictions; direct calls to violence; or pornography.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the government restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly restricts political speech by its citizens on the Internet. This is accomplished either directly by controlling servers hosting the restricted content, or indirectly through threats or intimidation against the persons posting political content.

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## 9. Are the media able to report on corruption?

58

9a. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The criminal code states that if one has reason to believe information that was published is true and it provided a critique to protect public good, they will not be prosecuted for a criminal act.

**References:**

Criminal Code of Montenegro

**YES:** A YES score is earned if it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of damage to their reputations. Public figures are defined broadly, including anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; any political leader; leaders of civil society groups including religious groups, trade unions, or NGOs; leaders or officers of large businesses. A YES score can still be earned if a reckless disregard for the truth (i.e. slander) is prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privacy laws protect any public figures (as defined in the YES coding) from accurate information.

9b. In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

**Comments:**

The Freedom House Report says, A lawyer from the NGO Action for Human Rights believes that having failed to seriously investigate and punish murders, physical attacks, and threats directed to the critics of the government, the competent authorities have created an atmosphere of fear where only the courageous dare speak up, which is a drastic limitation of freedom of expression to the detriment of democratic society in Montenegro.”

According to current law, the penalty for slander in criminal cases can be up to 14,000 dinars, while there are no limits for slander in civil suits.

DPS president Milo ukanovi filed a 1 million dinar civil suit against Vijesti, Ivanovi, and the paper’s editor for mental injury to his reputation and dignity owing to public statements by Ivanovi and a strong editorial in Vijesti that blamed the DPS president for the attack on Ivanovi .

**References:**

Freedom House Report: Nations in Transit 2008, [http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh\\_galleries/NIT2008/NT-Montenegro-final.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2008/NT-Montenegro-final.pdf)

**100:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make no attempt to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means.

**75:**

**50:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups make some attempts to restrict media coverage of corruption-related issues through unofficial means, such as restricting access by disfavored media outlets, or other short-term consequences. Violent reprisals against media outlets are rare.

**25:**

**0:** The government, its proxies, or media ownership/distribution groups actively use illegal methods to restrict reporting of corruption-related issues. This may include harassment, arrests, and threats. Journalists and publishers take a personal risk to report on corruption, and media outlets who commonly report on corruption face long-term consequences or violent reprisals.

9c. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

**Comments:**

The government does not frequently directly interfere with journalists, but self-censorship is widely spread among journalists from state-controlled media.

**References:**

IREX Media Sustainability Index (MSI) – Europe and Eurasia 2006/07

**100:** The government never prevents publication of controversial corruption-related materials.

**75:**

**50:** The government prevents publication of controversial corruption-related material in cases where there is a strong political incentive to suppress the information. This score is appropriate if in countries where illiteracy is high, the government may allow a free print press but censor broadcast media.

**25:**

**0:** The government regularly censors material prior to publication, especially politically sensitive or damaging corruption-related material. This score is appropriate even if the government restricts only politically damaging news while allowing favorable coverage.

10a. In law, print media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Adoption of such legislation was announced by the government after 2001. The Action Plan for the Fight Against Corruption and Organized Crime adopted by the government may be adopted, but has not happened.

**References:**

There is no legislation requiring print media companies to publicly disclose their ownership.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if print media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain types of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

10b. In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Adoption of such legislation was announced by the government after 2001. The Action Plan for the Fight Against Corruption and Organized Crime adopted by the government may be adopted, but has not happened.

**References:**

There is no legislation requiring broadcast media companies to publicly disclose their ownership.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if broadcast media companies are required by law to publicly disclose all owners of the company.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such requirement or if the requirement is optional, only partially applicable, or exempts certain type of entities or agents from being publicly disclosed.

10c. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

100 | 75 | 50 | **25** | 0

**Comments:**

Self-censorship in state-owned or state-controlled media, such as the daily Pobjeda and TVCG is a serious problem.

**References:**

IREX Media Sustainability Index (MSI) – Europe and Eurasia 2006/07, Montenegro

**100:** Editors and journalists at the major media outlets abide by a strict journalistic code of conduct and are unwilling to alter their coverage of a particular issue, event or person in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors or remuneration.

75:

50: Editors and journalists at the major media outlets generally avoid altering coverage in exchange for favors but some exceptions have been noted. Not all newsrooms abide by a formal journalistic code of conduct.

25:

0: Editors and journalists are widely known to sell" favorable or unfavorable coverage in exchange for money, gifts, or other remuneration. The major media outlets do not abide by any formal journalistic code of conduct.

10d. In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Opposition parties were complaining that the public broadcaster is favoring governing parties. The ODIHR report says, By law, media coverage of the presidential election by the public broadcaster, Radio Television Crna Gora (RTCG), is also to be regulated through regulations adopted by its Council. Issues relating to the nomination of members of the RTCG Council have delayed the passage of such regulations for this election and remain to be resolved. Parliament has not ratified new nominations, keeping the Council beneath the number necessary to form a quorum. The opposition has complained that this could result in bias by the public broadcaster."

**References:**

OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, Presidential Election, April 6, 2008.

100: All political parties and independent candidates have some access to media outlets. Individual media outlets may have biases, but on balance, the national media coverage reflects the interests of the electorate. Media groups generally act as disinterested parties in an election. In places where a government is popular with the public, opposition viewpoints can access the public via media outlets.

75:

50: Major popular media outlets have a persistent bias regarding some parties or independent candidates. Some major parties may be partially excluded from media coverage, or draw more negative coverage. Media sectors may have distinct biases, such as newspapers favoring one party, while radio favors another.

25:

0: The mass media, on balance, have clear preferences in election outcomes and coverage is driven to achieve these goals. Some major parties or independent candidates are excluded or consistently negatively portrayed by mass media. Dissenting political opinions are only found on fringe or elite media outlets, such as Web sites.

10e. In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Opposition parties were complaining that the public broadcaster is favoring governing parties. The ODIHR report says, By law, media coverage of the presidential election by the public broadcaster, Radio Television Crna Gora (RTCG), is also to be regulated through regulations adopted by its Council. Issues relating to the nomination of members of the RTCG Council have delayed the passage of such regulations for this election and remain to be resolved. Parliament has not ratified new nominations, keeping the Council beneath the number necessary to form a quorum. The opposition has complained that this could result in bias by the public broadcaster."

**References:**

OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, Presidential Election, April 6, 2008

100: The government ensures that equal access and fair treatment of election contestants is provided by all state-owned media outlets, including all electronic and print media. This obligation extends to news reports, editorial comment, and all

other content. All parties and candidates are offered consistent and equivalent rates for campaign advertising on state-owned media outlets.

75:

50: The government generally ensures equal access and fair treatment of all candidates and parties by state-owned media outlets but some exceptions exist. State-owned media may occasionally discriminate against particular parties or candidates and advertising rates may be confusing or non-transparent.

25:

0: The government uses state-owned media to routinely discriminate against opposition candidates and parties. Advertising space may be denied to opposition candidates and parties or higher rates may be charged.

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## 11. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?

67

11a. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.

YES | NO

### Comments:

Several journalists were injured or sued by public officers, but none were imprisoned.

### References:

According to Montenegrin media, no journalist was imprisoned for working on issues related to corruption

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no journalists imprisoned related to work covering corruption during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any journalist was jailed because of his/her work covering corruption during the study period. The causal relationship between the official charges and the journalist's work may not be explicit, however the burden of proof here is low. If it seems likely that the journalist was imprisoned due to his or her work, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes. Imprisoned" is defined here as detention by the government lasting more than 24 hours.

11b. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.

YES | NO

### Comments:

The main editor of the daily Vijesti" was beaten up, for writing about the prime minister's "biological and mafia family". Sports journalist Mladen Strojovic was beaten up after releasing information on the mafia in sports.

### References:

[http://www.b92.net/info/komentari.php?nav\\_id=300732](http://www.b92.net/info/komentari.php?nav_id=300732)  
<http://www.blic.co.yu/hronika.php?id=43337>  
<http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/index.php?id=271111>  
<http://www.pobjeda.co.me/citanje.php?datum=2007-09-02&id=125151>  
[http://www.pcnen.com/detail.php?module=15&news\\_id=259](http://www.pcnen.com/detail.php?module=15&news_id=259)  
<http://www.nezavisne.com/region/vijesti/13904/Milo-tuzi-pretucenog-direktora-Vijesti.html>  
[http://www.monitor.cg.yu/ARHIVA/a\\_918%20\(1\).html](http://www.monitor.cg.yu/ARHIVA/a_918%20(1).html)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being assaulted during the specific study period for their work covering corruption issues. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a journalist covering corruption during the study period. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

11c. In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.

YES | NO

**References:**

According to the media, no journalists have been killed this year.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of journalists being killed because of their work covering corruption-related issues during the study period. A YES score is positive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a journalist was killed in relation to his or her work covering corruption-related issues in the study period. The relationship between a mysterious death and an individual's work may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable guess that a person was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

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68  
I-3. Public Access to Information

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12. Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?

100

12a. In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is a law guaranteeing the right to access information, unless it fall within exceptions, defined by legislation.

**References:**

Law on Free Access to Information, Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 68/05

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal right to access government documents, including constitutional guarantees. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon a public request.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such right.

12b. In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.



YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the law, citizens can appeal if information is not disclosed within the deadline prescribed by the law. The appeal is submitted to the supervisory institution, or the Administrative Court, if such an institution does not exist.

**References:**

Law on Free Access to Information, Article 20, Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 68/05

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for rejected information requests. A YES score can still be earned if the appeals process involves redress through the courts rather than administrative appeal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal process.

12c. In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The law aims for every public institution to adopt guidelines for citizens requesting information as well as appoint an officer in charge of obtaining requests and providing information.

**References:**

Law on Free Access to Information, Article 5, Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 68/05

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal government mechanism/institution through which citizens can access government records available under freedom of information laws. This mechanism could be a government office (or offices within agencies or ministries) or an electronic request system.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such formal mechanism or institution.

---

### 13. Is the right of access to information effective?

45

13a. In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, access to information is frequently delayed, due to the lack of willingness to release government data, especially in some cases involving privatization.

If citizens appeal to the courts, it usually takes more than six months for the court to decide, and even if the verdict is in favor of citizens, institutions still refuse to provide information to the public.

**References:**

Right to know – experiences from implementation of the Law on Free Access to Information in Montenegro, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo\\_da\\_znam.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo_da_znam.htm)

Behind the closed door – Case study of Aluminum Plant of Podgorica (KAP), 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija\\_kap.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija_kap.htm)

Do I have right to know, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp\\_mn.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp_mn.htm)

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two weeks. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. Legitimate exceptions are allowed for sensitive national security-related information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around one to two months to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced. Politically-sensitive information may be withheld without sufficient justification.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than four months to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records. National security exemptions may be abused to avoid disclosure of government information.

13b. In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Costs for accessing information sometimes represent a serious obstacle to citizens trying to obtain information. Institutions use this as a way to keep information from the public. Some institutions allow only viewing the information on their premises. This requires citizens to pay the cost of travel that could be significant if the institution is in another city.

**References:**

Right to know – experiences from implementation of the Law on Free Access to Information in Montenegro, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo\\_da\\_znam.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo_da_znam.htm)

Behind the closed door – Case study of Aluminum Plant of Podgorica (KAP), 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija\\_kap.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija_kap.htm)

Do I have right to know, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp\\_mn.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp_mn.htm)

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

13c. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In case of an appeal to the administrative court, on average it takes seven months for the court to decide. Even then, it does not guarantee that the information will be released. In practice, institutions do not always follow court decisions, especially if something involves privatization. In such cases, citizens are trapped in a vicious circle of trials that could last several years.

**References:**

Right to know – experiences from implementation of the Law on Free Access to Information in Montenegro, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo\\_da\\_znam.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo_da_znam.htm)

Behind the closed door – Case study of Aluminum Plant of Podgorica (KAP), 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija\\_kap.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija_kap.htm)

Do I have right to know, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp\\_mn.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp_mn.htm)

**100:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on appeals quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not resolve appeals in a timely fashion quickly. Appeals may be unacknowledged for many months and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve.

13d. In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Court taxes are affordable for average citizens, if they hire a lawyer to represent them in court, it would require much more money, especially in cases where institutions do not respect court decisions, so trials must be repeated for a number of times.

**References:**

Right to know – experiences from implementation of the Law on Free Access to Information in Montenegro, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo\\_da\\_znam.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo_da_znam.htm)

Behind the closed door – Case study of Aluminum Plant of Podgorica (KAP), 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija\\_kap.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija_kap.htm)

Do I have right to know, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp\\_mn.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp_mn.htm)

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge an access to information determination.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the access to information appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging access to information determinations.

13e. In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The majority of government institutions do provide reasons for denying information, but frequently such explanations are not made on the basis of the law or are vague. Almost no institution is properly conducting the harm test" if information is not provided.

**References:**

Right to know – experiences from implementation of the Law on Free Access to Information in Montenegro, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo\\_da\\_znam.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo_da_znam.htm)

Behind the closed door – Case study of Aluminum Plant of Podgorica (KAP), 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija\\_kap.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/privatizacija_kap.htm)

Do I have right to know, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp\\_mn.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp_mn.htm)

**100:** The government always discloses to the requestor the specific, formal reasons for denying information requests.

**75:**

**50:** The government usually discloses reasons for denying an information request to the requestor, with some exceptions. The reasons may be vague or difficult to obtain.

**25:**

**0:** The government does not regularly give reasons for denying an information request to the requestor.

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Category II. Elections

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68  
II-1. Voting & Citizen Participation

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14. Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?

100

14a. In law, universal and equal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The right is given to every citizen older than 18 and who has lived at least two years in Montenegro.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, Article 45

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the right to vote is guaranteed to all citizens of the country (basic age limitations are allowed). A YES score can still be earned if voting procedures are, in practice, inconvenient or unfair.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if suffrage is denied by law to any group of adult citizens for any reason. Citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country. A NO score is earned if homeless or impoverished people are legally prohibited from voting.

14b. In law, there is a legal framework requiring that elections be held at regular intervals.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Legislation is defining procedures for elections and mandating elected representatives at all levels of government.

**References:**

Law on elections of members of national and local parliament (Official Gazette Nos. 4/98, 5/98, 17/98, 14/00, 18/00, 9/01, 41/02, 46/02, 45/04, 48/06, 56/06)

Law on election of the president of Montenegro (Official Gazette No. 17/07)

Law on election of majors (Official Gazette No. 42/03)

Law on local government (Official Gazette No. 42/03, 28/04, 75/05, 13/06)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a statutory or other framework enshrined in law that mandates elections at reasonable intervals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such framework exists.

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## 15. Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?

92

15a. In practice, all adult citizens can vote.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the decision of the administrative court made upon an appeal submitted by one of the opposition parties, some citizens were illegally deleted from the voters' list and therefore not able to participate in presidential elections.

**References:**

Daily Pobjeda" <http://www.pobjeda.co.me/citanje.php?datum=2008-09-09&id=148664>

"Republika" <http://www.republika.cg.yu/naslovna.phtml?akcija=vijest&id=117357>

TVCG <http://www.rtcg.org/index.php?news&read=31163>

**100:** Voting is open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers.

**75:**

**50:** Voting is often open to all citizens regardless of race, gender, prior political affiliations, physical disability, or other traditional barriers, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** Voting is not available to some demographics through some form of official or unofficial pressure. Voting may be too dangerous, expensive, or difficult for many people.

15b. In practice, ballots are secret or equivalently protected.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

[http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdf/html/29714\\_en.pdf.html](http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdf/html/29714_en.pdf.html)

OSCE/ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT5, Feb. 8 2008, REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION6 April 2008

**100:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in all cases.

**75:**

**50:** Ballots are secret, or there is a functional equivalent protection, in most cases. Some exceptions to this practice have occurred. Ballots may be subject to tampering during transport or counting.

**25:**

**0:** Ballot preferences are not secret. Ballots are routinely tampered with during transport and counting.

15c. In practice, elections are held according to a regular schedule.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Extraordinary Parliamentary elections held in April 2001. Local elections held in May 2002. Parliamentary elections held in October 2002. Presidential elections held from Dec. 22, 2002 to May 11, 2003. Extraordinary local elections held during 2004 and 2005. The Referendum on state-legal status held in May 2006. Parliamentary elections and local elections held in September 2006. Presidential elections held in 2008.

**References:**

<http://www.cdtmn.org/>

**100:** Elections are always held according to a regular schedule, or there is a formal democratic process for calling a new election, with deadlines for mandatory elections.

**75:**

**50:** Elections are normally held according to a regular schedule, but there have been recent exceptions. The formal process for calling a new election may be flawed or abused.

**25:**

**0:** Elections are called arbitrarily by the government. There is no functioning schedule or deadline for new elections.

---

16. Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?

85

16a. In law, all citizens have a right to form political parties.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Article 53 of the constitution guarantees all citizens of association the right to form political parties.

**References:**

Article 53 of the Constitution of Montenegro

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens have the right to form political parties without interference from government. A YES score may still be earned if groups or individuals with a history of violence or terrorism (within last ten years) are banned from forming political parties. Non-discriminatory minimal criteria (e.g. minimum age) are also allowed.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory restrictions or prohibitions barring any types of political parties from being formed.

16b. In law, all citizens have a right to run for political office.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The right to run for political office is given to every citizen older than 18 and who has lived at least two years in Montenegro.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, Article 45

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) have the right under law to run for political office. A YES score may still be earned if individuals with a history of violence, terrorism, or criminality are banned from running for office.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal restrictions barring certain individuals or groups from running for political office.

16c. In practice, all citizens are able to form political parties.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There were no recorded cases of barring citizens from forming political parties.

**References:**

Daily Vijesti, "Dan", "Pobjeda", "Republika", interview with representative of Center for Democratic Transition

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, political parties can form freely without opposition.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers to formation are present, such as burdensome registration requirements that may not be fairly applied. Some parties' political viewpoints may draw pressure from the government, such as surveillance or intimidation. Some political parties or organizations may have extra barriers to getting on a ballot.

**25:**

**0:** Some political parties are effectively barred from forming through some manner of official or unofficial pressure. This may include threats, arrest, or violence from competing parties or other groups.

16d. In practice, all citizens can run for political office.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

By law, candidates for president are required to gather signatures at the premises of the Municipal Election Commissions and in front of at least two members of the Commission.

Representatives of the opposition parties claim this is one of barriers for candidates as secrecy of a voter's political preference is infringed upon, and citizens are afraid to provide open support to candidates of the opposition.

**References:**

OSCE/ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT, REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, April 6, 2008, Daily Vijesti", "Dan"

**100:** While there is no guarantee of electoral success, anyone can run for office under transparent and equitable guidelines. There is a formal process for access to the ballot which is fairly applied. The costs of running a campaign are reasonable and do not deter candidates from entering a race.

**75:**

**50:** Some barriers exist to getting on the ballot and bureaucratic or regulatory requirements for doing so may be unfairly applied. The costs of running a political campaign are significant and result in dissuading some candidates from running for office. A system of party lists may discourage or prevent independent candidates from running for office.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens can effectively be barred from the ballot through government abuse of official rules and/or unofficial pressure. The costs of running a campaign are extremely high and result in most average citizens being unable to run an effective campaign for office.

16e. In practice, an opposition party is represented in the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The rules of procedures of the parliament frequently limit influence of opposition parties in the legislature. For example, rules aim to have governing parties chair all the relevant committees, and have majority in those committees. Without their support, opposition parties cannot use mechanisms for holding government accountable (eg. parliamentary hearings, investigations, etc).

**References:**

MANS Report on Parliament monitoring, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi\\_izvjestaji.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi_izvjestaji.htm)

**100:** The opposition party always has some influence on the proceedings of the legislature. The opposition party can introduce legislation or bring pending matters to a vote without the consent of the ruling party.

**75:**

**50:** The opposition party has influence on the proceeding of the legislature, but it is limited in scope. The opposition's ability to force votes or publicly debate certain topics may be limited.

**25:**

**0:** The opposition party has only token participation in the legislature's proceedings and cannot advance legislation or force a debate.



## II-2. Election Integrity

### 18. Is the election monitoring agency effective?

5

18a. In law, the agency or set of agencies/entities is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

#### References:

No law protecting agency from political interference.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency or set of agencies/entities has some formal organizational independence from the bodies contesting in the election. A YES score is still earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the election monitoring agency or set of agencies/entities is legally tied to bodies contesting the election (i.e. an executive branch agency such as the Interior Ministry, or a committee of the legislature). A NO score is automatically earned if there is no domestic election monitoring agency.

18b. In practice, agency (or set of agencies/entities) appointments are made that support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

#### Comments:

Members of the election commissions are appointed by the parliament, and they are representatives of political parties.

#### References:

[http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi\\_izvjestaji.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi_izvjestaji.htm)

**100:** Appointments to the agency or set of agencies/entities are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. However, individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

18c. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The election commissions have no professional employees.

**References:**

Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime, Government of Montenegro, <http://www.gom.cg.yu/files/1217511966.doc>

MANS Report on Parliament monitoring [http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi\\_izvjestaji.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi_izvjestaji.htm)

**100:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities has no staff, or such a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

18d. In practice, the agency or set of agencies/entities makes timely, publicly available reports following an election cycle.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The reports made by election commissions include only information on election results, and no information or analysis of election financing. In practice, the commissions are not allowing public access to records of political parties (eg. list of donations).

**References:**

MANS Report on monitoring parliament operations, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi\\_izvjestaji.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi_izvjestaji.htm)

**100:** Reports are released to the public on a predictable schedule, without exceptions.

**75:**

**50:** Reports are released, but may be delayed, difficult to access, or otherwise limited.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities makes no public reports, issues reports which are effectively secret, or issues reports of no value.

18e. In practice, when necessary, the agency or set of agencies/entities imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, election commissions have no ability to penalize an offender.

**References:**

MANS Report on Parliament Monitoring, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi\\_izvjestaji.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/Parlament/dokumenta/nasi_izvjestaji.htm)

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or set of agencies/entities is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or set of agencies/entities enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or set of agencies/entities does not effectively penalize offenders and/or cooperate with other agencies in penalizing offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

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19. Are elections systems transparent and effective?

75

19a. In practice, there is a clear and transparent system of voter registration.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Lists of voters are accessible to all citizens, in the law, but ODIHR Mission has notices some violations, underlined by the opposition parties.

**References:**

OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on Parliamentary Elections in Montenegro, 2006.

**100:** There is a transparent system of voter registration that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote.

**75:**

**50:** There is a transparent voter registration system that provides voters with sufficient time to understand their rights, check the accuracy of their registration, and ensure that errors are corrected before they vote but there are some problems. Voters may have not access to registration lists with sufficient time to correct errors before voting or registration lists may at times be inaccessible.

**25:**

**0:** The system of voter registration is incomplete or does not exist. Government may routinely falsify registration lists to affect voting patterns and limit access to the polls. Double voting and ghost" voting by non-existent voters is common.

19b. In law, election results can be contested through the judicial system.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is no specific article, but the constitution and different laws allow citizens and parties to challenge results of elections on the basis of different issueshow. However, the law on elections is gives base for that.

**References:**

Law on Elections

**YES:** A YES score is earned if citizens or political parties can challenge allegedly fraudulent election results through the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal right for citizens or political parties to challenge allegedly fraudulent election results in the courts or other judicial mechanisms.

19c. In practice, election results can be effectively appealed through the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on Parliamentary Elections in Montenegro, 2006

**100:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes cases from both candidates complaining of flaws in the electoral process as well as citizens bringing complaints related to denial of suffrage or registration errors. There is an expedited process for resolving such complaints to avoid delaying a timely announcement of electoral results.

**75:**

**50:** The electoral appeals mechanism takes complaints from both candidates and voters but may not always act on complaints promptly. The appeals mechanism may be abused at times by parties or candidates seeking to delay the announcement of electoral results.

**25:**

**0:** The electoral appeals mechanism rarely or never acts on complaints brought by candidates or citizens. Citizens may not be able to bring complaints related to denial of suffrage or voter registration errors.

19d. In practice, the military and security forces remain neutral during elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to the opinions of the opposition and some media articles, security and police forces are actively engaged in elections. For example, the director of the police was present at the headquarters of a governing party during elections in the municipality of Mojkovac, while several whistleblowers from police and intelligence agencies were publicly stating how they were used to mobilize citizens to vote for governing parties.

**References:**

OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on Parliamentary Elections in Montenegro, 2006

**100:** The military, military officers, and other security forces refrain from overtly supporting or opposing political candidates or commenting on elections. The military or security forces refrain from physically interfering with political campaigns, rallies, or voting.

**75:**

**50:** The military, military officers, and security forces may be known to unofficially support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces generally refrain from the use of force to support or oppose particular candidates or parties but there are exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** The military or other security forces are an active and explicit player in politics and overly support or oppose particular candidates or parties. The military or security forces routinely exercise the use of force to support or oppose parties or candidates.

19e. In law, domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor elections.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Elections

**YES:** A YES score is earned if domestic and international election observers are allowed to monitor the electoral process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are any legal or regulatory prohibitions on the monitoring of the electoral process by domestic or international election observers.

19f. In practice, election observers are able to effectively monitor elections.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on Parliamentary Elections in Montenegro, 2006

**100:** Election observers have unfettered access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters themselves. The government does not interfere with the observers' activities.

**75:**

**50:** Election observers generally have access to polling sites, counting stations, and voters but encounter restrictions in certain areas. The government may impose burdensome regulatory or bureaucratic requirements on observers to discourage their involvement.

**25:**

**0:** Election observers' movements are significantly limited by the government and many polling and counting sites are restricted or barred from observers. The government imposes so many bureaucratic or regulatory burdens on the observers that their mission is rendered ineffective.

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17. Is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

100

17. In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?

YES | NO

**References:**

State and Municipal Election Commissions (Drzavna i opstinske Izborne komisije) are monitoring elections processes.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to ensure the integrity of the election process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities exists that monitors elections. A NO score is earned if elections are only monitored by an agency informally, such as poll booth monitoring by the police, only by international observers, or only by NGOs. A NO score is earned if the domestic election agency or set of domestic agencies simply facilitates the process of voting but is not empowered to report violations or abuses.

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60  
II-3. Political Financing

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20. Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties?

86

20a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Financing Political Parties, Articles 3, 9 and 16

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to political parties, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to political parties.

20b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Financing Political Parties, Articles 9 and 16

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political parties. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Financing Political Parties, Articles 9 and 16

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to political parties. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to political parties. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20d. In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.

YES | NO

**References:**

No, party expenditures limits are not regulated, only incomes.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on political party expenditures. A YES score is earned if all party expenditures are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on political party expenditures. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition parties in a discriminatory manner.

20e. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Financing Political Parties, Article 26

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to political parties.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to political parties, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

20f. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances and expenditures of political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Financing Political Parties, Article 22, only if the political party acquires more than 50,000 euros (US\$62,638) from private

sources.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of party finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of political parties' finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for parties to self-audit.

20g. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of political parties.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Financing Political Parties, Article 7

Law on State Audit Institution, Article 4

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of political parties. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

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## 21. Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates?

67

21a. In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to individual political candidates.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Financing Campaigns for president and mayors was in process, and Montenegro did not have this kind of law before. The law has now passed.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any formal rules (by law or regulation) controlling private contributions to individual political candidates, including prohibitions against foreign donations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regulation of private contributions to individual political candidates.

21b. In law, there are limits on individual donations to political candidates.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on financing political parties, Article 9



**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on individual contributions to political candidates. A YES score is also earned if individual contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on contributions from individuals. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21c. In law, there are limits on corporate donations to individual political candidates.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Law on Financing Campaigns for president and mayors is still in process, and Montenegro did not have this kind of law before

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any limits in size on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A YES score is earned if corporate contributions are prohibited.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no limits on corporate contributions to individual political candidates. A NO score is also earned if limits are applied by the government on opposition candidates in a discriminatory manner.

21d. In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political candidates.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on Financing Campaigns for president and mayors was in process, and Montenegro did not have this kind of law before. The law has now passed.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are any requirements mandating the disclosure of financial contributions to individual political candidates.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no requirements mandating the disclosure of contributions to individual political candidates, existing regulations do not require a donor's name or amount given, or the regulations allow for anonymous donations.

21e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the campaign finances of individual political candidates.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Law on Financing Campaigns for president and mayors is still in process, and Montenegro did not have this kind of law before.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of an individual candidate's campaign finances and expenditures or if such requirements exist but allow for candidates to self-audit.

21f. In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on State Audit Institution, Article 4

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a domestic agency or set of domestic agencies/entities formally assigned to monitor and enforce laws and regulations around the financing of individual political candidates' campaigns. A YES score is earned even if the agency/entity is ineffective in practice.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such agency or entity.

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## 22. Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective?

8

22a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Assessment of legal framework related to political parties finances in Montenegro, and recommendation for changes of this legal framework, Council of Europe, done by Quentin Reed.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a political party are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

22b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Assessment of legal framework related to political parties finances in Montenegro, and recommendation for changes of this legal framework, Council of Europe, done by Quentin Reed.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support a political party. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support political parties above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular party; unregulated loans to parties (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to political parties are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

22c. In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

No such restrictions in the legislative framework exist.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which political parties are able to finance their activities. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a party to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a political party can finance its activities. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which parties can generate revenue or finance their activities beyond the scope of existing regulations. Such loopholes could include taking loans that are outside of the scope of regulations covering direct donations; links to revenue-generating business activities that are beyond the scope of electoral or campaign-related regulations; or accepting in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a party

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of expenditures are made outside of the formal limitation system. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a party.

22d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Not a single investigation related to political parties' finances was conducted before in Montenegro according to media articles.

**100:** The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of political parties. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

75:

50: The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, thought limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

25:

0: The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

22e. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political parties imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Not a single investigation related to political parties' finances was conducted before in Montenegro according to media articles.

100: When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

75:

50: The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

25:

0: The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

22f. In practice, contributions to political parties are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

New Law on Political Parties Finances, adopted on July 29, 2008, imposes the need for audits of contributions if they exceed 50,000 euros (US\$62,638). Since we did not have any elections held under this new legislative framework, there is no established practice, nor any case of an audit. The previous law on financing political parties did not require audits on contributions.

100: Political party finances are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices. This includes the auditing of nominally independent financial organizations that act as financial extensions of the party.

75:

50: Political party finances (as defined) are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions. Contributions to the political party may be sufficiently audited, but the auditing of nominally independent extensions of the party may not be.

25:

0: Party finances are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

23. Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates effective?

0

23a. In practice, the limits on individual donations to political candidates are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a particular candidate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Montenegro still does not have a law on financing campaigns for president and mayors. It is being processed in parliament, so no established practice exists.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a political candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which an individual can directly or indirectly financially support a particular candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which individuals can indirectly support particular political candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The vast majority of individual contributions to a particular political candidate are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23b. In practice, the limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Montenegro still does not have a law on financing campaigns for president and mayors. It is being processed in parliament, so no established practice exists.

**100:** Existing limits represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. Limits are reasonably low enough in the context of the total costs of running a campaign to be meaningful.

**75:**

**50:** Existing limits generally represent the full extent to which a company can directly or indirectly financially support an individual candidate. However, exceptions and loopholes exist through which companies can indirectly support individual candidates above and beyond those formal limitations. Such loopholes could include making donations to third-party groups that advocate on behalf of (or against) a particular candidate; unregulated loans to candidates (rather than direct donations); or in-kind support that is not explicitly regulated by laws or regulations. The limits may be too high in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

**25:**

**0:** Existing limits are routinely bypassed or willfully ignored. The majority of corporate contributions to individual candidates are made outside of the formal limitation system. There is no enforcement of violations. Limits are so high that they are meaningless in the context of the overall costs of running a campaign.

23c. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Montenegro still does not have a law on financing campaigns for president and mayors. It is being processed in parliament, so no established practice exists. And not a single investigation related to an individual candidate's campaign was conducted by the State Audit Institution before in Montenegro.

**100:** The agency or entity aggressively starts investigations into allegations of wrong doing with respect to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity will start investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity rarely investigates on its own, or the agency or entity is partisan in its application of this power.

23d. In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of individual candidates' campaigns imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Montenegro still does not have a law on financing campaigns for president and mayors. It is being processed in parliament, so no established practice exists. And, not a single investigation related to an individual candidate's campaign was conducted by the State Audit Institution.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency or entity is aggressive in penalizing offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency or entity enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency or entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency or entity does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency or entity may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency or entity may be partisan in its application of power.

23e. In practice, the finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Montenegro still does not have a law on financing campaigns for president and mayors. It is being processed in parliament, so no established practice exists. And, not a single investigation related to an individual candidate's campaign was conducted by the State Audit Institution.

**100:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed contributions.

**25:**

**0:** The finances of individual candidates' campaigns are not audited, or the audits performed have no value in tracking contributions. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

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## 24. Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties?

67

24a. In practice, political parties disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### References:

Data were disclosed within the period of 30 days after the elections, required by the Law on Financing Political Parties ([www.rik.cg.yu](http://www.rik.cg.yu))

**100:** Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

**75:**

**50:** Political parties disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

**25:**

**0:** Political parties never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

24b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### References:

Data were disclosed within the period of 30 days after the elections, required by the Law on Financing Political Parties. Financial disclosures on the regular work of political parties are unavailable for citizens. (More information available at [www.pravodaznam.info](http://www.pravodaznam.info). Database of requests for information submitted to State Electoral Commission).

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

24c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Part of financial records, related to political parties campaigns finance are available on the website [www.rik.cg.yu](http://www.rik.cg.yu) for free. Other financial records are unavailable.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## 25. Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns?

83

25a. In practice, individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Data were disclosed within the period of 30 days after the elections, required by the Law on Financing Political Parties.

**100:** Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures at least every quarter.

**75:**

**50:** Individual candidates disclose their sources of funding and expenditures only one or two times per year. Delays may occur when sensitive political information is involved.

**25:**

**0:** Individual candidates never publish their sources of funding or expenditures or publish that information only rarely with more than a year in between publication. Politically sensitive information is regular withheld from public disclosure.

25b. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period.



**References:**

All financial records on campaigns' revenues and expenditures for individual candidates are available on the website [www.rik.cg.yu](http://www.rik.cg.yu) for free, except lists of donations, which are unavailable to citizens.

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take two to four weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. There may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

25c. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their campaign revenues and expenditures) at a reasonable cost.

**References:**

All data are available at [www.rik.cg.yu](http://www.rik.cg.yu) for free, except lists of donations, which are unavailable.

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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Category III. Government Accountability

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III-1. <sup>54</sup>Executive Accountability

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27. Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

50

27a. In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The executive frequently does not provide any explanation and even tries to hide some decisions of the government. Even when they provide explanations, they are clearly not in compliance with the facts.

One of example is the decision of the government to adopt the national spatial plan, justifying that by requirements of the EU accession process. But the the European Commission has sent comments to the government underlining numerous shortcomings in that document, that could undermine process of integration.

**References:**

Monitoring implementation of poverty reduction strategy paper and agenda for economic reforms, Network for Affirmation of NGO Sector – MANS, Series 1 to 12.

**100:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give formal explanations of all policy matters. The chief executive regularly takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, usually at least once a month. There is no censoring of such sessions.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers give explanations of policy, but not always in a timely or complete way. The chief executive occasionally takes critical questions from journalists or an opposition party, but not in a regular or formalized process. Particular issues of political sensitivity may be censored by government broadcasters.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive and/or cabinet ministers do not give substantial justifications for policy. Public appearances by the chief executive offer no exposure to critical questions. The government and government-run media routinely censor such sessions.

27b. In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The decisions of the government that define the rights and responsibilities of citizens can be challenged at the constitutional court, while administrative decisions of the government can be challenged at the administrative court.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of actions taken by the executive.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exemptions exist with respect to executive actions that are reviewable (a national security exemption, for example).

27c. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The judiciary is very slow to act, and a backlog of cases remain a serious problem. Cases related to politically-sensitive issues

are frequently not reviewed in a timely manner. Enforcement of the judgments remains a problem.

**References:**

Decisions of the Administrative Court published in cooperation with USAID CHECCI

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing executive actions and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power. It does not need to rely upon the executive to initiate a constitutional or legal review.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review executive actions, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review executive policy. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power. It must rely on instructions from the executive in order to initiate a legal or constitutional review.

27d. In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Frequently the chief executive makes decisions that are clearly unconstitutional, for example appointing judges for other public positions, but those decisions cannot be challenged through the judiciary system.

**References:**

Interview with Dejan Milovac and Milena Deletic from MANS

**100:** The chief executive utilizes executive orders only when there is no constitutional or legal requirement for official legislative action or approval. Executive orders are limited in number and narrow in scope.

**75:**

**50:** The chief executive sometimes relies on executive orders to implement policies and regulations opposed by the legislature. Some executive orders are overly broad in scope and are designed to circumvent constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

**25:**

**0:** The chief executive routinely abuses executive orders to render the legislature practically useless. Executive orders are the norm, not the exception, and directly contravene constitutional or legal requirements for legislative action or approval.

---

## 28. Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

0

28a. In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The parliament decides whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government. The

parliament has refused to remove immunity.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government can be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on the heads of state or government.

28b. In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The parliament decides whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministers.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, can all be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ministerial-level official, or equivalent official, cannot be investigated, charged or prosecuted for criminal allegations or the executive branch controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on ministerial-level officials.

---

## 29. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

38

29a. In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form need not be publicly available to score a YES. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if either the head of state or government is not required to disclose assets.

29b. In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if ministerial-level officials, or their equivalents, are all required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if ministers are not required to disclose assets. A NO score is earned if some ministers must disclose assets, but other ministers are not required.

29c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch of government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are overly general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

29d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

29e. In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting the ability of heads of state/government and ministers to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. Figurehead officials (symbolic figures without day-to-day authority) may be exempt.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

29f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no such regulations.

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state/government and ministers are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of those officials taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, heads of state/government or ministers are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Heads of state/government or ministers routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

29g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Since the law on conflict of interest has been in effect, less than five public officers have reported gifts, but according to the Commission for Conflict of Interest, even those who reported gifts to the Commission didn't estimate their value, and cases are still pending.

**References:**

[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu)  
[www.mans.cg.yu](http://www.mans.cg.yu)

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are regularly enforced. Members of the executive branch never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some ministers in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the executive branch are routinely ignored and unenforced. Ministers and other members of the executive branch routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

29h. In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The law does not allow auditing of asset disclosures, and it is not conducted in practice.

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**100:** Executive branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Executive branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Executive branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

### 30. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

100

30a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Data can be found at the web site of the Commission for Conflict of Interest.

**References:**

[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the heads of state and government file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for either the head of state or government. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

30b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Data can be found at the web site of the Commission for Conflict of Interest.

**References:**

[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu)

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some additional delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

30c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Data can be found at the web site of the Commission for Conflict of Interest

**References:**

[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu)

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

## 26. Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

100

26. In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?



YES | NO

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, Article 149

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all citizens (citizen is defined broadly, to include all ethnicities, or anyone born in the country) can receive compensation or redress through the courts for civil rights violations committed by the government, such as failure to follow due process of law when detaining suspected criminals.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens is excluded from the right to sue the government, or no such mechanism exists.

---

31. Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

0

31. In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The government is highly politized, and since the same party is in power since the introduction of parliamentarian system, in practice there are no boundaries between government and party activities. For example, before each election, all ministers, the prime minister, and president open things like schools, roads, etc., and use those opportunities to argue with their political opponents.

**References:**

European Commission, Progress report for 2007

**100:** Clear rules are followed distinguishing state functions from party activities. Government funds are never used for party activities. The civil service is completely distinct from party bureaucracy.

**75:**

**50:** The ruling party is, in principal, separate from the state, but exceptions to this standard sometimes occur. Examples may be the use of civil servants to organize political rallies, use of government vehicles on campaign trips, or use of government funds for party purposes.

**25:**

**0:** The government bureaucracy is an extension of the ruling party. There are few boundaries between government and party activities. Government funds, equipment and personnel are regularly used to support party activities.

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## III-2. Legislative Accountability

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32. Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?

50

32a. In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.

YES | NO

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process by which the judiciary or constitutional courts can pass judgments on the legality or constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists. A NO score is earned if judicial review is vaguely established in law or regulation without formal procedures. A NO score is earned if general exceptions exist exempting certain legislative actions from being reviewed (a national security exemption, for example).

32b. In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The constitution court will review challenged laws, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary is slow to act and unwilling to take on politically-sensitive issues.

**References:**

[www.sudovi.cg.yu](http://www.sudovi.cg.yu), [www.vijesti.cg.yu](http://www.vijesti.cg.yu)

**100:** When constitutional or legal questions or possible violations are raised, the judiciary is aggressive in reviewing laws passed and can void illegal or unconstitutional actions. The judiciary is fair and nonpartisan in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judiciary will review laws passed, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judiciary may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judiciary does not effectively review laws passed. The judiciary may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to pass judgments on executive abuses. The judiciary may be partisan in its application of power.

32c. In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The legislative branch itself controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on members of the legislature.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature can, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal allegations.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature cannot, in law, be investigated and prosecuted for criminal proceedings. A NO score is also earned if the legislative branch itself controls whether investigative or prosecutorial immunity can be lifted on members of the legislature.

---

### 33. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?

29

33a. In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the legislature are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the legislature is not required to disclose assets.

33b. In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national legislators' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

33c. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the legislature.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the legislature. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

33d. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of legislative branch asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

33e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

There are no such regulations.

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of legislators taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, legislators are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Legislators routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

33f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

Since the law on conflict of interest has been in effect, less than five public officers have reported gifts, but according to the

Commission for Conflict of Interest, even for those who reported gifts to the Commission didn't estimate their value, and cases are still pending.

**References:**

www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu, www.mans.cg.yu

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are regularly enforced. Legislators never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some legislators in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to national legislators are routinely ignored and unenforced. Legislators routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

33g. In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no such legal requirement.

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**100:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Legislative branch asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

### 34. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?

100

34a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national legislature file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national legislature. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

34b. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Records are available online.

**References:**

[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu)

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

34c. In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Records are available online.

**References:**

[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu)

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

35. Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?

35a. In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Free Access to Information

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a general legal right to access records of legislative proceedings including voting records. A YES score can still be given if there are formal rules for specific exemptions to the right to disclosure (special secret sessions related to national security).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no general right to access documents recording legislative proceedings. A NO score is earned if there exemptions to the general right that are not clearly defined by formal rules.

35b. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In practice, access to information is frequently delayed, due to a lack of willingness to release government data, especially information involving privatization. If citizens appeal to the courts, it usually takes more than six months for the court to decide. Even if a verdict is in favor of citizens, institutions still refuse to provide information to the public.

**References:**

Do I have right to know, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp\\_mn.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp_mn.htm)

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

35c. In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Costs for accessing information sometimes represent a serious obstacle to citizens trying to obtain information. This is a way institutions are trying to keep information from public. Some institutions allow only viewing information at their premises. This requires citizens to pay the cost of travel, which could be significant if the institution is in another city.

**References:**

Do I have right to know, 2007, Vanja Calovic, Milena Deletic, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp\\_mn.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/hrggp_mn.htm)

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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61  
III-3. Judicial Accountability

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36. Are judges appointed fairly?

75

36a. In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

YES | NO

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, Article 125

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for selecting national level justices. This process should be public in the debating and confirmation stages. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

**NO:** A NO score is given if there is no formal process of selection or the process is conducted without public oversight. National-level judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a national law or constitution; are nominated/appointed by a national governmental body (head of state/government or national legislature); and/or are elected nationally.

36b. In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting national-level judges.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the past, some judges have been refused by the parliament as they were not in favor of the governing party. Many NGOs and opposition political parties are pointing out that judges are being elected and promoted on the basis of political criteria.

**References:**

Action for Human Rights, Tea Gorjanac Prelevic, former director of the Center for education of judges



**100:** National-level judges selected have relevant professional qualifications such as formal legal training, experience as a lower court judge or a career as a litigator.

**75:**

**50:** Most national-level judges selected meet these qualifications, with some exceptions.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judges are often unqualified due to lack of training or experience.

36c. In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Judges are appointed by the parliament on the recommendation of the Judicial Council.

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, Article 125

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process establishing a review of national-level judicial nominees by an agency independent from the body appointing the judges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no formal review. A NO score is earned if the review is conducted by a body directed by the body appointing the judges (such as review by the head of police if judges are appointed by the executive).

---

### 37. Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

63

37a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

Decisions of the judiciary must have justification in the form of written explanation.

**References:**

Law on Courts, Law on Administrative Appeal, Criminal Code

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal and mandatory process for judges to explain their decisions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices are not required to explain decisions. A NO score is earned if there is a general exemption from explaining some decisions (such as national security).

37b. In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

**References:**

Action for Human Rights, Tea Gorjanac Prelevic, former director of the center for education of judges

**100:** Judges are formally required to explain their judgments in detail, establishing a body of precedent. All judges comply with these requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Judges are compelled to give substantial reasons for their decisions, but some exceptions exist. These may include special courts, such as military courts or tribunals.

**25:**

**0:** Judges commonly issue decisions without formal explanations.

37c. In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Judicial Council

**References:**

Law on Judicial Council, Articles 45 to 59

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the judicial system. A disciplinary agency is defined here as an agency or mechanism specifically mandated to investigate breaches of procedure, abuses of power or other failures of the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency or mechanism is specifically mandated to act as a disciplinary mechanism for the national-level judiciary.

37d. In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Judicial Council, Articles 2 and 3

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference by the executive and legislative branches.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing the independence of the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism). A NO score is given if the judicial disciplinary agency or equivalent mechanism function is carried out by an inherently subordinate organization, such as an executive ministry or legislative committee.

37e. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There were no cases of investigations in the previous period as the judicial council was not functioning because the appointment of its members was blocked by parliament, which is by law in charge of appointments.

**100:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.

37f. In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There were no cases of investigations in the previous period as the judicial council was not functioning because the appointment of its members was blocked by parliament, which is by law in charge of appointments.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) does not effectively penalize offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) may be partisan in its application of power.

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38. Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

29

38a. In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all members of the national-level judiciary are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any member of the national-level judiciary is not required to publicly disclose assets.

38b. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regulating gifts and hospitality for members of the national-level judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no guidelines or regulations with respect to gifts or hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the guidelines are general and do not specify what is and is not appropriate.

38c. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of national-level judiciary asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

38d. In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

38e. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no such legal requirement.

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of judges taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain cases, judges are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Judges routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

38f. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Since the law on conflict of interest has been in effect, less than five public officers have reported gifts. According to the Commission for Conflict of Interest, even for those who reported gifts the Commission didn't estimate their value, and cases are still pending.

**References:**

[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu), [www.mans.cg.yu](http://www.mans.cg.yu)

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are regularly enforced. Judges never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some judges are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary are routinely ignored and unenforced. Judges routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

38g. In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no such legal requirement.

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**100:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** National-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

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39. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

100

39a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if members of the national-level judiciary file an asset disclosure form that is, in law, accessible to the public (individuals, civil society groups or journalists).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary. A NO score is earned if the form is filed, but not available to the public.

39b. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**  
Available online.

**References:**  
[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu)

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

39c. In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**  
Available online.

**References:**  
[www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu](http://www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu)

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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### III-4. Budget Processes

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40. Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

33

40a. In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Budget, Article 5

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the legislature has the power to add or remove items to the national government budget.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the legislature can only approve but not change details of the budget. A NO score is earned if the legislature has no input into the budget process.

40b. In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There are no such legal or practical requirements.

**100:** All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings.

**75:**

**50:** Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive's personal budget, or other expenses.

**25:**

**0:** The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.

40c. In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Legislators have no staff and no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Furthermore, even when they pose questions to the government, they do not obtain answers or the answers that are provided do not contain relevant information.

**References:**

Interview with Vuk Maras, MANS Coordinator for Monitoring Parliament Operations

**100:** Legislators benefit from a sufficient and qualified staff as well as adequate financial and physical resources. Lack of capacity is never a reason why legislators cannot carry out their duties effectively.

**75:**

**50:** Legislators have some staff and financial resources but are limited by a shortfall of resources to adequately perform all of their budgetary oversight functions. Legislators are occasionally overwhelmed by the volume of work to be performed.

**25:**



**0:** Legislators have little to no staff and virtually no financial resources with which to perform their budgetary oversight role. Lack of resources is a regular and systemic problem that cripples the performance of the legislature.

## 41. Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

8

41a. In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

No public hearings are organized prior to submission of the budget to parliament for approval.

### References:

Interview with Vuk Maras, MANS Coordinator for Monitoring Parliament Operations

**100:** Budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal, transparent process for budget debate, but major budget modifications may be negotiated in separate, closed sessions. Some items, such as non-secret defense projects, may be negotiated in closed sessions. Authors of individual line items may be difficult to identify.

**25:**

**0:** Budget negotiations are effectively closed to the public. There may be a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

41b. In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

No public hearings are organized prior to submission of the budget to parliament for approval.

### References:

Interview with Vuk Maras, MANS Coordinator for Monitoring Parliament Operations

**100:** Citizens, usually acting through CSOs, can provide information or commentary to the budget debate through a formal process. This information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens or CSOs can provide input, but this information is often not relevant to budget decisions.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens or CSOs have no formal access to provide input to the budget debate.

41c. In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The budget is published in the official gazette, but the level of detail published is not satisfactory. More detailed data cannot be obtained.

**References:**

Implementation of freedom of information legislative in Montenegro, Milena Deletic, MANS, [www.mans.cg.yu](http://www.mans.cg.yu)

**100:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations. This information is easily available and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** Citizens, journalists and CSOs can access itemized lists of budget allocations but this information may be difficult to access, incomplete or out of date.

**25:**

**0:** Citizens cannot access an itemized list of budget allocations, due to secrecy, prohibitive barriers or government inefficiency.

---

### 43. Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

17

43a. In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Reports are submitted only within joint final report.

**References:**

Vuk Maras, MANS Coordinator for Monitoring Parliament Operations

**100:** Heads of ministry- or cabinet-level agencies submit regular, formal reports of expenses to a budget oversight committee.

**75:**

**50:** Agency heads submit reports to a budget oversight committee, but these reports are flawed in some way. The reports may be inconsistently delivered, or lacking important details.

**25:**

**0:** There is no budget oversight committee or equivalent, or heads of agencies do not submit meaningful reports to the agency.

43b. In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party, which has the majority in all committees. Therefore the opposition's participation can't make any serious difference in work of the committees.

**References:**

Vuk Maras, MANS Coordinator for Monitoring Parliament Operations

**100:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee — including opposition party members — are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee's work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.

**75:**

**50:** The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members' ability to shape the committee's activities.

**25:**

**0:** The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.

43c. In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Not a single investigation has been initiated so far.

**References:**

Vuk Maras, MANS Coordinator for Monitoring Parliament Operations

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the committee is aggressive in investigating the government.

**75:**

**50:** The committee starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The committee may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The committee does not effectively investigate financial irregularities. The committee may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The committee may be partisan in its application of power.

42. Is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

100

42. In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

There is separate committee on budget within parliament.

**References:**

Rules of Procedures of the Parliament

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a dedicated legislative committee (or equivalent group located in the legislature) that oversees the expenditure of public funds.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such body exists within the legislature. A NO score is earned if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the legislature (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

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Category IV. Administration and Civil Service

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IV-1. <sup>37</sup> Civil Service Regulations

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44. Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?

100

44a. In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules establishing that the civil service carry out its duties independent of political interference.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent civil service.

44b. In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on State Employees, Ethical Code of Civil Servants

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal rules prohibiting nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in the civil service. These should include competitive recruitment and promotion procedures as well as safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such regulations exist.

44c. In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

According to the law on civil servants, one can require a sort of commission to be established to review his or her appeal, but such commission is appointed by the head of the institution. Also, a civil servant could use court system to appeal.

**References:**

Law on State Employees, Ethical Code of Civil Servants

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism to which civil servants and applicants for the civil service can take grievances regarding civil service management actions. The mechanism should be independent of their supervisors but can still be located within the government agency or entity (such as a special commission or board). Civil servants are able to appeal the mechanism's decisions to the judiciary.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

44d. In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific rules prohibiting continued government employment following a corruption conviction.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist or if the ban is not a lifetime ban.

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## 45. Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?

19

45a. In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The European Commission points out continuing politicization of the administration. After almost 20 years of the same parties in power, the administration became more of a service to the parties than to the citizens. All appointments at key positions are made on the basis of politics. Therefore, civil servants are not protected, and even if they ask for their rights to be respected, they are faced with supervisors who are appointed because of political affiliation.

**References:**

Montenegro 2007 Progress Report, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Brussels, Nov. 6, 2007

**100:** Civil servants operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable treatment or policy decisions on politically sensitive issues. Civil servants rarely comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. Civil servants can bring a case to the courts challenging politically-motivated firings.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political or personal incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by superiors, public criticism or praise by the government, or other forms of influence. Civil servants may bring a case to the judicial system challenging politically-motivated firings but the case may encounter delays or bureaucratic hurdles.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants are commonly influenced by political or personal matters. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. Civil servants are unable to find a remedy in the courts for unjustified or politically-motivated firings.

45b. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

After almost 20 years of the same parties in power, the administration became more of a service to the parties than to the citizens. All appointments at key positions are made on the basis of politics. Therefore, civil servants appointed because of political affiliation.

**References:**

Montenegro 2007 Progress Report, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Brussels, Nov. 6, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the civil service and their professional evaluations are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments and professional assessments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments and professional assessments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

45c. In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

After almost 20 years of the same parties in power, the administration became more of a service to the parties than to the citizens. All appointments at key positions are made on the basis of politics. Therefore, civil servants are hired, fired and promoted because of political affiliation and family connections.

**References:**

Montenegro 2007 Progress Report, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Brussels, Nov. 6, 2007

**100:** Nepotism (favorable treatment of family members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage (favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) are actively discouraged at all levels of the civil service. Hirings, firings, and promotions are based on merit and performance.

**75:**

**50:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are discouraged, but exceptions exist. Political leaders or senior officials sometimes appoint family member or friends to favorable positions in the civil service, or lend other favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage are commonly accepted principles in hiring, firing and promotions of civil servants.

45d. In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Most civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions, and even when they do such descriptions have little to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Civil servants almost always have formal job descriptions establishing levels of seniority, assigned functions, and compensation. Job descriptions are a reliable representation of positions in terms of a person's authority, responsibility and base pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servants often have formal job descriptions, but exceptions exist. Some civil servants may not be part of the formal assignment of duties and compensations. Some job descriptions may not map clearly to pay or responsibilities in some cases.

**25:**

**0:** Civil servants do not have formal roles or job descriptions. If they do, such job descriptions have little or nothing to do with the position's responsibilities, authority, or pay.

45e. In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Information obtained from institutions shows that in some cases civil servants' bonuses might exceed their salaries.

**References:**

Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Civil servant bonuses constitute no more than 10% of total pay and do not represent a major element of take-home pay.

**75:**

**50:** Civil servant bonuses are generally a small percentage of total take-home pay for most civil servants though exceptions exist where some civil servants' bonuses represent a significant part of total pay.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants receive bonuses that represent a significant amount of total take-home pay. In some cases bonuses represent the majority of total pay to civil servants.

45f. In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Such information is very rarely available and incomplete.

**References:**

[www.vlada.cg.yu](http://www.vlada.cg.yu)

**100:** The government publishes such a list on a regular basis.

**75:**

**50:** The government publishes such a list but it is often delayed or incomplete. There may be multiple years in between each successive publication.

**25:**

**0:** The government rarely or never publishes such a list, or when it does it is wholly incomplete.

45g. In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Such systems rarely work.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** The independent redress mechanism for the civil service can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis.

**75:**

**50:** The independent civil service redress mechanism can generally decide what to investigate and when but is sometimes subject to pressure from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The civil service redress mechanism must rely on approval from the executive or the bodies that manage civil servants on a day-to-day basis before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.



45h. In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In the past year some civil servants have been paid late.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** In the past year, no civil servants have been paid late.

**75:**

**50:** In the past year, some civil servants have been paid late.

**25:**

**0:** In the past year, civil servants have frequently been denied due pay.

45i. In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for civil servants convicted of corruption. All civil servants are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some civil servants may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective. Some bans are only temporary.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future employment of convicted civil servants.

---

46. Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?

25

46a. In law, senior members of the civil service are required to file an asset disclosure form.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

Only public officers are requested to file disclosure forms, and they are not members of the civil service. Only public officers are obliged to provide their disclosure forms. Senior members of the civil service are required only if they hold public offices such as ministers, but not if they are just civil servants.

**References:**

Law on conflict of interest

**YES:** A YES score is earned if senior members of the civil service are required by law to file an asset disclosure form while in office, illustrating sources of income, stock holdings, and other assets. This form does not need to be publicly available to score a YES.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any senior member of the civil service is not required to disclose assets.

46b. In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on State Employees, Ethical Code of Civil Servants

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests, including personal financial interests as well as those of their family and friends, are affected.

**NO:** A NO score exists if no such requirements exist in regulation or law.

46c. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.

46d. In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.

YES | NO

**References:**

Ethical Code of Civil Servants

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal guidelines regarding gifts and hospitality given to civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such guidelines or regulations.

46e. In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of senior members of the civil service.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a legal or regulatory requirement for independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures. The auditing is performed by an impartial third-party.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of civil service asset disclosures or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.

46f. In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

There are no such requirements.

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**100:** The regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are uniformly enforced. There are no cases or few cases of civil servants taking jobs in the private sector after leaving government where they directly lobby or seek to influence their former government colleagues without an adequate cooling off" period.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations are generally enforced though some exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to regularly take jobs in the private sector that entail directly lobbying or seeking to influence their former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are short and sometimes ignored.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations are rarely or never enforced. Civil servants routinely take jobs in the private sector following government employment that involve direct lobbying or influencing of former government colleagues. Cooling off periods are non-existent or never enforced.

46g. In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and not enforced. Civil servants routinely

accept significant amounts of gifts.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are regularly enforced. Civil servants never or rarely accept gifts or hospitality above what is allowed.

**75:**

**50:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to civil servants are generally applied though exceptions exist. Some civil servants in certain sectors are known to accept greater amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups or private sector actors than is allowed.

**25:**

**0:** The regulations governing gifts and hospitality to the civil service are routinely ignored and unenforced. Civil servants routinely accept significant amounts of gifts and hospitality from outside interest groups and actors seeking to influence their decisions.

46h. In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Most civil servants routinely participate in policy decisions when their personal interests are affected.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are routinely followed by most or all civil servants.

**75:**

**50:** The requirements that civil servants recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests are affected are followed by most civil servants though exceptions exist. In certain sectors, civil servants are known to routinely participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

**25:**

**0:** Most civil servants routinely ignore recusal requirements and continue to participate in policy decisions where their personal interests are affected.

46i. In practice, civil service asset disclosures are audited.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no such legal requirement.

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**100:** Civil service asset disclosures are regularly audited using generally accepted auditing practices.

**75:**

**50:** Civil service asset disclosures are audited, but audits are limited in some way, such as using inadequate auditing standards, or the presence of exceptions to disclosed assets.

**25:**

**0:** Civil service asset disclosures are not audited, or the audits performed have no value. Audits may be performed by entities known to be partisan or biased in their practices.

---

#### 47. Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?

0

47a. In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

Civil servants are not submitting disclosure records. Only public officers submit records.

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**YES:** A YES score is earned if laws or regulations guarantee that citizens can access the asset records of senior civil servants.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if senior civil servants do not file an asset disclosure. A NO score is earned if senior civil servants file an asset disclosure, but it is not available to the public.

47b. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**Comments:**

Civil servants do not submit disclosure records. Only public officers are obliged to submit records.

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

47c. In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Civil servants do not submit disclosure records. Only public officers are obliged to submit records.

**References:**

Law on State Employees

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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## IV-2. Whistle-blowing Measures

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48. Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

25

48a. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on State Employees, Ethical Code of Civil Servants

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against public sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for public-sector whistleblowers.

48b. In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, being demoted to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment, including arrest.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Public sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Public sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Public sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

48c. In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

YES | NO

**References:**

There is no such legislation.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific laws against recrimination against private sector whistleblowers. This may include prohibitions on termination, transfer, harassment or other consequences.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no legal protections for private-sector whistleblowers.

48d. In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There is no such legislation. As there is no such legislation, there is no such practice either.

**100:** Private sector whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Private sector whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Private sector whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

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50. In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

0

50a. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no such system. The Agency for Anti-Corruption is in charge of prevention of corruption through campaigns and development of legislative, not for internal reporting mechanisms.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** The agency/entity has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has limited staff, a fact that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

50b. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is no such mechanism.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** The agency/entity has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity has a regular source of funding but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**



0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

50c. In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

50d. In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies' investigations.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.

49. Is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

0

49. In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

YES | NO

**References:**

There is no such mechanism.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a mechanism, or multiple mechanisms for multiple national government agencies, through which civil servants can report cases of graft, misuse of public funds, or corruption.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism (or equivalent series of mechanisms) exists.

---

8  
IV-3. Procurement

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51. Is the public procurement process effective?

60

51a. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Public Procurements, Article 14

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for public procurement officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such rules exist.

51b. In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

No such requirement.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if public procurement officials receive regular mandatory training to ensure professional standards in supervising the tendering process. A YES score is earned if such training is mandated for portions of the broader civil service, to include procurement officials.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no regular required training of public procurement officials or if training is sporadic, inconsistent, unrelated to procurement processes, or voluntary.

51c. In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Conflict of interest regulations do not properly define this area and even as such they are not properly enforced.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for procurement officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict-of-interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

51d. In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

There is no such legal requirement.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal mandate to some agency to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials, such as an inspector general, or ombudsman.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mandate exists.

51e. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Public Procurements, Article 18

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all major procurements (defined as those greater than 0.5% of GDP) require competitive bidding.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if competitive bidding is not required by law or regulation for major procurement (greater than 0.5% OF GDP).

51f. In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on Public Procurements, Article 19

**YES:** A YES score is earned if sole sourcing is limited to specific, tightly defined conditions, such as when a supplier is the only source of a skill or technology.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no prohibitions on sole sourcing. A NO score is earned if the prohibitions on sole sourcing are general and unspecific.

51g. In law, unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on Public procurements, Article 91

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal appeal process for unsuccessful bidders.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51h. In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on Public procurements, Article 91

**YES:** A YES score is earned if unsuccessful bidders can use the courts to appeal a procurement decision.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51i. In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Public procurements, Article 45

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal procurement blacklists, designed to prevent convicted companies from doing business with the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such process exists.

51j. In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Establishment of such system is envisioned, but it is not yet in force.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

MANS Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime

**100:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place for companies convicted of corruption. All companies are subject to this system.

**75:**

**50:** A system of formal blacklists and cooling off periods is in place, but the system has flaws. Some procurements or companies may not be affected by the system, or the prohibitions are sometimes not effective.

**25:**

**0:** There is no such system, or the system is consistently ineffective in prohibiting future hiring of blacklisted companies.

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## 52. Can citizens access the public procurement process?

67

52a. In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Public procurements, Article 7

**YES:** A YES score is earned if procurement rules are, by law, open to the public. These regulations are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if procurement rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no procurement rules.

52b. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on Public procurements, Article 17

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the public procurement process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the public procurement process.

52c. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Depending on the institution and the nature of the records requested, it could take from a few days to several months, or even years to obtain that information.

Information on regulations is available on-line at <http://www.nabavka.vlada.cg.yu> concerns decisions made about tenders that are published on the web site, but not the regulations themselves.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

52d. In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | **50** | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Costs depend on length of the case and could be symbolic in cases where information is provided by the first instance institution. They could be quite high if citizens have to appeal to courts to obtain the information.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line. These records are defined here as the rules governing the competitive procurement process.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

52e. In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There is a formal process of advertisement, but it is frequently misused. For example, advertisements are published on websites of institutions, but links are broken and only people who are able to access the link can get the information. Or, in other cases, the advertisement is published in newspapers that are not read by the broad public.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective.

52f. In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Some decisions are published on the website of the responsible institutions, but depending on the institution and nature of the tender, it could take from a few days to several months or even years to obtain that information.

Only decisions on selecting best bidder are published, not the contracts that i understand as result of procurement bids. Contracts are very hard to access, especially annexes through which prices are usually additionally increased, after the tenders

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Records of public procurement results are publicly available through a formal process.

**75:**

**50:** Records of public procurements are available, but there are exceptions to this practice. Some information may not be available, or some citizens may not be able to access information.

**25:**

**0:** This information is not available to the public through an official process.

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## IV-4. Privatization

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### 53. Is the privatization process effective?

33

53a. In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on Privatization of Economy (Official Gazette 23/96, 6/99, 59/00, 42/04)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets. A YES score is still earned if the government did not privatize any state-owned assets during the study period.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of businesses (other than those blacklisted due to corruption charges) is excluded by law.

53b. In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The legislation does not define any specific rules for regulating conflict of interest. The only provision is contained in Article 4 of the government's decision on jurisdictions and composition of the Council for Privatization. It defines that members of the council, their spouses and children can not perform duties, hold shares or have commercial interest in companies that are in the process of privatization.

**References:**

Law on Privatization of Economy (Official Gazette 23/96, 6/99, 59/00, 42/04)  
Decision on jurisdictions and composition of the Council for Privatization (Official Gazette 23/07)  
Law on Conflict of Interest (Official Gazette 42/04, 17/05)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific formal regulations defining and regulating conflicts of interest between official public duty and private interests for privatization officials. A YES score is earned if such regulations cover all civil servants, including privatization officials.



**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no such formal regulations.

53c. In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

According to data of institutions in charge of privatization and reports adopted by the government, not a single case of conflict of interest in privatization was processed. Some informal regulations have been established by the privatization agency, but even those are not effective.

**References:**

The first, second and third reports on the implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime adopted by the government.

**100:** Regulations regarding conflicts of interest for privatization officials are aggressively enforced.

**75:**

**50:** Conflict-of-interest regulations exist, but are flawed. Some violations may not be enforced, or some officials may be exempt from the regulations.

**25:**

**0:** Conflict of interest regulations do not exist, or are consistently ineffective.

---

#### 54. Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?

50

54a. In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The law on privatization envisions that privatization is conducted through a public auction, public tender or public offer.

**References:**

The Law on Privatization (Official Gazette 23/96, 6/99, 59/00, 42/04)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if privatization rules (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are, by law, open to the public. Even if privatization is infrequent or rare, the most recent privatization should be used as the basis for scoring this indicator.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if privatization rules are officially secret for any reason or if there are no privatization rules.

54b. In practice, privatizations are effectively advertised.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** There is a formal process of advertising privatizations. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.

**75:**

**50:** There is a formal process of advertisement but it is flawed. Some privatizations may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.

**25:**

**0:** There is no formal process of advertising privatizations or the process is superficial and ineffective.

54c. In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Privatization of Economy (Official Gazette 23/96, 6/99, 59/00, 42/04)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required to publicly post or announce the results of the privatization process. This can be done through major media outlets or on a publicly-accessible government register or log.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no requirement for the government to publicly announce the results of the privatization process.

54d. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

No information on privatization has been made public upon numerous requests for information. Although the administrative and the supreme court have made numerous decisions, those requests have not been acted upon.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

54e. In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

No information on privatization has been made public upon numerous requests for information. Although the administrative and the supreme court have made numerous decisions, those requests have not been acted upon.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Records (defined here as the rules governing the competitive privatization process) are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

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Category V. Oversight and Regulation

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55  
V-1. National Ombudsman

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56. Is the national ombudsman effective?

50

56a. In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Ombudsman, Article 2

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or set of agencies) has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

56b. In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency is politically influenced, but has no credibility in public due to self-censorship.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** This agency (or set of agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or set of agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public criticism or praise by the government. The ombudsman may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or set of agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The ombudsman cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

56c. In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The director of the ombudsman serves a defined term, but could be removed by will of the majority of political parties in parliament.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the ombudsman (or directors of multiple agencies) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

56d. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The office has permanent staff and is asking for increases.

**References:**

<http://www.ombudsman.cg.yu>

**100:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The ombudsman agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

56e. In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Appointments are often based on political affiliation and personal loyalties.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

56f. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts or threats of cuts to the agency's budget by the government that is deciding on its budget.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

56g. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Only annual reports and a few public statements are published by the ombudsman agency. Annual reports contain only statistics on work of the ombudsman and they cannot be considered as enough to ensure transparency of operations of that institution

**References:**

<http://www.ombudsman.cg.yu>

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports either to the legislature or directly to the public outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or directly to the public that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

56h. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency rarely starts investigations, but often relies on external pressure. Also, the agency has limited effectiveness when investigating and lacks experience in cooperating with other institutions.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The agency aggressively starts investigations — or participates fully with cooperating agencies' investigations — into judicial misconduct. The agency is fair in its application of this power.

**75:**

**50:** The agency will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The agency, though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power.

**25:**

**0:** The agency rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies' investigations, or the agency is partisan in its application of this power.

56i. In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency doesn't have such jurisdiction.

**References:**

<http://www.ombudsman.cg.yu>

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency is aggressive in penalizing offenders or in cooperating with other agencies who penalize offenders.

**75:**

**50:** The agency enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, resistant to cooperating with other agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency does not effectively penalize offenders. The agency may make judgments but not enforce them, does not cooperate with other agencies in enforcing penalties, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

56j. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Ombudsman's reports are often ignored, and they do not lead to policy changes.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** Ombudsman's reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, ombudsman's reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Ombudsman's reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Ombudsman's reports do not lead to policy changes.

56k. In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

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57. Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?

83

57a. In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Ombudsman, Article 5

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all ombudsman reports are publicly available.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any ombudsman reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute the reports.

57b. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The reports are accessible via the Internet, but only general annual reports. In particular cases, citizens must visit the national capital. However, the ombudsman has organized several visits to other municipalities.

**References:**

[www.ombudsman.cg.yu](http://www.ombudsman.cg.yu)

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.



75:

50: Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

25:

0: Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

57c. In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The reports are accessible via the Internet, but only general annual reports. In particular cases, citizens must visit the national capital. However, the ombudsman has organized several visits to other municipalities.

**References:**

<http://www.ombudsman.cg.yu>

100: Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

75:

50: Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

25:

0: Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Reports costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

55. Is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

100

55. In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Ombudsman

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency or set of agencies whose primary mandate is to investigate the actions of government on the behalf of common citizens. This agency or set of agencies should be specifically charged with seeking out and documenting abuses of power.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency or set of agencies exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the legislature.

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## V-2. Supreme Audit Institution

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59. Is the supreme audit institution effective?

41

59a. In law, the supreme audit institution is protected from political interference.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on supreme audit institution, Article 2

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency has some formal organizational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department.

59b. In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

More importantly, the independence of this important institution is also in danger of being eroded. In December 2006, Miroslav Ivaniaevi was appointed as the new president of the Senate. Until his appointment, Mr. Ivaniaevi, who has also previously held the post of Minister of Finance, was member of the presidency and member of parliament of the ruling DPS. His appointment was a foregone conclusion, and had been announced in the media prior to the session of parliament that had to approve the nomination. What is more, the Law on the State Audit Institution had to be changed so that Mr. Ivaniaevi would qualify for the post, and the changes were approved at the very same parliamentary session during which his actual appointment took place.

While experts have confirmed that the quality of the first audit reports issued during Mr. Ivaniaevi's tenure was very high, there are also concerns that his proximity to the DPS will have an impact on the annual audit plans, i.e. on the selection of entities to be audited, and that the impartiality of the reports will ultimately be compromised," the report says.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The director of the agency serves a defined term and cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director of the agency serves a defined term, but can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director of the agency can be removed at the will of political leadership.

59c. In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

First, the salary of the state auditors is, at around ~ 300, not competitive enough to attract qualified personnel (members of the Senate and the president of the Senate receive more than this, though). Second, there is a shortage of state auditors, given that this profession did not exist in the past. Third, there is a continued need for training of those working in the SAI.

“SAI representatives themselves are approaching donors with requests for funding of a regional school for state auditors, which the government of Montenegro is apparently ready to host in Cetinje. However, according to international experts, there appear to be more pressing needs to be addressed in order to genuinely develop the capacity of the national SAI in the first place,” the report says.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview over Main Problems and Status of Reforms”, CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders it ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

59d. In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Quote from the report: More importantly, the independence of this important institution is also in danger of being eroded. In December 2006, Miroslav Ivaniaevi was appointed as the new president of the Senate. Until his appointment, Mr. Ivaniaevi , who has also previously held the post of Minister of Finance, was member of the presidency and member of parliament of the ruling DPS. His appointment was a foregone conclusion, and had been announced in the media 149 prior to the session of parliament that had to approve the nomination. What is more, the Law on the State Audit Institution had to be changed so that Mr. Ivaniaevi would qualify for the post, and the changes were approved at the very same parliamentary session during which his actual appointment took place.

“While experts have confirmed that the quality of the first audit reports issued during Mr. Ivaniaevi ‘s tenure was very high, there are also concerns that his proximity to the DPS will have an impact on the annual audit plans, i.e. on the selection of entities to be audited, and that the impartiality of the reports will ultimately be compromised,” the report says.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms”, CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** Appointments to the agency are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

59e. In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts since the government decides on the agency's budget.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

59f. In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency makes public reports to the legislature and public, but they are frequently delayed and incomplete.

**References:**

<http://www.dri.cg.yu/>.

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The agency makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency makes publicly available reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

59g. In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In some smaller cases, audit agency reports are acted upon, but exceptions occur for politically-sensitive issues and larger amounts of money.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** Audit agency reports are taken seriously, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action.

**75:**

**50:** In most cases, audit agency reports are acted on, though some exceptions may occur for politically sensitive issues, or particularly resistant agencies.

**25:**

**0:** Audit reports are often ignored, or given superficial attention. Audit reports do not lead to policy changes.

59h. In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically-sensitive issues, especially since high-level members are very affiliated to political parties.

**References:**

Corruption in Montenegro 2007: Overview of the Main Problems and Status of Reforms", CHR Michelsen Institute, 2007

**100:** The supreme audit institution can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive or legislature.

**75:**

**50:** The supreme audit institution can generally decide what to investigate, and when, but is subject to pressure from the executive or legislature on politically sensitive issues.

**25:**

**0:** The supreme audit institution must rely on approval from the executive or legislature before initiating investigations. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

---

60. Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?

100

60a. In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on supreme audit institution, Article 50

**YES:** A YES score is earned if all supreme auditor reports are available to the general public.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any auditor reports are not publicly available. This may include reports made exclusively to the legislature or the executive, which those bodies may choose not to distribute.

60b. In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The reports are published on the website.

**References:**

<http://www.dri.cg.yu/>

**100:** Reports are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Reports are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Reports take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Reports take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most reports may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

60c. In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

<http://www.dri.cg.yu/>

**100:** Reports are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Reports can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Reports impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving reports may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving reports imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Report costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

58. Is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

100

58. In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on supreme audit institution

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a specific agency whose primary mandate is to audit and track the movement of money through the government. This agency should be specifically charged to investigate and document the misuse of funds. A system of agencies located in each department is equivalent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency exists, or that function is a secondary concern of a larger body, such as the executive.

---

80  
V-3. Taxes and Customs

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62. Is the tax collection agency effective?

100

62a. In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

<http://www.poreskauprava.vlada.cg.yu/>

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

62b. In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

<http://www.poreskauprava.vlada.cg.yu/>

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

65. Is the customs and excise agency effective?

100

65a. In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

<http://www.upravacarina.vlada.cg.yu/>

**100:** The agency has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

65b. In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

<http://www.upravacarina.vlada.cg.yu/>

**100:** The agency has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.



75:

50: The agency has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

25:

0: Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

---

### 61. Is there a national tax collection agency?

100

61. In law, is there a national tax collection agency?

YES | NO

#### Comments:

The agency is the tax agency (Poreska Uprava).

#### References:

Law on Tax Administration

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a national agency formally mandated to collect taxes.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist. A NO score is earned if national government ministries can collect taxes independently.

---

### 63. Are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

25

63. In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

#### Comments:

Tax law is unequally applied, and some citizens and companies are more likely to evade tax law than others (eg. construction companies).

#### References:

Report on the implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime, MANS, 2007-2008, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje\\_AP.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje_AP.htm)

**100:** Tax laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade tax law than another.

75:

50: Tax laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade tax law. Some arbitrary and discriminatory tax rules exist.

25:

0: Tax law is unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade tax law than others. Tax regulations are, as a rule, written to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary.

---

#### 64. Is there a national customs and excise agency?

100

64. In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?

YES | NO

#### References:

Law on Customs

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency formally mandated to collect excises and inspect customs.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if that function is spread over several agencies, or does not exist.

---

#### 66. Are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

25

66. In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

#### Comments:

Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are more likely to evade customs and excise laws than others, especially companies that are linked to the executive.

#### References:

Report on the implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime, MANS, 2007-2008  
[http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje\\_AP.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje_AP.htm)

**100:** Customs and excise laws (which may be economically unfair as written) are enforced consistently for all citizens. No general group of citizens is more or less likely to evade customs than another.

**75:**

**50:** Customs and excise laws are generally enforced consistently, but some exceptions exist. For example, some groups may occasionally evade customs requirements.

**25:**

**0:** Customs and excise laws are unequally applied. Some groups of citizens are consistently more or less likely to evade customs and excise laws than others.

68. Is the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?

0

68a. In law, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There is no such legislation.

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has some formal operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the entity is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency.

68b. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

There is no such legislation.

**100:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has limited staff that hinders its ability to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has no staff, or a limited staff that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

68c. In practice, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | **0**

**References:**

There is no such legislation.

**100:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** Funding source is unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency functions.

68d. In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There is no such legislation.

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or in its cooperation with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

68e. In practice, when necessary, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies imposes penalties on offenders.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

There is no such legislation.

**100:** When rules violations are discovered, the agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism is aggressive in penalizing offenders and/or in cooperating with other agencies that impose penalties.

**75:**

**50:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism enforces rules, but is limited in its effectiveness or reluctant to cooperate with other agencies. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism does not effectively penalize offenders or refuses to cooperate with other agencies that enforce penalties. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may make judgments but not enforce them, or may fail to make reasonable judgments against offenders. The agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism may be partisan in its application of power.

## 69. Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?

35

69a. In law, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.

YES | NO

### References:

Law on Free Access to Information, Article 4

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the financial information of all state-owned companies is required by law to be public. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any category of state-owned company is exempt from this rule, or no such rules exist.

69b. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are regularly updated.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

Financial data is rarely publicly available, and even when it is made public, that information is rather superficial.

### References:

Right to know – experiences in implementation of the law on free access to information", MANS 2007  
"Do I have the right to know", 2008, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo\\_da\\_znam.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo_da_znam.htm)

**100:** State-owned companies always publicly disclose financial data, which is generally accurate and up to date.

**75:**

**50:** State-owned companies disclose financial data, but it is flawed. Some companies may misstate financial data, file the information behind schedule, or not publicly disclose certain data.

**25:**

**0:** Financial data is not publicly available, or is consistently superficial or otherwise of no value.

69c. In practice, the financial records of state-owned companies are audited according to international accounting standards.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

### Comments:

State-owned companies are not audited.

**References:**

There is no such legal requirement.

**100:** Financial records of all state-owned companies are regularly audited by a trained third party auditor using accepted international standards.

**75:**

**50:** Financial records of state-owned companies are regularly audited, but exceptions may exist. Some companies may use flawed or deceptive accounting procedures, or some companies may be exempted from this requirement.

**25:**

**0:** State-owned companies are not audited, or the audits have no functional value. The auditors may collude with the companies in providing misleading or false information to the public.

69d. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

It takes from several weeks to several months to obtain that information. There are persistent delays in obtaining politically-sensitive records.

**References:**

Right to know – experiences in implementation of the law on free access to information”, MANS 2007  
“Do I have the right to know”, 2008

[http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo\\_da\\_znam.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo_da_znam.htm)

**100:** Records are available on-line, or records can be obtained within two days. Records are uniformly available; there are no delays for politically sensitive information.

**75:**

**50:** Records take around two weeks to obtain. Some delays may be experienced.

**25:**

**0:** Records take more than a month to acquire. In some cases, most records may be available sooner, but there may be persistent delays in obtaining politically sensitive records.

69e. In practice, citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

If documents are provided in a timely manner, costs are usually just symbolic. But in cases of politically-sensitive records, costs are also used as a burden to avoid giving the information.

**References:**

Right to know – experiences in implementation of the law on free access to information”, MANS 2007  
“Do I have the right to know”, 2008

[http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo\\_da\\_znam.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/dokumenta/publikacije/pravo_da_znam.htm)

**100:** Records are free to all citizens, or available for the cost of photocopying. Records can be obtained at little cost, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Records impose a financial burden on citizens, journalists or CSOs. Retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Retrieving records imposes a major financial burden on citizens. Records costs are prohibitive to most citizens, journalists, or CSOs trying to access this information.

---

67. Is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

0

67. In law, is there an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?

YES | **NO**

**References:**

There is no such legislation.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency, series of agencies, or equivalent mechanism tasked with overseeing the conduct and performance of state-owned companies on behalf of the public. A YES score can be earned if several government agencies or ministries oversee different state-owned enterprises. State-owned companies are defined as companies owned in whole or in part by the government.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this function does not exist, or if some state-owned companies are free from government oversight.

---

12  
V-5. Business Licensing and Regulation

---

70. Are business licenses available to all citizens?

63

70a. In law, anyone may apply for a business license.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on companies, Article 86

**YES:** A YES score is earned if no particular group or category of citizens is excluded from applying for a business license, when required. A YES score is also earned if basic business licenses are not required.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if any group of citizens are categorically excluded from applying for a business license, when required

70b. In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied.

YES | NO

**References:**  
Law on companies, Article 86

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process for appealing a rejected license.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such mechanism exists.

70c. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**  
The cost in both time and in money terms of obtaining a licence to run a business is still the major constraint on firms," the report says.

**References:**  
MONTENEGRO 2007 PROGRESS REPORT, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Brussels, Nov. 6, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses can be obtained within roughly one week.

**75:**

**50:** Licensing is required and takes around one month. Some groups may be delayed up to a three months

**25:**

**0:** Licensing takes more than three months for most groups. Some groups may wait six months to one year to get necessary licenses.

70d. In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**  
The cost in both time and money terms of obtaining a licence to run a business is still the major constraint on firms," the report says.



**References:**

MONTENEGRO 2007 PROGRESS REPORT, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Brussels, Nov. 6, 2007

**100:** Licenses are not required, or licenses are free. Licenses can be obtained at little cost to the organization, such as by mail, or on-line.

**75:**

**50:** Licenses are required, and impose a financial burden on the organization. Licenses may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional or national capital.

**25:**

**0:** Licenses are required, and impose a major financial burden on the organization. Licensing costs are prohibitive to the organization.

---

**71. Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?**

0

71a. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Those requirements are usually defined by local regulations that are not transparent.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71b. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | **NO**

**References:**

Those requirements are usually defined by local regulations that are not transparent.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

71c. In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.

YES | NO

**References:**

Those requirements are usually defined by local regulations that are not transparent.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if basic regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are publicly accessible and transparent.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if such requirements are not made public or are otherwise not transparent.

---

**72. Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?**

25

72a. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Those requirements are usually defined by local regulations that are not transparent, while their content and implementation depend on municipalities.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public health standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

**75:**

**50:** Business inspections by the government to ensure public health standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

**25:**

**0:** Business inspections to ensure that public health standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72b. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Those requirements are usually defined by local regulations that are not transparent, while their content and implementation depend on municipalities.

**100:** Business inspections by the government to ensure that public environmental standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public environmental standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public environmental standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

72c. In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Those requirements are usually defined by local regulations that are not transparent, while their content and implementation depend on municipalities.

100: Business inspections by the government to ensure that public safety standards are being met are designed and carried out in such a way as to ensure comprehensive compliance by all businesses with transparent regulatory requirements.

75:

50: Business inspections by the government to ensure public safety standards are met are generally carried out in an even-handed way though exceptions exist. Bribes are occasionally paid to extract favorable treatment or expedited processing.

25:

0: Business inspections to ensure that public safety standards are met are routinely carried out by government officials in an ad hoc, arbitrary fashion designed to extract extra payments from businesses in exchange for favorable treatment.

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Category VI. Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law

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VI-1. <sup>56</sup>Anti-Corruption Law

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73. Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?

89

73a. In law, attempted corruption is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Criminal Code (Official Gazette 70/03, 13/04, 47/06) article 416 to 425

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include attempted acts.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73b. In law, extortion is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Criminal Code (Official Gazette 70/03, 13/04, 47/06) article 416 to 425

**YES:** A YES score is earned if corruption laws include extortion. Extortion is defined as demanding favorable treatment (such as a bribe) to withhold a punishment.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73c. In law, offering a bribe (i.e. active corruption) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Criminal Code (Official Gazette 70/03, 13/04, 47/06) article 416 to 425

**YES:** A YES score is earned if offering a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73d. In law, receiving a bribe (i.e. passive corruption) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Criminal Code (Official Gazette 70/03, 13/04, 47/06) article 416 to 425

**YES:** A YES score is earned if receiving a bribe is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73e. In law, bribing a foreign official is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

No such legal requirement.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if bribing a foreign official is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73f. In law, using public resources for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Criminal Code (Official Gazette 70/03, 13/04, 47/06) article 416 to 425

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using public resources for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73g. In law, using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Criminal Code (Official Gazette 70/03, 13/04, 47/06) article 416 to 425

**YES:** A YES score is earned if using confidential state information for private gain is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73h. In law, money laundering is illegal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism (Official Gazette 14/07, 04/08)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if money laundering is illegal. Money laundering is defined as concealing the origin of funds to hide wrongdoing or avoid confiscation.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

73i. In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

**YES** | NO

**Comments:**

In law, conspiracy to commit a crime (i.e. organized crime) is illegal.

**References:**

Criminal Code Official Gazette 70/03, 13/04, 47/06)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if organized crime is illegal.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if this is not illegal.

---

## VI-2. Anti-Corruption Agency

---

75. Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

17

75a. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

YES | **NO**

**Comments:**

The agency is supervised by the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the agency has no political or organizational independence and is supervised by the minister who is a political figure.

**References:**

Decision on organization and manner of operations of the public services (Official Gazette 54/04, 78/04, 06/05, 61/05, 06/06, 32/06, 42/06, 56/06, 60/06, 72/06, 06/07, 25/07, 32/07, 35/07, 06/07, 16/07, 26/08)

**YES:** A YES score is earned only if the agency (or agencies) has some formal organizational or operational independence from the government. A YES score is earned even if the agency/agencies is legally separate but in practice staffed by partisans.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the agency (or agencies) is a subordinate part of any government ministry or agency, such as the Department of Interior or the Justice Department, in such a way that limits its operational independence.

75b. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency is directly influenced by executive through the Ministry of Finance and is not provided with any investigative powers.

**References:**

Decision on organization and manner of operations of the public services (Official Gazette 54/04, 78/04, 06/05, 61/05, 06/06, 32/06, 42/06, 56/06, 60/06, 72/06, 06/07, 25/07, 32/07, 35/07, 06/07, 16/07, 26/08)

**100:** This agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Investigations can operate without hindrance from the government, including access to politically sensitive information. .

**75:**

**50:** This agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its work by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government, political appointments, or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** This agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political or personal incentives. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power. The agency (or agencies) cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information.

75c. In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The director is not protected from removal without relevant justification.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** The director(s) cannot be removed without a significant justification through a formal process, such as impeachment for abuse of power.

**75:**

**50:** The director(s) can in some cases be removed through a combination of official or unofficial pressure.

**25:**

**0:** The director(s) can be removed at the will of political leadership.

75d. In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications, but individuals appointed must have clear party loyalties.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest arising from personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

75e. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The directorate for anti-corruption Initiative doesn't have enough staff, nor does the staff possess all relevant skills to performing the mandate. This particularly relates to researching causes and forms of corruption and providing technical assistance in monitoring implementation of the action plan.

**References:**

Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Fight Against Corruption and Organized Crime adopted by the government

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has staff sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited staff, or staff without necessary qualifications to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no staff, or a limited staff, that is clearly unqualified to fulfill its mandate.

75f. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency obtains funding in accordance with decision of the Ministry of Finance, and throughout its work it has expressed the need for more funding than available. Some funding is obtained from projects funded by foreign donors, but not in the amount that would guarantee independence of the institution.

**References:**

Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Fight Against Corruption and Organized Crime adopted by the government



**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding.

**25:**

**0:** The agency's funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.

75g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The agency makes reports on its activities related to implementation of the action plan, but those reports are frequently incomplete

**References:**

Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Fight Against Corruption and Organized Crime adopted by the government, website for the Directorate for the anti-corruption initiative.

**100:** The agency (or agencies) makes regular, publicly available, substantial reports to the legislature and/or to the public directly outlining the full scope of its work.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports to the legislature that are sometimes delayed or incomplete.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports that are consistently out of date, unavailable to the public, or insubstantial.

75h. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The directorate for the anti-corruption initiative is only in charge of prevention, not for gathering information, or investigation

**References:**

Decision on organization and manner of operations of the public services (Official Gazette 54/04, 78/04, 06/05, 61/05, 06/06, 32/06, 42/06, 56/06, 60/06, 72/06, 06/07, 25/07, 32/07, 35/07, 06/07, 16/07, 26/08)

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has powers to gather information, including politically sensitive information. The agency (or agencies) can question suspects, order arrests and bring suspects to trial (or rely on related agencies or law enforcement authorities to perform such functions).

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has most of the powers needed to carry out its mandate with some exceptions.

**25:**

0: The agency (or agencies) lacks significant powers which limit its effectiveness.

75i. In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The directorate for the anti-corruption initiative is only in charge of prevention, not for gathering information, or investigation

**References:**

Decision on organization and manner of operations of the public services (Official Gazette 54/04, 78/04, 06/05, 61/05, 06/06, 32/06, 42/06, 56/06, 60/06, 72/06, 06/07, 25/07, 32/07, 35/07, 06/07, 16/07, 26/08)

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency (or agencies) is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency (or agencies) may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency (or agencies) may be partisan in its application of power.

---

## 76. Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

0

76a. In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The directorate for the anti-corruption initiative is only in charge of prevention, not for gathering information, or investigation. It can obtain complaints, but is only processing them to the police directorate without any feedback required.

**References:**

Decision on organization and manner of operations of the public services (Official Gazette 54/04, 78/04, 06/05, 61/05, 06/06, 32/06, 42/06, 56/06, 60/06, 72/06, 06/07, 25/07, 32/07, 35/07, 06/07, 16/07, 26/08)

Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime adopted by the government

**100:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) acts on complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

76b. In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no mechanisms to protect citizens from consequences. Whistleblowers face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

**References:**

Interview with Milena Deletic, Legal Adviser in MANS

**100:** Whistleblowers can report abuses of power without fear of negative consequences. This may be due to robust mechanisms to protect the identity of whistleblowers, or may be due to a culture that encourages disclosure and accountability.

**75:**

**50:** Whistleblowers are sometimes able to come forward without negative consequences, but in other cases, whistleblowers are punished for disclosing, either through official or unofficial means.

**25:**

**0:** Whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, or some form of harassment.

---

74. Is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

100

74. In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

YES | NO

**Comments:**

The directorate for anti-corruption initiatives is in charge for prevention of corruption.

**References:**

Decision on organization and manner of operations of the public services (Official Gazette 54/04, 78/04, 06/05, 61/05, 06/06, 32/06, 42/06, 56/06, 60/06, 72/06, 06/07, 25/07, 32/07, 35/07, 06/07, 16/07, 26/08)

**YES:** A YES score is earned if an agency is specifically mandated to address corruption. A YES score is earned if there are several agencies or entities with specific roles in fighting corruption, including special prosecutorial entities.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no agency (or group of agencies/entities) is specifically mandated to prevent or prosecute corruption.

---

77. Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?

42

77a. In law, there is a general right of appeal.

YES | NO

**References:**

Every law allows for the right to appeal, Law on administrative procedures, criminal procedures code

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process of appeal for challenging criminal judgments.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such process.

77b. In practice, appeals are resolved within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The efficiency of the judiciary suffers from serious institutional, legal, and organizational shortcomings....The significant backlog in both civil and criminal cases is a matter of serious concern," the report says.

**References:**

Montenegro 2007 Progress Report, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Brussels, Nov. 6, 2007

**100:** Appeals are acted upon quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, appeals are acknowledged promptly and cases move steadily towards resolution.

**75:**

**50:** Appeals are generally acted upon quickly but with some exceptions. Some appeals may not be acknowledged, and simple cases may take years to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** Most appeals are not resolved in a timely fashion. Appeals may go unacknowledged for months or years and simple cases may never be resolved.

77c. In practice, citizens can use the appeals mechanism at a reasonable cost.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

In many cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens.

**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** In most cases, the appeals mechanism is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees are not a barrier to appeals.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the appeals mechanism is not an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to challenge criminal judgments. Attorneys fees present somewhat of a barrier to pursuing appeal.

**25:**

**0:** The prohibitive cost of utilizing the appeals mechanism prevents middle class citizens from challenging criminal judgments. Attorneys fees greatly discourage the use of the appeals process.

---

78. Do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

25

78. In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** Judgments in the criminal system are made according to established legal code and conduct. There are no exceptional cases in which individuals are treated by a separate process. Political interference, bribery, cronyism or other flaws are rarely factors in judicial outcomes.

**75:**

**50:** Judgments in the criminal system usually follow the protocols of written law. There are sometimes exceptions when political concerns, corruption or other flaws in the system decide outcomes.

**25:**

**0:** Judgments in the criminal system are often decided by factors other than written law. Bribery and corruption in the criminal judicial process are common elements affecting decisions.

---

79. Are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

25

79. In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Judicial decisions are frequently not enforced especially in the case of politically-sensitive decisions.

**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** Judicial decisions are enforced quickly regardless of what is being decided or who is appearing before the court. Failure to comply brings penalties enforced by the state.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally enforced by the state, with some exceptions. Certain areas of law may be ignored, or certain parties appearing before the courts may evade or delay enforcement.

**25:**

**0:** Judicial decisions are often ignored. The state lacks the will or capacity to consistently enforce these decisions.

---

80. Is the judiciary able to act independently?

81

80a. In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.

YES | NO

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, Article 118

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are formal rules establishing that the judiciary is independent from political interference by the executive and legislative branches. Independence include financial issues (drafting, allocation, and managing the budget of the courts ).

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there are no formal rules establishing an independent judiciary.

80b. In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

Pending the entry into force of implementing legislation to the new constitution, the existing system of appointing judges and prosecutors continues to apply. This system raises serious concerns of political interference. In particular, judges and prosecutors are elected by parliament, on a proposal from the Judicial Council and the Prosecutors Council. Both the Judicial Council and the Prosecutors Council are appointed by parliament. Under the existing system, parliament also decides on promotions, disciplinary proceedings and the dismissal of judges and prosecutors, on a proposal from the Judicial Council and the Prosecutors Council. A further risk of political influence arises from the fact that the government decides on the financing of the judicial system and also provides judges with apartments and loans without any clear criteria," the report says.

**References:**

Montenegro 2007 Progress Report, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Brussels, Nov. 6, 2007

**100:** National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.

**75:**

**50:** National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavorable decisions.

**25:**

**0:** National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

80c. In law, there is a transparent and objective system for distributing cases to national-level judges.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Law on Courts, Article 8, 89

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an objective system that is transparent to the public that equitably or randomly assigns cases to individual judges. The executive branch does not control this process.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if the case assignment system is non-transparent or subjective where judges themselves have influence over which cases they adjudicate. A NO score is also earned if the executive branch controls this process.

80d. In law, national-level judges are protected from removal without relevant justification.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

Constitution of Montenegro, Article 121

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there are specific, formal rules for removal of a justice. Removal must be related to abuse of power or other offenses related to job performance.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if justices can be removed without justification, or for purely political reasons. A NO score is earned if the removal process is not transparent, or not based on written rules.

---

## 81. Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?

100

81a. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been physically harmed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

**YES** | NO

**References:**

No such cases were reported in the media.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being assaulted because of their involvement in a corruption case during the specific study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases of assault to a judge related to his/her participation in a corruption trial. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

81b. In practice, in the last year, no judges have been killed because of adjudicating corruption cases.

YES | NO

**References:**

No such cases were reported in the media.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there were no documented cases of judges being killed related to their involvement in a corruption case during the study period. YES is a positive score.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there were any documented cases where a judge was killed because of his/her participation in a corruption trial. The relationship between a mysterious death and a judge's involvement in a case may not be clear, however the burden of proof here is low. If it is a reasonable assumption that a judge was killed in relation to his or her work on corruption issues, then the indicator is scored as a NO. Corruption is defined broadly to include any abuses of power, not just the passing of bribes.

---

## 82. Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?

64

82a. In practice, judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** Judicial decisions are not affected by racial or ethnic bias.

**75:**

**50:** Judicial decisions are generally not affected by racial or ethnic bias, with some exceptions. Some groups may be occasionally discriminated against, or some groups may occasionally receive favorable treatment.

**25:**

**0:** Judicial decisions are regularly distorted by racial or ethnic bias. Some groups consistently receive favorable or unfavorable treatment by the courts.

82b. In practice, women have full access to the judicial system.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0



**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** Women enjoy full and equal status in the eyes of the courts. There are no exceptions or practices in which women are treated differently by the judicial system. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**75:**

**50:** Women generally have use of the judicial system, with some exceptions. In some cases, women may be limited in their access to courts, or gender biases may affect court outcomes. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

**25:**

**0:** Women generally have less access to the courts than men. Court decisions are commonly distorted by gender bias. Women may have to go through intermediaries to interact with the court, or are unable to present evidence. For this indicator, discrimination against women should reflect specific biases that confront women in the justice system as opposed to difficulties resulting from broader socio-economic disadvantages or discrimination against women.

82c. In law, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

YES | NO

**References:**

Criminal Procedures Code, Article 64

**YES:** A YES score is earned if the government is required by law to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no legal requirement for the government to provide impoverished defendants with legal counsel to defend themselves against criminal charges.

82d. In practice, the state provides adequate legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford it.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

State-provided legal aid is somewhat available to most impoverished defendants, because state legal aid is frequently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** State-provided legal aid is basic, but well-trained and effective in representing the rights of impoverished defendants.

**75:**

**50:** State-provided legal aid is available, but flawed. Legal aid may be unavailable to some impoverished defendants. Legal aid/public defenders may be sometimes unable or unwilling to competently represent all defendants.

**25:**

**0:** State-provided legal aid is unavailable to most impoverished defendants. State legal aid/public defenders may be consistently incompetent or unwilling to fairly represent all defendants.

82e. In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to citizens.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to middle class citizens seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents middle class citizens from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most citizens from bringing a case.

82f. In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** In most cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. Attorneys fees do not represent a major cost to small businesses.

**75:**

**50:** In some cases, the legal system is an affordable option to a small retail business seeking to redress a grievance. In other cases, the cost is prohibitive. Attorneys fees are a significant consideration in whether to bring a case.

**25:**

**0:** The cost of engaging the legal system prevents small businesses from filing suits. Attorneys fees are high enough to discourage most small businesses from bringing a case.

82g. In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

Human Rights Action, National report on human rights appreciation in Montenegro

**100:** Courtrooms are always accessible to citizens at low cost, either through rural courthouses or through a system of traveling magistrates.

**75:**

**50:** Courts are available to most citizens. Some citizens may be unable to reach a courtroom at low cost due to location.

**25:**

**0:** Courts are unavailable to some regions without significant travel on the part of citizens.

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## VI-4. Law Enforcement

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83. Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?

33

83a. In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

There are no clear criteria for appointments, and they are often based on political considerations.

**References:**

MANS Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime, [http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje\\_AP.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje_AP.htm)

**100:** Appointments to the agency (or agencies) are made based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed usually do not have clear political party affiliations.

**75:**

**50:** Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications. Individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties, however.

**25:**

**0:** Appointments are often based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.

83b. In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

MANS Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime [http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje\\_AP.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje_AP.htm)

**100:** The agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) has limited budget, generally considered somewhat insufficient to fulfill its basic mandate.

**25:**

**0:** The agency (or agencies) has no budget or an obviously insufficient budget that hinders the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate.

83c. In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**Comments:**

The investigative and enforcement work of the agency is influenced by politicians and the government, especially using political connections.

**References:**

MANS Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime [http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje\\_AP.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje_AP.htm)

**100:** The agency (or agencies) operates independently of the political process and has operational independence from the government. All laws can be enforced regardless of the status of suspects or the sensitivity of the investigation.

**75:**

**50:** The agency (or agencies) is typically independent, yet is sometimes influenced in its investigations or enforcement actions by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favorable or unfavorable public criticism by the government or other forms of influence. The agency (or agencies) may not be provided with some information needed to carry out its investigations.

**25:**

**0:** The investigative and enforcement work of the agency (or agencies) is commonly influenced by political actors or the government. These may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.

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## 84. Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?

46

84a. In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.

YES | NO

**References:**

Law on Police, Article 28

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is a formal process or mechanism by which citizens can complain about police actions. A YES score is earned if a broader mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency has jurisdiction over the police.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if there is no such mechanism

84b. In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

MANS Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime [http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje\\_AP.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje_AP.htm)

**100:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly. While some backlog is expected and inevitable, complaints are acknowledged promptly and investigations into serious abuses move steadily towards resolution. Citizens with simple issues can expect a resolution within a month.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity responds to complaints quickly, with some exceptions. Some complaints may not be acknowledged, and simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints may be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues may take three to six months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

84c. In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.

YES | NO

**References:**

Internal control of the police is not established by law, but by an internal act, it is part of the police directorate. So there is no special agency.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if there is an agency/entity specifically mandated to investigate corruption-related activity within law enforcement. This agency/entity may be internal to the police department (provided it has a degree of independence, such as an internal affairs unit) or part of a broader national mechanism such as the national ombudsman, human rights commission, or anti-corruption agency.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if no such agency/entity exists.

84d. In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

MANS Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime [http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje\\_AP.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje_AP.htm)

**100:** When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating government law enforcement officials or in cooperating with other investigative agencies.

**75:**

**50:** The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness or is reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments.

**25:**

**0:** The agency/entity does not effectively investigate or does not cooperate with other investigative agencies. The agency may start investigations but not complete them, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency may be partisan in its application of power.

84e. In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

YES | NO

**References:**

The Law on Police states that law enforcement officials are subject to criminal proceedings.

**YES:** A YES score is earned if law enforcement officers are fully accountable for their actions under the law and can be investigated and prosecuted for their actions.

**NO:** A NO score is earned if law enforcement enjoys any special protection from criminal investigation or prosecution.

84f. In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.

100 | 75 | 50 | 25 | 0

**References:**

MANS Report on implementation of the action plan for the fight against corruption and organized crime [http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje\\_AP.htm](http://www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/AP/pracenje_AP.htm)

**100:** Law enforcement officers are subject to criminal investigation for official misconduct. No crimes are exempt from prosecution.

**75:**

**50:** Law enforcement is generally subject to criminal investigation but exceptions may exist where criminal actions are overlooked by the police or prosecutors. Some crimes may be exempt from prosecution, such as actions taken in the line of duty.

**25:**

**0:** Law enforcement enjoys a general protection from most criminal investigation. This may be due to a formal immunity or an informal understanding that the law enforcement community protects itself.

